This study of interest‐based bargaining (IBB) examined past usage, current preferences, and future intentions to use this approach in U.S. airline and railroad labor negotiations. Based on a survey of eighty‐four union and management chief negotiators, we found that the personal attributes of the chief negotiator (orientation toward relationships, personal conflict handling style, and competency in IBB approaches) were strong predictors of the past use of IBB. However, personal affinities and styles became irrelevant as experience with IBB accumulated. The negotiator's preferences for IBB in general were strongly correlated to his or her awareness of other carriers' and unions' experiences with IBB, as well as to his or her own direct experience. The negotiator's intention to use IBB in the future was also related to the quality of the contract personally obtained through IBB practices. The study also revealed the unpopularity of IBB among labor negotiators relative to their management counterparts.

Contemporary research on negotiation has heavily emphasized the cognitive approach that focuses on information processing and judgment (Carrol and Payne 1991). The bulk of this research is characterized by laboratory studies of students engaged in one‐shot negotiations simulations. While this approach improves our understanding of basic psychological processes involved in negotiations, most scholars would agree that it lacks social context (Greenhalgh and Chapman 1995). Importantly, Roderick Kramer and David Messick (1995) argue that in order to understand bargaining phenomena, one must take into account the impact of the social and organizational environments in which negotiations are embedded.

In contrast to laboratory‐based research on negotiation, the study described in this article focuses on perceptions, attitudes, bargaining intentions, and behavior as reported by actual negotiators in the airline and rail industries. Our objective was to better understand the decisions about bargaining approaches made by those who engage in labor negotiations as a profession, particularly in these industries that have historically had strained labor relations and serious economic challenges. We are particularly interested in the choice between two contrasting approaches to negotiation: “traditional” adversarial (positional) bargaining and problem‐solving (integrative) bargaining that we refer to here as interest‐based bargaining (IBB). Because it contextualizes which bargaining approach a negotiator chooses to take, this study has the advantage of increased validity. The study also offers an important update and extension to previous research on IBB in other industrial sectors (Cutcher‐Gershenfeld, Kochan, and Wells 2001; Cutcher‐Gershenfeld et al. 2007) and to a series of case studies in the railroad industry (Walton, Cutcher‐Gershenfeld, and McKersie 1994).

Distributive Approaches versus Interest‐Based Approaches

In labor negotiations, traditional distributive bargaining, which has dominated for more than a century, is characterized by tactics of power, misrepresentation, and influence (Shapiro 2000). But in 1965, Richard Walton and Robert McKersie published a seminal work entitled A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations that identified integrative bargaining as a behavioral alternative. The negotiation landscape was fundamentally altered in 1981 when Roger Fisher and William Ury published Getting to YES: Negotiating Agreement without Giving in, which described a principle‐based approachcharacterized by strategies for problem solving to generate a mutually beneficial solution (Fisher, Ury, and Patton 1991) that later became known as interest‐based bargaining (IBB).

The IBB approach was slow to gain acceptance among labor negotiators. As global competition grew, however, labor and management increasingly recognized their interdependence, and interest in IBB increased dramatically (Paquet, Gaetan, and Bergeron 2000). Interest was further stimulated by initiatives in the public sector in response to directives from President Bill Clinton (Bohlander and Naber 1999). Subsequently, programs designed to train and promote the practice of IBB were developed by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) and the National Mediation Board (NMB). The FMCS offers mediation services to employers and unions but excludes the rail and airline industries, while the NMB provides mediation services exclusively to the railroads and airlines. The NMB's mission is clear: to minimize work stoppages in these two industries that are critical to the nation's interstate commerce. The NMB has been offering training and facilitation in IBB since 1997 and actively promotes its usage (NMB 2006).

Labor Relations in the Airline and Rail Industries

Studying the airline and rail industries has provided us with an opportunity to undertake a context‐specific analysis of bargaining style choices. While the industries share a common objective, transportation, each has its unique challenges. The airline industry has been in turmoil since the terrorist hijackings of September 11, 2001, when passenger confidence waned and airlines faced possible financial disaster. Even before September 11, labor–management relationships among the major airlines were strained as a result of competition from emerging successful, low‐cost carriers (von Nordenflycht and Kochan 2003). A comprehensive study of negotiations in the airline industry between 1982 and 2002 found that negotiations were protracted compared to other negotiations under the National Labor Relations Act and that there was a heavy reliance on the mediation services of the NMB. Interestingly, the analysis concluded that protracted negotiations in the airline industry could be attributed more to the relationship between labor and management than it could to the specific economic conditions in a particular organization (Gittell, von Nordenflycht, and Kochan 2003; von Nordenflycht and Kochan 2003), a finding that is of direct relevance to our study here.

Although less research has been undertaken with regard to railways, there is some suggestion that historically contentious relationships in the railway industry reflect poor labor–management relations more than they do industry economics. The culture of the railways has been characterized as a “benevolent dictatorship,” and numerous anecdotes describe the antiquated practices and dysfunctional lack of civility between labor and management (Wilner 2001). From the inception of bargaining in the railroad industry to the present day, the industry has largely followed an “arms' length,” conventional bargaining approach, with a few notable examples of IBB efforts, which were chronicled in the book Strategic Negotiations: A Theory of Change in Labor–Management Relations (Walton, Cutcher‐Gershenfeld, and McKersie 1994). While some efforts achieved modest success, the mostly disappointing results are attributed to the multicraft nature of the industry and the long tradition of adversarial bargaining. In fact, the union leaders who agreed to an integrative approach were subsequently removed from their positions (Walton, Cutcher‐Gershenfeld, and McKersie 1994).

