Abstract

In many unrelated languages, the same anaphor is either subject to Condition A of the binding theory, or exempt from it but with specific interpretive properties. On the basis of French data and crosslinguistic comparisons, I first show that such exempt anaphors must be anteceded by logophoric centers. Elaborating on but modifying Sells 1987, I provide specific tests to argue that these logophoric antecedents can be classified into two kinds of perspective centers, attitude holders and empathy loci, thus reducing logophoricity to mental perspective. Next, I propose to derive the logophoricity of exempt anaphors from the following hypothesis: seemingly exempt anaphors are in fact bound by silent logophoric pronouns introduced by syntactically represented logophoric operators within their local domain. Crucially, this hypothesis, which is independently supported by exhaustive coreference constraints on locally cooccurring exempt anaphors, also accounts for their apparent exemption from Condition A, reanalyzed here as local binding by a silent logophoric binder.

In a wide range of languages, the very same element displays two distinct behaviors: sometimes, it is subject to the locality conditions imposed by Condition A of the binding theory (e.g., Chomsky 1986); sometimes, it is exempt from them. In its former guise, I will call such an element a plain anaphor (as in Charnavel and Sportiche 2016) and in its latter guise, an exempt anaphor (as in Pollard and Sag 1992). Examples of this type of element are English himself (e.g., Pollard and Sag 1992), French lui-même and son propre (e.g., Charnavel and Sportiche 2016), Icelandic sig (e.g., Maling 1984), Mandarin ziji (e.g., Huang and Liu 2001), Japanese zibun (e.g., Kuroda 1973), and Turkish kendi si and Uyghur öz (Major and Özkan 2018), among many others.

Why is it that in language after language, the same element exhibits two types of behavior, each with distinct associated properties? To the (limited) extent that this question is addressed in the literature, the analysis proposed is one of lexical ambiguity or homophony, locating the source of these different behaviors in the anaphors themselves: himself, for example, has two (related) lexical entries, one for plain behavior, one for exempt behavior.

The main goal of this article is to argue instead that a plain anaphor and its exempt counterpart are one and the same object. The observed duality of behavior is due not to the anaphors themselves, but to the nature of their binder. While the binder of a plain anaphor simply needs to satisfy a structural requirement (local c-command), what properties the binder of an exempt anaphor must have is less clear. A second goal—subordinated to the first one—is to examine in detail what binders qualify by revisiting the notion of logophoricity, reaching different conclusions than Sells’s (1987) seminal work.

The unitary analysis of the plain/exempt dichotomy proposed here takes all instances of anaphors to be plain: they must all obey Condition A. It thus argues that instances of anaphors that seem to be exempt are in fact locally bound via a silent logophoric operator, and all the differences between plain and exempt anaphors derive from the properties of their antecedents, an overt c-commander for plain anaphors, a covert c-commanding logophoric pronoun (introduced by a logophoric operator) for exempt anaphors. That they can have the same form in a variety of languages is therefore not surprising.1

Beyond parsimony considerations, two crucial observations—chiefly based on the behavior of the French anaphors lui-même and son propre2—will constitute the main motivation for this unitary hypothesis. First, exempt anaphors must exhibit logophoric (i.e., perspectival) properties, as many have noted, at least in broad lines (e.g., Clements 1975, Sells 1987): not only must they be anteceded by a DP denoting a perspective center, but crucially, they must also occur in a constituent whose content is expressed from the perspective of that center. This twofold generalization can be explained by the hypothesis that an exempt anaphor is bound via a covert logophoric operator, which syntactically encodes that the constituent in its scope represents the logophoric center’s perspective. Fundamentally, this implies the existence of a cross between standard and free indirect discourse that could be called “embedded free indirect discourse.”

The second observation is based on the surprising constraint holding of exempt anaphors cooccurring in the same local domain: they must exhaustively corefer. As I will explain, this provides independent evidence for the presence of a silent element (a logophoric pronoun) that exhaustively and locally binds all exempt anaphors of the domain. This thus shows that exempt anaphors are in fact subject to the binding conditions imposed by Condition A.

The article is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the issues surrounding exempt anaphora and outlines the proposed solution: apparently exempt anaphors can be distinguished from plain anaphors by five properties; the proposal, guided by parsimony considerations, is to unify these two anaphoric behaviors by reducing the apparent differences between them to the nature of their binders (overt DP vs. covert logophoric pronoun introduced by a logophoric operator). Section 2 describes the interpretive restrictions on exempt anaphors (the first crucial observation above) in order to precisely specify the lexicosemantic properties on these logophoric operators, from which exempt anaphors inherit their interpretive properties. Using independent tests, I examine in detail and motivate what counts as logophoric conditions. This leads me, like Sells (1987), to distinguish between several types of logophoric centers, albeit different ones from his (namely, attitude holder and empathy locus instead of Source, Self, and Pivot): by excluding deictic perspective, I restrict the notion of logophoricity relevant for exemption (and potentially more generally) to mental perspective. Section 3 further motivates the hypothesis that exempt anaphors are locally bound (via logophoric operators) as required by Condition A. In particular, exhaustive coreference constraints between exempt anaphors cooccurring in the same local domain (the second observation above) provide independent evidence for the presence of a unique local (logophoric) A-binder for them. The other properties apparently distinguishing exempt from plain anaphors derive from the presence of this (logophoric) binder, which crucially need not itself be bound by its own antecedent(s). Section 4 concludes by presenting some crosslinguistic implications and remaining questions.

1 The Issue of Exempt Anaphora

1.1 Identifying Exempt Anaphors

Anaphors such as English himself have been standardly defined as being subject to Condition A of the binding theory (e.g., Chomsky 1986): they must be bound in a sufficiently local domain (which will be defined below), as illustrated in (1).

(1)

But in a wide variety of languages including for example English, French, Icelandic, Mandarin, Japanese, Turkish, and Uyghur (see references above, as well as earlier works like Kuroda 1965, Ross 1970, Postal 1971, Jackendoff 1972, Kuno 1972, Cantrall 1974), some instances of anaphors do not obey the locality constraints imposed by Condition A: under any definition of locality, himself and herself in (2a–b) are farther from their antecedents than itself in (1b–c).

(2)

  • Johni said to Mary that nobody would doubt that physicists like himselfi were a godsend.

    (Kuno 1987:125)

  • The picture of herselfi on the front page of the Times made Maryi’s claims seem somewhat ridiculous.

    (Pollard and Sag 1992:264)

All attempts to redefine Condition A so as to capture the behavior of both plain and exempt instances of anaphors have failed (see Huang and Liu 2001:144–147 for a review). It is therefore necessary to elaborate a theory of exemption from Condition A (see, e.g., Pollard and Sag 1992, Reinhart and Reuland 1993). This raises a methodological issue: given that plain and exempt anaphors have the same form, how can we tease them apart so as to identify the distribution of plain anaphors (which is required to define Condition A) and that of exempt anaphors (which is required to define a theory of exemption)?

To handle this problem, in this article I adopt Charnavel and Sportiche’s (2016) strategy, which consists of using a criterion independent of the definition of Condition A to distinguish between plain and exempt anaphors in a given sentence.3 A property that meets these conditions for French is inanimacy: inanimate anaphors are always plain anaphors. The reasoning behind this idea goes as follows. Many crosslinguistic generalizations have been proposed, showing that the antecedents of exempt anaphors are logophoric centers (e.g., Clements 1975, Sells 1987, Pollard and Sag 1992). But the definitions of logophoricity proposed in the literature are too vague or too diverse (see, e.g., Clements 1975, Kuno 1987, Sells 1987, Culy 1994, Schlenker 2003, Anand 2006) to reliably identify exempt anaphors. Nevertheless, all these generalizations (implicitly) agree on one fact: the referent of the antecedent of an exempt anaphor must be a live person (capable of holding a perspective). This crucially means that conversely, inanimates cannot antecede exempt anaphors, and it suggests that logophoric centers cannot be inanimate.

Inanimacy (used in sentence (1)) thus allows us to draw a dividing line between plain and exempt anaphors (at least in French).4 First, the syntactic distribution of inanimate anaphors can be used as the empirical basis for determining the generalization to be explained by Condition A. This is the strategy adopted in Charnavel and Sportiche 2016: from the behavior of inanimate anaphors in French, Charnavel and Sportiche determine the generalization describing the distribution of plain anaphors, and this new generalization motivates a reformulation of Condition A in terms of phase theory.

(3)

  • Descriptive formulation of Condition A

  • A plain anaphor must be bound within an XP containing it that is no larger than a tensed TP and where no subject intervenes between the anaphor and its binder.

  • (cf. Charnavel and Sportiche 2016:65)

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Conversely, (in)animacy can be used to identify exempt anaphors and determine the generalization to be explained by the theory of exemption. But animacy itself is not sufficient (a logophoric center requires further properties, as we will see in section 2): we can only be certain that an anaphor is exempt if it occurs in a configuration disallowing inanimate anaphors. Specifically, given the results in Charnavel and Sportiche 2016, a French anaphor is necessarily exempt if it is not bound (i.e., if it is not c-commanded by its antecedent or if it does not have any antecedent in the sentence) or if its binder is outside its Spell-Out domain (tensed TP or any other XP (vP, DP, etc.) with a subject).

(5)

  • Theory-neutral way to identify exempt anaphors

  • An anaphor is exempt if it is animate and appears in a configuration disallowing inanimate anaphors.

(6)

  • Distribution of exempt anaphors based on Charnavel and Sportiche’s (2016) results

  • An anaphor is exempt if it is not bound or if its binder is outside the smallest Spell-Out domain containing it.

We thus have a reliable way to empirically identify (some5) exempt anaphors in French. This will be the basis of investigation for elaborating a theory of exemption.6

1.2 Differences between Plain and Exempt Anaphors

Plain and exempt anaphors are reported to differ superficially in five ways (see, e.g., Bouchard 1984, Lebeaux 1984). Below, these differences are illustrated in French using the strategy explained above: the plain anaphor cases use inanimate anaphors, the exempt cases animate ones.

First, by definition, plain anaphors are visibly subject to locality requirements, while exempt anaphors are not. For instance, the French inanimate anaphor son propre ‘its own’ must have an antecedent that c-commands it and appears in its local domain.7

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  • [Cette auberge]i fait de l’ombre à soni propre jardin et au jardin de la maison voisine.

    ‘[This inn]i gives shade to itsi own garden and to the garden of the neighboring house.’8

  • *[Cette auberge]i bénéficie du fait que les touristes préfèrent soni propre jardin à ceux des auberges voisines.

    ‘*[This inn]i benefits from the fact that the tourists prefer itsi own garden to that of the neighboring inns.’

  • *Les gérants de [cette auberge]i s’occupent de soni propre jardin et de celui des auberges voisines.

    ‘*The managers of [this inn]i take care of itsi own garden and that of the neighboring inns.’

By contrast, exempt anaphors can escape such locality conditions.

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  • Zoéi fait de l’ombre à sai propre fille et à la fille de la voisine.

    ‘Zoei is shading heri own daughter and the neighbor’s daughter.’

  • Zoéi bénéficie du fait que les touristes préfèrent soni propre hôtel à ceux de ses concurrents.

    ‘Zoei benefits from the fact that the tourists prefer heri own hotel to those of her competitors.’

  • Les parents de Zoéi s’occupent de soni propre avenir et de celui de ses cousins.

    ‘Zoei’s parents take care of heri own future and that of her cousins.’

Second, plain anaphors must be exhaustively bound, while exempt anaphors can have partial or split antecedents (see, e.g., Helke 1970, Bouchard 1984, Lebeaux 1984): the (im)possibility of inclusive reference distinguishes between plain and exempt anaphors, as shown by the contrast between (9) and (10).

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  • *[L’auberge]i qui jouxte [la crêperie]k fait de l’ombre à leuri+k propre jardin et au jardin de la maison voisine.

    ‘*[The inn]i that is next to [the creperie]k gives shade to theiri+k own garden and to the garden of the neighboring house.’

  • *[L’auberge]i et la crêperie font de l’ombre à soni propre jardin et au jardin de la maison voisine.

    ‘*[The inn]i and the creperie give shade to itsi own garden and to the garden of the neighboring house.’

(10)

  • Zoéi , qui est à côte´ de Paulk, fait de l’ombre à leuri+k propre fille et à la fille de la voisine.

    ‘Zoei, who is standing next to Paulk, is shading theiri+k own daughter and the neighbor’s daughter.’

  • Zoéi et Paul font de l’ombre à sai propre fille et à la fille de la voisine.

    ‘Zoei and Paul are shading heri own daughter and the neighbor’s daughter.’

Third, plain anaphors give rise only to sloppy readings in ellipsis and focus constructions, while exempt anaphors can also trigger strict readings (e.g., Lebeaux 1984, Reinhart and Reuland 1993). This is illustrated using the French anaphor elle-même ‘≈ herself’ in (11) vs. (12). Apparent exceptions will be discussed in section 3.4.2.

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graphic

(12)

graphic

Fourth, plain anaphors, unlike exempt anaphors, seem to be in complementary distribution with pronouns (e.g., Bouchard 1984, Lebeaux 1984), on the basis of examples such as (13) vs. (14).

(13)

  • [La Terre]i tourne sur ellei*(-même).

  • ‘[The earth]i spins on iti*(self).’

(14)

  • Mariei subit l’influence des nombreux politiciens qui tournent autour d’ellei(-même).

  • ‘Maryi is subject to the influence of the many politicians that revolve around heri(self).’

To these distributional properties distinguishing between plain and exempt anaphors, we can add—as noted in the previous section—a fifth, interpretive difference: unlike plain anaphors, exempt anaphors are characterized by their logophoric interpretation (e.g., Clements 1975, Sells 1987, Pollard and Sag 1992).9 In the previous examples (i.e., (8b–c), (10), (12), and (14)), exempt son propre and lui-même are subject to perspectival conditions: the phrase containing the exempt anaphor must be understood as expressing the perspective of its antecedent, as will be detailed in section 2.

1.3 Unifying Plain and Exempt Anaphors: The Logophoric Operator Hypothesis

Despite these differences, the French plain and exempt anaphors discussed above are morphologically identical. Furthermore, apart from the perspectival effects just mentioned, their meaning contributions are identical: their referential value is that of their antecedent(s). This is not an idiosyncrasy of French, as the same array of differences between two sets of instances of anaphors has been observed in many languages from diverse language families (e.g., English himself, Japanese zibun, Mandarin ziji, Icelandic sig, Turkish kendi si, Uyghur öz; see references above).

Given that this pattern is documented in many unrelated languages, we are faced with an issue of parsimony: how to minimally account for these similarities and differences simultaneously. One possible type of account locates the plain/exempt differences in the anaphors themselves—for example, by postulating that anaphors are optionally underspecified for ϕ-features or some referential feature (e.g., Hicks 2009). When so underspecified, they must enter an Agree relation with an antecedent to become interpretable (the locality of Agree guaranteeing the locality of binding). But this would say nothing about why fully specified anaphors would have to be perspectival rather than akin to plain pronouns.10 A variant of this idea is to assume that anaphors are optionally marked as logophoric (e.g., [+log]) and to further assume that only [–log] anaphors are subject to locality requirements. But this would leave unexplained the correlation between locality and nonlogophoricity and would require postulating massive homonymy of the same type in various unrelated languages. A combination of the two variants taking fully specified anaphors to be [+log] (see, e.g., Sells 1987, Anand 2006) would similarly stipulate the correlation between nonlocality and logophoricity, as we will see in more detail in sections 2.4 and 3.1.

The alternative defended here is to reduce all distributional and interpretive differences between plain and exempt anaphors to one: their binder. An anaphor is seen as plain if it has a local overt DP antecedent; it is seen as exempt if it is bound by a silent logophoric pronoun introduced by a syntactically represented logophoric operator. The correlation between logophoricity and nonlocality follows: an exempt anaphor exhibits a logophoric interpretation because its binder is logophoric, and it superficially appears not to be locally bound because its local binder is silent. In other words, the illusion is created that an exempt anaphor need not be bound because the local binding dependency between the anaphor and its silent logophoric binder is misconstrued as a syntactically unconstrained relation between the anaphor and the antecedent of the logophoric binder (which need not be syntactically present, let alone be a c-commander).

