Anticipating the sensorimotor consequences of an action for both self and other is fundamental for action coordination when individuals socially interact. Somatosensation constitutes an elementary component of social cognition and sensorimotor prediction, but its functions in active social behavior remain unclear. We hypothesized that the somatosensory system contributes to social haptic behavior as evidenced by specific anticipatory activation patterns when touching an animate target (human hand) compared with an inanimate target (fake hand). fMRI scanning was performed during a paradigm that allowed us to isolate the anticipatory representations of active interpersonal touch while controlling for nonsocial sensorimotor processes and possible confounds because of interpersonal relationships or socioemotional valence. Active interpersonal touch was studied both as skin-to-skin contact and as object-mediated touch. The results showed weaker deactivation in primary somatosensory cortex and medial pFC and stronger activation in cerebellum for the animate target, compared with the inanimate target, when intending to touch it with one's own hand. Differently, in anticipation of touching the human hand with an object, anterior inferior parietal lobule and lateral occipital-temporal cortex showed stronger activity. When actually touching a human hand with one's own hand, activation was stronger in medial pFC but weaker in primary somatosensory cortex. The findings provide new insight on the contribution of simulation and sensory prediction mechanisms to active social behavior. They also suggest that literally getting in touch with someone and touching someone by using an object might be approached by an agent as functionally distinct conditions.

Action execution–perception links (mirror mechanism) have been repeatedly suggested to play crucial roles in social cognition. Remarkably, the designs of most studies exploring this topic so far excluded even the simplest traces of social interaction, such as a movement of the observer toward another individual. This study introduces a new design by investigating the effects of camera movements, possibly simulating the observer's own approaching movement toward the scene. We conducted a combined high-density EEG and behavioral study investigating motor cortex activation during action observation measured by event-related desynchronization and resynchronization (ERD/ERS) of the mu rhythm. Stimuli were videos showing a goal-related hand action filmed while using the camera in four different ways: filming from a fixed position, zooming in on the scene, approaching the scene by means of a dolly, and approaching the scene by means of a steadycam. Results demonstrated a consistently stronger ERD of the mu rhythm for videos that were filmed while approaching the scene with a steadycam. Furthermore, videos in which the zoom was applied reliably demonstrated a stronger rebound. A rating task showed that videos in which the camera approached the scene were felt as more involving and the steadycam was most able to produce a visual experience close to the one of a human approaching the scene. These results suggest that filming technique predicts time course specifics of ERD/ERS during action observation with only videos simulating the natural vision of a walking human observer eliciting a stronger ERD than videos filmed from a fixed position. This demonstrates the utility of ecologically designed studies for exploring social cognition.

Neuroscientists and philosophers, among others, have long questioned the contribution of bodily experience to the constitution of self-consciousness. Contemporary research answers this question by focusing on the notions of sense of agency and/or sense of ownership. Recently, however, it has been proposed that the bodily self might also be rooted in bodily motor experience, that is, in the experience of oneself as instantiating a bodily structure that enables a specific range of actions. In the current fMRI study, we tested this hypothesis by making participants undergo a hand laterality judgment task, which is known to be solved by simulating a motor rotation of one's own hand. The stimulus to be judged was either the participant's own hand or the hand of a stranger. We used this task to investigate whether mental rotation of pictures depicting one's own hands leads to a different activation of the sensorimotor areas as compared with the mental rotation of pictures depicting another's hand. We revealed a neural network for the general representation of the bodily self encompassing the SMA and pre-SMA, the anterior insula, and the occipital cortex, bilaterally. Crucially, the representation of one's own dominant hand turned out to be primarily confined to the left premotor cortex. Our data seem to support the existence of a sense of bodily self encased within the sensorimotor system. We propose that such a sensorimotor representation of the bodily self might help us to differentiate our own body from that of others.

