International Dimensions: What Is the Role of Third Parties? Open Access

The collapse of the Oslo Process in 2000 and the ensuing deterioration in Israeli–Palestinian relations have predictably led to an intensified debate over the role of third parties. From the Saudi peace plan, to the formation of the diplomatic “Quartet” (United Nations, the European Union, the Russian Federation, and the U.S.), to calls for a new “trusteeship,” outside intervention, as former U.S. Ambassador Dennis Ross (2004: 772) has argued, is most often needed when the prospects for a negotiated agreement are at rock bottom. This phenomenon is clearly demonstrated in Israel's own post‐Oslo initiative, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's “unilateral disengagement” plan, which relies on a considerable degree of explicit and implicit third‐party involvement.

The growing demands for third‐party intervention apply as much to the future of Jewish settlements as they do to other aspects of the conflict. Whether it is the twin questions of borders and territory, settler relocation, the status of settlement assets, or the future of the political process, virtually every decision about the settlements raises questions that relate to the role of third parties.

These contributors were brought together to explore the potential promises and pitfalls of outside intervention. Gabriella Blum examined Israel's expectations and interests vis‐à‐vis third parties. Blum and Robert Malley explored what conditions to place on cooperation by outside actors.

Samuel Lewis and Daniel B. Shapiro looked at the track record for third parties, especially that of the U.S. attempts to exert influence on the question of Jewish settlements — not simply what has been the result in terms of Arab–Israeli relations, but within Israeli society? Howard Raiffa discussed how outside actors could structure incentive strategies to promote cooperation on dismantling settlements. These contributors brought together both theory and practice. These contributors, academics and practitioners, represent the best tradition of public policy inquiry — reasoned, careful, and rigorous analysis grounded in lessons learned from the real world.

As is often the case when assessing the role of third parties and the settlements, debate revolved mainly around the U.S. Although views on the panel and among participants in the conference varied, it is the view of this author that Washington could play a much more instrumental role.

Although it remains a stated American objective, limiting the growth of settlements has been extraordinarily difficult for successive American administrations (the same could be said for Israeli governments). Different presidents have tried different strategies. Former President George H. W. Bush's administration, faced with a stalled peace process, unilaterally intervened in Israel's settlement debate (e.g., the 1991–1992 loan guarantees episode) and employed a strategy of positive and negative inducements (Arens 1995; Baker 1995; Lasensky 2004).

More than a decade later, President George W. Bush also intervened in the Israeli debate on the future of the settlements, but in this case at the invitation of an Israeli leader. The April 2004 Bush–Sharon exchange of letters (Bush–Sharon Letters 2004) represents another attempt by the U.S. to influence the course of Israeli political debate on settlements, but this time relying only on positive inducements. But there is far more that could have been done, particularly in terms of shoring up the majority in Israel that favors dismantling many of the settlements as part of an agreed two‐state solution. This is a view of the U.S. role also shared by Israelis.

Zeev Schiff, one of Israel's most respected security analysts, has called for greater American intervention. “When it comes to the [settlement] outposts, the issue has involved the spreading of one of the state of Israel's biggest lies — not only a lie that was told to the Americans . . . but an ongoing lie that the Israeli public is being fed,” Schiff writes. “The only viable conclusion,” he says, “is that . . . Washington must apply pressure to Israel for its own sake.”

A concerted and sustained U.S. reproach could further loosen the stranglehold this issue holds over Israeli politics and create space for a more serious internal debate. President Bush needs to know that taking a tough line on settlements will have a tremendous effect on Israeli public discourse. Israelis are extremely sensitive to friction with Washington because they attach almost existential significance to the relationship. The case of Yitzhak Shamir's 1992 elections defeat is just one example.

To be sure, Israeli settlements are not the cause of the Arab–Israeli or the Palestinian–Israeli conflict, nor are they the sole reason for the collapse of the Oslo Process and the resulting Palestinian uprising. But settlements do endanger Israel by diverting military resources from strategic needs, sapping scarce government funds, and providing Palestinians and the larger Arab world with a legitimate focal point for animosity, thereby undermining U.S. interests as well.