From this point of view, there is a single anaphor, which obeys Condition A in two different ways, yielding the plain/exempt distinction. That plain and exempt anaphors are morphologically identical in so many languages is therefore unsurprising: they are one and the same element. More specifically, given the formulation of Condition A provided in section 1.1, the present proposal consists in positing (the possibility of) a perspectival projection LogP in each Spell-Out domain (TP, vP, DP, and any other XP with a subject; see Charnavel and Sportiche 2016), which can host a silent logophoric operator; the intuition behind this is that each phase can be specified as being presented from some individual’s or individuals’ perspective (as will be detailed in section 3.3). This logophoric operator is a syntactic head Oplog that selects a silent logophoric pronoun prolog as its subject and requires that its complement α be presented from the first person perspective of its subject (as will be specified in section 2).

(15)

graphic

As shown in (15a), an exempt anaphor is bound by the logophoric pronoun introduced by the logophoric operator in its Spell-Out domain, thus obeying Condition A. This proposal is independently justified by the fact that an exempt anaphor must be exhaustively bound by its local binder (i.e., prolog), just as a plain anaphor must (see section 3.2).

The proposal in (15) also derives the interpretive constraints on exempt anaphors: an exempt anaphor refers to a logophoric center because its binder—the logophoric pronoun prolog—does; the domain of an exempt anaphor must express the first person perspective of that center because the complement α of the logophoric operator (which contains the anaphor) must. As we will see in section 2, the referential value of the logophoric center is determined pragmatically, on the basis of discourse and syntacticosemantic factors (cf., e.g., Anand and Hsieh 2005, Anand 2006). The logophoric operator thus provides a syntactic means of referencing the logophoric center and representing its first person perspective in each Spell-Out domain.

This solution to exemption is inspired by several existing ideas in the literature (as we will see in more detail in sections 2.4. and 3.1). First, the idea of attributing the apparent violation of Condition A to an invisible mediation between exempt anaphors and their antecedents has been explored using the notion of movement (e.g., Pica 1987, Battistella 1989, Cole, Hermon, and Sung 1990, Huang and Tang 1991, Huang and Liu 2001). Second, the introduction of logophoric operators and/or perspectival projections has been proposed to account for the distribution of so-called logophoric pronouns (see, e.g., Koopman and Sportiche 1989, Anand 2006) and to syntactically represent point of view (see, e.g., Jayaseelan 1998, Speas and Tenny 2003, Speas 2004, Sundaresan 2012, Nishigauchi 2014); in the same vein, a covert attitude operator is postulated in Sharvit 2008 to deal with the properties of free indirect discourse (FID). But to my knowledge, these two ideas have never been combined so as to simultaneously explain and correlate the logophoricity and the apparent nonlocality of exempt anaphors (a partial exception being Huang and Liu 2001). Furthermore, as they stand, all these accounts (including Huang and Liu 2001) fail to correctly derive the distribution of exempt anaphors (at least in French), as we will see in sections 2.4. and 3.1.

The rest of the article will provide more detail and motivation for this proposal. The next section examines the interpretive constraints on exempt anaphors to explain and motivate the logophoric nature of their binder. Section 3 provides evidence for the local binding relation between an exempt anaphor and its logophoric binder.

2 The Logophoric Properties of Exempt Anaphors: What They Are and How They Are Derived

As mentioned above, the idea that exempt anaphors are similar to logophoric pronouns in having to refer to the logophoric center of their domain is by no means new. After the term logophor was coined by Hagège (1974) to name specific pronouns in West African languages that refer to the author of thoughts in an indirect discourse, Clements (1975) noticed the resemblance of these pronouns to exempt anaphors: both types of elements refer to “the individual whose speech, thoughts or feelings are reported or reflected in a given linguistic context” (Clements 1975:141; for a review of the relation between logophoric pronouns and exempt anaphors, see Charnavel et al. 2017:sec. 5). Since then (and even before), many have observed that the distribution of anaphors in various languages is constrained by discourse notions such as point of view or perspective (see, e.g., Kuno 1972, 1987, Kuroda 1973, Cantrall 1974, Thráinsson 1976, Sells 1987, Zribi-Hertz 1989, Sigurðsson 1990, Iida 1992, Pollard and Sag 1992, Jayaseelan 1998, Huang and Liu 2001, Anand 2006, Oshima 2006, Sundaresan 2012, Nishigauchi 2014). But all these studies suffer from at least one of the two following issues. First, the distinction between plain and exempt anaphors is left unclear; in some cases (e.g., Kuno 1987, Nishigauchi 2014), it is even suggested that all anaphors are subject to perspectival conditions; when it is assumed otherwise (e.g., Sells 1987, Zribi-Hertz 1989), no independent criterion is proposed to reliably identify exempt anaphors. Second, most of these studies (but not all; see in particular Sells 1987 and Anand 2006) rely on vague and intuitive notions of logophoricity. As a result, we in fact do not know whether all exempt anaphors or just some of them must be perspectival. Neither do we know precisely what it means to be perspectival.

The main goal of this section is to show that the intuition about exempt anaphors having to be perspectival is correct (in French) when all relevant factors are controlled for and to specify the notion of perspective that is relevant for exemption (in French). As explained in section 1, I have defined a strategy for identifying exempt anaphors; in this section, I will combine it with a variety of syntactic tests to nail down the precise notion of logophoricity involved with exempt anaphors. As these tests will be performed on the understudied French anaphors son propre and lui-même,11 this will furthermore extend our crosslinguistic knowledge of exempt anaphors.

Specifically, I will show that exempt anaphors in French can have two types of antecedents: attitude holders (including the speaker), which hold an intellectual perspective (see section 2.1), and empathy loci, which have a perceptual or emotional perspective (see section 2.2). Crucially, we will further see that only these two types of perspective centers qualify as antecedents of exempt anaphors; in particular, deictic centers, which are spatial points of reference, do not license exempt anaphors (see section 2.3). The idea of distinguishing between different subtypes of logophoric antecedents for exempt anaphors is inspired by Sells (1987), but the specific subtypes proposed are distinct from his, which we will see are inappropriate (at least for French). Furthermore, as I will show, exempt anaphors can only take these antecedents if they occur in a syntactic domain expressing the first person perspective of these antecedents. I will establish this twofold generalization by designing and applying tests for identifying an attitude holder in its (de se) attitude context and an empathy locus in its empathy context.

(16) Empirical generalizations to be established (logophoric interpretation of French exempt anaphors; see sections 2.12.3)

  • An exempt anaphor must be anteceded by an attitude holder or an empathy locus (logophoric antecedent).

  • The constituent containing an exempt anaphor must express the first person perspective of its antecedent (logophoric domain).

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graphic

These interpretive constraints on exempt anaphors will lead me to propose (in section 2.4) that they are in the scope of a logophoric operator Oplog and that they are bound by the silent logophoric pronoun prolog it introduces (as its subject). The binding of exempt anaphors by prolog will derive their referential constraints, assuming that prolog references in the syntax the value of the local logophoric center, which can be an attitude holder or an empathy locus. The occurrence of exempt anaphors within the scope of Oplog will explain why they must occur in the logophoric domain of their antecedent, assuming that Oplog imposes the first person perspective of the local logophoric center on its domain (cf., e.g., Speas 2004, Anand 2006, Sharvit 2008).

(18) Analysis of exempt anaphors to be proposed (logophoric operator hypothesis; section 2.4)

  • Logophoric domain: An exempt anaphor is in the scope of a logophoric operator Oplog, which imposes on its complement the first person perspective of the referent of its subject prolog.

  • Logophoric antecedent: An exempt anaphor is bound by the logophoric pronoun prolog subject of Oplog, which refers to the local logophoric center.

By merging de se attitude holders and empathy loci into a single notion of logophoric center excluding deictic centers, then, I propose restricting the notion of logophoricity relevant for exemption to mental, first person perspective (contrary to the most articulated study on the topic, Sells 1987). In section 2.5, I will suggest that this restriction can be naturally explained by the fact that only mental perspective has a linguistic content (expressed in the logophoric domain), and I will discuss extending this notion of logophoricity to elements other than exempt anaphors, which could independently justify this categorization beyond anaphora.

2.1 First Subtype of Logophoricity Relevant for Exemption: De Se Attitude

This section is devoted to establishing the following threefold generalization by using tests detecting attitude holders in their attitude contexts as well as de se readings:

(19) Exemption under attitudinal logophoricity

  • An exempt anaphor can refer to an attitude holder.

  • There is no syntactic constraint on where this attitude holder is structurally located (e.g., it need not be the closest attitude holder).

  • The domain of the anaphor must express the perspective of the attitude holder in a de se attitude.

I use can in the first point because another type of logophoric antecedent will be defined in section 2.2. Also, I leave the notion of domain unspecified at this point: unless noted otherwise, it will be sufficient to use the smallest clause containing the anaphor as the relevant domain in this section, even if ultimately, that domain will be restricted to the Spell-Out domain of the anaphor; evidence for this restriction will be provided in section 3.12 Finally, it will be straightforward to identify an anaphor as exempt in such cases, as attitude contexts are always explicitly or implicitly embedded in such a way that the attitude holder does not (overtly) occur in the local binding domain of the anaphor.

2.1.1 Speaker

In the absence of any intensional predicate, sentences express the speaker’s attitude. This most primitive type of attitude holder can serve as an antecedent for exempt anaphors (see, e.g., Ross 1970, Cantrall 1974, Kuno 1987 for English myself; Huang and Liu 2001, Anand and Hsieh 2005 for Mandarin ziji; Nishigauchi 2014 for Japanese zibun). In French, it is easy to identify these exempt anaphors by their morphology. First person morphology is thus a simple diagnostic identifying anaphors that are in appropriate logophoric conditions for exemption.

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  • Les enfants de ma nouvelle compagne ne pourront jamais remplacer mes propres enfants.

  • ‘My new partner’s children will never be able to replace my own children.’

(21)

  • Les gens comme moi-même vont être bien affligés de cette nouvelle.

  • ‘People like myself will be deeply distressed by the news.’

(22)

  • First person test13

  • An anaphor can be exempt if it is marked first person.

2.1.2 Third Person Attitude Holder

Third person attitude holders are introduced by intensional verbs such as ‘say’ or ‘think’ (as their subjects) or by any other type of intensional expression like ‘opinion’ or ‘according to’ (or by contextual information such as FID contexts, as we will see). The propositional complement of these expressions—the attitude context—denotes the mental attitude of the attitude holder. Attitude contexts have been thoroughly investigated in the philosophical and semantic literature on independent grounds (for a review, see Pearson to appear). In particular, several specific properties have been shown to characterize attitude contexts. First, substitution of coreferring terms within attitude contexts might change the truth value of the attitude report (Frege 1892): this is because attitude expressions give rise to the de re/de dicto distinction. Second, nonreferring terms (e.g., unicorn) do not necessarily make the sentence containing them false when they are embedded in attitude contexts (e.g., Pearson to appear). Another property of these contexts is that evaluative expressions (e.g., epithets, expressives, appositives) contained in them can be evaluated either by the speaker or by the overt, third person attitude holder (e.g., Sæbø 2011).

All these properties can be used as tests to identify attitude contexts. For present purposes, this is insufficient: we must also show that (in the absence of other logophoric centers) an exempt anaphor must refer to the attitude holder of the attitude context containing it. We thus need a test that can specifically diagnose attitude holders in their attitude contexts. Such a test can be defined on the basis of the observation that an epithet occurring in an attitude context cannot refer to the attitude holder of that context (see, e.g., Ruwet 1990, Narahara 1991, Pica 1994, Dubinsky and Hamilton 1998,14Patel-Grosz 2012, Yashima 2015). This is illustrated in (23)–(24) (the corresponding English examples are from Dubinsky and Hamilton 1998:688): the epithet cet idiot ‘the idiot’ cannot refer to Jean in (23a) or (24a), where Jean is the relevant attitude holder (Jean is subject of parlait ‘told’, complement of d’après ‘according to’), but it can in (23b) and (24b), where Jean is not an attitude holder (Jean is subject of a renverse´ ‘ran over’, complement of à propos de ‘speaking of ’). This minimal contrast shows that epithets are not subject to Condition C, but are subject to anti-attitudinality, at least.15

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  • *Jeani nous parlait d’un homme qui essayait d’indiquer le chemin à [cet idiot]i.

    ‘*Johni told us of a man who was trying to give [the idiot]i directions.’

  • Jeani a renversé un homme qui essayait d’indiquer le chemin à [cet idiot]i.

    ‘Johni ran over a man who was trying to give [the idiot]i directions.’

(24)

  • *D’après Jeani, [cet idiot]i est marié à un génie.

    ‘*According to Johni, [the idiot]i is married to a genius.’

  • A propos de Jeani, [cet idiot]i est marié à un génie.

    ‘Speaking of Johni, [the idiot]i is married to a genius.’

(25)

  • Anti-attitudinality of epithets

  • An epithet is unacceptable in an attitude context if it refers to the attitude holder of that context.

The unacceptability of epithets can thus be used to detect third person attitude holders in their attitude context and show that they can antecede exempt anaphors there: this can be guaranteed by replacing an unacceptable epithet with the anaphor, or by inserting the anaphor in the same domain as the epithet, namely—in standard cases—in the smallest clause containing it (but see footnote 12).

(26) Epithet test

  • First variant: An exempt anaphor can be acceptable if replacing it with a coreferring epithet makes the sentence unacceptable.16

  • Second variant: An exempt anaphor can be acceptable if inserting a coreferring epithet in its domain makes the sentence unacceptable.17

The two variants are applied in (27b) and (27c), respectively, to test (27a): the unacceptability of the epithet cet idiot ‘the idiot’ when it is intended to refer to Robert shows that the anaphor son propre in (27a) can be exempt because it is anteceded by the attitude holder of its domain.

(27)

  • Roberti dit que soni/k rival a voté pour soni propre projet.

    ‘Roberti says that hisi/k rival voted for hisi own project.’

  • Roberti dit que soni/k rival a voté pour le projet de [cet idiot]*i/k.

    ‘Roberti says that hisi/k rival voted for [the idiot]*i/k’s project.’

  • Roberti dit que le rival de [cet idiot]*i/k a voté pour soni propre projet.

    ‘Roberti says that the rival of [the idiot]*i/k voted for hisi own project.’

The same tests are applied in (28b–c) to assess (28a) involving the exempt anaphor lui-même.

(28)

  • Selon Erici, sesi/k enfants ne dépendent que de luii-même.

    ‘According to Erici, hisi/k children only depend on himselfi.’

  • Selon Erici, sesi/k enfants ne dépendent que de [cet imbécile]*i/k .

    ‘According to Erici, hisi/k children only depend on [the fool]*i/k.’

  • Selon Erici, les enfants de [cet imbécile]*i/k ne dépendent que de luii-même.

    ‘According to Erici, [the fool]*i/k’s children only depend on himselfi.’

More generally, any element that cannot refer to the attitude holder of its context can be used as a test for reliably identifying anaphors that are in attitudinal conditions for exemption. As shown by Ruwet (1990), this is also the case for the French prepositional clitics en/y (‘≈ of him/her/it’), for instance (see Charnavel 2020 for further details). The application of such tests to the exempt anaphors son propre and lui-même confirms that they can be anteceded by the attitude holders of their context. As we will identify another type of logophoric antecedent for exempt anaphors, such tests are however not bidirectional: the acceptability of anti-attitudinal elements like epithets is not sufficient (but only necessary) to show that (cooccurring and coreferring) anaphors cannot be exempt. The failure of the epithet test (i.e., the epithet is acceptable) can yield ungrammaticality of coreferring exempt anaphors only if any other type of logophoric center has been excluded, as illustrated in (29).18

(29)

  • Luc a dit de Lisei que les professeurs étaient contents {a. d’ellei(*-même) / b. de [cet ange]i }.

  • ‘Luc said about Lisei that the teachers were happy about {a. heri(*self) / b. [that angel]i}.’

The notion of attitude holder as potential antecedent for exempt anaphors merges and replaces Sells’s (1987:457) notions of Source (“one who is the intentional agent of the communication”) and Self (“one whose mental state or attitude the content of the proposition describes”). It is more adequate because attitude holders independently form a natural class and because it makes better predictions about exemption: first, subjects of verbs of saying behave like subjects of verbs of mental attitude as antecedents of (French) exempt anaphors (see (27)), so it seems unnecessary to distinguish between Source and Self;19 conversely, a Source, when it is not an attitude holder, does not license logophoric exemption (at least in French), as shown in (30).