Both industries' history of acrimonious, arms' length relationships has created two of the more challenging environments for the implementation of the IBB approach. While the economic challenges in both industries would seem to produce an ideal setting for a problem‐solving approach, the historical relationships between labor and management clearly present a major obstacle.

Research suggests that over time, negotiators develop preferences for certain bargaining strategies and approaches (Lewicki, Hiam, and Olander 1996). An important factor in the development of preferences is the relationship between the parties. In addition, negotiators' perceptions of the bargaining situation, their personal goals, their feelings of competence in a particular bargaining style as well as past experiences with the particular bargaining approach and its associated outcomes are thought to affect future choices related to bargaining approaches (Thompson 1990; Oliver, Balakrishnan, and Barry 1994).

Walton, Cutcher‐Gershenfeld, and McKersie (1994) maintain that bargaining strategies are dictated by goals. On the one hand, goals may focus on the social contract (e.g., enhancing cooperation) between labor and management and substantive issues (e.g., labor costs) may be of lesser concern. Alternatively, substantive issues may be paramount and concerns for the social contract may be comparatively less important. Accordingly, if conflicts of interest over substantive issues are intense (e.g., wages), the parties are more likely to employ forcing (conventional) methods of bargaining. If the concerns involve issues that require labor cooperation (e.g., quality improvements), however, the parties are more likely to use a fostering (IBB) approach. In accordance with this dichotomy, our study hypotheses are divided according to their relational (social contract) or tactical (substantive) orientation; we describe the relational hypotheses (relationship importance and trust) first, followed by the tactical/substantive hypotheses.

Relationship Importance

Prior research suggests that the quality of the relationship between the parties is strongly related to bargaining behavior, outcomes, and, ultimately, firm performance (Gittell 2003). Research further supports the notion that concern for the other party and the social contract leads to more integrative (win–win) solutions (Ben‐Yoav and Pruitt 1984; Walton, Cutcher‐Gershenfeld, and McKersie 1994; Mayer 2000). Therefore Hypothesis One in our study is as follows: a negotiator's relationship orientation will be positively correlated to the past use of IBB (Hypothesis One A), a preference for IBB (Hypothesis One B), and the intention to use IBB in the future (Hypothesis One C).

Trust

Trust is a persistent theme in negotiation research (Lewicki, McAllister, and Bies 1998) and is essential to the expeditious negotiation of collective bargaining agreements (Gittell, von Nordenflycht, and Kochan 2003). IBB calls for the repose of trust by one party in the other party (Ross and LaCroix 1996; Eaton, McKersie, and Fonstad 2004). The process utilized by the FMCS begins with the declaration of “guiding principles,” which include “openness, candor, truthfulness, [and] trust” as operating norms (Bohlander and Naber 1999: 45). In contrast, traditional negotiations neither assume nor require trust in the other party. Indeed, the strategies employed by negotiators using this approach often include pressure tactics, secrecy, and concealing information (Carlton 1995) — the antithesis of trust‐building behavior. Accordingly, our Hypothesis Two is as follows: trust in the other party will be positively correlated to past use of IBB (Hypothesis Two A), preferences for IBB over positional bargaining (Hypothesis Two B), and the intention to use IBB in the future (Hypothesis Two C).

In addition, scholars believe that trust develops over time and that one develops trust in another person after having positive experiences with that other person (Holmes 1991; Bazerman and Neale 1992; Lewicki and Bunker 1995). Without this history of positive interactions, trust is less likely to be present unless one has indirect knowledge of the other parties, via his or her reputation, for example (McKnight, Cummings, and Chervany 1998). Thus, our third hypothesis is that familiarity with the other party will be positively correlated to trust in the other party.

Outcome Satisfaction

Richard Oliver, Sundar Balakrishnan, and Bruce Barry (1994) argue that contract outcome satisfaction is another important factor that has implications for subsequent behavior in negotiations. Studies in the organizational justice literature have consistently demonstrated that outcomes have a significant effect on perceptions of the process (Colquitt et al. 2001). Negotiators will thus positively evaluate (and therefore prefer) IBB if it leads to favorable agreements (Cutcher‐Gershenfeld, Kochan, and Wells 2001; Cutcher‐Gershenfeld et al. 2007). Thus our fourth hypothesis is as follows: the quality of settlements experienced by the respondent under IBB will be positively correlated to the preference for IBB (Hypothesis Four A) and intentions to use IBB in the future (Hypothesis Four B).

