Understanding Barriers to Peace: Reflecting on Israeli–Palestinian Economic Negotiations

Historians may not be the only ones that can reap the benefits of hindsight. Negotiators in prolonged conflicts may also be able to learn from their successes and their failures, and pass along those lessons of hindsight to help break down the barriers to peace. It is with this hope that I committed my reflections on the Israeli side of a prolonged negotiation to paper and invited my Palestinian counterpart to comment on my thoughts and offer his own views. It is our wish that this type of dialogue will result in a better mutual understanding that will improve future Israeli–Palestinian negotiations for the benefit of both parties.

From October 1998 to June 2000, Israel and the Palestinian Authority held negotiations regarding the implementation of the economic component of the Wye River Memorandum. The Memorandum was the result of a Middle East summit conference at the Wye River Plantation in Maryland held by the then United States President Bill Clinton. The Israeli delegation was headed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Chairman Yasser Arafat headed the Palestinian delegation. Signed in October 1998, the Wye River Memorandum was intended to clarify mutual responsibilities of the parties in implementing a further step of “Oslo II,” the Interim Agreement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

While the negotiations on the economic part of the discussions were formally scheduled to end within six weeks of the signing of the Wye River agreement, in fact, they were so prolonged that it took almost two years to complete. In my view, as a member of the Israeli delegation, the final agreement that was reached after years of effort failed to achieve most of the Israeli objectives, while the Palestinian objectives and goals were almost fully realized. This same phenomenon was repeated in the implementation of the agreement.

A series of interrelated barriers are responsible for prolonging the negotiations, the Israelis’ failure to satisfy their own interests, and the difficulties of implementing the agreement. Many of the barriers stemmed from the combination of the two sides’ cultural differences and conflicting mental models that, together, led to a lack of trust between the negotiating parties. In addition to the parties’ inherent differences, outside political pressures and third party influence set the stage for a contentious negotiation.

In this article, we will explore the nine barriers that contributed to the failure:

1. high versus low opening positions;

2. positional bargaining preventing value creation;

3. poor coordination within the Israeli delegation;

4. retraction of offers and its effect on trust building;

5. indirect information sharing versus no information sharing;

6. lack of reciprocity;

7. linked negotiations and the impact of external events;

8. time pressure and last-minute concessions;

9. tactical use of language.

All these factors created a synergy of interlocking barriers to reaching and implementing an agreement. In the course of this article, I will offer an explanation for the barriers, illustrate each factor by giving examples from the negotiations and show how these barriers were often related. It is my hope that this analysis might have a practical application in overcoming some of the barriers in future negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians. I do not pretend to offer a panacea. My intention is merely to call attention to these barriers and to the complexity of the relationships between two parties forced to coexist.

It is only fair to advise the reader that this analysis is seen through the subjective eyes of one Israeli negotiator. I have no doubt that other Israelis who participated in the same negotiations may have a different analysis regarding some of the issues discussed. Certainly, my Palestinian counterparts will have different views and interpretations of the reality that we all shared. In the interest of fairness and the further edification of the reader, my Palestinian counterpart, Omar Dajani, provides the other side’s perspective in the commentary immediately following this article.¹

This article begins with a summary of the circumstances that led to the economic negotiation that we will explore and continues by briefly focusing upon the cultural differences and historic sense of victimization that fostered the creation of the barriers that blocked the way to achieving a better agreement. It then analyzes barriers that emerged during the negotiations and concludes with a possible vision for the future.

The Interim Agreement (“Oslo II”) signed in 1995, created the Joint Economic Committee ( JEC) made up of Israeli and Palestinian Authority members.² Since its establishment, the JEC functioned at various levels of efficiency, depending upon external influences such as the volatile political situation between Palestine and Israel, and upon internal factors — namely the personalities and positions of the committee heads. Both the style and content of the negotiations were influenced by the leadership styles of the head negotiators as well as by their degree of such personal qualities as flexibility, interpersonal sensitivity, inventiveness, patience, and tenacity (Rubin 2002). While the Palestinian chairman of the JEC was the same individual over four years, Israeli had three chairmen during that same period. As we will see, that lack of continuity would prove to be problematic for the Israeli delegation.