(30)

  • Irène tient de Pauli qu’hier, plusieurs journaux ont parlé {a. [du vantard]i / b. de luii(*-même)}.

  • ‘Irene learned from Pauli that yesterday, several newspapers talked about {a. [the braggart]i / b. himi(*self)}.’

Finally, the notion of attitude holder also includes centers of FID, which are introduced by specific discourse conditions (see, e.g., Banfield 1982, Schlenker 2004, Sharvit 2008, Eckardt 2014). The epithet test shows that such centers can also serve as antecedents of exempt anaphors.

(31)

  • Evei était très inquiète. Comment allait-elle faire? {a. Les enfants de [la pauvre femme]#i/k / b. Sesi propres enfants} et ceux du voisin refusaient de l’écouter depuis hier.

  • ‘Evei was very worried. How would she manage? {a. [The poor woman]#i/k’s children / b. Heri own children} and the neighbor’s had been refusing to listen to her since yesterday.’

The discourses in (31a–b) are intended to be read as FIDs conveying Eve’s thought. In particular, the indexical hier ‘yesterday’ can be shifted and refer to the day before the day on which Eve (vs. the speaker) had her thought (see, e.g., Banfield 1982, Schlenker 2004, for the claim that the shifting of time and location indexicals is a property of FID). Under this interpretation, the epithet la pauvre femme ‘the poor woman’ is unacceptable when referring to Eve in (31a), which shows that Eve behaves as the attitude holder of the discourse. As predicted by the epithet test, the anaphor son propre can therefore be exempt in (31b) under that interpretation.

2.1.3 Multiple Embedding of Attitude Contexts

When an exempt anaphor is contained in an attitude context that is embedded within another one, the anaphor can refer to either of the attitude holders.

(32)

  • [La mère de Julie]i pense que {ma/sai} propre mère devrait être élue.

  • ‘[Julie’s mother]i thinks that {my/heri} own mother should be elected.’

(33)

  • Christeli pense qu’Agnèsk a dit que l’avenir de Constant ne dépend que d’ellei/k-même.

  • ‘Christeli thinks that Agnesk said that Constant’s future depends only on herselfi/k.’

Sentences like (32) and (33) illustrate that French exempt anaphors need not refer to the closest attitude holder. This has also been observed for, among others, logophoric pronouns in Ewe (Clements 1975:173, Culy 1997:849–850, Pearson 2015:96) and Yoruba (Anand 2006:59–60), as well as for exempt anaphors in Mandarin (e.g., Pan 1997, Huang and Liu 2001, Anand 2006), Icelandic (e.g., Sells 1987:451), Malayalam (Jayaseelan 1998:20), Tamil (Sundaresan 2012:15, 38), Latin (Solberg 2017:20–21), and English (e.g., Ross 1970:227, Cantrall 1974:95, Keenan 1988:223). Thus, there is no syntactic constraint on where the attitude holder is structurally located.

In sum, attitude holders constitute a first type of logophoric antecedent that can exempt an anaphor from Condition A, as summarized in (34).

(34)

  • Referential possibilities of exempt anaphors (first generalization)

  • An exempt anaphor can refer to the attitude holder of its domain, which is determined on the basis of discourse and syntacticosemantic constraints and can be identified by various tests (e.g., first person test, epithet test).

2.1.4 De Se Attitude

When formulating the epithet test, I have specified that French exempt anaphors can be acceptable if they are anteceded by the thereby diagnosed attitude holders of their context. This is because these exempt anaphors must furthermore be read de se. This de se requirement was also observed for other exempt anaphors (e.g., Mandarin ziji: see Pan 1997, Huang and Liu 2001, Anand 2006; Italian proprio: see Chierchia 1989; Japanese zibun: see Oshima 2006) and logophoric pronouns (e.g., Yoruba oun, see Anand 2006, vs. Ewe , see Pearson 2015).20 It is illustrated in (35) and (36), where the (a) sentences (in which the context imposes a non–de se reading) contrast with the (b) sentences (where the anaphor is read de se).

(35)

graphic

(36)

graphic

Furthermore, not only must exempt anaphors referring to the attitude holder of their domain be read de se, but all other perspectival elements of their domain must be evaluated from the perspective of that logophoric center.21 For instance, if the subject of the embedded clause in (37a) is presented from the speaker’s perspective, thus licensing a first person exempt anaphor, the adjective affreuses ‘horrible’ must be evaluated by the speaker and the noun photos must be read de re; if it is presented from the attitude holder Loïc’s perspective, as in (37b), the adjective beaux ‘beautiful’ must accordingly be evaluated by Loïc and the noun portraits must be read de dicto. Mixing perspectives is not possible, as illustrated in (37c–d). In other words, the domain of an exempt anaphor (the subject constituent in (37)) can be logophorically ambiguous (because the logophoric center need not be the closest attitude holder, as seen in section 2.1.3), but cannot be logophorically heterogeneous. This is reminiscent of what happens in FID, where pronouns referring to the discourse center must be read de se, and de re non–de dicto readings of definite descriptions are prohibited (see Sharvit 2008). This type of example thus reveals the existence of what could be called “embedded FID.”

(37)

  • [Loïc mistakes photos of me (taken from behind) for portraits of himself and finds them beautiful while I think they are horrible.]

  • Loïci espère que {a. [les affreuses photos de moi-même] / b. [les beaux portraits de luii-même] / c. *[les beaux portraits de moi-même] / d. *[les affreuses photos de luii-même]} vont se vendre.

  • ‘Loïci hopes that {a. [the horrible photos of myself] / b. [the beautiful portraits of himselfi] / c. *[the beautiful portraits of myself] / d. *[the horrible photos of himselfi]} will sell.’

The same holds if the speaker is replaced with another third person attitude holder as in (38).

(38)

  • [Loïc mistakes photos of Mary (taken from behind) for portraits of himself and finds them beautiful while Mary thinks they are horrible.]

  • Loïci pense que Mariek espère que {a. [les affreuses photos d’ellek-même] / b. [les beaux portraits de luii-même] / c. *[les beaux portraits d’ellek-même] / d. *[les affreuses photos de luii-même]} vont se vendre.

  • ‘Loïci thinks that Maryk hopes that {a. [the horrible photos of herselfk] / b. [the beautiful portraits of himselfi] / c. *[the beautiful portraits of herselfk] / d. *[the horrible photos of himselfi]} will sell.’

Thus, attitudinal exempt anaphors are subject not only to referential constraints, but also to further interpretive constraints, summarized in (39).22

(39)

  • Interpretive constraints on attitudinal exempt anaphors

  • The domain of an attitudinal exempt anaphor must express the de se attitude of its antecedent (i.e., all perspectival elements of its domain must be evaluated from the first person perspective of its antecedent).

In sum, these examples show that there is only one logophoric center in the domain of an exempt anaphor (which is smaller than the clause here; see section 3.3 for further discussion about this). This is one reason why several exempt anaphors in the same domain must corefer (see, e.g., Pollard and Sag 1992, Huang and Liu 2001), as illustrated in (40)–(41). The other reason will be discussed in section 3.2.

(40)

  • *Juliei pense que ma propre mère et sai propre mère devraient se parler.

  • ‘*Juliei thinks that my own mother and heri own mother should talk.’

(41)

  • *Christeli pense qu’Agnèsk a dit que l’avenir de soni fils dépend à la fois d’ellei-même et de sonk propre fils.

  • ‘*Christeli thinks that Agnesk said that heri son’s future depends both on herselfi and on herk own son.’

2.2 Second Subtype of Logophoricity Relevant for Exemption: Empathy

Since exempt anaphors in French (and in many other languages) can also occur in nonattitude contexts, they do not have to refer to attitude holders. This is illustrated in (42) and (43), where the epithet test applied in (b)–(c) shows that the anaphors in (a) are not contained in an attitude context even if they are exempt.23

(42)

  • Le courage de Pauli a sauvé des flammes à la fois {a. sai propre maison et celle de ses voisins / b. la maison de [ce héros]i et celle de ses voisins / c. sai propre maison et celle des voisins de [ce héros]i}.

  • ‘Pauli’s courage saved from the fire both {a. hisi own house and his neighbors’ / b. [the hero]i’s house and his neighbors’ / c. hisi own house and [the hero]i’s neighbors’}.’

(43)

  • Emilek mérite que Sophiei pense à {a. luik-même et à sa famille / b. [cette crème]k et à sa famille / c. luik-même et à la famille de [cette crème]k}.

  • ‘Emilek deserves Sophiei thinking about {a. himselfk and his family / b. [that sweetheart]k and his family / c. himselfk and [that sweetheart]k’s family}.’

The notion of logophoricity relevant for exemption is therefore not necessarily related to attitude. There exists another type of logophoric center that can antecede an exempt anaphor: the empathy locus, which is not created by attitude contexts. The goal of this section is to establish the following threefold generalization by using a test detecting an empathy locus in its context:

(44) Exemption under empathic logophoricity

  • An exempt anaphor can refer to an empathy locus.

  • There is no syntactic constraint on where this empathy locus is structurally located (e.g., it need not be the closest empathy locus).

  • The domain of that anaphor must express the first person perceptual perspective of that empathy locus.

2.2.1 Empathy Locus

The linguistic notion of empathy was first discussed in the literature on Japanese (see, e.g., Kuno and Kaburaki 1977, Kuno 1987, 2004, Oshima 2006), where some items are lexically marked for perspective outside attitude contexts: for instance, the verbs of giving yaru and kureru share the same core meaning (‘give’) and case frame (nominative–dative), but yaru is used when the action is looked at from the referent-of-the-subject’s perspective or the neutral perspective, whereas kureru is used when the event is described from the referent-of-the-dative-object’s perspective (cf. Malayalam verbs of giving; Jayaseelan 1998). Empathy has also been shown to be relevant in other languages (e.g., in Mandarin; see, e.g., Anand and Hsieh 2005, Wang and Pan 2015). Following this literature, I define the empathy locus as the event participant that the speaker empathizes with—that is, identifies with from a sensory perspective.24 Empathy loci are thus perceptual centers of perspective: as opposed to attitude holders (intellectual centers of perspective), they are not triggered by intensional expressions, but can occur in nonattitude contexts when the speaker adopts another individual’s emotional or perceptual point of view. They partially overlap with Sells’s (1987) notions of Self and Pivot.25

Under logophoric conditions of empathy, the speaker puts herself in the empathy locus’s shoes and reports his first person perception, namely, what he could say if he had to formulate his experience in the first person. This is especially relevant for qualia, which are individual instances of subjective, conscious, and direct experience (as opposed to propositional attitudes, which can only be beliefs about them). For instance, Kuroda (1973) argues that Japanese predicates of internal state in the adjectival form (e.g., atui ‘be hot’) can only be used in the first person, unless they are (embedded under evidential markers or) used in the nonreportive style, in which the speaker adopts her character’s point of view to report what this character feels spontaneously, not reflectively; in that case, the anaphor zibun can be exempt if it refers to that character. This is the empathy counterpart of FID: while FID is used to report the thoughts of a character (intellectual, reflective perspective), empathy perspective is used to report the first person direct experience of a character (perceptual, immediate perspective).

In French, the expression son cher ‘his/her dear’ (cf. English beloved in Kuno 1987, Sells 1987) can be used as a diagnostic for identifying empathy loci: whether someone or something is dear to someone is subject to evaluation, and such an evaluation can only be directly made by the person experiencing the feeling (only I know whether someone is dear to me or not; nobody else really can, although someone may have grounds to believe it if I say so or show some signs of it26); in that sense, cher is both evaluative and first person. That is why the use of third person son cher ‘his/her dear’ requires empathy: the speaker must empathize with the referent of son cher (i.e., adopt her emotional perspective),27 which therefore must be human (or humanized) and alive.28

Son cher can thus be used to identify empathic exempt anaphors.

(45) Son cher test

  • First variant: An exempt anaphor can be acceptable if replacing it with coreferring son cher makes the sentence acceptable.

  • Second variant: An exempt anaphor can be acceptable if inserting coreferring son cher in its domain makes the sentence acceptable.

This test applied to (42)–(43) in (46)–(47) confirms that the anaphors son propre and lui-même can be exempt because they are anteceded by an empathy locus. The acceptability of a coreferring epithet in (48) further shows that the perspective relevant for son cher is not attitude.

(46)

  • Le courage de Pauli a sauvé des flammes à la fois {a. sai chère maison et celle de ses voisins / b. sai propre maison et celle de sesi chers voisins}.

  • ‘Pauli’s courage saved from the fire both {a. hisi dear house and his neighbors’ / b. hisi own house and hisi dear neighbors’ house}.’

(47)

  • Emilek mérite que Sophie pense à luik-même et à sak chère famille.

  • ‘Emilek deserves Sophie thinking about himselfk and hisk dear family.’

(48)

  • Le courage de Pauli a sauvé des flammes à la fois sai propre maison, celle de sesi chers enfants, et celle des voisins de [ce héros]i.

  • ‘Pauli’s courage saved from the fire hisi own house, hisi dear children’s house, and [the hero]i’s neighbors’ house.’

Furthermore, exempt anaphors need not refer to the closest potential empathy locus just as in the case of attitude holders). The antecedent of ses propres can be either Christel or Ninon in (49).

(49)

  • Christeli mérite que le futur métier de Ninonk corresponde à la fois à sesi/k propres aspirations et à celles de sa famille.

  • ‘Christeli deserves Ninonk’s future job corresponding to both heri/k own aspirations and those of her family.’

In sum, empathy loci constitute a second type of logophoric antecedent that can exempt an anaphor from Condition A, as summarized in (50).

(50)

  • Referential possibilities of exempt anaphors (second generalization)

  • An exempt anaphor can refer to the empathy locus of its domain, which is determined on the basis of discourse and syntacticosemantic constraints and can be identified by the son cher test.

2.2.2 Empathy Domain

Like attitudinal domains, empathy domains must be logophorically homogeneous: coreference between ses propres and sa chère in (51) and between lui-même and son propre in (52) is obligatory (cf. Kuno and Kaburaki’s (1977) ban on conflicting empathy loci).

(51)

  • Christeli mérite que le futur métier de Ninonk corresponde à la fois à sesk propres aspirations et à celles de sa*i/k chère famille.

  • ‘Christeli deserves Ninonk’s future job corresponding to both herk own aspirations and those of her*i/k dear family.’

(52)

  • Emilek ne mérite pas que les proches de Sophiei comparent ce portrait de luik-même à celui de son*i/k propre fils.

  • ‘Emilek does not deserve Sophiei’s relatives comparing this portrait of himselfk to that of {hisk/*heri} own son.’

This shows that empathic exempt anaphors are subject to the same interpretive constraints as attitudinal exempt anaphors: their domain must be presented from the first person perspective of a unique logophoric center.

(53)

  • Interpretive constraints on empathic exempt anaphors

  • The domain of an empathic exempt anaphor must express the first person perceptual perspective of its antecedent.

2.2.3 Mixing Empathy and Attitude

In cases where a sentence contains both a third person attitude holder and a potential empathy locus, the situation is more complex. In (54), for example, the exempt anaphor son propre can be anteceded either by le fils d’Antonin ‘Antonin’s son’, which refers to the attitude holder, or by Paul, which refers to the empathy locus. Furthermore, in the latter case, either the speaker or the attitude holder Antonin’s son can identify with Paul (cf. empathic perspective shift in Oshima 2006:175). But son propre preferably refers to Antonin’s son, which argues for the referential hierarchy in (55).

(54)

  • [Le fils d’Antonin]i a dit que le courage de Paulk avait sauvé des flammes la maison de son propre filsi/?k.

  • ‘[Antonin’s son]i said that Paulk’s courage saved from the fire hisi/?k own son’s house.’

(55)

  • Preference hierarchy of logophoric centers

  • attitude holder > empathy locus

This suggests that the domain of an exempt anaphor contained in an attitude context is preferably presented from the attitude holder’s perspective, but if discourse and syntacticosemantic factors (including the features of the anaphor) forbid this option, it can be presented from the perspective of another individual the attitude holder can identify with (cf. Kuno’s (1987) Empathy Hierarchy).

2.3 Irrelevance of Other Types of Antecedents for Exemption: The Case of Deictic Centers

So far, we have established that an exempt anaphor can be anteceded by an attitude holder or an empathy locus relevant in its domain. The goal of this section is to show that these are the only types of antecedents licensing exemption—in other words, that an anaphor with a different type of antecedent cannot be exempt.