In addition, social information processing theory suggests that the social environment can shape attitudes and that the influence is greatest when the source of the information is a group with whom the recipient closely identifies (Salancik and Pfeffer 1978). In the current study, the theory would suggest that knowledge of the IBB experiences and attitudes of other unions and carriers in the transportation industry will affect an individual negotiator's preferences, independent of his or her own personal experiences. Awareness of other negotiators' positive experiences can foster a positive attitude, leading to a stated preference for IBB and intentions to use it in the future. In contrast, awareness of negative experiences could produce the opposite result. Therefore, our fifth hypothesis is that awareness of positive or negative experience of other carriers and unions with IBB will be correlated to the respondent's preferences for IBB (Hypothesis Five A) and intentions to use IBB in the future (Hypothesis Five B).

Labor–Management Affiliation Hypothesis

Displaying trust in a negotiation, which integrative negotiation requires, can be accompanied by significant risks for exploitation or loss (Tyler and Kramer 1996). Previous rounds of largely acrimonious union–management negotiations tend to carry forward and ingrain attitudes that favor traditional bargaining approaches (Fonstad, McKersie, and Eaton 2004; Caverly, Cunningham, and Mitchell 2006). While IBB has been successful in some venues (Preuss and Frost 2003), doubt remains about whether the technique works equally well for labor and management. In a Canadian study, researchers determined that unions made a greater number of concessions on working hours and schedules, a finding the authors describe as “disturbing for union organizations who have accepted [IBB]” (Paquet, Gaetan, and Bergeron 2000: 289). Similarly, Joel Cutcher‐Gershenfeld, Thomas Kochan, and John Wells (2001) found that twice as many union negotiators who have used IBB in the past no longer prefer it (40 percent) compared with management negotiators (20 percent), a finding the authors speculate is based on their different experiences. Further, in a different study, Cutcher‐Gershenfeld et al. (2007) found a diminishing preference for the use of IBB from both management and union negotiators from 1996 to 2003; union negotiators, in 2003, preferred IBB approximately 40 percent of the time, while managers, in 2003, preferred IBB approximately 65 percent of the time. If union negotiators believe that they are vulnerable to conceding too much on wages and benefits if they use IBB, then they are likely to prefer more traditional approaches. Thus, our sixth hypothesis is that labor affiliation will be negatively correlated to preferences for IBB (Hypothesis Six A) and intent to use IBB in the future (Hypothesis Six B).

Constituent Pressure

The negotiations literature further suggests that contextual factors, such as constituent pressures, will influence the choice of bargaining approaches. Negotiators must walk a tightrope by making concessions in the pursuit of an agreement without sacrificing their image of strength in the process. Negotiators will go to extraordinary lengths to maintain the appearance of strength (van Ginkel 2004), sometimes resulting in competitiveness and inflexibility in bargaining (Folger, Pooles and Stutman 2001). Thus, it follows that if a negotiator is receiving considerable pressure from his/her constituents to be aggressive in bargaining, that negotiator is more likely to engage in positional bargaining. Thus, our seventh hypothesis is that constituent pressure will be negatively correlated to past use of IBB (Hypothesis Seven A) and preferences for IBB (Hypothesis Seven B).

Individual Negotiation Experience

The literature further suggests that there are individual differences that relate to bargaining style choices that are independent of goals in bargaining. Among those examined in this field study are the experience level of the negotiators, their predisposition to conflict handling styles, gender, and their labor–management affiliation.

As noted by Timothy Chandler and Timothy Judge (1998), in most human interaction, what has occurred in the past is a significant predictor of the future, and collective bargaining is no exception. Accordingly, negotiators develop preferences for certain bargaining strategies over time (Lewicki, Hiam, and Olander 1996; Caverly, Cunningham, and Mitchell 2006). A study of FMCS cases found that the total number of years of experience a negotiator had was negatively associated with the use of IBB. This suggests that negotiators develop a style over time, one with which they feel competent and comfortable and are likely to be resistant to changing their approach. Thus, our eighth hypothesis is that labor relations experience will be negatively correlated to past use of IBB (Hypothesis Eight A), preferences for IBB (Hypothesis Eight B), and intentions to use IBB in the future (Hypothesis Eight C).

Predisposition to Conflict Handling

One of the more controversial determinants of bargaining behavior is the role of personality. After decades of research, the results have been largely inconclusive and often contradictory (Pruitt and Carnevale 1993). However, some scholars have argued that much of this research has been conducted in experimental settings and has not considered the importance of context (Barry and Friedman 1998; Morris, Larrick, and Su 1999). Walter Mischel and Yuichi Shoda (1995) argue that “personality” manifests itself in behavioral dispositions in particular situational contexts. In other words, one may handle personal conflict (e.g., familial) differently than professional conflict. Therefore, it is advisable to use context‐specific measures, an approach that has been found to have superior predictive ability (Morris, Larrick, and Su 1999).

In the specific context of collective bargaining, Richard Shell (2001) advocates the study of a negotiator's general predisposition toward handling conflict. For example, a negotiator's general predisposition toward confrontation (or alternatively, conflict avoidance) is likely to carry over into the professional bargaining setting. In the current study we adapted the compromising, avoidance, and forcing subscales from the DUTCH scale of conflict‐handling traits (De Dreu et al. 2001). Because IBB and traditional bargaining are specific approaches to conflict handling, however, it was necessary to measure predispositions at a level that is both professional and not specifically aimed at one's opponent in bargaining — in other words, one step removed from the collective bargaining process. As such, we examined intraorganizational bargaining (Walton and McKersie 1965) that relates to conflict handling within the negotiator's own bargaining team as a predictor of bargaining styles at the table. Thus, our ninth hypothesis is that a negotiator's predisposition toward a particular conflict‐management style (in handling conflicts within the team) will significantly relate to his or her bargaining style at the table. A compromising style will be correlated to past use of IBB (Hypothesis Nine A), preferences for IBB (Hypothesis Nine B), and intent to use IBB in the future (Hypothesis Nine C), whereas forcing styles will correlate to traditional bargaining (Hypothesis Nine D), and avoiding styles will not correlate to either approach to bargaining (Hypothesis Nine E).