While the JEC focused on economic issues, the main issues behind the assembly of the parties at the Wye River Plantation were political. The sides were meeting to determine the further redeployment of Israel from areas claimed by the Palestinian Authority, according to the Interim Agreement, and to address Israeli security concerns. With these primary goals in mind, the Israeli contingent did not intend to raise or deal with any economic issues. It was our view that the economic issues could and should be handled within the framework of the JEC. Only after significant pressure from Prime Minister Netanyahu’s office did one of the deputies of the Ministry of Finance Budget Director join the talks.

Upon arriving at the Wye River Plantation, it became clear to the Israelis that the Palestinians intended to introduce a few economic issues to the agenda, hoping to seize the opportunity to achieve economic gains by getting the Israeli politicians to make concessions on issues that had been tied up in the JEC. It seemed that, from their point of view, as no tangible progress in their favor was being made in the JEC, the Palestinian interests might be better served in this wider forum.

A list of Palestinian economic demands was presented to the Israeli team at Wye River — each of which was taken directly from the agenda of the JEC. This was neither the first nor the last time the Palestinians tried to shift issues from one committee to another, taking advantage of the poor internal coordination on the Israeli side. Poor Israeli internal coordination and communication was one of the barriers that prevented us from effectively pursuing our negotiation strategy.

In response to the Palestinian tactics, the Israeli Ministry of Finance representative at Wye River Plantation was instructed to try to redirect the economic issues back to the JEC. He was not successful in doing so because both Prime Minister Netanyahu and U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright were willing to pay with economic “currency” in order to make progress in other political arenas. As a result of the political meddling from Israeli superiors and third parties, the Palestinians succeeded in packaging economic issues with the other proposals at Wye River.

At the last minute, a paragraph was added to the Wye River Memorandum addressing four economic issues³ and establishing an Ad-Hoc Committee (AHC) within the framework of the JEC to deal more expeditiously with these issues. The paragraph (III 6.), signed as part of the Memorandum on October 23, 1998, reads:

The language of the paragraph was not concise. Instead, it was vague enough to allow both parties wide interpretations. The only consolation for the Israeli Minister of Finance was that Israel was able to lessen the damage by balancing the two “Palestinian” interests (A1/A2 lists of allowable Middle East imports and purchase tax on local goods)⁴ with two “Israeli” interests (vehicle thefts and Palestinian debts).

The six-week timeline set for the resolution of the four issues was unrealistic as the economic components involved were so complicated. It was aligned with the timeline of the other parts of the Wye River Memorandum that were of more strategic interest to the main parties at the table. With a deadline of less than two months to iron out our differences, the negotiations commenced almost immediately following the signing of the Memorandum.

Neither the parties involved in the actual negotiation nor the external analysts who viewed the results attributed enough importance to the cultural differences between the Israelis and Palestinians. Cross-cultural analysis tends to be stereotypical and simplistic — especially when relating “oriental” culture to “western” culture.

Many believe that, as Israelis and Palestinians reside in the same geographical area and have so many common characteristics, our cultures are too similar to differentiate. Indeed, it is true that Palestinian and Israeli societies have been interacting with each other for many years and we have adopted elements from each other’s culture and mentality. Yet, some basic differences remain, such as Israeli individualism versus Palestinian collectivism, Israeli egalitarian versus Palestinian hierarchical society, and Israeli low- versus Palestinian high-context communications.⁵

While these differences do not necessarily apply to all individuals in each culture or even exist in all contexts, they still affect our interactions, and their significance cannot be discounted. Analyzing the barriers to negotiation requires that we look at the differences and debates between the Israelis and the Palestinians through this cross-cultural prism. Such differences contributed to the emergence of many barriers, specifically the difficulties in building trust.