This is the case not only for inanimate anaphors, as we have seen, but also for animate anaphors that refer neither to the attitude holder nor to the empathy locus of their domain. This is for instance the case for lui-même in (30), as confirmed by the result of the son cher test in (56). Similarly, in (57) the attitude holder is the speaker and the empathy locus is Joël’s son, the referent of the antecedent of son cher; consequently, third person exempt son propre can only refer to Joël’s son and cannot be anteceded by Joël or son cher frère ‘his dear brother’ (namely, Joël’s son’s brother).

(56)

  • Irènei tient de Paulk qu’hier, plusieurs journaux ont parlé de soni/*k cher fils.

  • ‘Irenei learned from Paulk that yesterday, several newspapers talked about {heri/*hisk} dear son.’

(57)

  • La générosité [du fils de Joëlm]i s’adresse à [soni cher frère]k ainsi qu’à soni/*k/*m propre fils.

  • ‘[Joëlm’s son]i’s generosity is aimed at [hisi dear brother]k as well as hisi/*k/*m own son.’

The referential possibilities of exempt anaphors stated above can thus be strengthened into the following referential constraints:

(58)

  • Referential constraints on exempt anaphors

  • An exempt anaphor must refer either to the attitude holder or to the empathy locus relevant in its domain.

This generalization is corroborated by the fact that anaphors with nonmental perspective centers as antecedents cannot be exempt. This section presents a detailed argument for this generalization by showing that in French, spatial perspective centers—call them, as in Oshima 2006, deictic centers29—cannot antecede exempt son propre and lui-même. This suggests, as I will elaborate on in section 2.5, that the creation of logophoric domains licensing exempt anaphors is only possible in the case of mental perspective. Unlike attitude holders and empathy loci, deictic centers are indeed not mental in nature (they can be inanimate), but only need to be located in space and oriented. Sells’s (1987) notion of Pivot should therefore be split into two categories: empathy loci, which can indeed antecede exempt anaphors, and deictic centers,30 which cannot.

(59)

graphic

2.3.1 Types of Deictic Centers

On the basis of Oshima’s (2006) observations about Japanese, I assume that there are two main types of deictic centers: those created by motion verbs like come, and those created by spatial prepositional expressions like to the right of or behind.

As has been observed in several languages (see, e.g., Talmy 1975, Fillmore 1997, Oshima 2006), certain motion verbs—for example, French venir ‘come’ and apporter ‘bring’—require that the speaker or the addressee be located at (or associated with) the goal of motion. This inference is sometimes analyzed as a presupposition (see, e.g., Oshima 2006, Sudo 2016).

(60)

  • Luc va venir à Lyon.

  • ‘Luc will come to Lyon.’

  • Inference: The {speaker/addressee} is {located in/associated with} Lyon.

Let us call the individual located at the goal of motion (i.e., the speaker or addressee in (60)) the deictic center. In attitude contexts, the deictic center can shift to the attitude holder (see Oshima 2007, Sudo 2016).

(61)

  • Luc espère que sa mère va venir à Lyon.

  • ‘Luc hopes that his mother will come to Lyon.’

  • Inference: The {speaker/addressee} or Luc is {located in/associated with} Lyon.

Furthermore, it has been observed (see, e.g., Fillmore 1997, Oshima 2006, Sudo 2016) that the deictic center need not be a discourse participant or an attitude holder in certain cases like (62). An explanation will be provided in section 2.5.

(62)

  • Comme Luc vivait seul, son fils s’efforçait de venir à Lyon chaque semaine.

  • ‘As Luc lived alone, his son tried hard to come to Lyon every week.’

  • Inference: Luc lived in Lyon.

Spatial prepositional expressions (cf. deictic angular expressions in Oshima 2006) like derrière ‘behind’ encode a spatial relation between two objects and require a deictic center for their interpretation, as illustrated in (63), based on figure 1.

(63)

  • L’épinette est derrière la jeune femme.

    ‘The virginal is behind the young woman.’ (from the speaker’s perspective)

  • L’épinette est devant la jeune femme.

    ‘The virginal is in front of the young woman.’ (from the woman’s perspective)

Figure 1

Johannes Vermeer, A Lady at the Virginal with a Gentleman (The Music Lesson), c. 1662–1664

Figure 1

Johannes Vermeer, A Lady at the Virginal with a Gentleman (The Music Lesson), c. 1662–1664

These spatial expressions give rise to two types of interpretation depending on the identity of the deictic center (see, e.g., Levinson 2003, Rooryck and Vanden Wyngaerd 2011). Under the intrinsic interpretation, the deictic center is the referent of the complement of the preposition (e.g., the woman in (63b)) and must be intrinsically oriented (human beings have a back). Under the relative interpretation, the deictic center is a reference point (e.g., the speaker in (63a)) distinct from the two objects spatially located (the musical instrument and the woman), and in that case, the complement of the preposition need not be intrinsically oriented (e.g., it could be a ball).

These two types of interpretation are lexically distinguished in French in the case of spatial expressions involving the notions of right and left: à la gauche/droite de ‘to the left/right of’ (with a definite article) triggers the intrinsic interpretation, as in (64a), and à gauche/droite de ‘on the left/right of’ (without a definite article) the relative interpretation, as in (64b).

(64)

  • La jeune femme est à #(la) droite du professeur de musique.

    ‘The young woman is to the right of the music teacher.’ (from the teacher’s perspective)

  • La jeune femme est à (#la) gauche du professeur de musique.

    ‘The young woman is on the left of the music teacher.’ (from the speaker’s perspective)

2.3.2 Testing Exempt Anaphors in the Presence of Deictic Centers

To test whether deictic centers license exemption, we need to guarantee that the antecedent of a given exempt anaphor is the deictic center but is neither an attitude holder nor an empathy locus. As we will see in section 2.5, this is impossible in the case of motion verbs, which interestingly require their deictic centers to be either attitudinal or empathic. However, this can be the case in examples like (65a–b) involving a spatial prepositional expression. The antecedents of the exempt anaphors sa propre and lui-même in (65) are neither attitudinal nor empathic, given that the sentences are intended to be interpreted as neutral descriptions of the painting in figure 1.31 But these antecedents are intended to be the deictic centers since, as mentioned above, à la droite de ‘to the right of’ forces the intrinsic interpretation. In these conditions, the exempt anaphors are crucially not licensed.

(65)

  • A la droite du professeuri, sai (*propre) élève semble jouer de l’épinette.

    ‘To the right of the teacheri, hisi (*own) student seems to play the virginal.’

  • A la droite du professeuri, un portrait de luii(*-même) est accroché au-dessus de l’épinette.

    ‘To the right of the teacheri, a portrait of himi(*self) hangs above the virginal.’

The same holds with inanimates, which can in principle be deictic centers, since they can be located in space and oriented: examples like (66) show that even when they are deictic centers, inanimates cannot antecede exempt anaphors. Importantly, this further supports the generalization discussed in section 1.1, according to which inanimates can never antecede exempt anaphors because, lacking a mental state, they can never be logophoric. That the notion of logophoricity pertinent for exemption is restricted to mental perspective (pace, e.g., Sells 1987) is thereby confirmed.

(66)

  • Le tableau à la gauche de [l’épinette]i pourrait contenir une représentation d’ellei(*-même).

  • ‘The painting on the left of [the virginal]i could contain a representation of iti(*self).’

In sum, deixis does not create sufficient conditions for logophoric exemption.

(67)

  • Irrelevance of deictic centers for exemption

  • Deictic centers cannot exempt anaphors from Condition A by anteceding them.

2.4 Analysis: The Logophoric Operator Hypothesis (Part 1)

The generalization that we have now established using various tests is as follows: an anaphor can be exempt if it is anteceded by an attitude holder or an empathy locus and occurs in a domain expressing the first person perspective of its antecedent. This generalization can be derived by making the following hypotheses: (a) attitude holders and empathy loci form a linguistically relevant category: logophoric center; (b) in a given domain (i.e., a Spell-Out domain, as will be specified in section 3), the relevant logophoric center can be syntactically represented by a silent logophoric pronoun prolog introduced by a logophoric operator Oplog (as its subject); (c) Oplog imposes the first person perspective of the logophoric center on its complement α (see (68b)); (d) exempt anaphors are bound by prolog (see (68a)).

(68)

  • [prolog-i [Oplog [ . . . exempt anaphori . . . ]]]

  • graphic
    Oplog
    graphic
    = λα. λx. α from x’s first person perspective32

The first part of the generalization (exempt anaphors must be anteceded by attitude holders or empathy loci) is thus derived by the hypothesis that exempt anaphors are bound by prolog, which refers to the local logophoric center. Indeed, I assume that the notion of logophoric center encompasses the notions of attitude holders and empathy loci. In each domain, the value of the logophoric center is determined on the basis of various discourse and syntacticosemantic factors such as the presence of intensional predicates or contextual clues construing an individual as perspectival center (cf., e.g., Sells 1987, Anand and Hsieh 2005, Sharvit 2008). The role of prolog is to reference that value in the syntax (cf., e.g., Jayaseelan 1998, Speas 2004), which can be identified using the tests defined above (i.e., first person, epithet, and son cher tests) that are independent of anaphoricity.

The second part of the generalization (exempt anaphors must occur in a domain expressing the first person perspective of their antecedent) is derived by the hypothesis that exempt anaphors are in the scope of Oplog, which imposes the first person perspective of its silent subject prolog on its complement α (which can vary in size, as will be specified in section 3). Logophoric operators (first proposed in Koopman and Sportiche 1989) have already been argued to derive de se reading requirements of pronouns and anaphors (see Anand 2006,33). However, as further observed in section 2.1.4, not only must attitudinal exempt anaphors be read de se—all perspectival elements occurring in the same domain must match up with exempt anaphors. Moreover, we have seen that in the case of empathy, a logophoric domain expresses the subjective perceptual perspective of the empathy locus. What unifies these observations, I propose, is the notion of first person perspective: in all cases, the content of the logophoric domain corresponds to what the logophoric center could (or did) express in a direct discourse in the first person, reporting his thoughts or formulating his experience (cf. Kuno 1972). The role of Oplog is to impose this first person perspective on its complement. I therefore hypothesize that Oplog is similar to the FID operator (see Sharvit 2008), which forces all expressions in its scope to be interpreted from the FID center’s perspective.34

This analysis improves upon previous analyses for several reasons. Here, I concentrate on the aspects deriving the specific interpretation of exempt anaphors as compared with plain anaphors. In section 3.1, I will focus on the aspects deriving the local binding of exempt anaphors.

Instead of assuming that exempt anaphors inherit their referential constraints from a silent logophoric binder, some have proposed that they are lexically marked as logophoric by a feature [+log]. Under this hypothesis, exempt anaphors are pronouns intrinsically specified as referring to a logophoric center. A first version of this hypothesis, mentioned by Kuno (1987) and Sells (1987), among others, assumes that the feature [+log] is specified on some DPs such as the subjects of predicates of communication or consciousness, and exempt anaphors must be anteceded by such DPs due to their lexical marking. In other words, they are directly anteceded by an overt logophoric center, instead of being bound by a silent element (prolog) referring to that center.

One issue with this hypothesis is that it is not sufficient to derive the logophoric interpretation of exempt anaphors, as it does not derive the second part of the generalization. In fact, Kuno (1987:120) himself notes that it must be additionally specified that the anaphor must be in the corresponding logophoric domain. This is the property derived by the presence of the logophoric operator Oplog, which imposes the first person perspective of its subject prolog on its complement. The presence of Oplog is inspired by the second version of the [+log] hypothesis, which is to suppose that exempt anaphors, like any element specified as [+log], must be bound via Oplog (see, e.g., Koopman and Sportiche 1989, Speas 2004, Anand 2006). Specifically, most of these previous analyses suppose that Oplog occurs in a dedicated left-peripheral projection, which is traditionally the locus of the syntax-pragmatics interface (see, e.g., Rizzi 1997, Cinque 1999), and that it specifies the CP in its scope as its logophoric domain. This guarantees that the exempt anaphor occurs in the relevant logophoric domain.

This second version of the [+log] hypothesis also faces several issues. First, some of its implementations constrain the logophoric center represented by Oplog to be the closest attitude holder (e.g., Speas 2004). As we have seen, this undergenerates, as exempt anaphors in French (and in at least some other languages) need be anteceded neither by the closest attitude holder (see section 2.1.3) nor in fact by an attitude holder at all (see section 2.2). Instead, we must allow Oplog to represent the perspective of a structurally unconstrained attitude holder or empathy locus: the operator is not lexically introduced by some attitude verbs, but references the logophoric center determined on the basis of a combination of discourse and syntacticosemantic factors.

Second, this type of hypothesis cannot deal with plain anaphors in a parsimonious way, given that exempt anaphors are intrinsically hypothesized to be marked [+log]. Under the strong parsimonious assumption that all instances of anaphors are lexically identical, inanimate anaphors of the same form as exempt anaphors are predicted not to exist. This is clearly too strong for French, among other languages. Under the weak parsimonious assumption that [+log] is limited to animate anaphors, all animate anaphors are predicted to be logophoric. This is what Jayaseelan (1998), Sundaresan (2012), and Nishigauchi (2014) argue is the case for Malayalam taan, Tamil taan, and Japanese zibun, respectively. But this makes an incorrect prediction for (at least) French: overtly locally bound animate anaphors and overtly nonlocally bound animate anaphors do behave differently. Indeed, the former can behave like inanimate anaphors in not having to be anteceded by a logophoric center, as I now show.

The results of the previous sections provide the diagnostics for making this point.35 The first diagnostic is that overtly locally bound animate anaphors need not be anteceded by an attitude holder or an empathy locus (unlike overtly nonlocally bound anaphors; see (29) and (57)). This is illustrated in (69), where the context (description of a painting) and the use of mon cher preclude the referent of the antecedent of sa propre (the music teacher) from being an empathy locus.

(69)

  • Sur ce tableau peint par mon cher oncle, [le professeur de musique]i est placé à droite de sai propre élève.

  • ‘On this painting by my dear uncle, [the music teacher]i is placed on the right of hisi own student.’

The second diagnostic is that overtly locally bound animate anaphors need not be read de se even when they are coreferential with the attitude holder of their context, unlike overtly nonlocally bound anaphors (see (35)–(36)).36 In (70), for instance, the anaphor lui-même referring to the attitude holder Michel and locally bound by the (de re) pronoun il ‘he’ is acceptable even if it is not read de se.37 The same point can be made using intensional transitive verbs that take nonpropositional complements behaving like attitude contexts (see, e.g., Grodzinsky 2007, Schwarz to appear; see also illustrations in Charnavel 2020:chap. 3).

(70)

  • [Michel is listening to songs that he and his students recorded, as well as to the reactions of the singers afterward. Michel claims, “One of the singers seems to be very proud of himself.” Unbeknownst to him, that singer is actually Michel himself.]

  • Micheli a dit qu’ili était fier de luii-même.

  • ‘Micheli said that hei was proud of himselfi.’

(71) Tests for identifying plain animate anaphors

  • If an animate anaphor is anteceded neither by an attitude holder nor by an empathy locus, it is plain.

  • If an animate anaphor in an attitude context refers to the attitude holder and is not read de se, it is plain.

Under [+log] hypotheses, the same anaphor (e.g., lui-même) must thus have two lexical entries, one marked [+log] and the other [–log], and it must be stipulated that the [–log] feature comes with locality requirements. Given that the ambiguity between plain and exempt anaphors is present in many unrelated languages, the same stipulations must furthermore be made in many languages independently. It should be clear that the hypothesis proposed here does not make such a claim: the apparent ambiguity of anaphors derives solely from the nature of their binder, not from the anaphors themselves.

Third, the standard version of the [+log] hypothesis (e.g., Koopman and Sportiche 1989, Speas 2004, Anand 2006) constrains the logophoric domain to be a CP. As we will see in sections 3.2 and 3.3, this is both too weak and too strong. It is too weak because the [+log] hypothesis, which in effect equates exempt anaphors with pronouns, predicts that they can be nonexhaustively bound. At first glance, this appears to be a good prediction, given that exempt anaphors can have partial or split antecedents, as mentioned in section 1.2. But in fact, this means that the hypothesis is not sufficient to derive exhaustive coreference of logophors in the same domain (see section 3.2). This hypothesis is furthermore too strong because logophoric domains can be smaller than CPs (see section 3.3).