Gender

Research suggests that in conflict situations, men are more likely to focus on winning the dispute whereas women are more likely to focus on preserving the relationship (Pinkley 1990). In addition, meta‐analytical studies indicate that males and females differ significantly in the competitiveness they bring to negotiations (Walters, Stuhlmacher, and Meyer 1998). Because fostering the relationship is an important part of IBB (Walton, Cutcher‐Gershenfeld, and McKersie 1994; Fonstad, McKersie, and Eaton 2004), in theory women will be more likely to employ IBB in bargaining. This phenomenon was observed in the earlier FMCS study (Cutcher‐Gershenfeld, Kochan, and Wells 2001). Thus, our tenth hypothesis is that women will have been more likely than men to have used IBB in the past (Hypothesis Ten A), and will be more likely than men to prefer IBB (Hypothesis Ten B), and will be more likely than men to intend to use IBB in the future (Hypothesis Ten C).

Future Behavior

Finally, Icek Ajzen (1991) specifies in the Theory of Planned Behavior that intentions to perform a behavior can be predicted by attitudes toward that behavior. Strong empirical evidence supports Ajzen's theory across a variety of contexts, including the link between intentions to perform a behavior and actual performance (Cooke and Sheeran 2004). Based on the Theory of Planned Behavior, we expect that preferences for IBB will be a significant predictor of the party's intent to use it in the future. Thus our eleventh hypothesis is that a negotiator's preferences for IBB will be significantly correlated to intent to use IBB in the future.

Sample

We mailed 450 surveys to union and management chief negotiators in the airline and rail industries across the United States. To preserve negotiator anonymity, we enclosed the surveys in postage‐paid envelopes that were forwarded to the NMB for labeling and mailing. We received eighty‐four usable surveys for a response rate of approximately 19 percent. Because respondents were assured anonymity, we were precluded from conducting a follow‐up mailing. Although the response rate is low, it is similar to the response rates for other surveys involving professional negotiators (Curhan, Elfenbein, and Xu 2006).

In addition, there was no obvious demographic bias in the responses. Survey respondents broke down demographically as follows: 49 percent were from the rail industry while 51 percent were from the airlines; 45 percent were affiliated with management and 55 percent were affiliated with labor; 85 percent were male. Respondents were very experienced: the average length of experience as a negotiator was 20.5 years. In addition, 94 percent reported that they had substantial or complete authority to select their negotiations approach and 70.4 percent of the sample reported prior use of IBB in contract negotiations. Thirty‐five percent reported using IBB in their most recent negotiations. Respondents reported the financial health of their firm as excellent (39 percent), fair (45 percent), and poor (15 percent). Two carriers were in bankruptcy.

Because many of our participants are responsible for multiple contracts, we asked them to focus on the most recent contract in responding to the survey. In an initial exploratory effort, we asked respondents to indicate “to what extent is your choice of bargaining approach influenced by (the following items)?” The items were based on the conceptual work of Richard Oliver, Sundar Balakrishnan, and Bruce Barry (1994) and Leigh Thompson (1990). All responses were on a five‐point Likert scale anchored as 1 = not at all and 5 = always. Table One shows the mean responses listed in descending order of importance.

Table One

Determinants of Bargaining Approach

The relationship between the company and the union 3.83 
Your level of trust in the other party 3.82 
The likelihood that a particular style will result in a contract 3.78 
The contractual issues in dispute 3.75 
The relationship between the negotiators 3.66 
Your personal bargaining style preference 3.61 
The expectations of the people you represent 3.59 
The bargaining style you have historically used 3.36 
The tactical advantage to be gained by a particular style 3.28 
The financial condition of the carrier 3.23 
The reputation of the other chief negotiator 3.19 
The relative bargaining power of each party 3.14 
Your opponent's bargaining style preference 3.14 
The prior round of negotiations between the parties 3.08 
The financial condition of the industry 3.02 
The relationship between the company and the union 3.83 
Your level of trust in the other party 3.82 
The likelihood that a particular style will result in a contract 3.78 
The contractual issues in dispute 3.75 
The relationship between the negotiators 3.66 
Your personal bargaining style preference 3.61 
The expectations of the people you represent 3.59 
The bargaining style you have historically used 3.36 
The tactical advantage to be gained by a particular style 3.28 
The financial condition of the carrier 3.23 
The reputation of the other chief negotiator 3.19 
The relative bargaining power of each party 3.14 
Your opponent's bargaining style preference 3.14 
The prior round of negotiations between the parties 3.08 
The financial condition of the industry 3.02 

These responses provide support for the notion that the quality of the labor–management relationship is a primary consideration in determining the bargaining approach, along with tactical considerations. The financial condition of the carrier and the industry were of lesser importance, although they were clearly factors as well.