Principally, the Israelis’ eagerness to make progress, together with their underestimation of the existing cultural differences, sometimes resulted in amateur mistakes — like the one made in dealing with the issue of vehicle theft. This was a critical issue as Israel had the dubious distinction of being the auto theft capital of the world at the time. Israeli and Palestinian car thieves had formed a close, mutually beneficial relationship where vehicles stolen in Israel were hidden in Palestinian territory.⁶

In the latter part of the negotiations, when no progress was being made toward finding a mutual way to combat the stolen vehicles phenomenon, we asked the Israeli police to come up with a list of problems and suggested solutions. They provided us with a booklet that included aerial maps that showed chop shops — where stolen cars are disassembled for parts — together with the names of their Palestinian owners; a list of Palestinian security people and officials who used stolen Israeli cars; and a detailed proposal that outlined and requested specific Palestinian actions.

The Palestinians perceived this booklet as an insult and a loss of face. In their view, it was offensive because it was written in commanding — even patronizing — language and because it did not mention any steps that the Israeli police were taking or intended to pursue. Although it was not our intention, the booklet made it appear as if Israel did not mean to take any actions in ending the car theft problem, thereby ordering the Palestinian Authority to bear the entire burden.

Under other circumstances, we could have apologized and explained that security forces have their own bold language and that no offense was meant. We could have prevailed upon them to ignore the rhetoric and keep the substance. In this case, however, the apology did not help. Instead, this incident gave the Palestinians a reason to become defensive and aggressive. It became a sore spot that halted progress on this issue for a long time afterward.

Trust is defined in the negotiation literature in various ways. McAllister (1995) defines it as “an individual’s belief in and willingness to act on the words, actions and decisions of another.”

The individual personal relationships between the Israeli and Palestinian delegates were good. Some of us had known each other for ages. Likewise, the atmosphere during the meetings was usually amicable and warm; jokes were exchanged and personal stories were told. But when it came to trust at the committee level, it was a different story. As much we might trust our counterparts on the personal level, we did not have such feelings of trust as a group. Principally, the source of our distrust comes from our shared history, but it also stems from our cultural differences. While personal commitments were usually kept by the parties, as a group we Israelis experienced many cases where group promises and commitments did not materialized. A couple of examples are contained in this article. Moreover, in my contacts with individuals of the other party, I always knew that I could pressure my counterparts to stand up to their commitments; but I could not find ways of pressuring them as a group.

The feeling of distrust was mutual. The Palestinians were suspicious of anything that was said or suggested by the Israelis, seeing manipulations and hidden agendas in every Israeli word or action. For our part, the Israelis were absolutely certain that the Palestinians were looking for any possibility to deceive us and that the Palestinians had no intention of fulfilling their obligations. Our collective failure to understand each other’s mentality or, rather, our persistence in viewing each other’s actions through our own cultural prism created a reality where, while we all were speaking English, each side was speaking a different language.

Another important factor that became clear to me upon later reflection is the deep sense of victimization among some of the Palestinian negotiators. Their conviction was that the Israeli side, having more assets and more power, should be on the giving end, while the Palestinians should be on the receiving end. According to this line of thought, since the Israelis caused them harm and are in possession of Palestinian assets, Israel should provide compensation. The mindset seemed to be that negotiation was unnecessary because, “We do not have to bargain for what is rightfully ours.”

In a sense, there is justification for the notion that Israel has more to give in the economic game; however, this is only true up to a certain point. The giver has interests as well, and these interests need to be met in order for the giving party to continue to give.

In the negotiations, this no-need-to-bargain attitude created a reality where, in my view, the Palestinian side did not feel fully committed to the process and nor did they feel the need to participate in a more balanced game of give-and-take. The Palestinian side was frequently willing to give up major achievements and leave the negotiation table empty-handed rather than share the pie or contribute to its enlargement. An example of this conduct occurred at the 2000 AHC meeting in the Palestinian city of Ramallah.