An American reproach does not require setting new conditions on American aid, as some have advocated and as the first President Bush tried doing. Rather, a sustained political intervention by the White House would suffice. Moreover, it would be well within the guidelines of the Quartet's Road Map, which lies at the heart of official U.S. policy. Israelis must know that there is a political price for building more settlements and part of the price is Washington's disfavor. It is a price neither Sharon nor any other Israeli leader can bear for long. The Bush administration has so far chosen an approach based on reassurance and positive inducements, but it remains an incomplete strategy, one that falls short of realizing America's vast reservoir of influence on the settlements issue.

My remarks are personal and do not necessarily represent the views of Israel's National Security Council. The Israeli–Palestinian conflict has never been lonely. Many Western states have had their oar in it at one point or another, and many international actors continue to have a stake in it. International involvement has increased over the last two years with initiatives to return parties to the negotiation table, to curb violence, and to move forward. Examples include the Quartet's Roadmap proposed in 2003; the Saudi peace plan, which was endorsed by the Arab League; American proposals for trusteeship; and even the locally designed Geneva Initiative, which was widely endorsed by international actors. Palestinians have also called for international involvement and have won a significant victory recently in the United Nations (UN) General Assembly and International Court of Justice in their condemnation of Israel and its security fence.

The Israeli administration is keenly aware of this growing international interest and involvement. Prime Minister Sharon presented his disengagement plan to the Knesset as a means to break out of the stalemate while withstanding international pressure. He believes that a failure to do so will lead to Israel making far‐reaching concessions under intolerable international pressure while legitimacy is given to terrorists. His attitude is a result of Israel being a “repeat loser” in the international playground at the hands of the UN, the EU, and the Arab League.

The disengagement plan presents an interesting shift in this perspective. The plan's original title, “The Unilateral Disengagement Plan,” reflected the new policy that, in the absence of a negotiating partner, Israel must risk taking unilateral action. However, there was an open call to international actors to step in and intervene, to replace a nonexistent Palestinian partner with that of the international community.

This approach was apparent from the plan's inception. Sharon took the plan to President Bush before either the Knesset or most of his cabinet had even seen it. He sought to replace the traditional process of negotiation seen during the Oslo Process with one in which the outcome was a product of negotiation between Israel and the U.S. Thus the U.S. did not merely see the plan but was given the opportunity to comment on it. The idea of maintaining a negotiating partner was important to Israeli political opinion because large segments of the Israeli public resisted unilateral action.

The policy was also intended to minimize Israeli responsibility for Gaza following withdrawal by allowing, and indeed inviting, international actors to have a role in offering humanitarian, economic, and civic assistance that would surely be needed following withdrawal.

The policy invites international participation in both the economic and security spheres. Economically, the international community has been requested to assist in Palestinian economic recovery and institutional reconstruction. In response, the World Bank, under a wide international mandate, has been engaged in a consultation with Israelis and Palestinians over the immediate post‐disengagement issues of trade, movement, industrial zones, and Israeli assets. But far more long‐term planning is needed over energy, water, employment, and so on. The generous financial aid of the past has failed to yield satisfactory results, and the obstacles must be addressed.

In the security sphere, Israel faces many challenges: Palestinian factions are expected to escalate the violence in order to foster the image of an Israeli retreat under fire. The evacuation of some seven thousand people under fire will be almost impossible. There are also fears that Gaza will become a second Lebanon, flooded with medium‐range weapons.

Palestinian terrorism has an international context: it has long been financed through Saudi Arabia, armed through Egypt, and politically guided through Syria and Iran. In countering these harmful international effects, other international actors may have an important role to play. While exerting pressure upon Syria and Iran is problematic, even if crucial, other tasks may be more easily achieved. Thus, both Egypt and Britain have expressed interest in training Palestinian security forces. In addition, Israel needs to pull out of the Philadelphia Corridor, and Egypt is best situated to take over. But if a bilateral solution does not prove feasible because of Egyptian reluctance, there may be calls for other international players to take a role there.

Politically, there has been an assumption that new Palestinian leadership would enable a resumption of Israeli–Palestinian dialogue and a return to the Road Map. But there has been no thought given to how such a plan might come about. Again, the international community may have a role in identifying and supporting a suitable leadership (while Israel's expression of approval would almost inevitably undermine it).

