A central objective in the study of volition has been to identify how changes in neural activity relate to voluntary—“free will”—movement. The readiness potential (RP) is observed in the EEG as a slow-building signal that precedes action onset. Many consider the RP as a marker of an underlying preparatory process for initiating voluntary movement. However, the RP may emerge from ongoing slow-wave brain oscillations that influence the timing of movement initiation in a phase-dependent manner. Transcranial alternating current stimulation (tACS) enables brain oscillations to be entrained at the frequency of stimulation. We delivered tACS at a slow-wave frequency over frontocentral motor areas while participants ( n = 30) performed a simple, self-paced button press task. During the active tACS condition, participants showed a tendency to initiate actions in the phase of the tACS cycle that corresponded to increased negative potentials across the frontocentral motor region. Comparisons of premovement EEG activity observed over frontocentral and central scalp electrodes showed earlier onset and increased amplitude of RPs from active stimulation compared with sham stimulation. This suggests that movement-related activity in the brain can be modulated by the delivery of weak, nonconsciously perceptible alternating currents over frontocentral motor regions. We present novel findings that support existing theories, which suggest the timing of voluntary movement is influenced by the phase of slow-changing oscillating brain states.

Predictive coding models of attention propose that attention and prediction operate synergistically to optimize perception, as reflected in interactive effects on early sensory neural responses. It is yet unclear whether attention and prediction based on the temporal attributes of expected events operate in a similar fashion. We investigated how attention and prediction based on timing interact by manipulating the task relevance and a priori probability of auditory stimulus onset timing within a go/no-go task while recording EEG. Preparatory activity, as indexed via the contingent negative variation, reflected temporally specific anticipation as a function of both attention and prediction. Higher stimulus probability led to significant predictive N1 suppression; however, we failed to find an effect of task relevance on N1 amplitude and an interaction of task relevance with prediction. We suggest the predictability of sensory timing is the predominant influence on early sensory responses where a priori probabilities allow for strong prior beliefs. When this is the case, we find that the effects of temporal prediction on early sensory responses are independent of the task relevance of sensory stimuli. Our findings contribute to the expansion of predictive coding frameworks to include the role of timing in sensory processing.

Every day we make attributions about how our actions and the actions of others cause consequences in the world around us. It is unknown whether we use the same implicit process in attributing causality when observing others' actions as we do when making our own. The aim of this research was to investigate the neural processes involved in the implicit sense of agency we form between actions and effects, for both our own actions and when watching others' actions. Using an interval estimation paradigm to elicit intentional binding in self-made and observed actions, we measured the EEG responses indicative of anticipatory processes before an action and the ERPs in response to the sensory consequence. We replicated our previous findings that we form a sense of implicit agency over our own and others' actions. Crucially, EEG results showed that tones caused by either self-made or observed actions both resulted in suppression of the N1 component of the sensory ERP, with no difference in suppression between consequences caused by observed actions compared with self-made actions. Furthermore, this N1 suppression was greatest for tones caused by observed goal-directed actions rather than non-action or non-goal-related visual events. This suggests that top–down processes act upon the neural responses to sensory events caused by goal-directed actions in the same way for events caused by the self or those made by other agents.

Interactions between the visual system and the motor system during action observation are important for functions such as imitation and action understanding. Here, we asked whether such processes might be influenced by the cognitive context in which actions are performed. We recorded ERPs in a delayed go/no-go task known to induce bidirectional interference between the motor system and the visual system (visuomotor interference). Static images of hand gestures were presented as go stimuli after participants had planned either a matching (congruent) or nonmatching (incongruent) action. Participants performed the identical task in two different cognitive contexts: In one, they focused on the visual image of the hand gesture shown as the go stimulus (image context), whereas in the other, they focused on the hand gesture they performed (action context). We analyzed the N170 elicited by the go stimulus to test the influence of action plans on action observation (motor-to-visual priming). We also analyzed movement-related activity following the go stimulus to examine the influence of action observation on action planning (visual-to-motor priming). Strikingly, the context manipulation reversed the direction of the priming effects: We found stronger motor-to-visual priming in the action context compared with the image context and stronger visual-to-motor priming in the image context compared with the action context. Taken together, our findings indicate that neural interactions between motor and visual processes for executed and observed actions can change depending on task demands and are sensitive to top–down control according to the context.