Across-trial variability of EEG decreases more markedly before self-initiated than before externally triggered actions, providing a novel neural precursor for volitional action. However, it remains unclear whether this neural convergence is an early, deliberative stage or a late, execution-related stage in the chain of cognitive processes that transform intentions to actions. We report two experiments addressing these questions. Participants viewed randomly moving dots on a screen. At a random time, all dots started moving coherently to the left or right side of the screen. Participants were rewarded for correctly responding to the direction of coherent dot movement. However, the waiting time before coherent dot motion onset could be extremely long. Participants had the option to skip waiting by pressing a “

The feeling of control is a fundamental aspect of human experience and accompanies our voluntary actions all the time. However, how the sense of control interacts with wider perception, cognition, and behavior remains poorly understood. This study focused on how controlling an external object influences the allocation of attention. Experiment 1 examined attention to an object that is under a different level of control from the others. Participants searched for a target among multiple distractors on screen. All the distractors were partially under the participant's control (50% control level), and the search target was either under more or less control than the distractors. The results showed that, against this background of partial control, visual attention was attracted to an object only if it was more controlled than other available objects and not if it was less controlled. Experiment 2 examined attention allocation in contexts of either perfect control or no control over most of the objects. Specifically, the distractors were under either perfect (100%) control or no (0%) control, and the search target had one of six levels of control varying from 0% to 100%. When differences in control between the distractors and the target were small, visual attention was now more strongly drawn to search targets that were less controlled than distractors, rather than more controlled, suggesting attention to objects over which one might be losing control. Experiment 3 studied the events of losing or gaining control as opposed to the states of having or not having control. ERP measures showed that P300 amplitude proportionally encoded the magnitude of both increases and decreases in degree of control. However, losing control had more marked effects on P170 and P300 than gaining an equivalent degree of control, indicating high priority for efficiently detecting failures of control. Overall, our results suggest that controlled objects preferentially attract attention in uncontrolled environments. However, once control has been registered, the brain becomes highly sensitive to subsequent loss of control. Our findings point toward careful perceptual monitoring of degree of one's own agentic control over external objects. We suggest that control has intrinsic cognitive value because perceptual systems are organized to detect it and, once it has been acquired, to maintain it.

Inhibiting inappropriate action is key to human behavioral control. Studies of action inhibition largely investigated external stop signals, yet these are rare in everyday life. Instead healthy adults exert “self-control,” implying an ability to decide internally to stop actions. We added “choose for yourself” stimuli to a conventional go/no-go task to compare reactive versus intentional action and inhibition. No-go reactions showed the N2 EEG potential characteristic of inhibiting prepotent motor responses, whereas go reactions did not. Interestingly, the N2 component was present for intentional choices both to act and also to inhibit. Thus, free choices involved a first step of intentionally inhibiting prepotent responses before generating or withholding an action. Intentional inhibition has a crucial role breaking the flow of stimulus-driven responding, allowing expression of volitional decisions. Even decisions to initiate self-generated actions require this prior negative form of volition, ensuring the “freedom from immediacy” characteristic of human behavior.

The perceived intensity of sensory stimuli is reduced when these stimuli are caused by the observer's actions. This phenomenon is traditionally explained by forward models of sensory action–outcome, which arise from motor processing. Although these forward models critically predict anticipatory modulation of sensory neural processing, neurophysiological evidence for anticipatory modulation is sparse and has not been linked to perceptual data showing sensory attenuation. By combining a psychophysical task involving contrast discrimination with source-level time–frequency analysis of MEG data, we demonstrate that the amplitude of alpha-oscillations in visual cortex is enhanced before the onset of a visual stimulus when the identity and onset of the stimulus are controlled by participants' motor actions. Critically, this prestimulus enhancement of alpha-amplitude is paralleled by psychophysical judgments of a reduced contrast for this stimulus. We suggest that alpha-oscillations in visual cortex preceding self-generated visual stimulation are a likely neurophysiological signature of motor-induced sensory anticipation and mediate sensory attenuation. We discuss our results in relation to proposals that attribute generic inhibitory functions to alpha-oscillations in prioritizing and gating sensory information via top–down control.

The capacity to inhibit a planned action gives human behavior its characteristic flexibility. How this mechanism operates and what factors influence a decision to act or not act remain relatively unexplored. We used EEG readiness potentials (RPs) to examine preparatory activity before each action of an ongoing sequence, in which one action was occasionally omitted. We compared RPs between sequences in which omissions were instructed by a rule (e.g., “omit every fourth action”) and sequences in which the participant themselves freely decided which action to omit. RP amplitude was reduced for actions that immediately preceded a voluntary omission but not a rule-based omission. We also used the regular temporal pattern of the action sequences to explore brain processes linked to omitting an action by time-locking EEG averages to the inferred time when an action would have occurred had it not been omitted. When omissions were instructed by a rule, there was a negative-going trend in the EEG, recalling the rising ramp of an RP. No such component was found for voluntary omissions. The results are consistent with a model in which spontaneously fluctuating activity in motor areas of the brain could bias “free” decisions to act or not.