Previous studies suggested that the observation of other individuals' somatosensory experiences also activates brain circuits processing one's own somatosensory experiences. However, it is unclear whether cortical regions involved with the elementary stages of touch processing are also involved in the automatic coding of the affective consequences of observed touch and to which extent they show overlapping activation for somatosensory experiences of self and others. In order to investigate these issues, in the present fMRI study, healthy participants either experienced touch or watched videos depicting other individuals' inanimate and animate/social touch experiences. Essentially, a distinction can be made between exteroceptive and interoceptive components of touch processing, involved with physical stimulus characteristics and internal feeling states, respectively. Consistent with this distinction, a specific negative modulation was found in the posterior insula by the mere visual perception of other individuals' social or affective cutaneous experiences, compared to neutral inanimate touch. On the other hand, activation in secondary somatosensory and posterior superior temporal regions, strongest for the most intense stimuli, seemed more dependent on the observed physical stimulus characteristics. In contrast to the detected vicarious activation in somatosensory regions, opposite activation patterns for the experience (positive modulation) and observation (negative modulation) of touch suggest that the posterior insula does not reflect a shared representation of self and others' experiences. Embedded in a distributed network of brain regions underpinning a sense of the bodily self, the posterior insula rather appears to differentiate between self and other conditions when affective experiences are implicated.

Previous studies have shown a shared neural circuitry in the somatosensory cortices for the experience of one's own body being touched and the sight of intentional touch. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), the present study aimed to elucidate whether the activation of a visuotactile mirroring mechanism during touch observation applies to the sight of any touch, that is, whether it is independent of the intentionality of observed touching agent. During fMRI scanning, healthy participants viewed video clips depicting a touch that was intentional or accidental, and occurring between animate or inanimate objects. Analyses showed equal overlapping activation for all the touch observation conditions and the experience of one's own body being touched in the bilateral secondary somatosensory cortex (SII), left inferior parietal lobule (IPL)/supramarginal gyrus, bilateral temporal-occipital junction, and left precentral gyrus. A significant difference between the sight of an intentional touch, compared to an accidental touch, was found in the left primary somatosensory cortex (SI/Brodmann's area [BA] 2). Interestingly, activation in SI/BA 2 significantly correlated with the degree of intentionality of the observed touch stimuli as rated by participants. Our findings show that activation of a visuotactile mirroring mechanism for touch observation might underpin an abstract notion of touch, whereas activation in SI might reflect a human tendency to “resonate” more with a present or assumed intentional touching agent.

Developmental and cross-cultural studies show that finger counting represents one of the basic number learning strategies. However, despite the ubiquity of such an embodied strategy, the issue of whether there is a neural link between numbers and fingers in adult, literate individuals remains debated. Here, we used transcranial magnetic stimulation to study changes of excitability of hand muscles of individuals performing a visual parity judgment task, a task not requiring counting, on Arabic numerals from 1 to 9. Although no modulation was observed for the left hand muscles, an increase in amplitude of motor-evoked potentials was found for the right hand muscles. This increase was specific for smaller numbers (1 to 4) as compared to larger numbers (6 to 9). These findings indicate a close relationship between hand/finger and numerical representations.

Observing actions made by others activates the cortical circuits responsible for the planning and execution of those same actions. This observation–execution matching system (mirror-neuron system) is thought to play an important role in the understanding of actions made by others. In an fMRI experiment, we tested whether this system also becomes active during the processing of action-related sentences. Participants listened to sentences describing actions performed with the mouth, the hand, or the leg. Abstract sentences of comparable syntactic structure were used as control stimuli. The results showed that listening to action-related sentences activates a left fronto-parieto-temporal network that includes the pars opercularis of the inferior frontal gyrus (Broca's area), those sectors of the premotor cortex where the actions described are motorically coded, as well as the inferior parietal lobule, the intraparietal sulcus, and the posterior middle temporal gyrus. These data provide the first direct evidence that listening to sentences that describe actions engages the visuomotor circuits which subserve action execution and observation.