Respondents were also given space for additional comments. Excerpts of these are provided in the discussion.

Variables

Unless otherwise noted, all variables were measured on a five‐point Likert scale in which 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree.

Gender: This variable was coded as males = 0, females = 1.

Years of experience: This was a continuous variable reflecting the respondent's total years of labor relations experience.

Labor–management affiliation: This variable was coded as management = 0, labor = 1.

IBB used: This measure was drawn from Cutcher‐Gershenfeld, Kochan, and Wells (2001). The respondents were asked, “To what extent have you used IBB in contract negotiations?” Their responses were on a five‐point Likert scale where 1 = not at all, 3 = some of the time, and 5 = always.

Intent to use IBB (based on The Worklife Report 2003): The respondents were asked, “Do you intend to use IBB in the next round of negotiations?” Possible responses were yes, unsure, and no.

Preference for IBB (based on Cutcher‐Gershenfeld, Kochan, and Wells 2001) was measured using responses to six statements (α = 0.91). The statements were “I prefer to use traditional bargaining over IBB” (reverse scored), “IBB is better than traditional negotiations in generating creative solutions,”“IBB produces more satisfactory contracts than traditional bargaining,”“The IBB approach is more likely to generate contract agreements than the traditional approach,”“Traditional bargaining is better than IBB in resolving difficult issues” (reverse scored), and “I prefer to use IBB over traditional bargaining.” For this variable and for all the others (below) in which we used more than one statement to measure the variable, we computed the average of responses for analysis.

Trust in the other party (based on Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman 1995) was examined using five statements (α = 0.89): “The other party's representative has kept his or her commitments made during negotiations,”“I consider the other party's representative to be fair,”“I consider the other party's representative to be trustworthy,”“The other party's representative is forthcoming with the information we need to produce a fair contract,” and “I trust the other party's representative to keep information confidential when necessary.”

Familiarity with the other party (based on McKnight, Cummings, and Chervany 1998) was examined using two statements (α = 0.63). These statements were measured on a 1–5 scale as above. The items were “I feel I know how the other party's representative thinks” and “I am aware of the reputation of the other party's representative.”

Constituent expectations (based on Neale and Bazerman 1985) was measured with one statement: “My constituents expect me to take aggressive positions in negotiations.”

General relationship orientation (based on Pruitt and Rubin 1986) was measured using responses to five statements (α = 0.78): “I place considerable importance on my professional relationship with the other party,”“It is more important to focus on the needs of my constituency than on the relationship with the other party” (reverse scored), “I always advocate strongly even if it jeopardizes the relationship with the other party (reverse scored), “It is more important to get the best collective bargaining agreement for my constituents than to preserve the relationship with the other party” (reverse scored), and “The relationship between the parties is important because it has long‐term implications.”

Bargaining styles: Based on the work of De Dreu et al. (2001), we measured three different styles of handling conflicts within the bargaining team as a measure of predispositions toward a particular style. It was our belief that conflict handling within one's bargaining team is a better indicator of a negotiator's underlying predisposition as contrasted with bargaining with one's opponents at the table, which may be tactical in nature. The following describes the items that correspond to each bargaining style. Compromising style was measured using responses to three statements (α = 0.73): “I try to realize a middle‐of‐the‐road solution in discussions with my team members,”“I strive whenever possible towards a fifty‐fifty compromise in discussions with my team members,” and “I emphasize that we have to find a compromise solution in discussions with my team members.”Avoiding style was measured using these three statements (α = 0.75): “I try to avoid confrontation with the other team members,””I avoid differences of opinion as much as possible,” and “I avoid a confrontation about our differences.”Forcing style was measured using these three statements (α = 0.69): “I push my own point of view in discussions with my team members,”“I fight for the outcome I prefer in discussions with my team members,” and “I do everything to obtain the outcome I prefer in discussions with my team members.”

Others' experience with IBB was analyzed as a composite of two variables.1 We asked two questions: “Do you know if other carriers or unions who are similar to yours use IBB?” and “If yes, have they had positive experiences with this approach?” If the respondent indicated no awareness of others' experiences with IBB or if they were aware of IBB usage but did not know if the experience was positive or negative, they were considered to have had no social influence on their attitudes toward IBB. However, if the respondent indicated an awareness of others' experiences with IBB, they were either considered to be positively influenced (if the others' experiences were positive) or negatively influenced (if the others' experiences were negative).

IBB competency (based on Cutcher‐Gershenfeld, Kochan, and Wells 2001) was measured via responses to the following statements (α = 0.74): “I know the difference between traditional bargaining and IBB” and “I consider myself to be competent in IBB bargaining tactics.”

The interaction of contract quality and the use of IBB was measured as the multiplicative product of two variables: IBB used (as previously defined) and the quality of the current contract (based on Giacobbe‐Miller 1995), as measured by responses to three statements (α = 0.94): “In general, I am satisfied with the current contract,”“In general, I think the current contract is fair,” and “In general, the current contract gives my side what it deserves.”