The latter issue also arises with another type of hypothesis found in the literature (Huang and Liu 2001), which derives the perspectival interpretation of exempt anaphors by positing movement to perspectival projections at the left periphery of CPs (i.e., SourceP, Self P, PivotP, based on Sells’s (1987) proposal). However, this proposal does not face the parsimony issues faced by [+log] hypotheses, as it aims to reduce exempt anaphors to plain anaphors by arguing that exempt anaphors move to a position where they can be locally bound by their overt antecedent (see more details in section 3.1). But several points about how the logophoric interpretation of exempt anaphors is derived remain unclear: how to force exempt anaphors, but not plain anaphors, to move to such projections; how to allow several coreferring exempt anaphors to move to the same projection; how to ban cooccurring exempt anaphors from moving to different projections (e.g., SourceP and PivotP), which would wrongly permit disjointness; how to guarantee, in the case of multiple embedding, that the anaphor moves to the semantically adequate perspectival projection and is still in a position local to its antecedent. Under the proposed hypothesis, the operator local to the anaphor instead simply references the relevant logophoric center in the local syntactic domain.

In sum, the presence of a single logophoric operator in the domain of exempt anaphors, whose subject binds them, and the absence of logophoric marking on the anaphors themselves, are two ingredients crucial to the present hypothesis as compared with previous ones. The other important ingredient that I will examine and motivate in section 3 is the restriction of the logophoric domain to the Spell-Out domain of anaphors. Before doing so, I would like to offer some suggestions regarding why the notion of logophoricity should be restricted as it is to license exemption and how general the relevance of this notion is.

2.5 Toward Grounding and Extending the Notion of Logophoricity

On the basis of the behavior of French anaphors, we have established that the perspective centers that can antecede exempt anaphors are exclusively attitude holders and empathy loci, which implies, contra Sells (1987), that the notion of logophoricity relevant for exemption should be restricted to mental perspective. We have also seen that a crucial interpretive property of exempt anaphors is that they must occur in the domain expressing the first person perspective of their antecedent. I suggest that these two generalizations are directly linked: exempt anaphors must be anteceded by mental perspective centers because only mental perspective can create logophoric domains that can contain them. The reason for this is that only mental perspective has a content that can be linguistically expressed. This is directly reflected by the typical syntactic structure of mental attitudes, where the clausal complement of a verb (e.g., think) denotes the content of the perspective expressed by the verb (e.g., the content of the thoughts). The same happens even if the expression introducing the attitude is not a verb, but a noun (like opinion), is an adverbial expression (like according to), or is covert (as in FID): the content of the attitude is denoted by a clause or a phrase. Similarly, all empathy contexts denote the content of emotions or perceptions and can thus be assimilated to clausal complements of verbs expressing emotions or perceptions. However, spatial perspective has no linguistic content. In fact, the only way to give some linguistic content to spatial perspective is to add a perceptual component to it (e.g., see that), which thereby turns spatial perspective into empathy or attitude. No linguistic domain can therefore be created that would express the content of spatial perspective.

Exempt anaphors can thus only refer to perspective centers that can mentally represent the content of their perspective. This restriction has led me to hypothesize (in section 2.4) that the category of logophoric center defined as mental perspective center encompassing attitude holders and empathy loci is linguistically pertinent and can be syntactically represented via logophoric operators. If this is correct, we could reasonably expect that French anaphors are not the only elements sensitive to this notion. We have already seen in section 2 that other anaphors (e.g., in Japanese, English, Mandarin) seem to behave similarly. I will now mention further facts, beyond anaphora, that seem to confirm this expectation and independently motivate the linguistic notion of logophoricity as just described.

The obvious candidates for conforming to this definition of logophoricity should be the elements at the origin of this notion, namely, logophoric pronouns. The literature on logophoric pronouns in African languages is quite heterogeneous and does not reach a clear conclusion (for a review, see Charnavel et al. 2017:sec. 5). The generalization that seems to emerge from most studies is that logophoric pronouns are licensed in attitude contexts where they refer to the attitude holder (e.g., Pearson 2015). But many counterexamples to this generalization are documented. First, logophoric pronouns can appear in clauses that are not typical complements of attitude verbs, such as clauses following psychological constructions, adjunct clauses,38 or relative clauses, as illustrated in (72)–(74).

(72)

  • Ewe

  • E-do dyidzo na ama be yè-dyi vi.

  • PRO-put-forth happiness to Ama that LOG-bear child

  • ‘It made Ama happy that she bore a child.’

  • (Clements 1975:163)

(73)

  • Ewe

  • Devi-a xo tohehe be yè-a-ga-da alakpa ake o.

  • child-D receive punishment so.that LOG-T-P-tell lie again NEG

  • ‘The child received punishment so that he wouldn’t tell lies again.’

  • (Clements 1975:160)

(74)

  • Tuburi

  • Á Dīk tí m

    graphic
    y mà:gā s
    graphic
    kó n sú: mònò.

  • he think to young.woman RELLOG see RESUMPT yesterday CORR

  • ‘He thinks about the young woman he saw yesterday.’

  • (Hagège 1974:299)

Second, (at least some) logophoric pronouns can appear in matrix clauses. This is for instance the case in Ewe when the logophoric pronoun is part of a complex reflexive (Pearson 2015). This is also the case of the logophoric n-pronoun in Abe as long as it refers to a human being and is disjoint from any cooccurring o-pronoun (Koopman and Sportiche 1989).

(75)

  • Ewe

  • %Kofi ponu nay yè ɖokui.

  • Kofi talk PRPLOGREFL

  • ‘Kofi talked to himself.’

  • (Pearson 2015:95)

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A careful reading of the literature suggests that such data are more frequent than is usually assumed, but are obscured by the fact that in those cases, logophoric pronouns are often assumed to be homophonous with other elements such as independent pronouns, reflexives, or emphatics (e.g., von Roncador 1992). In view of such data, a hypothesis that naturally arises is that (some) logophoric pronouns may in fact be licensed not only in attitude contexts, but also in empathy contexts: extending the notion of logophoricity defined as mental perspective rather than attitude to (some) logophoric pronouns could solve many empirical issues. Although testing this hypothesis would require a detailed examination of logophoric pronouns that goes beyond the scope of this article, it suggests that the proposed definition of logophoricity may well be relevant beyond (French) anaphora.

Other pronominal elements besides African logophoric pronouns may also be sensitive to this notion of logophoricity. For instance, Malayalam taan is often described as an anaphor, but its compliance with Condition B seems to characterize it as a (logophoric) pronoun instead (e.g., Jayaseelan 1998). Moreover, taan is licensed not only in attitude contexts, but also outside them in environments such as (77), which bear a striking resemblance to the empathy contexts discussed here.39

(77)

  • Malayalam

  • tani-te makkal-ude perumaattam Johni-inc weedanippiccu.

  • REFL-GEN children-GEN behavior John-ACC pained

  • ‘Hisi children’s behavior pained Johni.’

  • (Jayaseelan 1998:19)

Finally, another type of fact that seems to independently motivate the notion of logophoricity as mental perspective relates to deictic perspective. We saw in section 2.3 that deictic centers are irrelevant for exemption. But there is a complication that distinguishes between the two kinds of deictic expressions we discussed. Unlike spatial prepositional expressions, motion verbs do interact with logophoric exemption: in the presence of a motion verb, the deictic center must corefer with the antecedent of an exempt anaphor. For instance, the attitude holder or empathy locus anteceding the exempt anaphor in (78a) and (79a), respectively, must be the deictic center.

(78)

  • [Le fils d’Isa]i craint que le mauvais temps n’empêche {a. soni propre fils/un ami de luii-même et de sa femme / b. soni fils/un ami à luii et à sa femme} de venir à Lyon.

  • ‘[Isa’s son]i is afraid that bad weather will prevent {a. hisi own son/a friend of hisi and his wife / b. hisi son/a friend of hisi and his wife from coming to Lyon.’

  • Inference in (a): Isa’s son is located in (or associated with) Lyon.

  • Inference in (b): Isa’s son or the speaker/addressee is located in (or associated with) Lyon.

(79)

  • [Le fils d’Isa]i mérite que les conditions climatiques permettent {a. à soni propre fils/aux amis de luii-même et de sa femme / b. à soni fils/aux amis à luii et à sa femme} de venir à Lyon.

  • ‘[Isa’s son]i deserves weather conditions allowing {a. hisi own son/friends of hisi and his wife / b. hisi son/friends of hisi and his wife} to come to Lyon.’

  • Inference in (a): Isa’s son is located in (or associated with) Lyon.

  • Inference in (b): Isa’s son or the speaker/addressee is located in (or associated with) Lyon.

This does not hold in the case of spatial prepositional expressions: son propre and lui-même anteceded by le fils d’Isa ‘Isa’s son’—the attitude holder in (80) and the empathy locus in (81)—are exempt even if the use of à droite de (without definite article) forces a relative interpretation; that is, the speaker, not the antecedent, is the deictic center.

(80)

  • [Le fils d’Isa]i craint que son ennemi ne soit placé à droite de {soni propre fils/luii-même} sur la photo.

  • ‘[Isa’s son]i is afraid that his enemy may be placed to the right of {hisi own son/ himselfi} in the picture.’

(81)

  • [Le fils d’Isa]i mérite qu’on place son ami à droite de {soni propre fils/luii-même} sur la photo.

  • ‘[Isa’s son]i deserves that his friend be placed to the right of {hisi own son/himselfi} in the picture.’

The deictic center must thus refer to a mental perspective center in the case of motion verbs, but not in the case of spatial prepositional expressions. This difference can be explained by hypothesizing that motion verbs like come (unlike spatial prepositional expressions) lexically require their deictic center to refer to a logophoric center as defined above. The previously proposed presuppositional restriction of come can thus be reanalyzed as a selectional restriction: motion verbs take a silent logophoric argument, which must be bound via a logophoric operator, just like French exempt anaphors; in other words, come roughly means ‘move to a location associated with the logophoric center’. Given that, as we have seen, a given logophoric domain cannot represent a mixed perspective, this explains why an exempt anaphor appearing in the same domain as come must corefer with the deictic center of come: both must be bound by the logophoric center of their domain (see Charnavel 2018a for a similar conclusion about Mandarin).

(82)

  • Logophoric sensitivity of motion verbs

  • Motion verbs like come take a silent logophor as their implicit argument, which must be bound by prolog.

In sum, the behavior of several elements besides French exempt anaphors suggests that the notion of logophoricity as mental perspective is more generally linguistically pertinent, but further research is needed to confirm this.

3 Further Motivating the Logophoric Operator Hypothesis: Locality Effects

Recall that under the proposed hypothesis, exempt anaphors are reduced to plain anaphors because they are locally bound by a silent logophoric binder. In section 2, I specified and motivated the logophoric nature of their binder. The goal of this section is to independently justify the locality of their binder. After further specifying the logophoric operator hypothesis as compared with previous hypotheses in section 3.1, I will provide independent arguments for it in sections 3.23.4.

3.1 The Logophoric Operator Hypothesis (Part 2)

I explained in section 2.4 how binding of exempt anaphors via logophoric operators derives their interpretive constraints. The logophoric operator hypothesis can further explain why exempt anaphors are morphologically identical to plain anaphors if we hypothesize that Oplog provides exempt anaphors with a local binder, thus reducing them to plain anaphors. This requires assuming that Oplog can appear in the binding domain of anaphors, namely, in their Spell-Out domain (smallest tensed TP, vP, DP, or any other XP with a subject containing them), according to the hypothesis in Charnavel and Sportiche 2016 (see section 1). I thus posit the possible presence of a logophoric projection LogP in each Spell-Out domain, which is headed by Oplog.40 This reflects the intuition (which I will support in section 3.3) that each phase can be specified as being presented from some individual’s or individuals’ perspective. Oplog takes a silent logophoric pronoun prolog as subject, which binds all logophors in its domain, including exempt anaphors.

(83) The syntactic status of logophoric operators

  • Each Spell-Out domain (tensed TP, vP, DP, or any other XP with a subject) can contain a dedicated perspectival projection LogP for Oplog in its left periphery.

  • Oplog is a head taking a logophoric pronoun prolog as subject.

The logophoric pronoun prolog thus provides an A-binder for exempt anaphors, which are thereby reduced to plain anaphors obeying Condition A.41 The apparent difference between plain and exempt anaphors is due to the fact that plain anaphors are bound within their Spell-Out domain by an overt binder (DP in (84b)) and exempt anaphors by a silent binder (prolog in (84a)). This silent binder does not require a binder, nor even an overt antecedent, in the sentence ((DP) in (84a)) since prolog references the value of the logophoric center in the syntax, which is determined on the basis of discourse and syntacticosemantic conditions (see section 2.4). That is why the local binding relation between an exempt anaphor and its silent binder prolog can be misconstrued as an unconstrained relation between the anaphor and the antecedent of prolog, which creates the illusion that the anaphor disobeys Condition A. In fact, plain and exempt anaphors are one and the same object obeying Condition A—visibly for the former, invisibly for the latter.

(84)

graphic

The next sections present arguments independently motivating the hypothesis that prolog serves as an A-binder for exempt anaphors. The coreferential constraints on cooccurring exempt anaphors shown in section 3.2 will demonstrate that prolog exhaustively and locally binds exempt anaphors. The possible shifts of logophoric centers within clauses described in section 3.3 will support the restriction of logophoric domains to Spell-Out domains. Finally, the mediation of prolog between exempt anaphors and their apparent antecedents will be further justified in section 3.4 by the fact that it derives the other specific distributional properties of exempt anaphors (apparent nonexhaustive binding and strict readings).

In sections 1.3 and 2.4, we saw that this hypothesis is superior to hypotheses attributing a [+log] feature to exempt anaphors, which must postulate some kind of homophony between plain and exempt anaphors and stipulate the correlation between logophoricity and nonlocality found in so many languages. It is also superior to the other type of hypothesis found in the literature that aims to reduce exempt anaphors to plain anaphors: instead of positing a silent binder for exempt anaphors,42 this type of hypothesis argues that exempt anaphors move to a position where they can be locally bound by their overt antecedent. The first version of this hypothesis (e.g., Pica 1987, Battistella 1989, Cole, Hermon, and Sung 1990) reduces long-distance binding to local binding by successive head movement at LF. It is clearly inapplicable to French anaphors and the like, which are morphologically complex (they are not heads). The second version instead assumes XP-movement of the anaphor and XP-adjunction to the IP below its antecedent (Huang and Tang 1991) or to perspectival projections (SourceP, SelfP, PivotP) in the left periphery of the CP just below the antecedent (Huang and Liu 2001). All these versions of the movement hypothesis face important issues. First, it is unclear how this kind of hypothesis can derive the fact that exempt anaphors need not be c-commanded by their antecedent. Second, they predict that an exempt anaphor cannot have its antecedent outside an island containing it, which is incorrect, as illustrated below for French and discussed in Charnavel et al. 2017. Under the hypothesis entertained here, the anaphor is instead bound within the island by prolog introduced by Oplog contained in its Spell-Out domain.

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  • Clairei espère que les voisins seront là [quand des lettres addressées à ellei-même ou à son mari arriveront].

  • ‘Clairei hopes that the neighbors will be present [when letters addressed to herselfi or her husband arrive].’

Third, in this family of proposals, the perspectival interpretation of exempt anaphors can only be explained under Huang and Liu’s (2001) version, which constrains the movement of exempt anaphors to be driven by perspectival considerations (despite some issues, as seen in section 2.4). These various issues thus show that in order to reduce exempt to plain anaphors, assuming the presence of a silent logophoric binder in their binding domain is more successful than assuming covert movement to the binding domain of their apparent antecedents.

3.2 Independent Evidence for Local A-Binding from Local Exhaustive Coreference

Recall that superficially, exempt anaphors allow partial or split antecedents (see section 1.2), or possibly even no syntactically represented antecedent at all (see section 2.1). As I have explained, however, assuming that exempt anaphors are not lexically marked as logophoric and are bound by a logophoric pronoun in their binding domain reduces them to a subcase of plain anaphors. Given that plain anaphors cannot have partial or split antecedents (see section 1.2), this predicts that exempt anaphors must be exhaustively bound by this logophoric pronoun (but crucially not by their apparent overt antecedent; see section 3.4.1).43 This prediction is correct, as shown by (86).

(86)

  • *Christeli pense qu’Agnèsk a dit que l’avenir de soni fils dépend d’ellesi+k-mêmes et de sonk propre fils.

