The traditional philosophical doctrines of Consequentialism, Doing and Allowing, and Double Effect prescribe that moral judgments and decisions should be based on consequences, action (as opposed to inaction), and intention. This study uses functional magnetic resonance imaging to investigate how these three factors affect brain processes associated with moral judgments. We find the following: (1) Moral scenarios involving only a choice between consequences with different amounts of harm elicit activity in similar areas of the brain as analogous nonmoral scenarios; (2) Compared to analogous nonmoral scenarios, moral scenarios in which action and inaction result in the same amount of harm elicit more activity in areas associated with cognition (such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) and less activity in areas associated with emotion (such as the orbitofrontal cortex and temporal pole); (3) Compared to analogous nonmoral scenarios, conflicts between goals of minimizing harm and of refraining from harmful action elicit more activity in areas associated with emotion (orbitofrontal cortex and temporal pole) and less activity in areas associated with cognition (including the angular gyrus and superior frontal gyrus); (4) Compared to moral scenarios involving only unintentional harm, moral scenarios involving intentional harm elicit more activity in areas associated with emotion (orbitofrontal cortex and temporal pole) and less activity in areas associated with cognition (including the angular gyrus and superior frontal gyrus). These findings suggest that different kinds of moral judgment are preferentially supported by distinguishable brain systems.

The localization of brain functions using neuroimaging techniques is commonly dependent on statistical analyses of groups of subjects in order to identify sites of activation, particularly in studies of episodic memory. Exclusive reliance on group analysis may be to the detriment of understanding the true underlying cognitive nature of brain activations. In the present study, we found that the patterns of brain activity associated with episodic retrieval are very distinct for individual subjects from the patterns of brain activity at the group level. These differences go beyond the relatively small variations due to cyctoarchitectonic differences or spatial normalization. We quantify this individual variability by cross-correlating volumes of brain images. We demonstrate that individual patterns of brain activity are reliable over time despite their extensive variability. We suggest that varied but reliable individual patterns of significant brain activity may be indicative of different cognitive strategies used to produce a recognition response. We believe that individual analysis in conjunction with group analysis may be critical to fully understanding the relationship between retrieval processes and underlying brain regions.