Financial health of the organization was measured as a composite variable, and we used it as a control variable by asking respondents two questions: (1) “How would you characterize the financial health of your carrier?” The possible responses were “poor,”“fair,” and “excellent.” (2) “Is the carrier in bankruptcy?” The possible answers were “yes” and “no.” Excellent financial health was coded as 5.0, fair financial health as 3.33, poor financial health was 1.67, and bankruptcy was coded 0.

The hypotheses were tested with a combination of bivariate correlations and multiple regression analysis. Table Two displays the bivariate correlations and Table Three displays the regression results.

Table Two

Correlations and Descriptive Statistics

MeanStandard Deviation__1____2____3____4____5____6____7____8____9____10____11____12____13____14____15____16__
 1. IBB used 2.75 0.99                 
 2. IBB intent 2.60 1.67 0.407**                
 3. IBB preference 2.98 0.77 0.313** 0.441**               
 4. Gender 85% Male 15% Female 0.144 0.178 0.020              
 5. Years experience 20.48 8.42 −0.049 0.015 −0.048 −0.185             
 6. Party labor or management 45% MGT 55% Labor −0.086 −0.181 −0.265* −0.053 −0.078            
 7. Trust 3.05 0.85 0.211 0.141 0.207 −0.121 0.085 −0.120           
 8. Relationship orientation 3.34 0.69 0.330** 0.248* 0.235* 0.103 0.072 −0.497** 0.296**          
 9. Familiarity 3.91 0.52 0.064 0.075 −0.196 0.086 0.040 −0.007 −0.043 −0.105         
10. Expectations of constituents 4.02 0.76 0.152 −0.021 −0.188 −0.028 0.021 0.446** −0.117 −0.236* 0.203        
11. Bargaining style: compromising 3.33 0.70 0.137 −0.015 −0.051 0.101 −0.163 0.303** −0.099 −0.221* 0.058 0.285**       
12. Bargaining style: avoiding 2.80 0.78 −0.038 −0.166 0.085 −0.044 0.000 0.117 −0.081 −0.139 0.013 0.075 0.366**      
13. Bargaining style: forcing 3.22 0.67 −0.057 −0.060 −0.079 −0.063 0.019 0.028 −0.026 −0.300** 0.156 −0.129 0.194 0.032     
14. Others experience with IBB 0.16 0.50 0.098 0.127 0.418** 0.019 −0.026 −0.263* 0.127 0.183 −0.134 −0.126 0.039 0.120 −0.083    
15. IBB competency 4.11 0.79 0.523** 0.206 0.137 0.240* 0.113 −0.076 0.109 0.230* 0.126 0.134 −0.071 −0.072 −0.075 0.096   
16. Financial health 3.67 1.26 −0.009 0.012 0.118 −0.198 −0.186 0.182 −0.073 −0.091 −0.015 0.051 0.056 −0.011 0.048 0.014 −0.235*  
17. Quality of contract × IBB use 4.82 7.39 0.427** 0.371** 0.257* 0.135 −0.198 −0.181 −0.029 0.183 0.038 −0.174 0.045 0.064 −0.041 0.046 0.139 −0.104 
MeanStandard Deviation__1____2____3____4____5____6____7____8____9____10____11____12____13____14____15____16__
 1. IBB used 2.75 0.99                 
 2. IBB intent 2.60 1.67 0.407**                
 3. IBB preference 2.98 0.77 0.313** 0.441**               
 4. Gender 85% Male 15% Female 0.144 0.178 0.020              
 5. Years experience 20.48 8.42 −0.049 0.015 −0.048 −0.185             
 6. Party labor or management 45% MGT 55% Labor −0.086 −0.181 −0.265* −0.053 −0.078            
 7. Trust 3.05 0.85 0.211 0.141 0.207 −0.121 0.085 −0.120           
 8. Relationship orientation 3.34 0.69 0.330** 0.248* 0.235* 0.103 0.072 −0.497** 0.296**          
 9. Familiarity 3.91 0.52 0.064 0.075 −0.196 0.086 0.040 −0.007 −0.043 −0.105         
10. Expectations of constituents 4.02 0.76 0.152 −0.021 −0.188 −0.028 0.021 0.446** −0.117 −0.236* 0.203        
11. Bargaining style: compromising 3.33 0.70 0.137 −0.015 −0.051 0.101 −0.163 0.303** −0.099 −0.221* 0.058 0.285**       
12. Bargaining style: avoiding 2.80 0.78 −0.038 −0.166 0.085 −0.044 0.000 0.117 −0.081 −0.139 0.013 0.075 0.366**      
13. Bargaining style: forcing 3.22 0.67 −0.057 −0.060 −0.079 −0.063 0.019 0.028 −0.026 −0.300** 0.156 −0.129 0.194 0.032     
14. Others experience with IBB 0.16 0.50 0.098 0.127 0.418** 0.019 −0.026 −0.263* 0.127 0.183 −0.134 −0.126 0.039 0.120 −0.083    
15. IBB competency 4.11 0.79 0.523** 0.206 0.137 0.240* 0.113 −0.076 0.109 0.230* 0.126 0.134 −0.071 −0.072 −0.075 0.096   
16. Financial health 3.67 1.26 −0.009 0.012 0.118 −0.198 −0.186 0.182 −0.073 −0.091 −0.015 0.051 0.056 −0.011 0.048 0.014 −0.235*  
17. Quality of contract × IBB use 4.82 7.39 0.427** 0.371** 0.257* 0.135 −0.198 −0.181 −0.029 0.183 0.038 −0.174 0.045 0.064 −0.041 0.046 0.139 −0.104 

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05;p < 0.10; significant coefficients are in boldface.