  • ‘*Christeli thinks that Agnesk said that heri son’s future depends on themselvesi+k and herk own son.’

We saw in section 2.1.4 that the perspective of a local domain must be homogeneous, so that only one logophoric center can be represented in the domain of elles-mêmes and son propre. But this ban on perspective conflicts should not exclude (86) from being represented as (87), where prolog partially binds themselves and exhaustively binds her own; this corresponds to a direct discourse involving we and I.

(87) *Christeli thinks that Agnesk said that heri son’s future [vP prolog-k depends on themselvesi+k and herk own son].

Indeed, the availability of a plural pronoun including a singular de se center is attested independently, in the case of logophoric pronouns (e.g., Hyman and Comrie 1981:32, Frajzyngier 1985: 26, Sells 1987:449), partial control constructions (e.g., Landau 2015, Pearson 2016), and FID (e.g., Eckardt 2014): PRO, logophoric pronouns, and pronouns referring to the FID center must be read de se (see section 2.1.4), and (88)–(90) show that these elements can be plural and partially refer to the logophoric center.

(88)

(89)

  • Ewe

  • kofi kpɔ be yèwo-do go.

  • Kofi see COMPLOG-PL-come out

  • ‘Kofii saw that theyi+k had come out.’

  • (Sells 1987:449)

(90)

  • We simply must pay Cargill something! shei thought. And tomorrow was the day of the Mothers’ Union tea, and theyi+k had finished the novel that Miss Foote had been reading to themi+k. The question was, what to get for them next?

  • (George Orwell, A Clergyman’s Daughter; quoted in Eckardt 2014:2)

Exempt anaphors, however, cannot similarly partially refer to the logophoric center: (86) shows that two exempt anaphors in the same domain cannot be partially coreferential, which argues against representation (87), where themselves is partially bound by the logophoric pronoun. In other words, allowing exempt anaphors to be nonexhaustively bound (which previous hypotheses using logophoric operators in effect do, since they equate exempt anaphors with logophoric pronouns and pronouns can be nonexhaustively bound) overgenerates in giving rise to the possibility of partial coreference of exempt anaphors in the same domain. On the contrary, hypothesizing that exempt anaphors must be exhaustively bound, just like plain anaphors, correctly derives the contrast between (86) and (88)–(90).44

The hypothesis that exempt anaphors must be exhaustively bound by their logophoric binders also directly derives the unacceptability of disjoint exempt anaphors in the same domain illustrated in (41) and represented here (cf. (52)).

(91) *Christeli thinks that Agnesk said that her son’s future [vP prolog-i+k depends both on herselfi and on herk own son].

If representation (91) were available, elle-même and son propre would each be partially bound by (or coreferential with) the plural logophoric pronoun and (41) should be acceptable, contrary to fact. Note however that in that case, a ban on perspective conflicts is sufficient to rule out (41) (as noted in section 2.1.4): unlike (86), (41) has no viable direct discourse counterpart, as two first person pronouns in the same root clause cannot be disjoint.

In sum, exempt anaphors in the same domain must be referentially identical, but the pragmatic constraints on perspective can only exclude cases of disjointness, not those of partial coreference. This demonstrates that exempt anaphors are in fact plain anaphors that must be exhaustively bound, and therefore provides independent evidence for the presence of a silent local A-binder (given that their apparent overt antecedents can be split or partial).

Finally, it also follows from this analysis that anaphors cooccurring in the same domain can however be disjoint if one of them has an overt local antecedent. (92) shows that this is borne out: sa propre can be bound by Cyril and elle-même by prolog (given that anaphors are not subject to intervention effects in their local domain).

(92)

  • Solangei pense que Cyrilk est [vP tk prolog-i fier d’ellei-même et de sak propre fille].45

  • ‘Solangei thinks that Cyrilk is [vP tk prolog-i proud of herselfi and hisk own daughter].’

3.3 Evidence for Nonclausal Logophoric Domains

We have observed that in many cases, there is only one perspective per clause due to discourse and syntacticosemantic conditions. This is the intuition motivating proposals hypothesizing the presence of at most one logophoric operator per CP (e.g., Koopman and Sportiche 1989, Speas 2004, Anand 2006). Unlike these proposals, the present hypothesis allows, but does not require, a given CP to have a single perspective: perspective switch between phases is permitted (cf. Sundaresan 2012 46) if the discourse and syntacticosemantic conditions allow it. As I now show, this is a desirable consequence, which has analytical implications.

First, recall from (37)–(38) that DPs within embedded attitude contexts can be presented from the speaker’s perspective, while the rest of the attitude context is presented from the closest attitude holder’s perspective; under the present hypothesis, the logophoric operator(s) within such DPs can accordingly reference a logophoric center different from that referenced by the operator(s) in the rest of the attitude context.

Second, new logophoric centers can be introduced within clauses. This is for instance the case when nouns with potential mental content like journal ‘diary’ in (93) occur within attitude contexts. In such cases, exempt anaphors can be disjoint within the same clause (sa propre vs. elle-même in (93)) as long as they occur in different perspectival and Spell-Out domains. Similarly, other perspectival expressions such as evaluative adjectives can also be relativized to different perspective centers: in (93), étrange ‘strange’ must be (at least) evaluated by Paul’s daughter, and ignobles ‘horrible’ (at least) by Paul’s granddaughter.

(93)

  • [La fille de Paul]i explique que [TP prolog-i l’étrange journal de [sai propre fille]k rapporte

  • [DP prolog-k les ignobles remarques des médias sur ellek-même]].

  • ‘[Paul’s daughter]i explains that [TP prolog-i [heri own daughter]k’s strange diary relates

  • [DP prolog-k the media’s horrible remarks about herselfk]].’

This shows that a perspectival domain is not necessarily a clause, but can be a smaller constituent. This reflects the intuition that one cannot only hold a perspective about a tensed clause; one can also hold a perspective about an event or an entity, which can be perceived in different ways (cf. Cantrall 1974 and Coppieters 1982 about viewpoints within DPs).47 Moreover, these facts are compatible with the assumption that only predications (phrases of the form subject-predicate) can be relativized to the perspective of a logophoric center (cf. Zribi-Hertz’s (1989) domain-of-point-of-view): the present hypothesis indeed implies that there is at most one logophoric operator per Spell-Out domain, and all Spell-Out domains including DPs (see, e.g., Svenonius 2004, Charnavel and Sportiche 2016) have a subject and are therefore predications.

The hypothesis that logophoric operators can occur in each Spell-Out domain has another consequence: it derives why Condition C need not be violated when the logophoric center of a clause is represented as a full DP in the clause containing the exempt anaphor. For example, (42a), represented here in (94), would be predicted to violate Condition C if Oplog had to occur in the left periphery of the clause. Instead, the present hypothesis implies that it can be lower, within the Spell-Out domain of the vP phase containing son propre. This correctly avoids a Condition C violation.48 Note further that we need not posit a coreferring operator in the TP phase: the subject here is presented from the speaker’s perspective rather than from Paul’s, so even if a logophoric operator were present in TP (see footnote 40), it would not take Paul as subject; rather, it would take the speaker.

(94) [Pauli’s courage]k [vP tk prolog-i saved from the fire both hisi own house and his neighbors’].

Similarly, the present hypothesis correctly predicts that the apparent antecedent of the anaphor (the overt DP denoting the logophoric center) can be further embedded in the clause, as in (95) or (96) (cf. footnote 25).49 No Condition C violation is triggered because in these cases the logophoric operator is within the Spell-Out domain of the DP phase, which is naturally construed as a logophoric domain under the discourse and syntacticosemantic conditions of the sentence.

(95)

  • Ces racontars sur le fils du voisin ramènent au souvenir de Mariei [DP prolog-i les ignobles propos des médias sur soni propre fils].

  • ‘The gossip about the neighbor’s son brings back to Maryi’s memory [DP prolog-i the media’s horrible words about heri own son].’

(96)

  • [DP prolog-i Les méchants commentaires des internautes sur luii-même] ont atteint le moral de Marci.

  • ‘[DP prolog-i The net surfers’ mean comments about himselfi] affected Marci’s morale.’

At the same time, the present hypothesis allows an exempt anaphor to occur within the subject as in (32);50 the relevant logophoric operator is within the TP Spell-Out domain in this case.51

3.4 Deriving the Other Properties of Exempt Anaphors

In the previous sections, I have presented independent evidence for the hypothesis that logophoric pronouns introduced by logophoric operators provide A-binders for exempt anaphors in their Spell-Out domain, thus reducing them to plain anaphors. The goal of this section is to show that this hypothesis also derives the three distributional properties (other than apparent nonlocal binding) apparently distinguishing between exempt and plain anaphors: nonexhaustive binding (section 3.4.1), strict readings (section 3.4.2), and noncomplementarity with pronouns (section 3.4.3).

3.4.1 Nonexhaustive Binding

As observed in section 1.2, exempt anaphors, unlike plain anaphors, appear to be able to have partial or split antecedents. The presence of Oplog accounts for this property: what we observe is not nonexhaustive binding of the anaphor, which must in fact be exhaustively bound by prolog (as seen in section 3.2), but nonexhaustive coreference (or binding) between prolog and the apparent overt antecedent(s) of the anaphor. Just like standard pronouns (including overt logophoric pronouns; see section 3.2), prolog introduced by Oplog can refer to the sum of two antecedents or to part of an antecedent. Split antecedence, schematized in (97), is illustrated in (98).

(97) antecedent-1i . . . antecedent-2k . . . [XP . . . prolog-i+k . . . anaphori+k . . . ]

(98)

  • Christeli pense qu’Agnèsk a dit que l’avenir de son fils [vP prolog-i+k dépend d’ellesi+k-mêmes et de leurs chers parents].

  • ‘Christeli thinks that Agnesk said that her son’s future [vP prolog-i+k depends on themselvesi+k and their dear parents].’

In (98), the exempt anaphor elles-mêmes refers to the sum of Christel and Agnès. This is because the pronoun introduced by the logophoric operator binding it refers to that sum, since these two attitude holders form the plural logophoric center of the domain; this is further confirmed by the availability of plural leurs chers ‘their dear’ (even in the absence of the exempt anaphor). Split antecedence of prolog in (98) is thus similar to that of the overt pronoun elles ‘they’ in (99).

(99)

  • Christeli pense qu’Agnèsk a dit que l’avenir de son fils dépend d’ellesi+k et de leurs parents.

  • ‘Christeli thinks that Agnesk said that her son’s future depends on themi+k and their parents.’

Apparent split antecedence of exempt anaphors therefore arises when the discourse and syntactico-semantic conditions determine a plural value for the logophoric center, and the parts of that plural center are represented as distinct overt DPs in the sentence. Note that the availability of plural logophoric centers is corroborated by the existence of plural logophoric pronouns (e.g., Hyman and Comrie 1981, Frajzyngier 1985), authors of FID (Banfield 1982:96), shifted indexicals (e.g., Laterza 2014), and PRO (e.g., Laterza 2014; cf. split control in, e.g., Landau 2015).

Partial binding can be explained in a similar way: there is in fact no partial binding of the anaphor; rather, there is partial coreference (or binding) between prolog and its antecedent, as shown in (100)–(101).

(100) [antecedenti and x]k . . . [XP . . . prolog-i . . . anaphori . . . ]

(101)

  • [Christeli et ses enfants]k croient que l’avenir [vP prolog-i ne dépendra que de sesi propres efforts].

  • ‘[Christeli and her children]k believe that the future will [vP prolog-i depend only on heri own efforts].’

In sum, exempt anaphors must be exhaustively bound, just like plain anaphors, but the illusion is created that they allow split or partial antecedents, because their silent binder does.

3.4.2 Strict Readings

Another property that distinguishes exempt from plain anaphors, as mentioned in section 1.2, is the availability of strict readings in ellipsis and focus constructions: while plain anaphors are standardly assumed to trigger only sloppy readings, exempt anaphors can also give rise to strict readings (see, e.g., Lebeaux 1984, Reinhart and Reuland 1993).

This observation has been questioned in recent experiments (see, e.g., Frazier and Clifton 2006, Kim and Runner 2009, Ong and Brasoveanu 2014, McKillen 2016) showing that locally bound anaphors can trigger strict readings (see also, e.g., Dahl 1973, Sag 1976, Fiengo and May 1994). But in fact, it crucially remains valid after stricter control of the data: namely, if we adopt the present inanimacy strategy for distinguishing between plain and exempt anaphors52 and if we incorporate Hestvik’s (1995) and Kehler’s (2002) discovery that anaphors in ellipsis behave differently in subordination and in coordination, as shown by the contrast between (102) and (103).

(102)

graphic

(103)

graphic

Indeed, the contrast between (104) and (105), in which the ellipsis site is in a subordinate clause,53 confirms that inanimate (thus plain) anaphors exhibit only sloppy readings, while animate anaphors can give rise to both sloppy and strict readings.

(104)

graphic

(105)

graphic

The logophoric operator hypothesis accounts for these facts, assuming that the ellipsis site contains a copy of the anaphor (unlike what is assumed under analyses based on vehicle change; cf., e.g., Fiengo and May 1994). In the case of inanimates, only sloppy readings are available because the elided anaphor must be locally bound by the overt antecedent—for example, la mienne ‘mine’ in (104), as represented in (106).

(106)

graphic

In the case of animates, the elided anaphor can also be directly bound by the local antecedent as a plain anaphor, which gives rise to a sloppy reading as in (107a). Crucially, however, an elided animate anaphor can also be anteceded by a silent logophoric pronoun if it refers to the logophoric center. A strict reading can therefore arise as long as the antecedent of the nonelided anaphor is the logophoric center in the ellipsis site.54 This is the case in (107b), where the acceptability of sa chère ‘her dear’ shows that Lea is an empathy locus. As required by the parallelism condition in ellipsis (see, e.g., Takahashi and Fox 2005), the anaphor in the antecedent is also bound by a logophoric pronoun in that case.

(107)

graphic

Thus, the availability of strict readings depends on the possibility of construing the antecedent of the overt anaphor as a logophoric center in the ellipsis site. This can explain the contrast between subordination and coordination observed by Hestvik (1995) and Kehler (2002), as subordination favors this possibility. For instance, John, the highest subject of the sentence in (102), can easily be construed as the empathy locus of the whole sentence, including the subordinate clause. But in (103), it is hard to interpret John as the empathy locus outside the first conjunct: because of the symmetry of the coordinated structure, it is much more natural to construe Bill (the subject of the second conjunct) than John (the subject of the first conjunct) as the empathy locus in the second conjunct. This accounts for the contrast in French between (105), which involves subordination and licenses a strict reading, and (108), which involves coordination and only marginally licenses a strict reading; prolog does not (easily) have the right value for triggering a strict reading.

(108)

graphic

Coordination structures are nevertheless predicted to be able to give rise to strict readings if the antecedent of the overt anaphor is construed as a logophoric center in the ellipsis site. Example (109), where the expression d’après ‘according to’ makes Thomas an attitude holder in the whole sentence, shows that this is borne out. Example (110), where the subject of the second conjunct is inanimate, further illustrates this.

(109)

graphic
graphic

(110)

graphic

Similarly, the strict reading in (108) becomes available if the discourse and syntacticosemantic conditions allow Léa to be a logophoric center in the ellipsis site. This is for instance the case if Suzanne is replaced with sa chère soeur ‘her dear sister’ as in (12): the presence of sa chère ‘her dear’ in the second conjunct favors the construal of Léa as an empathy locus there.

3.4.3 Noncomplementarity with Pronouns

The last property that is usually assumed to distinguish exempt from plain anaphors is that the former are in free variation with pronouns, while the latter are supposed to be in complementary distribution with them (e.g., Bouchard 1984, Lebeaux 1984; cf. Safir 2004).

As noted by Hicks (2009) and Charnavel and Sportiche (2016), this difference is less robust than the other ones. While some examples like (111) (repeating (13)) seem to support the existence of a complementarity between plain anaphors (e.g., elle-même) and pronouns (e.g., elle), many examples can be found where a plain anaphor can be replaced with a pronoun: this is generally the case of plain son propre, as illustrated in (112) (repeating (7a)); it is sometimes the case of plain lui-même, as exemplified in (113).

(111)

  • [La Terre]i tourne sur ellei*(-même).

  • ‘[The earth]i spins on iti*(self).’

(112)

  • [Cette auberge]i fait de l’ombre à soni (propre) jardin et au jardin de la maison voisine.

