The effect of prior beliefs on reasoning and decision-making is a robust, poorly understood phenomenon, exhibiting considerable individual variation. Neuroimaging studies widely show the involvement of the left pFC in reasoning involving beliefs. However, little patient data exist to speak to the necessity and role of the left pFC in belief-based inference. To address this shortcoming, we tested 102 patients with unilateral focal penetrating traumatic brain injuries and 49 matched controls. Participants provided plausibility ratings (plausible/implausible) to simple inductive arguments and (separately) strength of believability ratings of the conclusion to those same arguments. A voxel-based lesion symptom mapping analysis identified 10 patients, all with lesions to the left pFC (BA 9 and BA 10) as rating significantly fewer arguments with highly believable conclusions as “plausible,” compared with all other patients. Subsequent analyses, incorporating the right hemisphere homologue of these patients ( n = 12) and normal controls ( n = 24), revealed patients with lesions to left pFC found fewer arguments plausible in the high believable than either of these groups, and there was no difference in the behavioral scores of the right pFC patients and normal controls. Further analysis, utilizing the belief ratings as the dependent measure, revealed a Group × Belief Rating interaction, with left pFC patients having less intense beliefs about the conclusions of moderately believable and highly believable arguments. We interpreted these results to indicate that lesions to left pFC (BA 9, BA 10) increase incredulity and make these patients more skeptical reasoners. The former can partially, but not fully, explain the latter. The other relevant factor may be that unilateral left pFC lesions disrupt hemispheric equilibrium and allow for an increased inhibitory role of the right pFC. We speculate that individual differences in belief bias in reasoning in the normal population may be a function of individual differences in the left and right pFC interactional dynamics.

The element of surprise, a necessary condition for the experience of humor, often derives from the fact that the alternative interpretation/resolution offered by the punch line of a joke is physically or socially forbidden. Children's humor typifies violation of physical norms, whereas adult humor typically pushes the boundaries of social norms. Excess norm violation, to the point of offending, can attenuate the experience of humor/mirth. To examine the neural basis of regulation of affective experience of humor by social norms, we scanned 16 normal subjects while they viewed a series of cartoons that varied in funniness and social acceptability. Behavioral results indicated two separate groups of subjects, those who found the cartoons less offensive and those who found them more offensive. In the group that found the jokes more offensive, there was a negative correlation between funniness and social inappropriateness. In this group, the corresponding Humor by Social inappropriateness interaction during functional magnetic resonance imaging revealed enhanced activation in the right hippocampus along with relative deactivation in the ventral medial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC). By contrast, the Funniness by Social appropriateness interaction resulted in activation in the VMPFC and relative deactivation in the right hippocampus. These results suggest that the regulation of humor by social norms involves reciprocal response patterns between VMPFC and hippocampus regions implicated in contextual regulation of behavior and memory, respectively.

It has recently been shown that syllogistic reasoning engages two dissociable neural systems. Reasoning about familiar situations engages a frontal-temporal lobe system, whereas formally identical reasoning tasks involving unfamiliar situations recruit a frontal-parietal visuospatial network. These two systems may correspond to the “heuristic” and “formal” methods, respectively, postulated by cognitive theory. To determine if this dissociation generalizes to reasoning about transitive spatial relations, we studied 14 volunteers using event-related fMRI, as they reasoned about landmarks in familiar and unfamiliar environments. Our main finding is a task (reasoning and baseline) by spatial content (familiar and unfamiliar) interaction. Modulation of reasoning toward unfamiliar landmarks resulted in bilateral activation of superior and inferior parietal lobules (BA 7, 40), dorsal superior frontal cortex (BA 6), and right superior and middle frontal gyri (BA 8), regions widely implicated in visuospatial processing. By contrast, modulation of the reasoning task toward familiar landmarks, engaged the right inferior/orbital frontal gyrus (BA 11/47), bilateral occipital (BA 18, 19), and temporal lobes. The temporal lobe activation included the right inferior temporal gyrus (BA 37), posterior hippocampus, and parahippocampal gyrus, regions implicated in spatial memory and navigation tasks. These results provide support for the generalization of dual mechanism theory to transitive reasoning and highlight the importance of the hippocampal system in reasoning about familiar spatial environments.

Inductive inference underlies much of human cognition. The essential component of induction is hypothesis selection based on some criterion of relevance. The purpose of this study was to determine the neural substrate of inductive inference, particularly hypothesis selection, using fMRI. Ten volunteers were shown stimuli consisting of novel animals under two task conditions, and asked to judge whether all the animals in the set were the same type of animal. In one condition, subjects were given a rule that specified the criteria for “same type of animal.” In the other condition, subjects had to infer the rule without instruction. The two conditions were further factored into easy and difficult components. Rule inference was specifically associated with bilateral hippocampal activation while the task by difficulty interaction was associated with activation in right lateral orbital prefrontal cortex. We interpret the former in terms of semantic encoding of novel stimuli, and the latter in terms of hypothesis selection. Thus, we show an anatomical dissociation between task implementation and task difficulty that may correspond to a critical psychological distinction in the processes necessary for inductive inference.

One of the important questions cognitive theories of reasoning must address is whether logical reasoning is inherently sentential or spatial. A sentential model would exploit nonspatial (linguistic) properties of representations whereas a spatial model would exploit spatial properties of representations. In general terms, the linguistic hypothesis predicts that the language processing regions underwrite human reasoning processes, and the spatial hypothesis suggests that the neural structures for perception and motor control contribute the basic representational building blocks used for high-level logical and linguistic reasoning. We carried out a [ 15 O] H 2 O PET imaging study to address this issue. Twelve normal volunteers performed three types of deductive reasoning tasks (categorical syllogisms, three-term spatial relational items, and three-term nonspatial relational items) while their regional cerebral blood flow pattern was recorded using [ 15 O] H 2 O PET imaging. In the control condition subjects semantically comprehended sets of three sentences. In the deductive reasoning conditions subjects determined whether the third sentence was entailed by the first two sentences. The areas of activation in each reasoning condition were confined to the left hemisphere and were similar to each other and to activation reported in previous studies. They included the left inferior frontal gyrus (Brodmann areas 45, 47), a portion of the left middle frontal gyrus (Brodmann area 46), the left middle temporal gyrus (Brodmann areas 21, 22), a region of the left lateral inferior temporal gyrus and superior temporal gyrus (Brodmann areas 22, 37), and a portion of the left cingulate gyrus (Brodmann areas 32, 24). There was no significant right- hemisphere or parietal activation. These results are consistent with previous neuroimaging studies and raise questions about the level of involvement of classic spatial regions in reasoning about linguistically presented spatial relations.