The disengagement plan represents a shift from Israel's traditional aversion to any international involvement, and this is not limited to the disengagement plan. However, limits must exist and involvement must not be confused with replacement; Israel must accept its continuing relationship with the Palestinians. International actors must also do everything they can to ensure that the Palestinians are held accountable for their actions and resist the temptation to attribute violence to a loss of control.

My remarks are personal and do not necessarily represent the views of Senator Bill Nelson. First, although Congress's role is broader than simply writing the checks, it cannot lead on this issue despite strong bipartisan support for both Israel and the peace process. This is partly because foreign aid is generally unpopular with the public, which ensures that it is politically easier to respond to requests for foreign aid than to actually propose them. Moreover, it is awkward to preempt the requests of the parties that are more directly involved (i.e., the Israeli and American governments). And, of course, members of Congress are mindful of special interest groups in the American‐Jewish and evangelical Christian communities.

This reluctance has led to a very odd congressional silence over the disengagement plan even though President George W. Bush has endorsed it. Senate Resolution 393, which was passed in July 2004, approved the president's endorsement of the disengagement plan, but it was a very low profile resolution and has not been addressed in the House of Representatives. The leadership of the House has close ties to both Jewish and Christian evangelical communities. The stiff competition for their political contributions and votes in 2004, a presidential election year, exacerbated a reluctance to get out in front of the Israeli government.

Moreover, some members have doubts about whether the disengagement plan will really happen or be successful. There are questions about Sharon's true intentions and his political strength as well as questions about the effect of an escalation of Palestinian activities. Some members are also reluctant to reward Palestinian leadership, which has been dysfunctional and unwilling to take the security measures demanded of it.

If Sharon receives approval in the Knesset, it is likely that next year there will be a proposal for a large U.S. assistance package for disengagement. Early next session, Congress will almost certainly take up a supplemental appropriations bill for Iraq, which will be the vehicle for this assistance package.

However, assuming the plan is passed and the Sharon government survives, we can expect negotiations over an American financial package in support of the withdrawal to begin next year. Israeli Finance Minister Benjamin Netanyahu already met with then U.S. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice for preliminary discussions. Legislatively, the timing is particularly apt. A supplemental appropriations bill is likely to be on the floor next year pursuant to the Iraqi conflict. It can serve as the legislative vehicle for the aid package and will be useful in linking the two issues.

The package can be framed as supporting the peace process and a two‐state solution, or as helping Israel deal with intense state security needs. The choice will affect the nature of the debate that follows but not the ultimate result. Packages under the Clinton administration always provoked greater debate and conditions when they balanced aid for the Israelis with aid for the Palestinians, although packages framed as emergency security aid sailed through with minimal debate. Consequently, it may be preferable for the Europeans to deal with Palestinian aid and security. One key issue in the way the debate unfolds is how vigorously elements of the Jewish and Christian evangelical communities oppose the disengagement process and how effectively more mainstream groups, such as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), support it.

The nature of the assistance is also likely to provoke legislative difficulties. For example, it is a long‐standing U.S. policy not to provide assistance to Israeli activities in the territories. This might have to be reinterpreted to allow funding to help settlers leave the territories. Similarly, their destination may provoke difficulties. What of those settlers who wish to use their compensation money to move to the West Bank? Which West Bank settlements would be considered acceptable?

Regarding the form of assistance, direct cash assistance has been almost totally phased out by the U.S. government. The new model of loan guarantees is more likely to be used. It has the advantage of a dollar‐for‐dollar reduction mechanism by which the U.S. can reduce the loan guarantee for activities that it does not approve of.

Emergency military assistance in cash might also be considered. It meets the more traditional test of responding to Israeli security needs and removes the specter of directing aid into the territories. It is unlikely that Congress will place conditions on the annual assistance package to pressure Israel to take additional steps toward reconciliation and/or disengagement.

A likely scenario following Israeli–American consultations in the spring of 2005 would be a package of military assistance for relocating military bases, loan guarantees for the removal of settlements and the compensation of settlers with the dollar‐for‐dollar reduction mechanism, and perhaps, a small amount of Palestinian aid, all of which are likely to form part of a supplemental appropriations bill.

Significant questions are raised by this course of events: Is the U.S. investing long term in the settlement removal enterprise? Will there be an expectation that the U.S. will play a similar role in the West Bank? Does U.S. assistance make it harder for Israel to freeze the disengagement if it goes poorly? And how much will Israel's future choices be limited by U.S. involvement?