  • ‘[This inn]i gives shade to itsi (own) garden and to the garden of the neighboring house.’

(113)

graphic

Such facts question the assumption that the binding domains for anaphors and pronouns are identical. They instead suggest that the domain for Condition B is smaller than the domain for Condition A, as argued for example by Huang (1983) and Chomsky (1986) on the basis of examples like (112).

Regarding exempt anaphors, the question of how they are predicted to be in free variation with pronouns hinges on the exact definition of Condition B and how it could be violated in the presence of a logophoric operator. The full exploration of these questions must be left for further research, but a preliminary investigation of the relevant facts suggests that logophoric pronouns introduced by logophoric operators can never trigger Condition B effects, as they always occur outside the relevant domain. That this is the case with possessive son directly follows from facts like (112) and is illustrated in (114) (cf. (8)), where the curly brackets represent the most plausible domain for Condition B.55

(114)

  • [La fille de Marie]i observe que la maison [vP prolog-i fait de l’ombre à (sai propre fille et à) {sai voisine}].

  • ‘[Mary’s daughter]i observes that the house [vP prolog-i gives shade to (heri own daughter and to) {heri neighbor}].’

Furthermore, the facts shown in (111) and (113) also support the hypothesis that logophoric operators appear outside the binding domain of the pronoun lui. In particular, it seems that only binding by coarguments as in (111) (vs. (113b)) triggers Condition B violations, which suggests that a coargumenthood-based analysis of Condition B as in Reinhart and Reuland 1993 is on the right track. In fact, robust Condition B effects in French mainly arise with clitics bound by their coarguments, as shown in (115).56

(115)

  • *Mariei {a. lai regarde / b. luii parle / c. lek luik montre dans le miroir}.

  • ‘*Maryi {a. is looking at heri / b. is talking to heri / c. is showing himk to himk in the mirror}.

These observations imply that binding of the pronoun lui by prolog could never violate Condition B, given that prolog can never be the coargument of lui (or any other pronoun: the only possible coargument of prolog is the complement of Oplog, which is of the form subject-predicate). Consequently, exempt anaphors are predicted to be in free variation with pronouns (putting aside interpretively driven complementarity that may follow from a general preference for more specified forms; see, e.g., Schlenker 2005 57).

4 Conclusion: Crosslinguistic Implications and Open Questions

To sum up, the remarkable crosslinguistic homophony between exetxors and plain anaphors is explained by assuming that they are the same objects: seemingly exempt anaphors are A-bound in their local domain by silent logophoric pronouns introduced by logophoric operators. This allows us to explain both the syntactic and the semantic specificities of exempt anaphors as compared with plain anaphors, without postulating a lexical difference between them.

In this article, the logophoric operator hypothesis has been primarily motivated on the basis of French data. The hope is of course that this hypothesis explains the distribution of exempt anaphors more generally, that is, in the many other languages where exempt and plain anaphors have the same form. As we have seen, this seems promising for cases like English himself, Japanese zibun, and Mandarin ziji, among others, but a careful application of the logophoric tests and the other diagnostics mentioned will be necessary to confirm the predictions.

This does not mean that all these exempt anaphors will exhibit exactly the same characteristics as the French ones. I leave open the possibility that other cases of morphologically identical plain and exempt anaphors exhibit additional, language-specific properties not found with these French anaphors. For instance, it seems that English himself is subject to an additional prosody-related condition preventing exempt himself from appearing in weak positions such as the direct object position, as suggested in Ahn 2015, Charnavel and Sportiche 2016:sec. 3.2.5, Charnavel and Zlogar 2016, and Charnavel 2020:chap. 2. Also, Mandarin ziji may be subject-oriented (see discussion in Charnavel 2020:chap. 5), as opposed to French son propre and lui-même. Furthermore, some lexical factors that play a role in determining the value of logophoric centers may vary from language to language. For example, we have seen that verbs of giving are lexically specified for empathy in Japanese and Malayalam, but not in French or English. Fully explaining the behavior of plain and exempt anaphors in other languages will thus require an understanding of various factors that could interact with the logophoric operator hypothesis in ways to be determined.

Moreover, the present article has not said anything about languages where the two kinds of anaphors are morphologically distinct. In particular, it does not exclude the existence of more specified anaphors: some anaphors in some languages may well be more specified (e.g., [–log]), so as to be unbindable by perspectival elements (such anaphors would only be plain; potential candidates are Dutch zichzelf (Rooryck and Vanden Wyngaerd 2011) and Hebrew acmi (Bassel 2018)); conversely, some anaphors in some languages may be more specified (e.g., [+log]), so as to be necessarily perspectival (such anaphors would be logophors; potential candidates are Dutch hemzelf (Rooryck and Vanden Wyngaerd 2011) and Tamil taan (Sundaresan 2012; but see section 2.5)). To determine the extent of such cases, it would nevertheless be necessary to apply the inanimacy strategy to these anaphors when possible, and otherwise the tests (described in section 2.4) distinguishing between logophoric and nonlogophoric animate anaphors.

Furthermore, this article has focused on exempt anaphors that are not subject to any syntactic requirement (also sometimes called free anaphors). I did not aim to take a stand on the putative existence of so-called long-distance anaphors (see, e.g., Reinhart and Reuland 1993, Cole, Her-mon, and Huang 2006, Reuland 2011), which are considered to be exempt from locality constraints (their antecedent can be outside the local binding domain defined by Condition A), but not from binding constraints (they still need to be bound). Such anaphors are also often assumed to be monomorphemic and subject-oriented, as opposed to complex anaphors such as French son propre and lui-même. The null hypothesis would be to reduce the behaviors of so-called long-distance anaphors and free anaphors to a unique behavior (i.e., to capture both cases using the logophoric operator hypothesis). This would imply that long-distance anaphors have the same distributional and interpretive properties as free anaphors, which is an empirical question. This question is investigated in Charnavel and Sportiche 2017, which shows that the null hypothesis is in fact supported for Icelandic sig. Further careful empirical investigation should decide whether other long-distance anaphors should be considered as a category different from exempt anaphors (see further discussion in Charnavel 2020:chap. 5).

Besides crosslinguistic investigations, further work needs to be done to address several remaining questions tied to the logophoric operator hypothesis. My goal has been to reduce the behavior of exempt anaphors to that of plain anaphors by using independently existing tests and mechanisms (binding, logophoric operator). But of course, the logophoric operator hypothesis could be made more precise by further specifying these mechanisms it involves (which should be done on independent grounds): on the one hand, the discourse and syntacticosemantic conditions that determine the value of a logophoric center in a given domain; on the other hand, the binding mechanism for anaphors. Regarding the latter question, the logophoric operator hypothesis supports a Chomskyan, antecedent-based theory of Condition A against predicate-based theories, which rely on the notion of coargumenthood, since logophoric operators are never coarguments of anaphors. But the nature of binding involved in Condition A remains to be specified. This is controversial, as some reduce it to Agree (e.g., Hicks 2009, Reuland 2011, Rooryck and Vanden Wyngaerd 2011) and others adopt a movement approach (see Charnavel and Sportiche 2016:sec. 5). Regarding the former question, the precise examination of other types of logophors (besides exempt anaphors) should be crucially informative. In particular, it would be worth further investigating the behavior of motion verbs like come, which I have argued take a logophor as implicit argument.

Notes

1 The variety of lexical forms exhibiting this dual behavior in French (e.g., lui-même, son propre) and crosslinguistically (e.g., English himself, Mandarin ziji, Icelandic sig) makes it difficult to reduce this duality to the lexical makeup of anaphors, unfortunately (cf., e.g., Safir 1996 vs. Safir 2004). In particular, it is not the case that only complex self-anaphors exhibit this dual (plain/exempt) behavior; other types of complex anaphors do too (same-anaphors or possessive anaphors), as well as simplex anaphors.

2 I will not investigate the French (reflexive) clitic se here, as se is not itself an anaphor. Se occurs not only in reflexive constructions in French, but also in other constructions such as middle and anticausative constructions (see, e.g., Labelle 2008, Sportiche 2014).

3 The predicate-based theories mentioned above (Pollard and Sag 1992, Reinhart and Reuland 1993; cf., e.g., Safir 2004, Reuland 2011) attempt to use independent criteria to distinguish between plain and exempt anaphors (see Charnavel and Sportiche 2016), but are not successful. Moreover, these theories make incorrect predictions for French inanimate anaphors, as shown in Charnavel and Sportiche 2016: they are too weak in leaving unexplained why some anaphors they predict to be exempt are in fact ungrammatical; they are too strong in wrongly ruling out all coargumental anaphors not bound by their coargument. It is for these reasons that this type of theory must be abandoned (at least for French). However, the theory of exemption presented here remains indebted to proponents of predicate-based theories for the idea of investigating exemption itself.

4 See section 2.4 for diagnostics distinguishing between plain and exempt anaphors in languages that lack inanimate anaphors.

5 At this point, nothing indicates that the sets of configurations for plain and exempt anaphors must be disjoint: it may well be the case that an exempt (logophoric) anaphor can also occur in a position allowing an inanimate anaphor. See section 2.4 for discussion about locally bound animate anaphors.

6 As mentioned in Charnavel and Sportiche 2016 and further discussed in Charnavel 2020:chap. 2, there is one further caveat about the anaphor lui-même: unless it is heavily stressed, lui-même is not acceptable when it can be replaced with a weaker form such as the reflexive clitic se (subject-oriented cliticizable argument) or the object clitics le and lui. This condition depends neither on Condition A nor on exemption from it; rather, it falls under a generalization discussed by Cardinaletti and Starke (1999). For present purposes, this means that to observe the behavior of exempt lui-même, we need to exclude cases where lui-même occurs in configurations licensing se, le, or lui. This will be taken into consideration in the rest of the article.

Furthermore, note that English himself is subject to a similar constraint: as shown in Ahn 2015, plain himself exhibits special prosodic properties in configurations that would license clitics. This implies that exempt himself, just like lui-même, cannot appear in these configurations (see Charnavel and Sportiche 2016, Charnavel and Zlogar 2016, Charnavel 2020:chap. 2).

7 In the case of son propre, explicit contrasts with another contextual possessor are made to guarantee that we are dealing with anaphoric possessor son propre: based on Charnavel 2012, Charnavel and Sportiche (2016) note that son propre exhibits different readings and that only possessor son propre (i.e., son propre inducing a contrast with contextual possessors) behaves like an anaphor. Note that, as explained in Charnavel 2012:chap. 1, the judgments of this kind of sentence were checked using a systematically controlled questionnaire. As is standard, the star (*) is used contrastively: starred sentences are significantly more degraded than corresponding sentences without a star.

8 Throughout the article, the English translations are meant as glosses of the French examples: the (absence of) stars indicated in the English translations reflect(s) the French judgments. No stand is taken on the judgment of the corresponding English sentences.

9 As discussed in Charnavel 2020:chap. 2, focus or intensification is however neither sufficient nor necessary for exemption (pace, e.g., Reinhart and Reuland 1993, Baker 1995). Focus on inanimate anaphors (e.g., on son propre and lui-même in the examples above) does not make them exempt (see Postal 2006 for relevant examples with English itself). Conversely, exempt anaphors are not necessarily focused, as Zribi-Hertz (1995) shows using lui-même and himself.

10 This option, or the next one mentioned in the text, would also say nothing about why exempt anaphors within the same local domain must be exhaustively coreferential (as I will explain in section 3.2). Furthermore, see Charnavel and Sportiche 2016:sec. 5.2 for reasons casting doubt on an Agree-based solution for anaphor binding.

11 To my knowledge, only Zribi-Hertz (1990, 1995) explores the potential logophoricity of one of these anaphors, lui-même. But she proposes neither an independent way of identifying exempt lui-même nor precise tests for identifying a logophoric center. Another French element that has been examined as an instance of an exempt anaphor is the generic reflexive soi (e.g., Pica 1987, Zribi-Hertz 1990), but it is not related to logophoricity in these studies (see Charnavel 2018b for a logophoric analysis of soi).

12 In section 3.3, I will show that perspective shift within a clause is possible, but only if the discourse and syntactico-semantic conditions allow it. In this section, I will avoid these cases unless noted otherwise.

13 The tests designed in this section are meant to identify sufficient logophoric conditions for exemption. The use of can nevertheless reflects the fact that any other condition (independent of binding or exemption) applying to the anaphor under investigation must also be met to make it acceptable. For instance, the use of lui-même (cf. himself) is subject to the constraint described in footnote 6. Furthermore, we will see in section 3.2 that cooccurrence of several exempt anaphors in the same domain must conform to exhaustive coreference constraints.

14Dubinsky and Hamilton’s (1998:689) “antilogophoricity” constraint on epithets states that “[a]n epithet must not be anteceded by an individual from whose perspective the attributive content of the epithet is evaluated.” But for most speakers, even if the attributive content of the epithet is intended to be evaluated from the speaker’s perspective, not from the third person attitude holder’s, an epithet is still unacceptable when referring to that attitude holder: in (23a) and (24a), cet idiot ‘the idiot’ is not acceptable whether it is intended to be evaluated by Jean or by the speaker. That is why I strengthen Dubinsky and Hamilton’s notion of antilogophoricity into that of anti-attitudinality: namely, epithets occurring in an attitude context cannot refer to the attitude holder of that context. This is the basis for my epithet test; but note that for the few speakers who do accept epithets when evaluated from the speaker’s perspective, this needs to be controlled for when using the test.

15Dubinsky and Hamilton (1998) claim that epithets are subject not only to antilogophoricity, but also to Condition B (see also, e.g., Patel-Grosz 2012, Yashima 2015, Nediger 2017). This additional constraint on epithets must be taken into account when performing the epithet test.

16 The fact that it is an exempt anaphor that is replaced with the epithet ensures that any unacceptability that may arise is not due to a Condition B violation (see footnote 15). Furthermore, can is used in the definition of the test not only because other independent constraints on the anaphor under investigation must be obeyed (see footnote 13), but also because exempt anaphors referring to attitude holders must be read de se (see section 2.1.4). Given that epithets can refer to the attitude holder of their context in non–de se contexts (see, e.g., Schlenker 1999, Patel-Grosz 2012), this latter point can be controlled for by keeping the reading constant when replacing the anaphor with the epithet. See Charnavel 2020: chap. 3 for illustrations.

17 Both variants of the test can be used for obligatorily attitudinal contexts: in these cases, the unacceptability (resp. acceptability) of the epithet indeed entails the acceptability (resp. unacceptability) of the anaphor. However, only the second variant is reliable for optionally attitudinal contexts: if a given clause can be interpreted as either attitudinal or not attitudinal (e.g., because-clauses in Charnavel 2019), the acceptability of the epithet entails the unacceptability of the anaphor (and vice versa) only if the interpretation remains constant, which is guaranteed under the second variant of the test (see Charnavel 2020:chap. 3 for further tests to be used in such cases).

18 Anticipating the next section, I note that Lise is not an empathy locus in (29). Lise is not an attitude addressee either, as for some French speakers, attitude addressees can antecede exempt anaphors (cf., e.g., logophoric pronouns in Mapun (Frajzyngier 1985) and in Yoruba (Anand 2006:60); exempt anaphors in English (e.g., Kuno 1987) and marginally in Mandarin (e.g., Pan 1997), Japanese (e.g., Nishigauchi 2014), and Icelandic (e.g., Sigurðsson 1990)). Due to the instability of judgments (see Ruwet 1990:64–65), I leave the full exploration of attitude addressees as logophoric centers for further research (see Charnavel 2020:sec. 3.4.3, where addressees are reduced to empathy loci). Note that addressees are restricted to second person pronouns and objects of communicative verbs like dire ‘say’. Objects of psychological verbs like convaincre ‘convince’, however, behave like attitude holders (see, e.g., Stephenson 2007, Patel-Grosz 2012, Landau 2015).

19 The distinction between Source and Self may however have empirical correlates for logophoric pronouns (e.g., Culy 1994).

20De se readings are also reported to characterize shifted indexicals (e.g., Schlenker 1999, 2003, Anand 2006), which are sometimes called logophors (Schlenker 1999, 2003). I do not use this notion of logophor in this article.

21 This seems to include pronouns that corefer with exempt anaphors: examples such as (ib) suggest that an exempt anaphor cannot cooccur with a coreferring de re pronoun in its domain when the pronoun does not c-command the anaphor (when the pronoun does c-command the anaphor, as in (ia), the anaphor may be plain and the presence of de re blocking effects depends on the definition of Condition A; see Sharvit 2010).

