To achieve our moment-to-moment goals, we must often keep information temporarily in mind. Yet, this working memory (WM) may compete with demands for our attention in the environment. Attentional and WM functions are thought to operate by similar underlying principles, and they often engage overlapping fronto-parietal brain regions. In a recent fMRI study, bilateral parietal cortex BOLD activity displayed an interaction between WM and visual attention dual-task demands. However, prior studies also suggest that left and right parietal cortices make unique contributions to WM and attentional functions. Moreover, behavioral performance often shows no interaction between concurrent WM and attentional demands. Thus, the scope of reciprocity between WM and attentional functions, as well as the specific contribution that parietal cortex makes to these functions, remain unresolved. Here, we took a causal approach, targeting brain regions that are implicated in shared processing between WM and visual attention, to better characterize how those regions contribute to behavior. We first examined whether behavioral indices of WM and visual search differentially correlate with left and right parietal dual-task BOLD responses. Then, we delivered TMS over fMRI-guided left and right parietal sites during dual-task WM–visual search performance. Only right-parietal TMS influenced visual search behavior, but the stimulation either helped or harmed search depending on the current WM load. Therefore, whereas the left and right parietal contributions were distinct here, attentional and WM functions were codependent. Right parietal cortex seems to hold a privileged role in visual search behavior, consistent with prior findings, but the current results reveal that behavior may be sensitive to the interaction between visual search and WM load only when normal parietal activity is perturbed. The parietal response to heightened WM and attentional demands may therefore serve to protect against dual-task interference.

Everyday life, as well as psychiatric illness, is replete with examples where appetitive and aversive stimuli hijack the will, leading to maladaptive behavior. Yet the mechanisms underlying this phenomenon are not well understood. Here we investigate how motivational cues influence action tendencies in healthy individuals with a novel paradigm. Behaviorally, we observed that an appetitive cue biased go behavior (making a response), whereas an aversive cue biased no-go behavior (withholding a response). We hypothesized that the origin of this behavioral go/no-go bias occurs at the motor system level. To test this, we used single-pulse TMS as a motor system probe (rather than a disruptive tool) to index motivational biasing. We found that the appetitive cue biased the participants to go more by relatively increasing motor system excitability, and that the aversive cue biased participants to no-go more by relatively decreasing motor system excitability. These results show, first, that maladaptive behaviors arise from motivational cues quickly spilling over into the motor system and biasing behavior even before action selection and, second, that this occurs in opposing directions for appetitive and aversive cues.

Behavioral studies show that subjects respond more slowly to stimuli to which they previously stopped. This response slowing could be explained by “automatic inhibition” (i.e., the reinstantiation of motor suppression when a stimulus retrieves a stop association). Here we tested this using TMS. In Experiment 1, participants were trained to go or no-go to stimuli. Then, in a test phase, we compared the corticospinal excitability for go stimuli that were previously associated with stopping (no-go_then_go) with go stimuli that were previously associated with going (go_then_go). Corticospinal excitability was reduced for no-go_then_go compared with go_then_go stimuli at a mere 100 msec poststimulus. Although these results fit with automatic inhibition, there was, surprisingly, no suppression for no-go_then_no-go stimuli, although this should occur. We speculated that automatic inhibition lies within a continuum between effortful top–down response inhibition and no inhibition at all. When the need for executive control and active response suppression disappears, so does the manifestation of automatic inhibition. Therefore, it should emerge during go/no-go learning and disappear as performance asymptotes. Consistent with this idea, in Experiment 2, we demonstrated reduced corticospinal excitability for no-go versus go trials most prominently in the midphase of training but it wears off as performance asymptotes. We thus provide neurophysiological evidence for an inhibition mechanism that is automatically reinstantiated when a stimulus retrieves a learned stopping episode, but only in an executive context in which active suppression is required. This demonstrates that automatic and top–down inhibition jointly contribute to goal-directed behavior.

Organisms operate within both a perceptual domain of objects and events, and a mnemonic domain of past experiences and future goals. Each domain requires a deliberate selection of task-relevant information, through deployments of external (perceptual) and internal (mnemonic) attention, respectively. Little is known about the control of attention shifts in working memory, or whether voluntary control of attention in these two domains is subserved by a common or by distinct functional networks. We used human fMRI to examine the neural basis of cognitive control while participants shifted attention in vision and in working memory. We found that these acts of control recruit in common a subset of the dorsal fronto-parietal attentional control network, including the medial superior parietal lobule, intraparietal sulcus, and superior frontal sulcus/gyrus. Event-related multivoxel pattern classification reveals, however, that these regions exhibit distinct spatio-temporal patterns of neural activity during internal and external shifts of attention, respectively. These findings constrain theoretical accounts of selection in working memory and perception by showing that populations of neurons in dorsal fronto-parietal network regions exhibit selective tuning for acts of cognitive control in different cognitive domains.

Attention is a neurocognitive mechanism that selects task-relevant sensory or mnemonic information to achieve current behavioral goals. Attentional modulation of cortical activity has been observed when attention is directed to specific locations, features, or objects. However, little is known about how high-level categorization task set modulates perceptual representations. In the current study, observers categorized faces by gender (male vs. female) or race (Asian vs. White). Each face was perceptually ambiguous in both dimensions, such that categorization of one dimension demanded selective attention to task-relevant information within the face. We used multivoxel pattern classification to show that task-specific modulations evoke reliably distinct spatial patterns of activity within three face-selective cortical regions (right fusiform face area and bilateral occipital face areas). This result suggests that patterns of activity in these regions reflect not only stimulus-specific (i.e., faces vs. houses) responses but also task-specific (i.e., race vs. gender) attentional modulation. Furthermore, exploratory whole-brain multivoxel pattern classification (using a searchlight procedure) revealed a network of dorsal fronto-parietal regions (left middle frontal gyrus and left inferior and superior parietal lobule) that also exhibit distinct patterns for the two task sets, suggesting that these regions may represent abstract goals during high-level categorization tasks.