Adaptive behavior often requires predicting future events. The theory of reinforcement learning prescribes what kinds of predictive representations are useful and how to compute them. This review integrates these theoretical ideas with work on cognition and neuroscience. We pay special attention to the successor representation and its generalizations, which have been widely applied as both engineering tools and models of brain function. This convergence suggests that particular kinds of predictive representations may function as versatile building blocks of intelligence.

Natural learners must compute an estimate of future outcomes that follow from a stimulus in continuous time. Widely used reinforcement learning algorithms discretize continuous time and estimate either transition functions from one step to the next (model-based algorithms) or a scalar value of exponentially discounted future reward using the Bellman equation (model-free algorithms). An important drawback of model-based algorithms is that computational cost grows linearly with the amount of time to be simulated. An important drawback of model-free algorithms is the need to select a timescale required for exponential discounting. We present a computational mechanism, developed based on work in psychology and neuroscience, for computing a scale-invariant timeline of future outcomes. This mechanism efficiently computes an estimate of inputs as a function of future time on a logarithmically compressed scale and can be used to generate a scale-invariant power-law-discounted estimate of expected future reward. The representation of future time retains information about what will happen when. The entire timeline can be constructed in a single parallel operation that generates concrete behavioral and neural predictions. This computational mechanism could be incorporated into future reinforcement learning algorithms.

The hypothesis that the phasic dopamine response reports a reward prediction error has become deeply entrenched. However, dopamine neurons exhibit several notable deviations from this hypothesis. A coherent explanation for these deviations can be obtained by analyzing the dopamine response in terms of Bayesian reinforcement learning. The key idea is that prediction errors are modulated by probabilistic beliefs about the relationship between cues and outcomes, updated through Bayesian inference. This account can explain dopamine responses to inferred value in sensory preconditioning, the effects of cue preexposure (latent inhibition), and adaptive coding of prediction errors when rewards vary across orders of magnitude. We further postulate that orbitofrontal cortex transforms the stimulus representation through recurrent dynamics, such that a simple error-driven learning rule operating on the transformed representation can implement the Bayesian reinforcement learning update.

Temporal difference learning models of dopamine assert that phasic levels of dopamine encode a reward prediction error. However, this hypothesis has been challenged by recent observations of gradually ramping stratal dopamine levels as a goal is approached. This note describes conditions under which temporal difference learning models predict dopamine ramping. The key idea is representational: a quadratic transformation of proximity to the goal implies approximately linear ramping, as observed experimentally.

The successor representation was introduced into reinforcement learning by Dayan ( 1993 ) as a means of facilitating generalization between states with similar successors. Although reinforcement learning in general has been used extensively as a model of psychological and neural processes, the psychological validity of the successor representation has yet to be explored. An interesting possibility is that the successor representation can be used not only for reinforcement learning but for episodic learning as well. Our main contribution is to show that a variant of the temporal context model (TCM; Howard & Kahana, 2002 ), an influential model of episodic memory, can be understood as directly estimating the successor representation using the temporal difference learning algorithm (Sutton & Barto, 1998 ). This insight leads to a generalization of TCM and new experimental predictions. In addition to casting a new normative light on TCM, this equivalence suggests a previously unexplored point of contact between different learning systems.

Ambiguous images present a challenge to the visual system: How can uncertainty about the causes of visual inputs be represented when there are multiple equally plausible causes? A Bayesian ideal observer should represent uncertainty in the form of a posterior probability distribution over causes. However, in many real-world situations, computing this distribution is intractable and requires some form of approximation. We argue that the visual system approximates the posterior over underlying causes with a set of samples and that this approximation strategy produces perceptual multistability—stochastic alternation between percepts in consciousness. Under our analysis, multistability arises from a dynamic sample-generating process that explores the posterior through stochastic diffusion, implementing a rational form of approximate Bayesian inference known as Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC). We examine in detail the most extensively studied form of multistability, binocular rivalry, showing how a variety of experimental phenomena—gamma-like stochastic switching, patchy percepts, fusion, and traveling waves—can be understood in terms of MCMC sampling over simple graphical models of the underlying perceptual tasks. We conjecture that the stochastic nature of spiking neurons may lend itself to implementing sample-based posterior approximations in the brain.