The meeting began around four o’clock in the afternoon and discussions went straight through until midnight. At that point in time, the Palestinian side had achieved substantial gains as the Israeli delegation had given in on the three most important issues on the table (out of five). Immediately following the Israeli team’s conciliation on the first three issues, the Palestinian side initiated a discussion regarding the two remaining items. While the Israeli cochair of the meeting understood that the Palestinians expected more concessions, we were not willing to make any more because we felt that we had reached a balance of interests.

Our cochair approached his Palestinian counterpart and suggested two possibilities: the Palestinians could consent to the Israeli view on the remaining two issues, or we reshuffle the deck and start over with a new game. The logic behind the second suggestion was that, as all the issues seemed equally crucial to both sides and the Israelis had already given as much as they could, no creative solution could be found to satisfy both parties’ interests. Understanding this, the Israeli committee head was ready to explore different ways for enlarging the pie so that neither side had to give everything up.

After a minute of hushed consultations came the Palestinian reaction: “It seems that this forum cannot reach an agreement. We suggest that we reconvene under a higher rank of committee chairs.” As the Israeli side saw it, in a matter of seconds, the Palestinian party gave up on the results of eight hours of hard work and, by suggesting changing the players, had also negated substantial achievements made after months of negotiations.

Looking back, if we could have properly dealt with our cultural differences, understood the different mindsets created by our shared history, and controlled the influence of the “outside world,” all the components for a win-win negotiation existed in this case. We were in a classic scenario for integrative bargaining and creating value. There were creative people on both sides of the table; enough issues to satisfy all parties’ aspirations and needs; the potential for creating side deals between the parties; and different preferences of the parties that could lead to a broad consensus (Thompson 2001). Although the situation seemed almost perfect, the reality was quite different. Nine barriers stood in the way to reaching an optimum agreement. Taken separately, they would have increased the difficulty of any negotiation. Taken together, they had doomed this one.

Our impression was that the Palestinian side anchored its demands high in order to have a broad range for maneuvering. Moreover, the Palestinian party allowed themselves to make only very minor concessions, if any. On the other hand, the Israeli side continuously anchored low, frequently very close to or exactly at its reservation point. It was a strange phenomenon to observe, especially bearing in mind that Israelis have a reputation for being tough negotiators.

Naturally, when negotiating, the sides had to make concessions. However, when the Israeli side made such concessions starting from a low anchoring point, they were more likely to wind up under their reservation point or to sacrifice principle interests. In hindsight, the solution seems painfully obvious: the Israeli side should have anchored higher in order to end the negotiations at a better position. By doing so, we could have moved in increments parallel to the Palestinian concessions and might have demonstrated to our counterparts that the same game can be played by both sides.

Initially, both parties started with positional bargaining as we were continuing the same momentum developed in the JEC. As the Palestinian side resisted making any concessions, we followed suit. But, after the Israeli cochair of the JEC had changed, the Israelis quickly came to the realization that this bargaining style was leading nowhere.

The Israelis switched their style to a more integrative approach, talking about joint interests, rather than opposing positions. Instead of specifically outlining our mutual interests, we used a more subtle approach to address the interests on both sides: “We are looking for ways to seriously reduce the car theft phenomenon that is badly affecting our economy,”“Let’s find methods to reduce Palestinian insurance debts to Israelis and make sure that the trigger for such debts will not occur in the future,” and “Give us a list of any goods that you would like to import from Arab countries together with quantities that are beyond your needs [expansion of the A1/A2 lists] and we will seriously consider them.”

We were sharing information about our interests, unconsciously hoping that this would pave the way toward progress. However, the strategy did not work, and we were getting the impression that the Palestinian side was not interested in the direction that we were trying to push the negotiation process.

Since positional bargaining is about claiming value, it is one of the barriers to creating value. In this instance, positional bargaining was both unnecessary and counterproductive. After all, on most issues we were not strict competitors. Each side had things that the other wanted — things that could be given to the other party with little or no cost. But instead of systematically exploring each side’s interests and trying to figure out ways to enlarge the pie, the parties fell back into the trap of restating their positions with different phrasing — over and over again. The attempts made by the Israelis to define a different track were doomed to fail, mainly because the gap in trust was already too wide to bridge.