Note: IBB = interest‐based bargaining.

Table Three

Regression Results

Dependent VariableIBB UsedIBB IntentIBB Preference
Adjusted R2 0.402*** 0.283** 0.200** 
Intercept −4.76** −2.07 2.55* 
Gender 0.017 0.648 0.068 
Years experience −0.008 0.029 0.001 
Party (labor or management) 0.150 −0.393 −0.271 
Trust 0.144 0.072 0.147 
Relationship orientation 0.435* 0.004 −0.026 
Familiarity 0.233 −0.008 −0.282 
Constituent expectations 0.184 0.274 0.008 
Bargaining style: compromising 0.260 0.223 −0.041 
Bargaining style: avoiding −0.122 −0.441* 0.112 
Bargaining style: forcing 0.067 −0.030 −0.006 
Others experience with IBB −0.081 −0.227 0.444* 
IBB competency 0.528*** 0.066 0.115 
IBB preference 0.308* 0.849*** — 
Quality of contract × IBB use — 0.083** 0.025* 
Financial health 0.053 0.095 0.130 
Dependent VariableIBB UsedIBB IntentIBB Preference
Adjusted R2 0.402*** 0.283** 0.200** 
Intercept −4.76** −2.07 2.55* 
Gender 0.017 0.648 0.068 
Years experience −0.008 0.029 0.001 
Party (labor or management) 0.150 −0.393 −0.271 
Trust 0.144 0.072 0.147 
Relationship orientation 0.435* 0.004 −0.026 
Familiarity 0.233 −0.008 −0.282 
Constituent expectations 0.184 0.274 0.008 
Bargaining style: compromising 0.260 0.223 −0.041 
Bargaining style: avoiding −0.122 −0.441* 0.112 
Bargaining style: forcing 0.067 −0.030 −0.006 
Others experience with IBB −0.081 −0.227 0.444* 
IBB competency 0.528*** 0.066 0.115 
IBB preference 0.308* 0.849*** — 
Quality of contract × IBB use — 0.083** 0.025* 
Financial health 0.053 0.095 0.130 

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; p < 0.10; significant coefficients are in boldface.

Note: IBB = interest‐based bargaining.

Social Contract Emphasis

Hypothesis One proposes that negotiators who express a stronger relationship orientation will have been more likely to have used IBB in the past, have a preference for IBB, and express intentions to use IBB in the future. Our bivariate analysis did find significant correlations among these variables. This is consistent with the supposition that a relationship orientation, in contrast to an outcome orientation, is more likely to lead to the use of more integrative approaches (Ben‐Yoav and Pruitt 1984; Walton, Cutcher‐Gershenfeld, and McKersie 1994; Mayer 2000). However, the relationship was only statistically significant in predicting the past use of IBB when all other variables were controlled in the regression analysis.

Hypothesis Two proposes that trust in the other party will be positively correlated to IBB use, IBB preference over traditional forms of bargaining, and intention to use IBB. Significant relationships were not found either in the bivariate analysis or the regression results. Accordingly, this hypothesis was not supported and it appears that trust is not a prerequisite for IBB in this context, perhaps because of the deeply embedded acrimony between the parties. However, the negotiator's level of trust in the other party significantly correlated to having a relationship orientation, which suggests that trust may be a prerequisite for focusing on relational concerns, which in turn leads to a willingness to try IBB approaches.

Hypothesis Three proposes that familiarity with the other party will be positively correlated to trust in the other party, but we did not find a significant bivariate correlation, nor was it significant in the regression results. Therefore, this hypothesis was not supported. Accordingly, it appears that a strong familiarity with one's opponent in this context does not necessarily engender trust — a result that could possibly arise from the long acrimony that has characterized bargaining in these two industries. In fact, while the correlation was not significant, the relationship was slightly negative — indicating familiarity was more likely to breed distrust than trust. This is an interesting contrast to the studies of trust conducted outside of the labor negotiations setting (McKnight, Cummings, and Chervany 1998). It seems possible that the adversarial basis for labor negotiations may stand in stark contrast to other types of group dynamics (e.g., team building) in which the importance of familiarity to trust has been demonstrated.

Tactical (Substantive) Emphasis

Hypothesis Four proposes that negotiators who have experienced better settlements after using IBB will be more likely to prefer IBB and to use it in the future. Indeed, we found both correlations to be significant in the bivariate analysis and in the regression analysis. Accordingly, this hypothesis was supported, providing support for the notion that the negotiators may simply be pragmatic. If they personally tried IBB and it produced favorable results, they are more likely to conclude that they like it and are willing to try it again.

Hypothesis Five proposes that awareness of other parties' positive experiences with IBB will correlate to negotiators' preference for IBB and to their intention to use IBB in the future. Hypothesis Five was partially supported. We found that preferences for IBB were influenced by the respondent's perceptions of other parties' experiences in both the bivariate correlations and the regression analysis. Perceptions of others' experiences, however, did not appear to affect the intention to use IBB in the future. Thus, it appears that social influences may affect overall attitudes toward IBB, but other factors intervene (e.g., the respondent's own experiences) in determining the intent to use IBB in the future.