To start with a deep methodological insight: if a problem appears intractable, couple it with a second intractable problem and maybe, just maybe, the composite problem will be more amenable to a solution. The original problem is the relocation of West Bank and Gaza settlers, an issue that is internally divisive and engenders religious polarization. Moreover, compensating the settlers will be extraordinarily expensive. It could cost more than $12 billion, and Israel may decide it is not worth it. Additionally, a minority of settlers will not accept any financial compensation to move.

If the first problem is the relocation of the settlers, the second problem must be the creation and development of the Palestinian state. The first problem is complicated by the fact that some settlers may move from within the occupied territories to without; others may move from within to within; and others may stay put. Over time, these movements create an extremely complex dynamism that prohibits a simple static prescription for the movement of settlers.

The second problem, that of creating a new Palestinian state, is complicated by the internal divisions between Hamas and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the vitriolic rhetoric against accepting a Jewish presence in the Arab Kingdom, the obstructionism of the late Yasser Arafat, and the crushing unemployment of the Palestinian youth who see no future except their involvement in the anti‐Israel struggle.

While Israelis and Palestinians seem only partially interested in solving the problem, a large number of states external to the conflict do want to solve it. Their guilty feelings can be tapped for the financial wherewithal to implement some reasonable solutions. More specifically, the EU, Japan, China, the U.S., and Russia might be willing to provide $5 to $8 billion per year over 10 years to establish a Relocation and Development Commission (RDC) that will act as a master with the managerial and arbitration skills to disburse funding aimed at ameliorating the problem.

The RDC would consist of four or five distinguished statesmen — preferably from small countries — with managerial, negotiating, and intervening skills. A staff of analysts and communication experts, a consulting firm, and an advisory group of Israelis and Palestinians for separate and joint brainstorming would support it. The RDC would establish an escrow account with contributions of about $1 billion per year with a rigorous investigatory team to prevent the misappropriation of funds.

Such a body could generate plans for exciting new communities in the Negev to be a lure for settlers who reject financial compensation, and could also develop a comprehensive plan for the transfer of property. Its funding would be aimed at compensating and relocating the settlers while developing a Palestinian state and diverting the vitriolic anger of Palestinian youth against Israel. Projects would range from small investments in clinics, schools, and athletic facilities to major public works aimed at sanitation, infrastructure, and public health.

The underlying idea is based on the observance of repeated games of “prisoners’ dilemma” in which a pattern of cooperation develops but the lure of defection remains. The RDC could maneuver Israelis and Palestinians into just such a tenuous but stable cooperative relationship through the threatened withdrawal of funds. And it could avoid the destabilizing effects of end play by keeping the ending indeterminate and receding. Progress on the fulfillment of objectives, such as increasing the employment of Palestinians, should be carefully monitored. Suitable indices should be constructed and periodic statistics reported. The RDC should establish incentives for exemplary performance (e.g., bonuses, free vacations, etc.).

Glimpsing ahead to a brighter future may serve as an incentive for moving from a depressing “here” to a more palatable “there.” The transition has to be nurtured and managed, preferably jointly. We need a permanent think tank to start thinking about this issue. The Program on Negotiation (PON) has a place in devising brighter futures and helping to organize the launch of such a project.

Terminology is an interesting aspect of the American approach. In the era of former President Jimmy Carter, the U.S. described the settlements as illegal pursuant to the U.S. State Department's legal advice based on the Fourth Geneva Convention. The State Department under former President Ronald Reagan later threw out this advice. From then on, the word “illegal” with respect to Israeli settlements disappeared from the American vocabulary. The preferred terminology became “obstacles to peace,” and no stand was taken on their illegality.

The Carter era saw one of the few relative success stories with the first Camp David Conference: peace — albeit a cold peace — between Israel and Egypt has endured. But a sticking point toward the end of that conference was the permanence of Israeli settlements in the Sinai. Neither the Americans nor the Israelis were able to persuade former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat that the small number of Israelis in the Sinai, who were more interested in diving and fishing than in politics, could stay there. Sadat was adamant that their continued presence would be seen as a continuing colonialism. Former Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin finally agreed after he received a phone call from Ariel Sharon, who was then Israel's Secretary of Defense, assuring him that the Cabinet would support him.