  • [Mary tells Paul that a certain man and his friends have a very bad influence on Paul’s son. Unbeknownst to Paul, this man is Paul himself.]

    • [Paul tells Mary, “We must take this man away from my son.”]

      ?Pauli dit qu’il faut l’i-de re éloigner ti-de re de soni-de se propre fils.

      ‘?Pauli says that one must take himi-de re away t from hisi-de se own son.’

    • [Paul tells Mary, “We must take this man’s friends away from my son.”]

      ?Pauli dit qu’il faut éloigner sesi-de re amis de soni-de se propre fils.

      ‘?Pauli says that one must take hisi-de re friends away from hisi-de se own son.’

The judgments are subtle, but note that the fact that (ib) is no better than (ia) suggests that exempt anaphors behave differently from Anand’s (2006) logophoric pronouns, including pronouns in dream reports: the de re blocking effects Anand describes only imply that a logophor cannot be c-commanded by a de re element (which predicts (ib) to be better than (ia)).

22 The same point can be made using appositives (see Charnavel 2020:chap. 3), whose orientation is also sensitive to the identity of the logophoric center (see, e.g., Harris and Potts 2009).

23 Recall that plain anaphors cannot be bound by possessors, as shown by (7c), for example. Also, note that the nonattitudinality of the verb mériter ‘deserve’ was noticed by Ruwet (1990).

24 The notion of empathy here is a technical one that is not to be confused with informal notions such as ‘have sympathy for’ or ‘pity’; in particular, even an event participant toward whom the speaker has a negative attitude can be an empathy locus.

25Sells (1987:455n14) explicitly relates his notion of Pivot (“one with respect to whose (space-time) location the content of the proposition is evaluated”) to the notion of empathy. His notion of Self should also be partially equated with empathy, as some of his Self examples involve psych-verbs, which do not create attitude contexts, as shown for French in (i) by the epithet test.

  • (i)

    Les méchants commentaires des internautes sur {a. luii-même / b. [le pauvre homme]i} ont atteint le moral de Marci.

    ‘The net surfers’ mean comments about {a. himselfi / b. [the poor man]i} affected Marci’s morale.’

26 In other words, it is to some extent possible to deduce that someone/something is dear to someone using indirect evidence, and in fact, predicative cher ‘dear’ can be used in combination with markers of evidentiality like apparemment ‘apparently’ (just like predicates of internal states in Japanese, as mentioned in the text above).

  • Apparemment, Cécile est chère à Christophe.

    ‘Apparently, Cecily is dear to Christopher.’

But this evidential use is impossible for attributive cher in possessive DPs: son cher ‘his/her dear’ can only express an internal (cf. logophoricity) vs. external (cf. evidentiality) perspective.

27Son cher is frequently used ironically, as illustrated in (i).

  • Jérômei va aller rendre visite à sai chère cousine (qui profite de lui).

    ‘Jeromei will visit hisi dear cousin (who takes advantage of him).’

This indirectly supports the hypothesis that son cher expresses the internal, emotional point of view of its referent, as irony arises when two points of view come into conflict. In the case of son cher, the irony effect comes from the discrepancy between its referent’s perspective and the speaker’s: in (i), the speaker contrasts her perspective with Jérôme’s by suggesting that his perspective is ill-advised (as made explicit by the content of the parenthesis). Note that this is different from evaluative expressions like cet idiot de Jérôme ‘that idiot Jerome’. Jérôme can be evaluated as an idiot by the speaker or any other attitude holder irrespective of Jérôme’s judgment. In (i), however, the speaker has to take Jérôme’s emotional perspective to evaluate his cousin as dear to Jérôme since it is Jérôme’s internal feeling; but the speaker builds on it to add another layer of judgment, namely, that Jérôme’s feeling is unjustified, thus creating an irony effect.

28 It is not necessary for the empathy locus to be alive at the time of utterance, as long as he is alive at the time of the event for which the speaker empathizes with him (as in (i)) or at the time of evaluation (as in (iia) vs. (iib)). A more precise examination of the interaction between tense and perspective is beyond the scope of this article (see, e.g., Bianchi 2003, Giorgi 2006, Sharvit 2008).

  • Le courage de Franklin Roosevelti a sauvé sai propre vie et celle de millions d’Américains.

    ‘Franklin Roosevelti’s courage saved hisi own life and that of millions of Americans.’

    • Comme [le pharaon]i le demande, les embaumeurs prendront soin de soni propre corps et du corps de son épouse une fois qu’ils seront morts.

      ‘As [the pharaoh]i asks, the embalmers will take care of hisi own body and that of his wife when they die.’

    • Comme l’avait demandé [le pharaon]i de son vivant, les embaumeurs prennent soin de soni (*propre) corps et du corps de son épouse.

      ‘As [the pharaoh]i asked when he was alive, the embalmers are taking care of hisi (*own) body and that of his wife.’

29Oshima (2006) also distinguishes deictic centers from empathy loci, and observes—against proposals in Iida 1992—that deictic centers, unlike empathy loci, cannot systematically antecede long-distance zibun. This suggests that the facts are similar in French and in Japanese.

30Sells (1987:456) explicitly includes spatial centers of perspective in the Pivot category: “[I]f someone makes a report with Mary as the pivot, that person is understood as (literally) standing in Mary’s shoes.”

31Cantrall (1974:146–147) notices the contrast between (ia), which is acceptable under the intrinsic interpretation (i.e., from the adults’ perspective), and (ib), where the antecedent of the anaphor is inanimate.

    • The adultsi in the picture are facing away from us with the children placed behind themselvesi.

    • The housei in the picture is facing away from us with an elm tree behind iti(*self).

This suggests that deictic conditions alone are not sufficient in English either to exempt himself from locality conditions (see, e.g., Zribi-Hertz 1989, Rooryck and Vanden Wyngaerd 2011, and Charnavel and Zlogar 2016, for discussion about the distribution of English himself in deictic conditions). The reason why (ia) is acceptable, I argue, is that the adults can be construed as empathy loci, which may be favored by the passive placed, suggesting that the adults took responsibility for the placement; in fact, the children can be replaced with their dear children.

32 The formal details do not matter for present purposes, but note that the notion of first person perspective could be formalized using quantification over centered worlds. Furthermore, the presentation of α from the logophoric center’s first person perspective is in effect added as a conjoined assertion here. An alternative would be to insert this contribution as a presupposition. I leave the choice between the two alternatives for further research, as the behavior of exempt anaphors with respect to projection yields unclear results (see discussion in Charnavel 2020:sec. 4.4.1).

33 In Anand 2006:50, the logophoric operator is the immediate complement of a referential item CENTER, which denotes the de se center and gets its value from the index node that it takes as its complement. My definition of logophoric operator is different in two main respects. First, my logophoric pronoun prolog does not get its value directly from the index (i.e., the context). Rather, it is determined pragmatically, because, as we have seen, the logophoric center is not necessarily an attitude holder; also, the logophoric domain can be smaller than the domain of a given context, which is standardly a proposition (see section 3.3). Second, the operator is not simply a λ-abstractor; instead, it affects the whole constituent in its scope.

34 But there are some (irrelevant) differences with FID: in particular, FID shifts time and location indexicals (e.g., Schlenker 2004, Sharvit 2008; see (31)), while logophoric domains need not do so (see (80)–(81)). Also, FID takes full sentences as its domain (e.g., Banfield 1982), while logophoric domains need not do so (see section 3.3).

35 To test Jayaseelan’s (1998), Sundaresan’s (2012), and Nishigauchi’s (2014) assumption that animate anaphors in their languages are always logophoric, such diagnostics should be applied to Malayalam taan, Tamil taan, and Japanese zibun. In particular, controlling for (the absence of) empathy and de se readings may reveal that some instances of zibun and taan are not logophoric.

36 Similarly, Pan (1997) and Huang and Liu (2001) propose (non)obligatory de se readings as a diagnostic for distinguishing between plain and exempt ziji.

37 In fact, plain lui-même must be read de re here, not de se, because its binding by a de re pronoun would otherwise trigger a de re blocking effect (see Sharvit 2010; cf. footnote 21). However, plain anaphors can conversely be read de re when they are bound by a de se element (see Sharvit 2010); this pertains to the definition of Condition A (see Sharvit’s (2010) Type-II covaluation).

38 See Charnavel 2019 for an argument that (some) adjunct clauses in fact qualify as attitude contexts.

39 Another potential candidate could be French lui, which triggers antilogophoricity effects when clustered with other clitics both within and outside attitude contexts (Charnavel and Mateu 2015).

40 For present purposes, it is sufficient to assume that a projection hosting Oplog appears in each Spell-Out domain containing an exempt anaphor. I leave open the question whether each Spell-Out domain contains a logophoric projection even in the absence of logophors. Note that Condition B cannot be informative if it is based on coargumenthood as in Reinhart and Reuland 1993: a pronoun referring to the logophoric center would never trigger a Condition B violation, as a logophoric operator cannot be the coargument of a pronoun (see section 3.4.3). This question could instead be explored by examining Condition C effects (see section 3.3) and perspectival effects independent of anaphora.

41 The anaphor is A-bound since its binder is within its Spell-Out domain: as argued in Charnavel and Sportiche 2016:sec. 5.4.2, the standard A/Ā distinction should be redefined in terms of movement span, given the evolution of the theory; Ā-movement is movement to the edge of a phase, and A-movement is movement within the Spell-Out domain. The other requirement for A-binding is that the binder be a phrase (XP), not a head (X). That’s why the anaphor is not directly bound by Oplog (as in, e.g., Anand 2006), but is bound by its pronominal subject (prolog).

42 The hypothesis that the presence of a silent binder can affect the binding of anaphors has also been made independently of the issue of Condition A. For instance, Anand and Hsieh (2005) derive the constraints on the long-distance binding of ziji out of purpose clauses from the presence of a covert variable introduced by the purpose clause marker and denoting the affectee. Sundaresan (2012) and Nishigauchi (2014) assume the presence of a silent binder of anaphors mainly for perspectival reasons (see footnote 46).

43 The reason why plain anaphors must be exhaustively bound is discussed in Charnavel and Sportiche 2016:sec. 5.4.3: the most promising theories in this respect are movement approaches to anaphor binding. Further note that exhaustive binding of plain anaphors does not imply that they must exhaustively corefer in the same local domain: several disjoint antecedents can cooccur in the same domain, as in (i). It is because there is at most one logophoric operator per Spell-Out domain that exhaustive coreference is predicted in the case of exempt anaphors.

  • A sa 2ème édition, [le livre]i a comparé [sai propre introduction]k à une parodie d’ellek-même.

    ‘In its 2nd edition, [the book]i compared [itsi own introduction]k to a parody of itselfk.’

44 This hypothesis also correctly rules out representation (i), where conversely, the logophoric pronoun is plural and partially binds her own.

  • *Christeli thinks that Agnesk said that heri son’s future [vP prolog-i+k depends on themselvesi+k and herk own son].

However, there is less independent evidence supporting this type of configuration, where a singular pronoun partially refers to a plural logophoric center (the reverse of partial control is not available, and singular logophoric pronouns anteceded by a plural logophoric center are not documented, as mentioned for example in Hyman and Comrie 1981:32). Representation (i) may thus be independently ruled out by a perspectival principle precluding partial de se reference.

45 Here, Oplog is inserted lower than the trace of the subject so that prolog cannot count as an intervener for A-movement of the subject. But this precaution is probably unnecessary, as intervention effects for A-movement depend on the type of probe (see, e.g., Angelopoulos and Sportiche 2016).

46 Sundaresan (2012, 2018) similarly proposes that there is one perspectival projection per phase. Her motivations are different from mine. First, her syntactic motivation for the locality of the silent perspectival center relies on the observation that taan in subject position seems to trigger agreement on the verb. Given the anaphor-agreement effect and the possible person mismatch in some cases (first person agreement on the verb while taan is marked third person), she concludes that the verbal agreement must come from another local source: a silent perspectival pronoun locally binding taan. But this forces her to stipulate a mechanism ensuring agreement between T and this pronoun above TP. Second, the syntactic nature of taan binding is motivated, Sundaresan argues, by antilocality effects on taan (ban on clausemate subject antecedence): a general well-formedness condition on perspective-holding is assumed (but not explained), namely, that the DP denoting the perspective holder cannot be embedded within the predication toward which its referent holds a perspective (under the present analysis, this apparent perspectival constraint derives from Condition C effects, as shown in the rest of the section). Third, given that Sundaresan’s perspectival projection need not be within the Spell-Out domain, but must be within the phase containing the anaphor, this proposal cannot reduce exempt to plain anaphors. (This reduction is not her goal for Tamil, however, given that according to her (as noted in section 2.4), the Tamil anaphor taan is always perspectival; but see footnote 35.) Finally, Sundaresan motivates the restriction of perspectival domains to phases on the basis of nonmental, deictic perspective, which I have shown to be a different phenomenon (see footnote 35 about ways of further testing this in Tamil).

47 In fact, expressions such as according to x modify not only clauses, but also nouns.

48 Condition C would not even be violated under the hypothesis that the logophoric binder is above the trace of the subject (see footnote 45), because A-movement can bleed Condition C violations (as long as reconstruction is not total; see, e.g., Sportiche 2017).

49 Even if we adopt Belletti and Rizzi’s (1988) proposal about the structure of psych-verbs (where the object c-commands the subject at some level of representation, namely, before movement of the subject when it is in the theme position), the anaphor lui-même is not plain here, since Marc is embedded within the object and thus cannot c-command lui-même at any level of representation.

50 If an anaphor is (within) the subject of the DP, it is not contained within the Spell-Out domain of this DP and thus does not have to be bound within it (see Charnavel and Sportiche 2016).

51 This is consistent with some previous proposals. Cinque (1999) argues that the Speech Act, Evaluative, Evidential, and Epistemic Mood projections, in which Speas (2004) positions logophoric operators, are (the highest) elements of the TP-space, given that they can follow focused and topicalized phrases of the CP-periphery space. Charnavel and Mateu (2015) demonstrate that the logophoric operator responsible for the Clitic Coreference Constraint in some Romance languages can occupy a position below the nominative projection. Nishigauchi (2014) claims that the set of projections that he calls POV (point of view) lies below Tense. But even if these authors propose a lower position for the operator than the standard CP periphery, these proposals still seem to allow only one operator per clause.

52 All experimental papers mentioned above suffer from the same confound: all the anaphors used in the stimuli are animate and can therefore easily be construed as being logophoric.

53 In French, only TP-ellipsis is possible, not VP-ellipsis.

54 This analysis can be extended to focus constructions like (11b)–(12b) (Charnavel 2020:chap. 4).

55 The presence of an exempt anaphor cooccurring with the pronoun in (114) guarantees the presence of a logophoric operator in their Spell-Out domain. Under the hypothesis that logophoric projections are optional (see discussion in footnote 40), pronouns can otherwise be directly predicted to be in free variation with anaphors as long as we assume that logophoric projections are absent in the presence of pronouns.

56 (113a) further shows that the notion of coargumenthood relevant for Condition B must be restricted in a way to be determined, as not all cases of coargumental binding trigger Condition B effects. Note that if Condition B effects are only triggered by clitics (but see (111)), free variation between exempt lui-même and pronouns directly follows given that exempt lui-même is in complementary distribution with clitics (see footnote 6).

57 In particular, exempt anaphors could be preferred over pronouns in de se contexts, as they are specified for de se readings (due to their dependency on a logophoric operator; see section 2.4).

Acknowledgments

This article expands upon a previously unpublished 2012 manuscript (see lingbuzz/002683), which has since been considerably modified and developed thanks to many comments, suggestions, and questions that I have received from numerous colleagues, students, and anonymous reviewers. In particular, I am grateful for all the helpful feedback I got at the MIT Ling-Lunch (2014), the Pronouns@Tübingen 2 Workshop (2014), the NYU Syntax Brown Bag (2015), CLS 51 (2015), LSRL 45 (2015), NELS 47 (2016), WCCFL 35 (2017), the Syntax Winter School in Jerusalem (2017), the Tel Aviv colloquium (2017), the Harvard Ana-Log Workshop (2018), and my Harvard graduate seminars on the topic (2013, 2018). Further empirical and theoretical details, as well as crosslinguistic extensions of this work, can be found in Charnavel 2020.

This material is based upon work supported by the NSF under grants 1424054 and 1424336.

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