Human time perception is malleable and subject to many biases. For example, it has repeatedly been shown that stimuli that are physically intense or that are unexpected seem to last longer. Two competing hypotheses have been proposed to account for such biases: One states that these temporal illusions are the result of increased levels of arousal that speeds up neural clock dynamics, whereas the alternative “magnitude coding” account states that the magnitude of sensory responses causally modulates perceived durations. Common experimental paradigms used to study temporal biases cannot dissociate between these accounts, as arousal and sensory magnitude covary and modulate each other. Here, we present two temporal discrimination experiments where two flashing stimuli demarcated the start and end of a to-be-timed interval. These stimuli could be either in the same or a different location, which led to different sensory responses because of neural repetition suppression. Crucially, changes and repetitions were fully predictable, which allowed us to explore effects of sensory response magnitude without changes in arousal or surprise. Intervals with changing markers were perceived as lasting longer than those with repeating markers. We measured EEG (Experiment 1) and pupil size (Experiment 2) and found that temporal perception was related to changes in ERPs (P2) and pupil constriction, both of which have been related to responses in the sensory cortex. Conversely, correlates of surprise and arousal (P3 amplitude and pupil dilation) were unaffected by stimulus repetitions and changes. These results demonstrate, for the first time, that sensory magnitude affects time perception even under constant levels of arousal.

Different theories have been proposed to explain how the human brain derives an accurate sense of time. One specific class of theories, intrinsic clock theories, postulate that temporal information of a stimulus is represented much like other features such as color and location, bound together to form a coherent percept. Here, we explored to what extent this holds for temporal information after it has been perceived and is held in working memory for subsequent comparison. We recorded EEG of participants who were asked to time stimuli at lateral positions of the screen followed by comparison stimuli presented in the center. Using well-established markers of working memory maintenance, we investigated whether the usage of temporal information evoked neural signatures that were indicative of the location where the stimuli had been presented, both during maintenance and during comparison. Behavior and neural measures including the contralateral delay activity, lateralized alpha suppression, and decoding analyses through time all supported the same conclusion: The representation of location was strongly involved during perception of temporal information, but when temporal information was to be used for comparison, it no longer showed a relation to spatial information. These results support a model where the initial perception of a stimulus involves intrinsic computations, but that this information is subsequently translated to a stimulus-independent format to be used to further guide behavior.