Israel also argued that it should keep an economic stake in the large modern airfields that it had built in the Sinai after they were converted to civilian use. The Egyptians refused, and, after the Israelis complained that they could not afford their relocation, the U.S. paid for it. In effect, despite Carter's determination not to buy a peace that was of benefit to both parties, the U.S. did end up paying a large amount of money, the “Sinai dividend,” to both Israel and Egypt. It has formed the basis for continuing economic assistance.

There is a very great difference between the way the Sinai settlers reacted and the way we can expect the Gaza settlers to react. The Sinai settlers were totally uninterested in politics and were peaceniks, if anything. Their attitude was simply, “If we have to give up our homes for peace, it is worth it.” They accepted the compensation agreements, and the settlements were abandoned without difficulty.

The story in the Sinai town of Yamit was a little different. While many grudgingly agreed to accept compensation, the situation was complicated by a flood of protestors from the West Bank. It was they who were violently removed from the settlements in 1983, dragged down from the roofs and doused with foam so graphically and dramatically on the television news. And, incidentally, it was Sharon who made the decision to destroy the town rather than turn it over to the Palestinians. He justified this on the grounds that Yamit could otherwise form a base for terrorist activity, but it was far more important that he demonstrated Yamit to be a unique event that would never happen again.

Another issue in those years was the attempt to incorporate a commitment to freeze the settlements. Such commitments have appeared in many documents since but have rarely been effective. During the last night of the Camp David Conference, everything hinged on getting a commitment from Begin to freeze settlements while autonomy was discussed after the Camp David talks ended. But there was no note taker. At the very end of the discussion, Carter apparently asked Begin, “Do you agree?” To which Begin mumbled something that Carter interpreted as “Yes.”

There may have been a genuine misunderstanding, but Carter and U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance became convinced that Begin had double‐crossed them. The next morning, he agreed to a settlement freeze for only the next three months. Begin insisted that what he said was, “I’ll let you know in the morning,” or “I’ll think about it.” Carter made a strategic mistake that poisoned their future relationship by not confronting him immediately.

It is interesting to compare Begin's relationship with the U.S. with Sharon’s. Sharon has made a career of sticking his thumb in the eyes of the U.S. and twisting it. But he learned from the events in Lebanon and his years out of power that it is crucial for the prime minister of Israel to stay in good terms with the U.S. president.

Now he is doing exactly what was done in the Begin years. He came to Washington, D.C. to discuss the disengagement plan and have it endorsed by President Bush before he had even discussed it with his cabinet. This approach works politically. Israelis have one consistent historical view of the U.S.: a prime minister who cannot get along with Washington, D.C. is going to pay a political price.

American policy toward the Israeli–Palestinian conflict has been entirely reactive during the last four years. President George W. Bush — who had promised to ride the parties hard — has ended up being shepherded by Israeli Prime Minister Sharon. U.S. policy is now driven by the Gaza disengagement plan, an approach that we would have been unlikely to reach had we created the plan from scratch.

But the disengagement offers an opportunity to rethink U.S. policy toward settlements as a whole and to move from what heretofore has been an essentially unhelpful approach to one that can contribute to a resolution of the conflict as a whole.

Settlements have been described in a number of shifting and fluctuating ways over the years and across administrations, leading to confusion as to how we actually see them and what we ought to do about them. Operationally, the policy tool of choice has not been, for some time now, evacuation, but a freeze. That, in turn, has hampered our effectiveness because there is no such thing as an airtight freeze of communities that live and breathe, and therefore, all freezes have been accompanied by exceptions that, over time, ended up swallowing the rule. Some of these exceptions made eminent sense, but they were, as a general matter, manipulated by successive Israeli governments so that the policy was effectively neutered.

Notable examples, all of which provoke unavoidable problems of definition, include the issue of Greater Jerusalem, tenders that have been accepted and are “in the pipeline,” the concept of “natural growth,” the policy of allowing continued construction in existing settlements, and the policy of allowing settlement expansion in areas that Israel is expected to annex.

One could argue that the U.S. was not forceful enough in policing these exceptions. One could also argue that Israel was often disingenuous in invoking them. But I believe the problem lies elsewhere and concerns the point in the peace process at which the issue of a settlement freeze was raised.

