For the Sake of the Team: Unity and Disunity in a Multiparty Major League Baseball Negotiation

Suppose you were attacked and robbed on a dark street one night by two men with knives. Later, you might wonder whether you could have prevented this crime. A thoughtful negotiation strategist might ask if you could have somehow compelled the two robbers to turn their weapons on each other. This tactic, known commonly as “divide and conquer,” is relevant to negotiation strategy (Yarn 1999). Previous studies have assumed that this concept evolved from the Latin term divide et impera or divide and rule (Cambridge International Dictionary of Idioms 2004; Pendergast 1990; Wikipedia 2004) and that it emerged around 300 b.c. after the Romans crushed a revolt by their former allies and established a new bilateral system of relations between Rome and each individual ally. Under Roman rule, these city states were prohibited from federal action independent of Rome and were allowed to have bilateral relations only with Rome, not with each other (Grant 1978; Pelham 1949). Divide et impera, while a cornerstone of Roman political administration, was not, it seems, a Roman negotiating technique. (William R. Pendergast [1990] offers a counter view.)

“Divide and conquer” is relevant to negotiations that are defined as contests that can have winners and losers. “Divide and conquer” means to “secure a victory by causing your opponents to quarrel among themselves” (Dictionary of Sayings and Everyday Expressions 2004). St. Matthew wrote (Matthew 12:25) that “Every kingdom divided against itself is brought to desolation; and every city or house divided against itself shall not stand” (The Holy Bible, King James version 1611). Here, Matthew indicates that a “house divided” is something to be avoided. However, if the house in question happens to be that of your enemy, then perhaps you would be pleased to see it divided, and, given the opportunity, you might even take action to facilitate this development. In a dangerous world, there is a place for a strategy that purposely seeks to divide your opposition.

Curiously, neither the negotiation nor alliance literatures devote much attention to divide and conquer as a negotiation technique. Michael Watkins (2002) examines the undisciplined negotiation team that unintentionally makes its own internal differences visible, which can inspire the other side to play a “divide‐and‐conquer game.” This situation is more opportunistic than strategic. George Liska (1962) considers alliance “dealignment;” and Ole R. Holsti, Terrence P. Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan (1985) discuss alliance disintegration, but both classic works consider dealignment and disintegration as states that an alliance might experience rather than as a result of strategic action taken by others.

But clearly, there are tangible benefits to a divide‐and‐conquer strategy because the resources that parties on one side waste in fighting each other cannot then be used against opposing parties. Moreover, there is strength in unity. Strategically dividing parties on the other side could shift the balance of power between sides in favor of the party that can implement such a strategy.

This study seeks to extend our knowledge of competitive strategy by identifying specific negotiation techniques that can produce significant decreases in the degree of unity between parties on the other side in a negotiation, thus increasing the possibility of achieving one's own goals in a defined contest. But this is only one side of the coin. Using the same “strength‐in‐unity” logic, this study also examines specific techniques to assist two or more parties on the same side to build unity so they can work together effectively and efficiently to achieve negotiation goals. The development of dividing techniques and of unifying techniques are components of a larger negotiation theory that seeks to evaluate and identify actions designed to strategically modify the degree of unity between parties working together on the same side.

This article develops these theories in an interorganizational (multiple organizations on one or more sides) negotiation context. It begins with a theoretical discussion about the nature of interorganizational unity and disunity, followed by presentation and analysis of an interorganizational negotiation case with distributive characteristics involving the deliberations over the sale of an American Major League baseball team to a Japanese‐ organized investor group in 1992. I have chosen this bilateral multiparty negotiation case to illustrate the application of this theory, because there are multiple organizations on both sides and the organizations on each side appear to have experienced increasing disunity and/or enhanced unity — in some cases when such developments are unexpected. John S. Odell (2001) and Robert K. Yin (1989) have argued that analysis of a “least‐likely case study” is useful for developing and confirming theory. Thus, this case analysis builds propositions that will establish a foundation for further research.

Unity between two or more entities (people, groups, communities, organizations, and/or nations) exists when a defined threshold of affiliation and/or convergence is achieved. (This level of unity can be enhanced.) Anything below this threshold represents varying degrees of disunity. This threshold is achieved when two or more entities are able to deliberately coordinate behavior so that they speak in a single voice or demonstrate consistently coherent behavior on one or more substantive issues over time (Crump and Glendon 2003). This definition is easily operationalized for measuring unity and disunity as it is behavioral in focus. Interorganizational unity is not absolute unity in all organizational endeavors — organizations can and do cooperate with each other on some issues and fight each other over other issues. Rather, unity is achieved on an issue‐by‐issue basis. Thus, interorganizational unity is issue‐focused and requires that the parties have a common goal.

The overall utility of interorganizational relations (costs and benefits) is important for determining the degree of unity between cooperating organizations, as are interpersonal relations (feelings of affiliation or alienation) between key organizational members (e.g., organizational leaders and negotiation team members). For example, research indicates that unity is enhanced when parties share a common identity (Friedman 1994; Friedman and Gal 1991; Walt 1997). On the other hand, disunity is defined as the inability of two or more entities to speak in a single voice or demonstrate consistently coherent behavior. Often the importance of interorganizational unity is not appreciated until it recedes.

Much is known about cohesion, a concept grounded in the small group literature,¹ while less is known about this same phenomenon at the interorganizational level. Establishing the similarities and differences between cohesion and unity can help advance our understanding of the factors that support interorganizational unity. A simple illustrative model of an interorganizational negotiation assists in this regard. (See Figure One.)

