When I opened our conference on Israeli settlements in October, I explained to participants why we chose to focus on one narrow aspect of a larger conflict. In thinking about the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, and about the prospects for a successful resolution of various “final‐status” issues between these two parties, it is critical to keep in mind the reality of this “two‐level game.” In such games, there are interactions between the internal conflicts behind the table and the external conflicts across the table.
The premise of our conference was that the internal conflicts on both sides of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict are primary barriers to progress in the peace process. Our focus has been on the internal conflict among Israelis over Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza. This is only one piece, albeit a very important piece, of a much larger and very complicated puzzle. The work of our conference participants certainly does not suggest any easy ways to unlock this larger puzzle. But it does suggest the importance of developing a more nuanced picture of the behind‐the‐table conflicts on both sides.
In conclusion, I cannot attempt to summarize this work in all its richness. Instead, I would like to underline four main points:
The internal conflict within Israel has profound implications for the sense of identity of many of the protagonists.
Monetary compensation is important but acknowledgement, empathy, and ideological compensation are also critical aspects of what should be offered to settlers who will need to relocate.
The experience of other countries suggests that when a nation's contraction requires relocation of settlers, the process will typically be highly contentious and even violent. In the long run, however, a country may be better off if its political leaders “bite the bullet,” avoid delay and equivocation, and proceed with firmness and determination.
While the United States, alone and in conjunction with others in the international community, must play an active role if there is to be progress toward the resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, an examination of the internal conflicts on both sides suggests that it is unrealistic to believe a resolution can simply be imposed by these outside actors.
The articles coming out of this conference emphasize that the Jewish West Bank and Gaza settlers are a diverse lot. Many settlers moved to the West Bank, for example, not for any deeply religious or ideological reasons but in order to improve the quality of their daily lives. Thinking through monetary compensation schemes is important, because for these settlers, reasonable financial compensation will be fundamental.
But for the central protagonists in this internal conflict, much more than money is at stake. For messianic Zionists, settling Eratz Yisrael represents the fulfillment of their deepest religious and political commitments — the settlement project is central to their identities. But the conflict over the settlements also poses identity issues for those secular and “cosmopolitan” Israelis who vehemently oppose the settlement movement because, in their view, it requires continuing occupation and domination of another people. This threatens their core commitments to making Israel a secure, liberal democracy committed to tolerance and human rights.
What are the implications of this reality that the resolution of internal conflict over settlements threatens identity? It obviously means that Israeli leaders need to worry about more than monetary compensation; they should think about ideological and political compensation as well. I was reminded of this the first time I visited the West Bank settlements, when a settler told me, “If someone came up and offered me a million dollars to abandon my home, I’d spit on them. I didn’t come here for money. But, if I really felt that for the good of the Jewish people my country asked me to leave my home and become a pioneer again in some other part of Israel, I would do it for nothing.” While I cannot suggest what form this ideological compensation should take, I am persuaded that it is of profound importance.
In addition to ideological compensation, several of our participants suggested that acknowledgement and empathy are important. Returning settlers must be given a sense that they will be embraced, not rejected, by Israeli society. Cosmopolitan and secular Israelis should acknowledge that the settlers are the ones who will be making a profound sacrifice if relocation is implemented. Israelis leaders who support relocation should demonstrate genuine empathy for settlers who may be relocated.
Other participants put the issue of settlements in a broader context. Over the years, in countries throughout the world, millions of people have been displaced and relocated. Outside of Israel, compensation schemes have been developed and applied to thousands of people. Indeed, the message of the second panel suggested the need for realpolitik and “tough love,” not simply empathy. Furthermore, in any multiparty negotiation, one must also be aware that some stakeholders are “spoilers” who want no resolution.
Political scientist Ian Lustick notes that Israel is not the only country that has faced the need for a contraction that required settlers to be removed and relocated. He writes that there is always an asymmetry between expansion and contraction. When expansion has come through settlements, contraction always creates a political crisis. One should expect protests and even violence. Lustick's message to Israeli leaders is clear: “Don’t defer. Bite the bullet and get it done.” Winston Churchill's advice should have been followed in Ireland. An Israeli leader should emulate Charles deGaulle in Algeria — confront those settlers who are reluctant to leave and use force to displace them, if that is necessary.
I want to make one final point. The final presentation of our conference reminded us of the role of the international community in this complicated problem. The rest of the world looks at the U.S. and asks why the U.S. does not “get tougher” with Israel. Progress toward peace will require active U.S. involvement. A greater willingness for the U.S. to put pressure on Israel might be productive. But many in the international community make much broader claims: they suggest that the U.S. should simply move to impose a resolution on the Israelis and Palestinians.
I find such suggestions painfully naïve, given the internal conflicts both among Israeli Jews and among Palestinians. While third parties can sometimes do things to facilitate the resolution of these internal conflicts, there are limits to what can be accomplished from the outside. Can the U.S. provide ideological compensation for Israeli settlers whose lives would be profoundly disrupted by relocation? Moreover, can the American military control the extent to which various armed groups of Palestinians engage in violent acts? What American politician is likely to be willing to send troops to the West Bank and Gaza to help evacuate settlers or clamp down on armed Palestinian groups bent on terror? Even the Israeli government, which has been aggressively willing to use force to combat terror (notwithstanding international condemnation), has learned that there are limits to what armed troops can do. If foreign troops were today to be stationed in the West Bank and Gaza to stop the expansion of settlements and to try to control Palestinian extremists, I think it likely that the troops would be attacked by extremists on both sides. Under present circumstances, what country — what domestic politician — would be willing to volunteer thousands of its own troops to face those risks?
As this issue of Negotiation Journal goes to press, no one can know whether Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon will succeed in withdrawing all Israeli settlers from Gaza by the end of 2005. As I write this, I estimate his chances to be no better than fifty–fifty. But irrespective of the fate of this limited initiative, issues relating to settlements will plague Israel for the foreseeable future. How Israel resolves its internal conflict over the settlements will have a profound influence both on the nature of Israeli society and on Israeli–Palestinian relations.
