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January 01 1998

Deciding to Negotiate with Villains

Bertram I. Spector

Bertram I. Spector

Bertram I. Spector is executive director of the Center for Negotiation Analysis, a nonprofit group providing research, training and advisory support in negotiation, mediation, and other forms of dispute resolution for government agencies, international organizations, and foundation programs. The Center is based at 1160B Le Havre Drive, Pototomac, Md. 20854. Spector is currently completing a book on post‐agreement negotiations and international regimes. He is also editor‐in‐chief of International Negotiation: A Journal of Theory and Practice, published by Kluwer Law International (The Hague).

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Author and Article Information

Bertram I. Spector

Bertram I. Spector is executive director of the Center for Negotiation Analysis, a nonprofit group providing research, training and advisory support in negotiation, mediation, and other forms of dispute resolution for government agencies, international organizations, and foundation programs. The Center is based at 1160B Le Havre Drive, Pototomac, Md. 20854. Spector is currently completing a book on post‐agreement negotiations and international regimes. He is also editor‐in‐chief of International Negotiation: A Journal of Theory and Practice, published by Kluwer Law International (The Hague).

First Publication: July 02 2007

Online ISSN: 1571-9979

Print ISSN: 0748-4526

© 1998 Plenum Publishing Corporation. Published under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0) license.

1998

Plenum Publishing Corporation

This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the use is non-commercial and the original work is properly cited. For a full description of the license, please visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0.

Negotiation Journal (1998) 14 (1): 43–59.

https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1571-9979.1998.tb00147.x

Abstract

Do national leaders have an obligation to negotiate with enemies that have been villainized despite government policies and popular opinion that constrain them from doing so? This article compares the prenegotiation decision to negotiate under normal circumstances and under more trying conditions in which negotiation may be viewed as appeasement. Why enemies are villainized, the objectives of the villainizerr, the cosequences, and the “villainizer's dilemma” are examined. Four recent examples of negotiations – Israel‐PLO, U.S.‐Haiti, U.S.‐North Korea, and Great Britain‐Sinn Fein – are used to draw implications for researchers and practitioners on how, why, and under what circumstances leaders agree to negotiate with their villains, while saving face and shielding themselves from charges of appeasement.

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© 1998 Plenum Publishing Corporation. Published under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0) license.

1998

Plenum Publishing Corporation

This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the use is non-commercial and the original work is properly cited. For a full description of the license, please visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0.