The specific forces that support interorganizational relations and the degree of disunity or unity that exist between two or more cooperating organizations can be understood through structural theory. Structure is based on a “distribution of elements” (Zartman 1988) and is understood by the way these elements are distributed or linked to each other along critical dimensions. In negotiation, a “party” is identified as the basic element (Diehl, Druckman, and Wall 1998; Wall 1981) — the single most important structural element — and “sides” are the single most important linkage of elements within negotiation. For example, parties in a multiparty negotiation are usually distributed on the same side, on opposing sides, on neutral sides, and on other sides (Crump and Glendon 2003). Distribution or linkage can also be described along certain salient or instrumental dimensions. Power relations between opposing sides are identified as the most significant structural dimension in a negotiation (Zartman 1988; 2002), although this is not the only salient dimension. Structural analysis can assist in identifying other salient structural factors that support interorganizational relations, which can be useful in explaining the degree of disunity or unity between parties.

Figure One illustrates a bilateral multiparty negotiation. Side A has two organizations, while the number of organizations on Side B is unspecified. (A description of Side A is sufficient for this illustration.) If relations between the two organizations on Side A are recently established, then this entity is best characterized as a coalition, but this model is just as relevant to organizations that have maintained relations over a long period of time.

Within Side A, we can apply four levels of structural analysis to identify which dimensions will influence the degree of disunity or unity that exists between organizations on the same side in a negotiation (i.e., interorganizational relations) and help maintain relations between these parties. Three dimensions are horizontal, operating between organizations, and one dimension is vertical and operates separately within each organization. Let us briefly consider each of these four levels of analysis.

The first dimension exists at the interorganizational level of analysis. (See the top arrow on Side A in Figure One.) As distinct cooperating parties, Organization 1 and Organization 2 have horizontal relations between them along several critical dimensions. The overall power relationship between these two organizations — symmetry, asymmetry, and ambiguity (Zartman 1988; 2002) — is a critical dimension underlying their relationship.

The motivating force that brings the two organizations together initially is a second critical dimension. For what reasons, and under what conditions, do organizations establish linkages with one another? Christine Oliver (1990) identifies six: necessity (e.g., legal requirements), asymmetry (control over another), reciprocity (collaboration and coordination), efficiency (internal input–output ratio), stability (response to environmental uncertainty), and legitimacy (concurrence with prevailing norms). It is reasonable to assume that the forces that initially bring two organizations together contribute to the texture of the overall relation‐ ship and the degree of disunity or unity that may exist between these parties. For example, other things being equal, it seems likely that organizations on the same side in a negotiation whose linkages are based on either reciprocity or stability would be likely to maintain their unity longer than organizations with linkages based on either asymmetry or necessity.

A third critical dimension at the interorganizational level of analysis is the relationship between each organization's intrinsic logic, which serves as a foundation for organizational culture. Organizations exist within a larger network of organizations that operate with differing types of logic, including the logic of administrative controls, the logic of the market, and the logic of association derived from reciprocity and balanced exchange (Osborn and Hagedoorn 1997). Other things being equal, for example, we might expect cooperating organizations from the same type of network (e.g., two corporations) to be able to maintain their unity longer than organizations from two differing types of networks (e.g., a corporation and a government). The fundamental logic of each organization, the motives that bring parties together, and the power relations between parties on the same side are critical dimensions that can contribute to the degree of disunity or unity between these parties.

The second level of structural analysis involves horizontal relationships between organizational leaders. (See the second arrow from the top on Side A in Figure One.) Organizational leaders (chief executive officer, president, prime minister, etc.) do not become involved in every interorganizational negotiation, but leaders can inject themselves into negotiations at any time, especially at the formation stage and implementation or management stage (Inkpen and Ross 2001). Some studies observe that relations between organizations are actually based more on relations between key leaders or managers in each organization than on overall institutional relations between these organizations (Boyer and Cremieux 1999; Gordenker and Weiss 1995). Interorganizational unity may be based as much on the quality of relations between two leaders and their “degree of rapport” as on the utility of the overall organizational relationship.

A third level of structural analysis involves vertical relations between hierarchical levels within each organization. Note in Figure One the vertical arrows between leader and project manager and between project manager and the negotiation team. Here it is assumed that the quality of working relations (e.g., commitment to organizational goals, feeling of affiliation, or alienation between linked supervisor and subordinate) affects unity within a single organization. This variable has the potential to influence both intraorganizational relations and the unity that exists between these organizations (e.g., intraorganizational conflict can damage interorganizational relations). In Figure One, there is a hierarchical link between the leader and a functional or project manager (e.g., vice president, minister, secretary, division head). In addition, there is a hierarchical link between this project manager and operations staff retained to serve as the point of physical contact for a task involving an interorganizational negotiation. (The degree of involvement in interorganizational relations by the project manager can vary from no involvement to playing a dominant role in the negotiation team.)

This description briefly captures the essential structural characteristics of supervisory or superior–subordinate relations, which are normally focused on organizational goals, strategies, and plans, as well as delegation of responsibility, authority, and resources (Friedman and Gal 1991; Hilgert and Leonard 1998; Lax and Sebenius 1986). However, it is important to note that subordinates or operations staff can be either organizational employees or outside agents who were delegated the responsibility to represent organizational interests. Agents are often retained because of their specialized knowledge (Mnookin and Susskind 1999; Sharma 1997). The involvement of agents can increase structural complexity and complicate the transaction (Hendry 2002; Rubin and Sander 1988). Such factors can also affect the degree of disunity or unity between two cooperating organizations.

The fourth level of structural analysis involves horizontal relations between operations staff (employees or contracted agents) from Organization 1 and Organization 2 and the group or team dynamics that develop as a result. (See the negotiation team in Figure One.) Much is known about group process (see Brown 2000; Levi 2001; Thibaut and Kelley 1959; Turner 2001) and the effect of team member relations on negotiation process and outcome (see Friedman 1994; Friedman and Gal 1991), especially inputs (member composition and resources) and outputs (quality and quantity of product, problem solved, group decisions). Less is known about the activities that occur between group input and output (Weingart 1997). One critical structural dimension is the degree of cohesion that exists within a negotiation team. This is the point where inter‐organization theory and group or team theory meet, as team dynamics become one factor in establishing the degree of disunity or unity between cooperating organizations.

Structural factors that support interorganizational relations and the degree of disunity or unity between entities on the same side in a negotiation are summarized below.

The architecture of interorganizational relations:

1. The fundamental nature of relations at an interorganizational level of analysis (e.g., power relations, motives for linking, and congruence of organizational logic).

2. The quality of relations between key leaders from two or more cooperating organizations.

3. The quality of relevant supervisory–subordinate relations, including agent–constituent relations within each organization.

4. The quality of relations between members of an interorganizational negotiation team and the degree of cohesion created by team dynamics.

These four structural factors form an architectural typology of interorganizational relations. Cohesion, a term primarily used in the small group literature, is fundamental to interorganizational unity when negotiation teams are also under examination. But the power relations between organizations, their motives for linkage, and the congruence of their organizational logic also contribute to the fundamental nature of relations between organizations, structural factors that are not relevant to relations between small group members. It is useful to establish distinct terms to describe relations between organizations and relations between small group members. Moreover, this typology directs our attention to specific elements and events that actually influence interorganizational unity and disunity and provides a framework for case analysis. When this typology is combined with our definitions of unity and disunity, found at the beginning of this section, these theoretical constructs provide very useable analytical tools because of their structural and behavioral qualities. The case study and analysis that follow illustrate the utility of the proposed conceptual structure.

The case analysis that follows in this article is drawn from a larger work that was constructed from data derived from forty‐three interviews and twenty‐one archives and specialized libraries. (See Crump 1995, in Japanese, for a more complete examination of this case summary.) The case considers negotiations that took place over a six‐month period to enable the sale of a U.S. major league baseball team to a Japanese‐organized investor group in 1992.

Some background will provide context for the negotiation under examination. In 1992, when the sale concluded, Major League Baseball (MLB) was a commercial association comprising more than thirty organizations structured under three major entities, the American League (AL), the National League (NL), and the Office of the MLB Commissioner. The AL comprised fourteen professional baseball clubs at that time.

In 1969, the AL had placed a baseball club in Seattle but relocated this club to Milwaukee after a single season. The Washington state government sued the league for relocating the Seattle franchise, and the AL agreed to expand back to Seattle in 1976 to settle this five‐year lawsuit. A Seattle‐based investor group purchased this MLB franchise from the AL for $6.3 million in 1976 and named the club the Seattle Mariners. The club was sold again in 1981, and in 1989 Jeff Smulyan, a media entrepreneur from Indiana, bought the team for $78 million in a highly leveraged purchase.

A requirement to repay borrowed funds, an economic downturn in the media industry, and a potential opportunity to advantageously relocate the Mariners to Tampa, Florida combined to convince Smulyan to put the team on the market with an asking price of $100 million in early December 1991. He was contractually required through a county‐owned stadium lease (Kingdome Stadium) to offer the club for 120 days to a Seattle buyer (anyone prepared to keep the Mariners in Seattle), after which it would be legally possible to relocate the club to another city. To Smulyan's surprise, an investor group organized by Nintendo, the video game manufacturer with world headquarters in Japan and North American headquarters near Seattle, made an offer to buy the team.

In December 1991, Nintendo representatives Minoru Arakawa and Howard C. Lincoln asked Seattle community leaders and potential investors to participate in an investor group to purchase and operate the Mariners after they were encouraged to invest in the team by U.S. Senator Slade Gorton. Eventually, John W. Ellis, chairman and CEO of the local electric utility, and Frank Shrontz, chairman and CEO of the Seattle‐based Boeing Co., each agreed to make a nominal investment in this enterprise. Both were recruited because of their community leadership and negotiation skills. A group of investors led by Chris Larson, a young senior manager at Microsoft, and John McCaw, Jr., executive vice president of McCaw Cellular Communications, agreed to invest around $50 million (combined). The remaining $50 million (plus another $25 million for operating expenses) came from the personal wealth of Hiroshi Yamauchi, the president of Nintendo.

Eventually, this investor group comprised four separate organizations to control and manage its proposed purchase. The Baseball Club of Seattle L.P. was formed initially with Baseball of Seattle, Inc. as the general partner in this limited partnership. Next, Larson and others formed the Mudville Nine Inc. to manage their investment, while a group headed by McCaw formed JWR Inc. to manage its portion of the investment. Yamauchi signed an irrevocable proxy (a legal tool) passing complete control of his $75 million investment to Minoru Arakawa, his son‐in‐law and president of Nintendo of America Inc. Arakawa delegated much of the management responsibility that came with this investment to Howard C. Lincoln, Nintendo's senior vice president. Financial, legal, media, and organizational expertise were retained on contract to pursue this opportunity by both The Baseball Club of Seattle (BCS) and Nintendo. The multilevel structure of this investor group and the interrelationship of their companies illustrate the structural qualities of an interorganizational negotiation for one side. (See Figure One.)

The BCS sought a meeting with MLB Commissioner Francis (Fay) Vincent in his New York office just prior to announcing its plans to purchase the Mariners. But this meeting was cancelled the day before it was scheduled to occur when the MLB commissioner learned that key members of this investor group were not from North America. Nevertheless, the BCS went forward and announced its offer to purchase the Mariners on January 23, 1992. Local political leaders were present at this announcement including Senator Gorton, Washington State Governor Booth Gardner, Seattle Mayor Norm Rice, as well as King County Executive Tim Hill, and George Duff, president of the Greater Seattle Chamber of Commerce. Each community leader expressed support for the BCS and its plans to invest in MLB, and suggested that the purchase would engender international goodwill. In Seattle, the news media coverage of this development was favorable.

This BCS announcement, however, was quickly followed by a press release from the MLB commissioner stating, “Baseball has addressed the issue of ownership of its franchises and has developed a strong policy against approving investors from outside the United States and Canada. It is unlikely foreign investors would receive the requisite baseball approval.” Peter O’Malley, the president of the Los Angeles Dodgers, had chaired the MLB subcommittee that considered foreign ownership issues in 1991. George W. Bush, who was then managing partner of the Texas Rangers and a member of this committee, was one of the owners who had argued vigorously against foreign ownership in MLB. Commissioner Vincent, on the other hand, was required to implement the policy although he personally disagreed with it. The policy was also never announced to the public, but the New York Times eventually reported that it had been adopted at the 1991 MLB winter meeting, just one month prior to the BCS announcement.

Representatives of MLB initially asserted without internal dissent that the BCS was unqualified to invest in MLB for nationality and/or citizenship reasons, and during the following week, the commissioner and other MLB representatives consistently repeated that position to representatives of various news media. As a result, both Washington state and King County officials threatened to take legal action against MLB. The BCS sought to distance itself from legal threats, indicating that it had not solicited government assistance — the investors did not want to be too closely associated with organizations that threatened MLB, an organization they soon hoped to be part of.

Threats of lawsuits, which are common in baseball, did not upset MLB — but the “beating” it received in the national media over accusations of intolerance, xenophobia, and racism did. These accusations from and through the media were especially interesting, as they seemed to be inconsistent with the American mood at that time. For example, the fiftieth anniversary of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor had been publicly acknowledged the previous month. Many Americans felt threatened by recent Japanese purchases of high‐profile U.S. cultural icons like the Rockefeller Center, CBS Records, and Columbia and Universal Pictures, while a protracted U.S. recession and America's $40 billion trade deficit with Japan were straining U.S.–Japanese relations during a presidential election year. One could argue that, at the time, MLB's new ownership policy was probably consistent with the national mood.

Initially, when the national media moved from reporting to expressing an opinion, it was usually against Japanese investment in MLB. For example, CBS Evening News stated that the Japanese bid in MLB was tantamount to buying an American cultural symbol, and the commissioner (not the BCS) was interviewed on NBC news the day after the BCS announcement. Immediately after the announcement, newspapers including the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Chicago Tribune, the Miami Herald, and USA Today ran articles expressing concern about Japanese investment in MLB.

The mood of the national media shifted quickly, however, and news reports and editorials supporting Japanese investment in MLB soon ran in the Chicago Tribune and the Los Angeles Times (January 25, 1992); the Houston Post, the New York Times, The Oregonian, and the Saint Paul Pioneer Press (January 26); and the Detroit Free Press, the Orange County Register, the Philadelphia Inquirer, and the Washington Post (January 27). In February 1992, many other major newspapers published articles and editorials critical of MLB or supportive of the BCS. The BCS had employed The Rocky Company, a media relations company, to coordinate its message to the media. The BCS, however, was not responsible for all this media support. Rather, it seems that the idea of the Japanese serving as a “white knight” in Seattle captured the imagination of the American public at that moment in time.

For MLB, the BCS proposal contained an element of surprise, and it challenged an established MLB policy. Essentially, this BCS proposal violated the organizational logic of MLB and appeared initially to pull MLB members together. The data indicate that one reaction within MLB was the strengthening of member unity immediately after the BCS announcement, as MLB demonstrated consistently coherent behavior and attitudes regarding foreign ownership issues. For example, Commissioner Vincent cancelled a meeting to discuss the possibility of MLB investment after learning the identities of the proposed investor group. The following day, he issued a press release identifying MLB's strong policy against ownership from outside the U.S. and Canada and expressed doubt that the BCS would receive MLB approval for the Seattle purchase. Fred Kuhlmann, president of the St. Louis Cardinals and chair of the MLB Ownership Committee, agreed with Vincent and said “the fact that the company is called Nintendo of America really does not matter. It is still offshore money. It is not a matter of racism. We’d have the same problem if it was an English company” (Crump 1995: 192). When Jeff Smulyan was contacted by the BCS, he explained that questions of foreign ownership were for MLB to decide, although Smulyan said that he wanted the identity of the investor group established right down to their Social Security numbers. Initially, few voices were heard within the offering support to the BCS. No one in MLB agreed publicly or privately that the BCS might hold a viable solution for Seattle MLB. Initially at least, the owners and their various organizations essentially spoke with a single voice.

The BCS expected a public debate on its purchase offer and prepared for this debate by retaining a national network of media relations professionals who could explain why the BCS was the best solution given Seattle's unique (litigious) relationship to MLB. Although governmental leaders in Seattle first accused MLB of xenophobia, they quickly stopped making such statements, even though editorial writers and sports writers throughout America continued to frame MLB's position as intolerant, xenophobic, and racist. MLB members interpreted such statements as an attack on their institutional legitimacy and personal integrity. MLB sought to reframe public debate away from issues of non–North American ownership and around issues of patriotism and the importance of locally owned baseball teams, but this attempt at reframing was unsuccessful.

Essentially, what we find in this case are two sides competing to control a scarce resource (MLB in Seattle), each with its own solution and each with a frame, which is a fundamental definition of the situation based on the process of constructing and representing our interpretation of the world (Gray 2003). Frames assist negotiators to sort, synthesize, and condense large amounts of information to make it manageable. In the process of framing, we also discard, devalue, and ignore information that is inconsistent with the frame we have chosen (Elliott, Gray, and Lewicki 2003).

Each side appreciated that it was in a battle to define the meaning of foreign investment in MLB: is it profane or acceptable, is it unpatriotic or a realistic solution? Although the battle was not to persuade the other side, each side sought to impose its frame on the situation and, consequently, on the other side by winning the contest in the marketplace of ideas, which was the initial conflict's battleground. Ultimately, this marketplace, in the form of editorials and sportswriters, decided that supporting the BCS was not unpatriotic. Had the BCS lost this battle, MLB could have continued to refuse to meet with BCS representatives (and the Washington state government would have likely taken MLB to court once again). This initial exercise was not so much a matter of reframing but a matter of putting forward two competing frames.

Michael Watkins (2002) refers to such interaction as the “frame game.” In this case, MLB clearly lost. The unity that had been built through MLB committee deliberations and administrative procedures on the issue of foreign investment in MLB during 1991 was shattered, while interorganizational relations, and organizational size and complexity made it difficult to quickly engage in additional deliberations to reestablish unity on this issue. Every time MLB talked of patriotism and the importance of locally owned baseball teams, an editorial would appear that described MLB as intolerant, xenophobic, and racist.

Clearly, patriotism was not working as a useful frame for MLB. Given the need for a strategic interorganizational response, some leaders within MLB sought to reframe the debate with a new focus on the city of Seattle's historic lack of support for MLB. (The Mariners had experienced financial difficulties for years.) AL President Bobby Brown led this fight with the argument that, because the people of Seattle had not provided sufficient financial support to their MLB team in the past, then perhaps the Mariners should be relocated, rather than sold to the BCS. But other MLB leaders, Commissioner Vincent in particular, told the media that they thought Seattle's financial support for MLB was laudable and that a team should not be relocated when it has community support. (A Seattle group led by Herman Sarkowsky claimed that they had generated $13 million in new Mariners revenue through media advertising, corporate ticket sales, and so forth.)

In this example, one MLB leader questioned Seattle's support for MLB, a view that was contradicted by other MLB leaders. In addition to these public contradictions, reports also appeared that MLB leaders were feeling animosity toward each other, especially Commissioner Vincent, AL President Bobby Brown, and several members of the MLB Ownership Committee. (These media reports were supported by interview data.)

MLB behaved coherently on other contentious baseball issues at that moment such as deliberations over franchise expansion and collective bargaining but did not present consistently coherent behavior on issues related to the Seattle Mariners. Data indicate that this disunity within MLB, as demonstrated by contradictory media reports, arose at about the same time that MLB shifted its frame from rejecting the sale for national identity reasons to rejecting it because of Seattle's inadequate support. Essentially, after MLB lost the initial frame game, it needed to come up with a new way of explaining the logic behind its opposition. The BCS did not deliberately force MLB to engage in this reframing exercise, rather, the BCS and MLB had each proposed incompatible frames to describe the situation in a contest, and MLB's frame was found inadequate. However, it is possible that one side in a negotiation could purposely and strategically force its frame on the other side causing its opponent to engage in a reframing exercise. The scramble to reframe, in this case, appears to have contributed to significant disunity within MLB.

The relationships between party goals, issue framing, issue reframing, and unity or disunity are interesting because of the impact they have on negotiation strategy. Usually, negotiation issues are tied directly to party goals, which are normally established on the basis of a frame. During negotiations between sides, a debate over how an issue or set of issues will be framed often represents a critical turning point in negotiation process, as the results from this debate can define the range and legitimacy of possible outcomes or consequences (interests, positions, alternatives, etc.). An issue under negotiation can be framed initially and then reframed to modify its perceived fundamental character or meaning (Bazerman 1983; Gray and Putnam 2003; Lakoff 2004; Lewicki, Gray, and Elliott 2003; Putnam and Holmer 1992; Watkins 2002). If one side succeeds in imposing its perceived frame of the negotiation (defining the issues) on the opposing side, then each party on the other side must review this development in relation to its own independent and shared goals, because these parties may have different views about this new frame, its meaning, and its impact on them.

For example, it cost MLB leaders very little to argue that it was patriotic to object to foreign ownership, but suddenly this argument was interpreted not as patriotism but as racism. Individual tolerance for public ridicule can vary widely. Each MLB leader was forced to reexamine the costs and benefits of maintaining complete control over MLB in Seattle or of sharing control over Seattle MLB with the BCS. This study offers no data indicating that MLB leaders shifted from unity toward disunity at this point, but it seems likely that the seeds of disunity were planted through public ridicule of MLB. Study data do indicate that there was a shift toward disunity (MLB leaders publicly contradicting each other through the media combined with news and interview reports identifying increasing levels of animosity between MLB leaders) at the same time that MLB reframed its “patriotism argument” into a “Seattle does not support MLB” argument. In this case, data indicate that MLB leaders had divergent views about Seattle's public support for baseball and about the possibility of relocating a baseball club to another city.

The argument that one side's imposition of its frame on the opposing side affects the members of the opposing party and their independent and shared goals has significant implications for how reframing can be used to effect negotiation processes. Such reframing can enhance or diminish unity between two or more parties on the same side. Specifically, issue reframing can substantially modify the meaning of a specific issue for parties involved in a negotiation and thus change the perceived value that those parties attach to the negotiation and to the desired goal (e.g., some members of MLB sincerely thought that rejection of BCS was patriotic, but over time they were forced to accept that these views were socially unacceptable). Furthermore, reframing can lead parties on the same side to reevaluate the utility they derive from their cooperative relationship with each other and thus affect the unity that exists between them. When unity decreases via reframing, this technique can divide cooperating parties — a divide‐and‐conquer effect.

This possibility leads to two propositions. They are:

Carefully designed research could empirically reveal a direct relationship between issue reframing and organizational unity. This research could also demonstrate an indirect relationship between organizational unity and success or failure in goal attainment through negotiation.

Some provisional prescriptive guidance can also be developed from this case data: given the experience of MLB in losing the frame game, it seems that parties on the same side in a negotiation should proceed with great care if the other side seeks to reframe issues perceived as fundamental. For example, representatives of the AL, of the NL, and of the Office of the MLB Commissioner could have held discussions to build a consensus view on Seattle's support for MLB as part of the reframing process. Such discussions and the building of a consensus could have pushed MLB away from disunity and back toward unity on the BCS issue.

Cooperating parties on the same side should carefully examine how issue reframing can affect congruence and the degree of internal unity already achieved on both sides of a negotiation. Concurrently, if a distributive strategy is pursued, as in the case discussed here, then it will be useful to examine the relationship between parties on the other side and, in particular, the issues that unify them, to determine if it is possible to reframe core issues in a way that divides the other side. This observation illuminates the mechanics of a divide‐and‐conquer technique and the ways in which this knowledge can be used strategically within a negotiation where at least one of the sides comprises multiple parties.

Compared to MLB, the BCS as a party demonstrated substantial diversity in its demographic characteristics. All BCS investors were male, but two very different national cultural values were at work in this group. Members ranged from 32 to 63 years of age and were drawn from a wide range of occupational fields (lawyers, business professionals, computer industry professionals and civil engineers). Except for the three members from Nintendo (Yamauchi, Arakawa, and Lincoln), none of the BCS members had worked together previously. Some members knew one another professionally, but most did not know each other until coming together through the BCS. Based on their assumed value and attitude differences, one might not have expected that the BCS group would achieve high levels of unity (Jehn, Northcraft, and Neale 1999; Mortensen and Hinds 2001; Williams and O’Reilly 1998). Nevertheless, field data indicate that BCS members believed that they achieved high levels of internal unity and that this unity helped to make BCS a strong negotiator. Furthermore, observable BCS behavior confirms the view that the BCS did achieve enhanced levels of unity. For example, BCS simultaneously executed complex negotiating strategies aimed at segmented audiences including MLB, national public opinion leaders, political groups, and community groups while also demonstrating consistently coherent behavior.

How did BCS members achieve such unity? Reports indicate that BCS members believe their investor group began to work together effectively after winning the highly publicized media contest. The potentially positive effect of external conflict on internal cohesion has been clearly identified in the literature (Stein 1976; Wilkinson 1976). A second factor involves the way that the BCS managed the diversity in member values that arose from differences between Japanese and American culture. For example, through the initial Nintendo initiative, the BCS had to organize an investor group; build financial, legal, organizational, and public relations strategies (each a major undertaking); and then implement these strategies in a competitive environment under a bright spotlight. Many hours of small group planning among principals, and among principals and their agents and advisers, were required to conduct these activities.

In addition to cultural differences in communication, negotiation, and decision‐making styles, the academic literature also identifies substantial differences in the way that Japanese and Americans manage investments, use the tool of law, build organizations, and relate to the media and the public (Crump 1995). How did the BCS manage these cultural differences and their consequences? It appears that such diversity was bridged and unity was achieved through the use of a “link‐person.”² This person initiates and maintains effective interpersonal relations with key members of two or more groups with differing values. By channeling communication through a link‐person, this investor group was able to function effectively and achieve enhanced unity, which contributed to negotiation performance. In this case, Howard Lincoln, Nintendo's senior vice president in North America, acted as a communication link between American BCS members and Japanese BCS members by generally representing the interests of the Japanese members in American‐dominated BCS deliberations. It appears that the potential for the sustained internal disagreement that is inherent where there is value diversity among parties was minimized and internal unity was enhanced through a communication structure created through supervisory–subordinate relations.

These observations lead to two more propositions:

This study has not specifically compared the functioning of heterogeneous groups that include and do not include a link‐person. Data from this study do suggest that a link‐person may have relevance to issues of diversity especially when those differences are grounded in value and attitudinal differences — additional research in this area would seem to be worthwhile.

As for unity and outcome, it is difficult to demonstrate a relationship between interorganizational unity and negotiation outcome. A test of Proposition Three would confirm or refute the relationship between what appears to be a unity‐enhancing technique — employing a link‐person — and changes in group unity. Likewise, a test of Proposition Four could confirm or refute the relationship between the use of a link‐person and the degree of outcome success in negotiations between groups and organizations with value differences. Findings from these tests could enable us to infer a relationship between interorganizational unity and goal achievement.

Negotiations to sell the Seattle Mariners to the BCS were challenging but were completed in early April 1992. Before the actual ownership of an MLB club may be transferred, however, both the AL and NL must first approve the purchase agreement. As a procedural matter, before an AL and NL vote, the MLB Ownership Committee (OC) examines the purchase agreement and other documents and makes a recommendation to all MLB owners. Fred Kuhlmann (representing the NL St. Louis Cardinals) served as chair of the ten‐member OC, but data indicate that he was not a strong leader. For example, during deliberations on the BCS application, reports indicate that Kuhlmann was essentially pushed aside by AL Chicago White Sox owner and OC member Jerry Reinsdorf, who took over the OC meetings. At the time, Reinsdorf was said to be one of the most powerful men in American sports (Greising 1992), because he also owned the very successful Chicago Bulls National Basketball Association team. Several years earlier, he had threatened to move the White Sox to Tampa Bay, Florida, a threat he did not carry out. When Reinsdorf heard of the decision to sell the Mariners, he said this could only mean one thing: “It's one step closer to baseball in Tampa Bay.” Reinsdorf had even visited Florida in early 1992 to lay the groundwork for relocating the Mariners, an unauthorized visit that Commissioner Vincent later fined him $50,000 for making.

Curiously, the first formal meeting between the OC and the BCS was scheduled for Tampa Bay in mid‐March. The commissioner, the AL president, Kuhlmann, and Reinsdorf represented MLB; John Ellis represented the BCS. The central issue to be discussed was foreign‐majority ownership. In the meetings that followed, the issue was slowly reframed into control over the Mariners by a Seattle‐based owner. Both sides made compromises, but MLB experienced so much disunity that the group was unable to come to a decision on any of BCS's proposed solutions. Negotiations finally deadlocked when Reinsdorf demanded that the BCS indemnify MLB against all legal claims arising out of the transfer or attempted transfer of Mariners ownership.

After conducting additional research, the BCS learned that it is standard practice for both buyer and seller to indemnify MLB by waiving their right to sue. However, it is not standard practice to ask a potential buyer to indemnify MLB against any lawsuit brought by anyone else regarding a franchise sale. (Here, MLB was most likely taking protective action against a possible lawsuit from the Washington state government.) The BCS advised the OC that it would relinquish its legal rights to sue, but it would not indemnify MLB against any other lawsuit that might arise. The two sides did not meet for almost two months. Finally, the commissioner met with Reinsdorf and Kuhlmann on June 2, 1992 to try and restart negotiations with the BCS. Reinsdorf argued strongly in favor of local ownership and that control over day‐to‐day club decisions must be vested in a single owner rather than a company or board. But Commissioner Vincent pointed out that if the policies Reinsdorf advocated were applied consistently, Kuhlmann would also be excluded from involvement in MLB because the Cardinals were owned by Anheuser‐Busch brewing company and Kuhlmann was merely the company's representative to MLB.

Two days later, the OC convened a meeting with BCS investors in Chicago. MLB's demand for the BCS to indemnify MLB against all lawsuits was withdrawn without explanation, as were demands to force Nintendo president Hiroshi Yamauchi to travel from Kyoto to the U.S. to meet with the OC. The BCS then sent MLB one final proposal that vested almost all policy and operational authority for the Mariners in the hands of the CEO of the BCS and employed the BCS lead negotiator, John Ellis, to serve as CEO.

With this final BCS offer, Reinsdorf proposed the motion to recommend that the OC accept the BCS purchase agreement for the Seattle AL franchise, and the committee unanimously approved this motion on June 9, 1992 in New York. Each league voted to approve the Mariners sale to the BCS the following day. (The vote was unanimous in the NL; in the AL only one owner voted against the sale.) Japanese funds, converted into U.S. dollars, began paying the salaries of American baseball players on July 1, 1992.

Critical to our analysis of the MLB–BCS negotiation process is a clear understanding of the relationship between the Office of the Commissioner as represented by Vincent, the AL as represented by Reinsdorf, and the NL as represented by Kuhlmann. Vincent's authority to fine Reinsdorf $50,000 demonstrates the asymmetrical power relations between these two organizational leaders. Such asymmetry, when combined with interpersonal animosity, motivated power‐balancing actions through coalition building.

The relationship between Reinsdorf and Kuhlmann is one example of this power balancing and coalition formation. As OC chair, Kuhlmann held formal authority but demonstrated passive leadership, which gave Reinsdorf the opportunity to assert control over the OC during a vital three‐month period. Continued alignment between the informal and bold leadership offered by Reinsdorf and the formal and weak leadership offered by Kuhlmann would probably have produced a recommendation against the BCS purchase offer. However, as the commissioner, whose responsibility is to protect the best interests of the game of baseball, Vincent held veto authority on any decision made by MLB owners, although he did not use such authority casually. Eventually, he came to accept that another Seattle investor group would not emerge and recognized that the most viable solution was the approval of the BCS offer. Because he recognized that the BCS proposal required closure (ownership approval or disapproval), Vincent invited Reinsdorf and Kuhlmann to the June 2, 1992 meeting. Vincent's arguments separated Kuhlmann from Reinsdorf, which then allowed Vincent to characterize Reinsdorf's BCS views as idiosyncratic to other MLB owners. Vincent's arguments also motivated Kuhlmann to reassert leadership over the OC.

In this case, negotiations between sides deadlocked for two months because of the disunity within MLB. As time passed, the internal conflict within the MLB sharpened, with Vincent, Reinsdorf, and Kuhlmann — each representing a different organizational unit within MLB — becoming MLB's champions for creating a solution to the “BCS problem.” Achieving a shift from disunity to unity on the issue of Japanese investment in MLB became possible only after a realignment of key power relations between MLB leaders that cut across formal and informal organizational roles. The tactic that accomplished this power realignment was a vague threat that was communicated from one power broker to another — Vincent to Kuhlmann — that if acted upon, could have excluded Kuhlmann from MLB (i.e., the application of Reinsdorf's proposal suddenly had implications for Kuhlmann in Vincent's eyes). These observations lead to the following proposition:

In this case, power realignment came about when formal organizational leadership (Vincent) succeeded in dismantling, or at least disabling, an informal NL–AL interorganizational coalition. Essentially, the reestablishment of MLB unity was achieved by infusing disunity between Vincent's internal opponents, Reinsdorf and Kuhlmann. Until this meeting, Kuhlmann's personal fate in MLB was not connected in any way to the BCS outcome, but at this meeting, Vincent presented cogent arguments that linked an adverse BCS decision to potential adverse consequences for Kuhlmann — a clear conflict with his own interests. This reframing produced potential outcome costs that were apparently too great for Kuhlmann to bear, and so he took action to disable an informal MLB coalition. It is instructive to note that the technique that facilitated recovery of MLB unity was reframing, while this reframing technique served to divide an established informal coalition of AL and NL representatives.

This study has sought to examine the utility of unity and disunity as concepts for developing a descriptive and prescriptive negotiation theory and to develop a theory to support specific techniques that can affect interorganizational unity and disunity. Study findings are likely to be helpful in providing greater strategic and tactical control in negotiations.

Issue framing and issue reframing are fundamental to negotiation process and have the potential to affect the degree of disunity or unity between organizations on the same side in a negotiation. This is not the first time that a relationship has been found between fundamental negotiation processes and unity. Dupont (2003) identifies a relationship between complexity and coalition cohesiveness that offers an opportunity to strengthen or weaken a coalition. In the present case study, the actions and consequences of a “reframing effect” are observed twice. This study concludes that attempts to reframe a significant issue in an interorgani‐ zational negotiation should be carefully scrutinized because interor‐ ganizational unity is fundamentally issue‐based. Issue reframing can: (1) substantially modify the meaning of a specific issue for parties involved in a negotiation; (2) change the perceived value that parties attach to a negotiation and the attractiveness of the desired goal; (3) result in parties on the same side reevaluating the utility they derive from maintaining cooperative relations with each other in the pursuit of such goals; and (4) affect the unity that exists between two or more cooperating parties on the same side in a negotiation. When unity decreases via reframing, this technique divides cooperating parties.

Case analysis observed the use of this reframing technique initially, when public opinion leaders sought to define the meaning and significance of Japanese investment in MLB and then at the conclusion of the case when Commissioner Vincent met with Kuhlmann and Reinsdorf. This study reveals how a unified party can suddenly be thrown into disunity through a strategically crafted reframing technique. It also suggests a relationship between issue reframing and variability in interorganizational unity.

The capacity to successfully use issue reframing as the basis of a divide‐and‐conquer technique has not been recognized hitherto in the negotiation literature. This observation has great theoretical and practical relevance. Moreover, the development and application of unity and disunity as conceptual tools could provide greater understanding about negotiation processes and strategies. Developing an interorganizational concept to complement cohesion is an important advancement in our understanding of interorganizational studies generally and of interorganizational negotiation specifically. This study points to the need for further research into the relationship between reframing and interorganizational unity and disunity in both distributive and integrative negotiations. For example, it is possible that the relationship between issue reframing and unity/disunity may have different qualities in a negotiation that is fundamentally integrative, rather than distributive.

Issue reframing is a powerful tool for infusing disunity in an interorganizational opponent. What methods can be adopted to protect against such techniques? Parties on the same side in a negotiation that are vulnerable to this technique should seek to connect their interests and concerns through effective negotiation preparation combined with multiple levels of structural interdependency. Effective negotiation preparation between cooperating entities gained through in‐depth analysis and discussion about the negotiation issues of concern are the first steps in strengthening party interest and goal alignment. Such preparation is critical to both building unity and protecting against techniques that could infuse disunity. In addition, discrete parties that are structurally connected with each other are more likely to find solutions to maintain unity if and when the opposing side uses techniques designed to create disunity. Organizations that have built interdependency at differing levels in their hierarchy (structural interdependency) can call on a network of internal contacts that are committed to protecting the relationship. Multiple interorganizational links may assist to identify solutions and/or organizational resources in response to reframing techniques intended to instill disunity. Related to this linking technique is the use of a “link‐person” to facilitate understanding between leaders in two or more organizations.

A link‐person appears to be especially helpful for managing diversity that may exist between interorganizational leaders, although it is important to recognize that not all diversity presents challenges. “It is the diversity associated with values, and not social category, that causes the biggest problems . . . and has the greatest potential for enhancing both workgroup performance and morale” (Jehn, Northcraft, and Neale 1999: 758). A link‐person may be able to minimize or negate the effect of diversity associated with values at the group and organization level. Two elements, one structural and one interpersonal, appear to be critical for the effective application of this technique. First, the link‐person must exist within an interorganizational structure that allows him or her access to key leaders who have value differences. Second, this link‐person must have a high degree of interpersonal communication skill that can overcome differences and misunderstandings that diversity of values can create. Findings of this case analysis suggest that both elements must be present if a link‐person is to perform his or her role effectively in interorganizational negotiations. For example, over a ten‐year period, Howard Lincoln, who had been Nintendo of America's legal adviser for several years before becoming the company's senior vice president in 1983, had established close relations with other key leaders at Nintendo including Hiroshi Yamauchi in Kyoto and Minoru Arakawa in Seattle. These structural links are critical to link‐person performance, but the interpersonal links are equally important. Lincoln, Yamauchi, and Arakawa had strong personal as well as professional relationships. For example, in 1994 Lincoln was appointed chairman of Nintendo of America, a position he would not have received without having earned the trust of Yamauchi and Arakawa. As a trained lawyer, Lincoln had clearly developed high‐level communication skills that were most effectively applied when he was communicating with people in his circle of trust.

Interorganizational unity does not assure goal achievement, while interorganizational disunity does not preclude coherent action and negotiation success. This study presents case analysis that identifies a relationship between interorganizational unity and disunity, and negotiation process. If there is a relationship between interorganizational unity and negotiation outcome, it is an indirect relationship, but this does not mean that this relationship is insignificant. The present study does not claim that BCS's success in goal attainment was a direct result of enhanced interorganizational unity, although actions taken by the BCS to influence the national media were instrumental in bringing disunity and disorganization to MLB. The consequences of this latter action did contribute to BCS goal achievement. In the final analysis, interorganizational unity and disunity clearly affected negotiation processes and appear to influence negotiation outcome.

Supported by a discussion of the architecture of interorganizational relations, the analysis of case data in this study indicates that conceptually, interorganizational unity and disunity are helpful in developing descriptive and prescriptive theory and specific negotiation techniques. The five propositions presented can be used to test the relationships between unity and negotiation framing, unity and management of diverse cultural values, and regaining lost unity through realignment of interorganizational power relations. They also establish a foundation for further research. The understanding of negotiation processes developed in this study will, it is hoped, assist two or more organizations on the same side in a negotiation to gain greater internal and external control that can contribute to interorganizational goal achievement.