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Simone Schütz-Bosbach
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Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience (2023) 35 (7): 1075–1091.
Published: 01 July 2023
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Flexible changes in behavior can involve changes in the processing of external information (i.e., shifts in attention between different stimuli) or internal information (i.e., shifts in task rules stored in memory). However, it is unclear if different types of flexible change rely on separate, domain-specific neural processes or on a domain-general system, which enables flexible actions independent of the type of change needed. In the current study, participants performed a task switching procedure while we measured neural oscillations via EEG. Importantly, we independently manipulated the need to switch attention between 2 types of stimuli, as well as the need to switch between two sets of stimuli–response rules stored in memory. Both attentional and rule switches significantly increased error rates and RTs. On a neural level, both types of changes were associated with a widespread decrease in alpha power, predominantly over the parietal cortex. Attentional switches and rule switches showed a subadditive interaction effect on both participants' performance as well as on their alpha power reactivity. This indicates that implementing both changes at the same time was more efficient than implementing each individual change separately. Independent of the presence or absence of either attentional or rule switches, higher frontal theta power and lower parietal/posterior alpha power predicted faster responses on correct trials. Our study suggests that flexible behavior relies on domain-general frontal and parietal oscillatory dynamics, which enable efficient implementation of goal-directed actions independent of which aspects of the task change.
Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience (2022) 34 (6): 1070–1089.
Published: 02 May 2022
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Cognitive conflicts typically arise in situations that call for sudden changes in our behavior. Resolving cognitive conflicts is challenging and prone to errors. Humans can improve their chances to successfully resolve conflicts by mentally preparing for potential behavioral adjustments. Previous studies indicated that neural theta oscillations (4–7 Hz), as well as alpha oscillations (8–14 Hz), are reflective of cognitive control processes during conflict resolution. However, the role or neural oscillations for conflict preparation is still unclear. Therefore, the aim of the current study was to determine which oscillatory changes during conflict preparation predict subsequent resolution success. Participants performed a cued change-signal task, in which an anticipatory cue indicated if the upcoming trial might contain a cognitive conflict or not. Oscillatory activity was assessed via EEG. Cues that indicated that a conflict might arise compared with cues that indicated no conflict led to increases, directly followed by decreases, in theta power, as well as to decreases in alpha power. These cue-induced changes in theta and alpha oscillations occurred widespread across the cortex. Importantly, successful compared with failed conflict trials were characterized by selective increases in frontal theta power, as well as decreases in posterior alpha power during preparation. In addition, higher frontal theta power and lower posterior alpha power during preparation predicted faster conflict resolution. Our study shows that increases in frontal theta power, as well as decreases in posterior alpha power, are markers of optimal preparation for situations that necessitate flexible changes in behavior.
Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience (2012) 24 (2): 464–474.
Published: 01 February 2012
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In the absence of visual information, our brain is able to recognize the actions of others by representing their sounds as a motor event. Previous studies have provided evidence for a somatotopic activation of the listener's motor cortex during perception of the sound of highly familiar motor acts. The present experiments studied (a) how the motor system is activated by action-related sounds that are newly acquired and (b) whether these sounds are represented with reference to extrinsic features related to action goals rather than with respect to lower-level intrinsic parameters related to the specific movements. TMS was used to measure the correspondence between auditory and motor codes in the listener's motor system. We compared the corticomotor excitability in response to the presentation of auditory stimuli void of previous motor meaning before and after a short training period in which these stimuli were associated with voluntary actions. Novel cross-modal representations became manifest very rapidly. By disentangling the representation of the muscle from that of the action's goal, we further showed that passive listening to newly learnt action-related sounds activated a precise motor representation that depended on the variable contexts to which the individual was exposed during testing. Our results suggest that the human brain embodies a higher-order audio-visuo-motor representation of perceived actions, which is muscle-independent and corresponds to the goals of the action.
Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience (2011) 23 (12): 3817–3828.
Published: 01 December 2011
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The ability to recognize oneself in voluntary action is called the sense of agency and refers to the experience of causing one's own actions and their sensory consequences. This form of self-awareness is important not only for motor control but also for social interactions and the ascription of causal responsibility. Here, we examined the sense of agency at early and prereflective stages of action perception using ERPs. Subjects performed a visual forced-choice response task in which action effects were either caused by the subject or by the computer. In addition, to modulate the conscious experience of agency, action effects were subliminally primed by the presentation of congruent, incongruent, or neutral effect stimuli before the action. First, we observed sensorimotor attenuation in the visual ERP selectively for self-generated action effects. That is, the N1 component, a negative deflection around 100 msec after a visual stimulus, was smaller in amplitude for visual effects caused by the subject as compared with effects caused by the computer. Second, congruent effect priming enhanced the explicit judgment of agency and further reduced the N1 amplitude for self-generated effects, although effect primes were not consciously processed. Taken together, these results provide evidence of a top–down modulation of sensory processing of action effects by prior effect information and support the neurophysiological mechanism of sensorimotor attenuation as underlying self-registration in action. Our findings suggest that both efferent information and prior thoughts about the action consequence provide important cues for a prereflective form of the experience of being an agent.
Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience (2009) 21 (6): 1215–1227.
Published: 01 June 2009
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Numerous studies suggest that both self-generated and observed actions of others activate overlapping neural networks, implying a shared, agent-neutral representation of self and other. Contrary to the shared representation hypothesis, we recently showed that the human motor system is not neutral with respect to the agent of an observed action [Schütz-Bosbach, S., Mancini, B., Aglioti, S. M., & Haggard, P. Self and other in the human motor system. Current Biology, 16, 1830–1834, 2006]. Observation of actions attributed to another agent facilitated the motor system, whereas observation of identical actions linked to the self did not. Here we investigate whether the absence of motor facilitation for observing one's own actions reflects a specific process of cortical inhibition associated with self-representation. We analyzed the duration of the silent period induced by transcranial magnetic stimulation of the motor cortex in active muscles as an indicator of motor inhibition. We manipulated whether an observed action was attributed to another agent, or to the subjects themselves, using a manipulation of body ownership on the basis of the rubber hand illusion. Observation of actions linked to the self led to longer silent periods than observation of a static hand, but the opposite effect occurred when observing identical actions attributed to another agent. This finding suggests a specific inhibition of the motor system associated with self-representation. Cortical suppression for actions linked to the self might prevent inappropriate perseveration within the motor system.