Our perception was that one side was playing softball (Israel), aiming to reach an agreement; and the other side was playing hardball (Palestinian Authority), aiming to achieve a victory. As far as we could judge, the Palestinian side had a general attitude of all-or-nothing hard line bargaining. They gave no quarter to the concept of obtaining a mutual gain.

We overlooked each other’s basic instincts or emotions to our peril. A deep distrust lay between the parties, and the sequence of events only augmented these feelings. We were under the impression that the Palestinians were deliberately trying to damage the Israeli economy, while the Palestinians were under the impression that the Israelis were trying to damage Palestinian economic interests. Subsequently, it did not matter when the cycle began or who was to blame because the parties were never able to break it as long as they remained locked into opposing positions.

It is hard to implement an integrative bargaining style and pursue a value-sharing negotiation strategy when the sides are not playing according to the same rules. However, a clear and explicit explanation of the ground rules that the Israeli delegation was trying to apply — rules that could have brought a better outcome for both parties — might have helped restore the trust between the sides. We might have said: “We are trying to figure out how to address all of the interests that are present at this table with a mutually beneficial process. We will show goodwill, exchange information, and focus on areas of mutual concern. But we also expect you to do the same.”

The coordination among the various Israeli entities negotiating with the Palestinians was far from perfect. An outcome of this weakness was that the Palestinians, well aware of our internal disarray, tried — and many times succeeded — to achieve small victories by speaking with various members of different ranks on the Israeli side about the same issue until they got the answer they wanted.

As far as we could observe, the Palestinians were highly coordinated, collective in their conduct (even when having different individual interests), hierarchical in their structure, and aligned seamlessly along their positions. One reason for their high level of coordination is the fact that the Palestinian leadership and their leading negotiating teams had been composed of the same circle of people since 1994. Together they lived the entire history of the negotiations and were familiar with all the pitfalls and small details. On the Israeli side, frequent elections meant people regularly changed their positions and the rhetoric shifted with the turnover. For the Israelis this meant the loss of institutional memory, and unchecked repetition of mistakes.

This difference in continuity was also seen in the backing that the sides received from their superiors and their political establishment. The Palestinians can count on the fact that they would get the support of their constituency because they usually presented an unvarying line. With changing political appointees, regular elections, and a larger, more diverse population, the Israelis do not always enjoy the luxury of unwavering support.

The high coordination of the Palestinian side enabled them to better achieve their goals. By carrying an issue through different committees and negotiation groups with continuity, the repetition of an idea horizontally, as well as vertically, led to a stronger, more united stance on the issues.

Not only were the Israelis negotiators not always supported by their hierarchy, they were often victims of a democratic view of the process that allowed the players freedom of independent action. This enabled the Palestinians to play us off each other and led some of our negotiators to stake positions from which we could not retreat with honor.

The solution in this case was very simple. Had the Israeli side recognized the damage that was created due to their lack of coordination, we could have created the rule that no one would be allowed to divert without a thorough discussion from the policy that had been decided upon. The process of conferring and consulting can be time-consuming and often frustrating, but the outcome of such a process, combined with a strong and determined leadership, would undoubtedly have been well worth the investment.

Time after time we sat at the table and renegotiated issues that were agreed upon in previous meetings. The tactic of retracting an offer or pronouncing previous understandings as null and void was an important strategy reserved for Palestinian negotiators. The Israeli negotiators, on the other hand, were expected to keep their side of the bargain. For the Palestinians, retraction was just a part of the game, an aspect of the bargaining culture, and an acceptable tactic used to obtain positive results by a side that was disadvantaged.

The Israeli side saw the retraction of an offer as negotiating in bad faith. This notion was so deeply embodied in our conduct that even when a mistake was made, we found it hard to retract and even correct it. When a Palestinian erred and took a position different from the mainstream, he corrected his stance in accordance with the “party” line as soon as he discovered his deviation. When a member of the Israeli side made such a mistake, it was very difficult for him or her to correct because, as a rule, we do not retract an offer once it has been made. This collision between attitudes frequently created negative emotions between the parties and often led to impasse.

