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April 01 1997

Intervenors with Interests and Power

Michael Watkins,

Michael Watkins

Michael Watkins is associate professor of public policy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 02138.

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Kim Winters

Kim Winters

Kim Winters is a research assistant at the Kennedy School and a free‐lance journalist.

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Author and Article Information

Michael Watkins

Michael Watkins is associate professor of public policy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 02138.

Kim Winters

Kim Winters is a research assistant at the Kennedy School and a free‐lance journalist.

First Publication: July 02 2007

Online ISSN: 1571-9979

Print ISSN: 0748-4526

© 1997 Plenum Publishing Corporation

1997

Plenum Publishing Corporation

This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) license, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. For a full description of the license, please visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode.

Negotiation Journal (1997) 13 (2): 119–142.

https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1571-9979.1997.tb00122.x

Abstract

This article presents a framework for understanding the roles that interested and powerful intervenors play in resolving disputes. Called an intervention role grid, this framework can be used to analyze the dispute resolution functions that third parties can perform. It may also be used to shed light on the difficult choices that confront intervenors with interests and power. The article uses case material from five recent international conflicts to illustrate how the intervention role grid works.

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© 1997 Plenum Publishing Corporation

1997

Plenum Publishing Corporation

This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) license, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. For a full description of the license, please visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode.