Abstract
Using the negotiations over the future of Northern Ireland and other case examples, the author develops a conceptual framework for analyzing how negotiators seek to build momentum and overcome stalemate. The framework focuses on the choices negotiators face between taking action and waiting in the hope that counterparts will make concessions, exploring the importance of perceptions of time‐related costs and action‐forcing events in shaping decision making. The framework highlights the uneven, nonlinear nature of the flow of negotiation processes from initiation to agreement or breakdown, and focuses on the ways negotiators seek to influence the flow by shaping perceptions of time‐related costs, structuring action‐forcing events, and creating linkages among sets of negotiations.
REFERENCES
Arrow
, K.
,
R.
Mnookin
,
L.
Ross
,
A.
Tversky
, and
R.
Wilson
1995
. Barriers to conflict resolution
.
New York
: Norton
.
Cramton
, P. C.
and
J. S.
Tracy
1992
. Strikes and holdouts in wage bargaining: Theory and data
.
The American Economic Review
. 82
(1
): 100
–121
.
Fisher
, R.
,
W.
Ury
, and
B.
Patton
1991
. Getting to YES: Negotiating agreement without giving in
. 2nd Ed.
New York
: Penguin
.
Gersick
, C.
1989
. Marking time: Predictable transitions in task groups
.
Academy of Management Journal
. 32
(2
): 274
–309
.
Lax
, D. A.
and
J. K.
Sebenius
1986
. The manager as negotiator
.
New York
: Free Press
.
Pruitt
, D. G.
and
J. L.
Drews
1969
. The effect of time pressure, time elapsed, and the opponent's concession rate of behavior in negotiation
.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
5
: 43
–60
.
Pruitt
, D. G.
and
Carnevale
, P. J.
1993
. Negotiation in social conflict
.
Pacific Grove
,
Calif.
: Brooks/Cole
.
Putnam
, R.
1988
. Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two‐level games
.
International Organizations
42
(3
): 427
–460
.
Raiffa
, H.
1982
. The art and science of negotiation
.
Cambridge
,
Mass.
: Harvard University Press
.
Roth
, A. E.
,
J. K.
Murnighan
, and
F.
Schoumaker
1988
. The deadline effect in bargaining: Some experimental evidence
.
The American Economic Review
. 78
(4
): 806
–823
.
Rosegrant
, S.
and
M.
Watkins
1994
. The Gulf crisis: Building a coalition for war
.
Cambridge
,
Mass.
: John F. Kennedy School of Government
Case no. 1264.0.
Rosegrant
, S.
and
M.
Watkins
1995
. Carrots, sticks and question marks: Negotiating the North Korean nuclear crisis (A) and (B)
.
Cambridge
,
Mass.
: John F. Kennedy School of Government
Case nos. 1297.0 and 1298.0.
Rosegrant
, S.
and
M.
Watkins
1996a
. A “seamless” transition: United States and United Nations operation in Somalia ‐ 1992–1993 (A) and (B)
.
Cambridge
,
Mass.
: John F. Kennedy School of Government
Case nos. 1324.0 and 1325.0.
Rosegrant
, S.
and
M.
Watkins
1996b
. Getting to Dayton: Negotiating an end to the war in Bosnia
. Case no. C125‐96‐1356.0, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
.
Smith
, D. L.
,
D. G.
Pruitt
, and
P. J.
Carnevale
1982
. Matching and mismatching: The effect of own limit, other's toughness, and time pressure on concession rate in negotiation
.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
42
: 876
–83
.
Watkins
, M.
and
S.
Passow
1996
. Analyzing linked systems of negotiations
.
Negotiation Journal
12
(4
): 325
–339
.
Watkins
, M.
, and
K.
Winters
1997
. Intevenors with interests and power
.
Negotiation Journal
13
(2
): 119
–142
.
Yukl
, G. A.
1974
. The effects of situational variables and opponent concessions on a bargainer's perception, aspiration, and concessions
.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
29
: 227
–236
.
This content is only available as a PDF.
© 1998 Plenum Publishing Corporation
1998
Plenum Publishing Corporation
This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) license, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. For a full description of the license, please visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode.