Aware of the other side’s pattern of retracting offers, we tried to use the instrument of joint minutes to thwart this tactic. The first meeting of the AHC lasted about three hours and some progress was made. However, trying to reach an agreement on the content of the joint minutes from the first meeting consumed three days because we could not agree on a language that reflected our understanding of what transpired.

We decided, from that point on, to write the minutes during the meeting and have the committee heads sign off on them before we adjourned. This solution lasted for one meeting. Afterward, the Palestinians elegantly evaded the issue each time we tried to elicit signatures on minutes. Our interpretation was that they were so unwilling to make and keep commitments that they were not ready to document any concessions for fear they might be held to their word.

Only when mirroring the Palestinian behavior of retracting our offers were we able to achieve some limited results. It is only natural that when we are rewarded for a certain behavior, we keep behaving in the same manner. The only way to break such a pattern is by offering incentives to change behavior. In this case, we thought mirroring the other side’s behavior might serve as an incentive for them to change it. I can recall only one time when we used this tactic of mirroring their retraction. My memory of the event is that during the meeting following our mirroring attempt, our counterparts did not retract any of their offers.

Another barrier to successful completion of the economic negotiations relates to sharing information. Neither side asked enough questions to uncover the hidden interests of the other party. We all tended to be locked into our own perceptions, failing to look toward the horizon.

Although neither side subscribed to direct information sharing, the Israelis shared information through propositions and counterproposals while the Palestinians did not reciprocate. They offered few counterproposals and rarely took the initiative. One possible explanation for this difference in information-sharing and proposal-making behavior might be found in a research study, which showed that Israelis tend to rely heavily on proposals for information (Brett 2001). As a result, the Israelis tried to make that type of give-and-take a primary means of communication. However, the Palestinians were not similarly inclined.

This phenomenon started to change toward the middle of the negotiation, when the Palestinian party came up with a new draft agreement that was very different from the draft that we had been working on together for some time. We perceived this new draft to be yet another cycle of retracting from previous understandings, but it may have been a belated attempt to share information. The outcome was mutual frustration and anger, which only served to amplify existing conflicts.

One lesson that may be gleaned from this case study is that negotiating parties need reciprocity in order to build trust; when there is an asymmetric sharing of information, trust is hard — if not impossible — to build. Clarifying expectations could be one way to create a process of mutual information sharing.

Our history in the JEC taught us that resolving Palestinian issues before confronting Israeli issues would many times lead to a deadlock in solving the latter issues. We experienced situations where when dealing with issues one by one, the Palestinian party stopped cooperating once they achieved their desired results.⁷

We observed the same phenomenon when it came to implementing an economic agreement. Israel usually implemented its obligations while the Palestinian side often failed to comply with their portion of the agreement.

We were sure that once we reached an agreement regarding the two “Palestinian issues,” Israel would be pressured by the Palestinians and third parties to start implementing the agreed elements while still negotiating on the issues that were of primary concern to Israel. Naturally, this would have made us less inclined to make any concessions during the negotiations. With their interests taken care of, the Palestinians could afford to stall on the remaining issues.

Hence, the Israeli negotiators proposed that an agreement should be completed and implemented as a package deal that linked the implementation of the “Palestinian” issues to the progress of “Israeli” issues of the agreement. We called it a “parallel phase approach.” We were hoping that such a process would create an incentive for a faster and fairer process, from agreement through implementation.

The idea of packaging, a basic tool of negotiations when dealing with complex issues, was not used by the JEC and was difficult to introduce and assimilate as a basic and necessary component for the AHC negotiations. Obviously, Palestinians were content with a process that allowed them more flexibility. At first, the Palestinians rejected the packaging notion, but long discussions and the insistence of the Israeli side led to initial agreement.

