Consciousness can be manipulated in many ways. Here, we seek to understand whether two such ways, visual masking and pharmacological intervention, share a common pathway in manipulating visual consciousness. We recorded EEG from human participants who performed a backward-masking task in which they had to detect a masked figure form its background (masking strength was varied across trials). In a within-subject design, participants received dextromethorphan (a N -methyl- d -aspartate receptor antagonist), lorazepam (LZP; a GABA A receptor agonist), scopolamine (a muscarine receptor antagonist), or placebo. The behavioral results show that detection rate decreased with increasing masking strength and that of all the drugs, only LZP induced a further decrease in detection rate. Figure-related ERP signals showed three neural events of interest: (1) an early posterior occipital and temporal generator (94–121 msec) that was not influenced by any pharmacological manipulation nor by masking, (2) a later bilateral perioccipital generator (156–211 msec) that was reduced by masking as well as LZP (but not by any other drugs), and (3) a late bilateral occipital temporal generator (293–387 msec) that was mainly affected by masking. Crucially, only the intermediate neural event correlated with detection performance. In combination with previous findings, these results suggest that LZP and masking both reduce visual awareness by means of modulating late activity in the visual cortex but leave early activation intact. These findings provide the first evidence for a common mechanism for these two distinct ways of manipulating consciousness.

Humans largely guide their behavior by their visual representation of the world. Recent studies have shown that visual information can trigger behavior within 150 msec, suggesting that visually guided responses to external events, in fact, precede conscious awareness of those events. However, is such a view correct? By using a texture discrimination task, we show that the brain relies on long-latency visual processing in order to guide perceptual decisions. Decreasing stimulus saliency leads to selective changes in long-latency visually evoked potential components reflecting scene segmentation. These latency changes are accompanied by almost equal changes in simple RTs and points of subjective simultaneity. Furthermore, we find a strong correlation between individual RTs and the latencies of scene segmentation related components in the visually evoked potentials, showing that the processes underlying these late brain potentials are critical in triggering a response. However, using the same texture stimuli in an antisaccade task, we found that reflexive, but erroneous, prosaccades, but not antisaccades, can be triggered by earlier visual processes. In other words: The brain can act quickly, but decides late. Differences between our study and earlier findings suggesting that action precedes conscious awareness can be explained by assuming that task demands determine whether a fast and unconscious, or a slower and conscious, representation is used to initiate a visually guided response.

The presupplementary motor area (pre-SMA) is considered key in contributing to voluntary action selection during response conflict. Here we test whether individual differences in the ability to select appropriate actions in the face of strong (conscious) and weak (virtually unconscious) distracting alternatives are related to individual variability in pre-SMA anatomy. To this end, we scanned 58 participants, who performed a masked priming task in which conflicting response tendencies were elicited either consciously (through primes that were weakly masked) or virtually unconsciously (strongly masked primes), with structural magnetic resonance imaging. Voxel-based morphometry revealed that individual differences in pre-SMA gray-matter density are related to subjects' ability to voluntary select the correct action in the face of conflict, irrespective of the awareness level of conflict-inducing stimuli. These results link structural anatomy to individual differences in cognitive control ability, and provide support for the role of the pre-SMA in the selection of appropriate actions in situations of response conflict. Furthermore, these results suggest that flexible and voluntary behavior requires efficiently dealing with competing response tendencies, even those that are activated automatically and unconsciously.

Cognitive control allows humans to overrule and inhibit habitual responses to optimize performance in challenging situations. Contradicting traditional views, recent studies suggest that cognitive control processes can be initiated unconsciously. To further capture the relation between consciousness and cognitive control, we studied the dynamics of inhibitory control processes when triggered consciously versus unconsciously in a modified version of the stop task. Attempts to inhibit an imminent response were often successful after unmasked (visible) stop signals. Masked (invisible) stop signals rarely succeeded in instigating overt inhibition but did trigger slowing down of response times. Masked stop signals elicited a sequence of distinct ERP components that were also observed on unmasked stop signals. The N2 component correlated with the efficiency of inhibitory control when elicited by unmasked stop signals and with the magnitude of slowdown when elicited by masked stop signals. Thus, the N2 likely reflects the initiation of inhibitory control, irrespective of conscious awareness. The P3 component was much reduced in amplitude and duration on masked versus unmasked stop trials. These patterns of differences and similarities between conscious and unconscious cognitive control processes are discussed in a framework that differentiates between feedforward and feedback connections in yielding conscious experience.