Abstract
Book reviews in this article:
Samuel B. Bacharach and Edward J. Lawler, Power and Politics in Organizations: The Social Psychology of Conflict, Coalitions, and Bargaining.
Max H. Bazerman and Roy J. Lewicki, eds., Negotiating in Organizations.
Jeffrey Pfeffer, Power in Organizations.
NOTES
See James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958); Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960); Richard M. Cyert and James G. March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice‐Hall, 1963); Graham T. Allison, The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).
Not everyone applies negotiation notions to management this way; rather, I outline here how I think one ought to proceed. For my discussion of this matter, I'm indebted to my mentor‐colleagues at the Negotiation Roundtable of the Harvard Business School, David Lax, Howard Raiffa, and James Sebenius. See Raiffa's The Art and Science of Negotiation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982) for the techniques of negotiation analysis, and Lax and Sebenius' “Negotiation and Management: Some Analytical Themes” (75th Anniversary Colloquium Series, Division of Research, Harvard Business School, 1983) for a framework that applies these techniques to management settings.
Bacharach and Lawler, Bargaining. Power, Tactics, and Outcomes (San Francisco: Jossey‐Bass, 1981).
For yet another cut at model‐making, well worth reading, see Richard F. Elmore, “Organizational Models of Sociat Program Implementation,” Public Policy 26 (Spring 1978): 185–228. Elmom adds a model based on shared norms, and chivaIrousty puts some muscle on everyone's straw man, the rational‐choice model.
For a thorough discussion of differences, see James K. Sebenius, Negotiating the Law of the Sea: Lessons in the Art and Science of Reaching Agreement (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984), pp. 113–81.
Actually, whether payoffs sum to zero or to some positive number depends merely on one's accounting practices. The interesting analytic distinction is between constant‐sum games (of either the zero, positive, or negative‐sum varieties) and variable‐sum games. The ambiguous tern: “non‐zero‐sum,” meaning variable‐sum in the game‐theory literature, has been usecl differently elsewhere, and probably ought to be retired from use.