We explained that such a mechanism would help generate trust for both parties. We believed that trust should be built upon the mutual fulfillment of obligations. Once we created an atmosphere of trust based upon tangible results, it would be easier for both parties to progress in good faith with the feeling that they would be rewarded by the other party’s positive actions.

During the two years that followed, the Palestinians repeatedly tried to revisit the idea of packaging, applying direct and indirect pressure to dismantle the package approach. The Israelis did not yield to the pressure. However, despite this victory of process, the outcome was still not a satisfactory one for the Israelis, as we did not insist on reciprocity during the implementation.

The progress of the AHC negotiations also depended upon the status of other relations between the Palestinian Authority and Israel. When the political machinations were stalled or when violence occurred, the impact was clearly felt at the AHC. Meetings were canceled or postponed by the Palestinians and periods of silence occurred between the parties.

As much as the Israeli side of the AHC was eager to keep up the momentum and avoid a situation of interdependency between the work of the AHC and other committees, the Palestinians appeared eager to reinforce the link between the troubles in the outside world and the internal struggles at the AHC. It was a show of solidarity that left us vulnerable to events outside our control and committee actions that were not “our own.”

In the economic negotiations, experience has shown that the Palestinians usually benefited from the introduction of time pressure. The Israelis have a fear of being seen as the ones that caused a failure in the process and, therefore, tend to make more concessions as the deadline approaches and the Palestinians continue to be reticent to compromise. Many times in the past, the Israeli negotiator capitulated in the last minute. Even without a hard and fast deadline approaching, the Israeli side sometimes gave in due to political pressure and due to their desire to finally reach an agreement so they could move on to the next phase. This pattern, combined with high anchoring, gave the Palestinians a clear advantage in the negotiations.

A key Palestinian tactic was to make only minor concessions, so progress was incremental and stalemates were frequent. Some of this behavior probably stems from the Palestinian concept that they are the oppressed side. According to their view, as they did not have much to lose, they would wait for a “big” opportunity to improve their situation in one large leap rather than doing it progressively. Therefore, they did not feel obliged to make steady progress, calculating that there is always a chance that, at the end of the day, they will “get it all.”

This might explain the Palestinian tendency to wait until the last possible second in order to make decisions or concessions. The Israeli side, on the other hand, tends to try to make progress early on. This difference in mindset was further exacerbated by low-context versus high-context communications (Brett 2001). Generally, the Israelis are more direct in their approach (low context) and tend to want to get down to business and accomplish things fast, whereas the Palestinians are more indirect (high context) and tend to prolong the decision-making process.

One possible solution to combat the negative effects of the timing element and the Palestinian’s anticoncession tactics might be mirroring the Palestinian negotiation behavior. The Israeli team could mirror the Palestinian strategy by also anchoring high and conceding little. However, besides the obvious concerns about impasse and escalation, the Palestinians may well have confidently waited us out, knowing from experience that we often concede at the last minute. Politically, the waiting game is harder for Israelis to play as there is more outside pressure to make progress and the cost of impasse is often greater. To even attempt to mirror the behavior and tactics of the other side, the Israelis would need to assure that all its players were completely coordinated — which, as we’ve noted, was a problematic issue.

Another difference of cultures is illustrated in the language and amount of detail that each side expects in an agreement. While the Israeli side of the AHC was interested in a language that would be as precise as possible and cover the maximum possible scenarios, the Palestinian side of the committee tended to be interested in a vaguer language, which would enable more freedom in implementation and more exit points in the future. This constant tension made it hard to reach an agreed language even on issues that were under mutual consent.

A possible explanation for this difference in attitudes (besides the cultural ones) may be that the Palestinians were less confident in their view of their economic future. As the Palestinian economy had not developed as they had hoped when the interim agreements were signed, the Palestinians may have wanted to leave as many options open as possible. As a result, they tried to avoid a precise agreement through the use of ambiguous language, which could be used to defer decisions until the Palestinians knew what their situation would be. Perhaps these tactics created a Palestinian feeling of strength and the notion that by not setting the terms in stone, they could adjust to meet the needs of their future situation and perhaps upgrade the results of the negotiation.

