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July 01 1996

Interagency Bargaining and International Negotiation: Lessons from the Open Skies Treaty Talks

Jonathan B. Tucker

Jonathan B. Tucker

Jonathan B. Tucker is associated with the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, 425 Van Buren St., Monterey, Calif. 93940. He is currently directing a research project at the center on the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.

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Author and Article Information

Jonathan B. Tucker

Jonathan B. Tucker is associated with the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, 425 Van Buren St., Monterey, Calif. 93940. He is currently directing a research project at the center on the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.

First Publication: July 02 2007

Online ISSN: 1571-9979

Print ISSN: 0748-4526

© 1996 Plenum Publishing Corporation. Published under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0) license.

1996

Plenum Publishing Corporation

This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the use is non-commercial and the original work is properly cited. For a full description of the license, please visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0.

Negotiation Journal (1996) 12 (3): 275–288.

https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1571-9979.1996.tb00101.x

Abstract

Internal bargaining among government agencies has a direct effect on the formal external negotiation, particularly with regard to the flexibility of the negotiator and their ability, to reach agreements. This article illustrates how interagency bargaining within the U.S. and Soviet governments affected the negotiation of the 1992 Open Skies Treaty between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the former Warsaw Pact.

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© 1996 Plenum Publishing Corporation. Published under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0) license.

1996

Plenum Publishing Corporation

This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the use is non-commercial and the original work is properly cited. For a full description of the license, please visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0.