Theories about the neural bases of semantic knowledge tend between two poles, one proposing that distinct brain regions are innately dedicated to different conceptual domains and the other suggesting that all concepts are encoded within a single network. Category-sensitive functional activations in the fusiform cortex of the congenitally blind have been taken to support the former view but also raise several puzzles. We use neural network models to assess a hypothesis that spans the two poles: The interesting functional activation patterns reflect the base connectivity of a domain-general semantic network. Both similarities and differences between sighted and congenitally blind groups can emerge through learning in a neural network, but only in architectures adopting real anatomical constraints. Surprisingly, the same constraints suggest a novel account of a quite different phenomenon: the dyspraxia observed in patients with semantic impairments from anterior temporal pathology. From this work, we suggest that the cortical semantic network is wired not to encode knowledge of distinct conceptual domains but to promote learning about both conceptual and affordance structure in the environment.

Human and animal lesion studies have shown that behavior can be catastrophically impaired after bilateral lesions but that unilateral damage often produces little or no effect, even controlling for lesion extent. This pattern is found across many different sensory, motor, and memory domains. Despite these findings, there has been no systematic, computational explanation. We found that the same striking difference between unilateral and bilateral damage emerged in a distributed, recurrent attractor neural network. The difference persists in simple feedforward networks, where it can be understood in explicit quantitative terms. In essence, damage both distorts and reduces the magnitude of relevant activity in each hemisphere. Unilateral damage reduces the relative magnitude of the contribution to performance of the damaged side, allowing the intact side to dominate performance. In contrast, balanced bilateral damage distorts representations on both sides, which contribute equally, resulting in degraded performance. The model's ability to account for relevant patient data suggests that mechanisms similar to those in the model may operate in the brain.

Word frequency is a powerful predictor of language processing efficiency in healthy individuals and in computational models. Puzzlingly, frequency effects are often absent in stroke aphasia, challenging the assumption that word frequency influences the behavior of any computational system. To address this conundrum, we investigated divergent effects of frequency in two comprehension-impaired patient groups. Patients with semantic dementia have degraded conceptual knowledge as a consequence of anterior temporal lobe atrophy and show strong frequency effects. Patients with multimodal semantic impairments following stroke (semantic aphasia [SA]), in contrast, show little or no frequency effect. Their deficits arise from impaired control processes that bias activation toward task-relevant aspects of knowledge. We hypothesized that high-frequency words exert greater demands on cognitive control because they are more semantically diverse—they tend to appear in a broader range of linguistic contexts and have more variable meanings. Using latent semantic analysis, we developed a new measure of semantic diversity that reflected the variability of a word's meaning across different context. Frequency, but not diversity, was a significant predictor of comprehension in semantic dementia, whereas diversity was the best predictor of performance in SA. Most importantly, SA patients did show typical frequency effects but only when the influence of diversity was taken into account. These results are consistent with the view that higher-frequency words place higher demands on control processes, so that when control processes are damaged the intrinsic processing advantages associated with higher-frequency words are masked.

On the basis of a theory about the role of semantic knowledge in the recognition and production of familiar words and objects, we predicted that patients with semantic dementia would reveal a specific pattern of impairment on six different tasks typically considered “pre-” or “non-” semantic: reading aloud, writing to dictation, inflecting verbs, lexical decision, object decision, and delayed copy drawing. The prediction was that all tasks would reveal a frequency-by-typicality interaction, with patients performing especially poorly on lower-frequency items with atypical structure (e.g., words with an atypical spelling-to-sound relationship; objects with an atypical feature for their class, such as the hump on a camel, etc). Of 84 critical observations (14 patients performing 6 tasks), this prediction was correct in 84/84 cases; and a single component in a factor analysis accounted for 87% of the variance across seven measures: each patient's degree of impairment on atypical items in the six experimental tasks and a separate composite score reflecting his or her degree of semantic impairment. Errors also consistently conformed to the predicted pattern for both expressive and receptive tasks, with responses reflecting residual knowledge about the typical surface structure of each domain. We argue that these results cannot be explained as associated but unrelated deficits but instead are a principled consequence of a primary semantic impairment.

Previous studies have found that the lateral posterior fusiform gyri respond more robustly to pictures of animals than pictures of manmade objects and suggested that these regions encode the visual properties characteristic of animals. We suggest that such effects actually reflect processing demands arising when items with similar representations must be finely discriminated. In a positron emission tomography (PET) study of category verification with colored photographs of animals and vehicles, there was robust animal-specific activation in the lateral posterior fusiform gyri when stimuli were categorized at an intermediate level of specificity (e.g., dog or car). However, when the same photographs were categorized at a more specific level (e.g., Labrador or BMW), these regions responded equally strongly to animals and vehicles. We conclude that the lateral posterior fusiform does not encode domain-specific representations of animals or visual properties characteristic of animals. Instead, these regions are strongly activated whenever an item must be discriminated from many close visual or semantic competitors. Apparent category effects arise because, at an intermediate level of specificity, animals have more visual and semantic competitors than do artifacts.