As a general matter, a settlement freeze was conceived of as a confidence‐building measure, something that would help the two parties get on the road to negotiations. But this is fundamentally a mistaken category. Settlements are living communities. Resources have been poured into them; a whole web of laws and incentives has been built around them. To actually, hermetically “freeze” a settlement would be a difficult, dramatic, even wrenching gesture. It simply cannot be done as the first step in an ill‐defined process. There are human lives and very strong feelings at stake that make it a politically costly action. That cost has typically been underestimated, even more so given that the settlements now form an integral and important part of the political and legal landscape of Israel. One can only genuinely freeze a settlement (i.e., ban all building, moving in, refurbishment, reconstruction) as a prelude to its evacuation.

Given that settlements constitute a genuine threat to the peace process and to the viability of a two‐state solution, but, that at the same time a freeze is so difficult to implement and to enforce, one must ask one's self whether this is the right or realistic way to think of the problem. I would submit that a better way to frame it is to ask one's self which settlements will be annexed and which will be evacuated. Once that decision has been made, those that are to be evacuated can be dismantled or allowed to wither (in effect, to freeze) without any more outside financial assistance. That, of course, presupposes a political process in which the parties can agree as to the scope of territorial concessions and settlement evacuation/annexation.

As for the process of evacuating Gaza, it presents some difficulties if accomplished in isolation of a wider political process. That is because there are trade‐offs (political, symbolic, as well as material) that can only be accomplished in the context of a comprehensive solution. Nor can one ignore how the disengagement will be perceived by the Palestinians and how they will react — this will have a profound impact on the future of other disengagements and settlement evacuations. Should the settlement evacuation take place under fire or under adverse conditions, which is more likely to happen in the absence of a clear political understanding of what will happen next, the potentially positive impact of the evacuation will be seriously diluted and polluted.

With regard to the issues of compensation and resettlement that were raised earlier, I note that these are, of course, important to the settlers, but many of these issues are just as, if not more, relevant to the Palestinian refugees. The disengagement plan as it is currently constituted (i.e., de‐linked from other permanent status issues) will miss the opportunity to tie the two questions, to think of symbolic trade‐offs, and to make an effort to promote the notion of equality in treatment between Israelis and Palestinians.

The next U.S. presidential administration must seize the opportunity to think more broadly about how the international community can expand the disengagement from Gaza into a more comprehensive approach. This would promote the success of the disengagement plan and help address the question of settlements more effectively. This ought to be done sooner rather than later. As for this group, I would urge it to adopt the same approach to other final status issues so that we may begin to think about the whole problem in a more holistic way.

There are several themes at play here. First, one of the roles for third parties in a negotiation such as this is the provision of “reassurance.” Second, it is important to recognize that there have been invited and uninvited third‐party interventions, with the former usually being the more effective means of conflict resolution. Third, there are already a large number of official intergovernmental bodies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) involved on the ground, and we should consider the credibility and/or utility of any threat to withdraw. These points are valid for Gaza and Israel's disengagement plan there but also apply to the larger question of Arab–Israeli relations.

We have been discussing the international community as a monolith, but it is not. And it is not only the Israeli government that has problems making decisions. There are enormous obstacles in coming to comprehensive decisions, and a division of labor would be one way of addressing these problems.

The real problem is getting the peace deal on the table with the Palestinians or other Arabs behind it in such a way that an Israeli prime minister would feel it is worth the gamble politically at home to do something about settlements because of the carrot of peace that is right in front of him or her. Outside pressure only had leverage when the Israeli player could taste peace. We should not have too much faith in international pressure on this issue, which is entangled in Israeli history, politics, and faith.

We have to be realistic about how much can actually be achieved through international involvement. Once Egypt and the U.S. get involved, it will become less clear whose head the gun is pointed at. If the parties renege on their deals, will international investors just pull out? Or will they be sucked in and incapable of walking away? It is a trap the U.S. has fallen into in the past, and it is likely to occur in Gaza. Therefore, the international community must focus not on the specifics of the withdrawal from Gaza but on a more comprehensive solution.

The U.S. must put strong and specific conditions on its aid to the Palestinians to ensure that it has maximum leverage over the process.