Multisensory interactions can produce analgesic effects. In particular, viewing one's own body reduces pain levels, perhaps because of changes in connectivity between visual areas specialized for body representation, and sensory areas underlying pain perception. We tested the causal role of the extrastriate visual cortex in triggering visually induced analgesia by modulating the excitability of this region with transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS). Anodal, cathodal, or sham tDCS (2 mA, 10 min) was administered to 24 healthy participants over the right occipital or over the centro-parietal areas thought to be involved in the sensory processing of pain. Participants were required to rate the intensity of painful electrical stimuli while viewing either their left hand or an object occluding the left hand, both before and immediately after tDCS. We found that the analgesic effect of viewing the body was enhanced selectively by anodal stimulation of the occipital cortex. The effect was specific for the polarity and the site of stimulation. The present results indicate that visually induced analgesia may depend on neural signals from the extrastriate visual cortex.

Integration of information across sensory modalities is enhanced when stimuli in both modalities are in the same location. This “spatial rule” of multisensory integration has been primarily studied in humans by comparing stimuli located either in the same versus opposite side of the body midline or in peripersonal versus extrapersonal space, both of which involve large, categorical differences in spatial location. Here we used psychophysics and ERPs to investigate visuo-tactile integration in personal space (i.e., on the skin surface). We used the mirror box technique to manipulate the congruence of visual and tactile information about which finger on either the right or left hand had been touched. We observed clear compatibility effects for both visual and tactile judgments of which finger on the left hand had been touched. No such effects, however, were found for judgments about the right hand. ERP data showed a similar pattern. Amplitude of the vertex P200 potential was enhanced and that of the N2 was reduced for congruent visuo-tactile events on the left, but not the right, hand. Similarly, a later positivity over posterior parietal cortices (P300) showed contralateral enhancement for congruent visuo-tactile events on both the left and right hands. These results provide clear evidence for spatial constraints on visuo-tactile integration defined in personal space and also reveal clear lateralization of these effects. Furthermore, these results link these “ultraprecise” spatial constraints to processing in the right posterior parietal cortex.

Numerous studies suggest that both self-generated and observed actions of others activate overlapping neural networks, implying a shared, agent-neutral representation of self and other. Contrary to the shared representation hypothesis, we recently showed that the human motor system is not neutral with respect to the agent of an observed action [Schütz-Bosbach, S., Mancini, B., Aglioti, S. M., & Haggard, P. Self and other in the human motor system. Current Biology, 16, 1830–1834, 2006]. Observation of actions attributed to another agent facilitated the motor system, whereas observation of identical actions linked to the self did not. Here we investigate whether the absence of motor facilitation for observing one's own actions reflects a specific process of cortical inhibition associated with self-representation. We analyzed the duration of the silent period induced by transcranial magnetic stimulation of the motor cortex in active muscles as an indicator of motor inhibition. We manipulated whether an observed action was attributed to another agent, or to the subjects themselves, using a manipulation of body ownership on the basis of the rubber hand illusion. Observation of actions linked to the self led to longer silent periods than observation of a static hand, but the opposite effect occurred when observing identical actions attributed to another agent. This finding suggests a specific inhibition of the motor system associated with self-representation. Cortical suppression for actions linked to the self might prevent inappropriate perseveration within the motor system.

We studied how the integration of seen and felt tactile stimulation modulates somatosensory processing, and investigated whether visuotactile integration depends on temporal contiguity of stimulation, and its coherence with a preexisting body representation. During training, participants viewed a rubber hand or a rubber object that was tapped either synchronously with stimulation of their own hand, or in an uncorrelated fashion. In a subsequent test phase, somatosensory event-related potentials (ERPs) were recorded to tactile stimulation of the left or right hand, to assess how tactile processing was affected by previous visuotactile experience during training. An enhanced somatosensory N140 component was elicited after synchronous, compared with uncorrelated, visuotactile training, irrespective of whether participants viewed a rubber hand or rubber object. This early effect of visuotactile integration on somatosensory processing is interpreted as a candidate electro-physiological correlate of the rubber hand illusion that is determined by temporal contiguity, but not by preexisting body representations. ERP modulations were observed beyond 200 msec poststimulus, suggesting an attentional bias induced by visuotactile training. These late modulations were absent when the stimulation of a rubber hand and the participant's own hand was uncorrelated during training, suggesting that preexisting body representations may affect later stages of tactile processing.

Saccadic chronostasis refers to the subjective temporal lengthening of the first visual stimulus perceived after an eye movement, and is most commonly experienced as the “stopped clock” illusion. Other temporal illusions arising in the context of movement (e.g., “intentional binding”) appear to depend upon the volitional nature of the preceding motor act. Here we assess chronostasis across different saccade types, ranging from highly volitional (self-timed saccades, antisaccades) to highly reflexive (peripherally cued saccades, express saccades). Chronostasis was similar in magnitude across all these conditions, despite wide variations in their neural bases. The illusion must therefore be triggered by a “lowest common denominator” signal common to all the conditions tested and their respective neural circuits. Specifically, it is suggested that chronostasis is triggered by a low-level signal arising in response to efferent signals generated in the superior colliculus.