In essence, the economic component of the Wye River Memorandum was not very complicated. Rational parties should have been able to reach an agreement in the described case within a relatively short period of time. However, the dynamics described in this article complicated the process to the extent that what should have taken two months was still not resolved to the satisfaction of both parties after nearly two years.

Finally, an agreement was signed due to time constraints and third party pressure. As far as the Israeli side is concerned, the outcome of the negotiations was far from successful. Many of the Israeli interests were unmet and their major concerns remained unresolved. No solution was found for future Palestinian debt accumulations and no real plan of co-operation was created to fight the vehicle theft phenomenon. In addition, the agreement lacked real incentives for the Palestinians to implement their part of the bargain.

Overall, the Palestinian side seemed to have achieved its goals: the A1/A2 importation lists were expanded and a change was introduced to the tax clearance mechanism that raised the amount of tax moneys transferred from Israel to the Palestinian Authority each month. While Israel implemented its part fully, the Palestinians did not follow through on their commitments.

It is easy to find excuses for this Israeli failure to achieve their goals and even easier to claim that there was not sufficient time to test the agreement in a neutral environment. To be sure, the failure of the Camp David Peace Talks of July 2000 and the second wave of violence that started in September 2000 (and is still continuing) prevented the full implementation of the agreement. As a result, the parallel phase of implementing the agreement never fully materialized.

“Creative ways of handling conflicts often emerge from the adoption of a flexible, pragmatic outlook. Such a contingency model necessitates finding the strategy that appears the most appropriate in a specific situation,” wrote author Christopher A. Leeds (1997) in an article for the International Journal of Peace Studies.

Many of the barriers described here are discussed in negotiation literature. The reader may have even encountered many of them in their course of daily life. If you have experienced them, you know that most of these barriers can be overcome. By acknowledging the problem, one has already taken the first step toward defusing tension and bridging the barriers that arise.

The next step is to put yourself in the other parties’ shoes and try to explore their perception of the issues and their interests. In our case, it would be useful to find out how the Palestinians evaluate the same negotiation process and the barriers described. To that end, my Palestinian counterpart, Omar Dajani, has written a commentary, which follows this article.

Once we acknowledge the problem and do our best to understand the other parties’ perspective, we should take action by defining ground rules both parties can agree on. Ground rules help in the building of trust because you know where you stand. Agreeing on the rules of the game may help to prevent impasse and improve our ability to rise above some of our differences when difficulties arise.

However helpful, ground rules are not a complete solution. Differences in mentality and styles of negotiations will continue to exist. Mirroring can sometimes bridge the cultural differences. It is like speaking a different language — the cultural or mental language of your counterpart. Mirroring may cause the other party to modify its behavior if that party feels uncomfortable with the reflection of its own behavior. In other cases, behaving according to the norms of the other party may bring the sides closer together and more committed to finding solutions.

Finally, it is important to remember that negotiating patterns are dependent on the personal characteristics of the participants. We each have our personal agendas, characters, and constraints, and the impact of these elements on the negotiation process should not be underestimated.

For example, a short while after the final agreement was reached on the economic issues of the Wye River Memorandum; we began negotiating the permanent status agreement, with a new counterpart — a different leader of the Palestinian team. He was a tough negotiator, actually much tougher than his predecessors but somehow, within a few meetings, we were able to make tremendous progress regarding the details of our future economic relationships, an issue that is much more complex than the Wye issues. Some of the progress was made because we assimilated several of the stylistic differences into the manner in which we confronted the Palestinian delegation. However, much of this progress was also due to personality differences in the new leadership.

Looking to the future, the hope is that the parties will learn from past mistakes. For Israelis, that may mean finding a method that allows us to retain institutional knowledge in the face of elections and transfers that move the players from one position to another.

The analysis clearly illustrates the importance of creativity, planning, and persistence. Whereas none of the parties can change the behavior of their counterparts, we should be open to understanding our differences and be creative enough to reinvent new realities out of the situations that we encounter.