Humans recognize the facial expressions of others rapidly and effortlessly. Although much is known about how we perceive expressions, the role of facial experience in shaping this remarkable ability remains unclear. Is our perception of expressions linked to how we ourselves make facial expressions? Are we better at recognizing other's facial expressions if we are experts at making the same expressions ourselves? And if we could not make facial expressions at all, would it impact our ability to recognize others' facial expressions? The current article aims to examine these questions by explicating the link between facial experience and facial expression recognition. It includes a comprehensive appraisal of the related literature and examines three main theories that posit a connection between making and recognizing facial expressions. First, recent studies in individuals with Moebius syndrome support the role of facial ability (i.e., the ability to move one's face to make facial expressions) in facial expression recognition. Second, motor simulation theory suggests that humans recognize others' facial expressions by covertly mimicking the observed expression (without overt motor action) and that this facial mimicry helps us identify and feel the associated emotion. Finally, the facial feedback hypothesis provides a framework for enhanced emotional experience via proprioceptive feedback from facial muscles when mimicking a viewed facial expression. Evidence for and against these theories is presented as well as some considerations and outstanding questions for future research studies investigating the role of facial experience in facial expression perception.

For primates, expressions of fear are thought to be powerful social signals. In laboratory settings, faces with fearful expressions have reliably evoked valence effects in inferior temporal cortex. However, because macaques use so called “fear grins” in a variety of different contexts, the deeper question is whether the macaque inferior temporal cortex is tuned to the prototypical fear grin, or to conspecifics signaling fear? In this study, we combined neuroimaging with the results of a behavioral task to investigate how macaques encode a wide variety of fearful facial expressions. In Experiment 1, we identified two sets of macaque face stimuli using different approaches; we selected faces based on the emotional context (i.e., calm vs. fearful), and we selected faces based on the engagement of action units (i.e., neutral vs. fear grins). We also included human faces in Experiment 1. Then, using fMRI, we found that the faces selected based on context elicited a larger valence effect in the inferior temporal cortex than faces selected based on visual appearance. Furthermore, human facial expressions only elicited weak valence effects. These observations were further supported by the results of a two-alternative, forced-choice task (Experiment 2), suggesting that fear grins vary in their perceived pleasantness. Collectively, these findings indicate that the macaque inferior temporal cortex is more involved in social intelligence than commonly assumed, encoding emergent properties in naturalistic face stimuli that transcend basic visual features. These results demand a rethinking of theories surrounding the function and operationalization of primate inferior temporal cortex.