Hypothesis Six proposes that a negotiator's affiliation with labor will correlate negatively to his or her preference for IBB and intention to use IBB. We found that indeed labor affiliation was significantly (and negatively) correlated to negotiators' preferences for IBB but not for their intention to use IBB in the future. We found, however, that this affiliation was not ultimately significant when we examined the data using a regression analysis that controlled for other variables in the model. Therefore, our sixth hypothesis is only partially supported. (We discuss this finding in depth in the subsequent section of this article.)

Hypothesis Seven proposes that constituent pressures will negatively correlate to the negotiator's use of IBB, preference for IBB, and intention to use IBB. We did not find these relationships, and thus this hypothesis was not supported. We found this result surprising in light of the “punishment” exacted on labor negotiators who used IBB in the railroad case studies discussed earlier (Walton, Cutcher‐Gershenfeld, and McKersie 1994). It is possible that strong economic pressures and clear advocacy by the federal government for the IBB approach have overshadowed constituent pressures. In addition, it is possible that the act of combining labor and management responses in the analysis obscured underlying differences between labor and management. In fact, the significant bivariate correlations clearly indicate that unions experience stronger constituent pressures to take firm positions relative to management.

Individual Differences

Hypothesis Eight proposes that negotiators with more years of negotiation experience will be less likely to have used IBB in the past, be less likely to prefer IBB, and be less likely to intend to use IBB in the future. Neither the bivariate correlations nor the regression results found negotiator experience to significantly correlate to IBB use, preferences, or intended use, although the signs of the bivariate correlations were negative for past use and preferences. This result is somewhat inconsistent with previous findings in an FMCS study of IBB (Cutcher‐Gershenfeld, Kochan, and Wells 2001), which finds a significant negative correlation between negotiator experience and previous use of IBB or IBB preferences; however, the authors suggest that the views of experienced and inexperienced negotiators might converge as experience with IBB accumulates. Because the current study was conducted nearly fifteen years after the FMCS study, we suspect that experience with IBB is creating the convergence anticipated by Cutcher‐Gershenfeld, Kochan, and Wells (2001).

Hypothesis Nine states that a negotiator's predisposition toward handling conflict can predict his or her past use of IBB, preferences for IBB, and intention to use IBB. We measured three conflict‐handling styles: compromising, forcing, and avoiding confrontation. To capture the respondent's predisposition (as opposed to tactical use) toward resolving conflict in a professional setting, we measured conflict‐handling styles within the context of intrateam conflict resolution.

We found that the compromising style correlated to the past use of IBB and, unexpectedly, the avoiding style negatively correlated to the intent to use IBB in the future (supporting the notion that IBB is not an avoidance of conflict but rather an active engagement of the issues). As expected, the forcing style did not significantly correlate to the negotiator's past use of IBB, preferences for IBB, or the intention to use IBB. This is consistent with the findings of Walton, Cutcher‐Gershenfeld, and McKersie (1994) and supports the greater effectiveness of context‐specific measures rather than general measures of personality traits (Morris, Larrick, and Su 1999).

Hypothesis Ten proposes that we would find gender differences in the use of IBB, preference for IBB, and intention to use IBB. In fact, we found none. Because our sample was only 15 percent female, however, we do not believe our study sample provided a sufficient test of potential gender differences.

Hypothesis Eleven proposes that a preference for IBB will correlate to the intention to use IBB. We found this relationship to be significant based on the bivariate correlations and regression results. Therefore, our eleventh hypothesis was supported, a result that supports the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen 1991).

We added IBB competency as a control variable to our regression analyses. Those results are as follows:

  1. Past use of IBB correlated to having a relationship orientation, a compromising bargaining style, a general preference for IBB, and IBB competency. These variables accounted for 40 percent of the variance in IBB use.

  2. IBB preference was positively correlated to the respondent's and others' positive experiences with IBB, as well as the positive financial health of the company. These three variables accounted for 20 percent of the variance in IBB preferences.

  3. A negotiator's intentions to use IBB in the future correlated positively to his or her IBB preferences and personal past contract results when using IBB, and correlated negatively to having an avoiding bargaining style. These variables explained 28 percent of the variance in a negotiator's intention to use IBB.

This study offers a rare look at some of the factors that can influence negotiation strategies among actual practitioners in two industries that have been characterized by labor–management strife. The results clearly highlight the role of negotiators' relationship orientation in influencing a negotiator's initial decision to try IBB as a bargaining approach.

Relationship orientation was significantly positively correlated with past use of IBB, intent to use IBB in the future, and a general preference for IBB as a bargaining style, although it remained significant in the regression only for correlating to a past use of IBB. In addition, the actual quality of the relationship between the parties (labeled as “trust” in the current study) was not significantly positively correlated to IBB use, IBB preference, and a future intention to use IBB but was strongly correlated to having an overall relationship orientation. This may indicate that trust is inextricably linked to a focus on relationships or, stated differently, if the other party is not trustworthy, the relationship becomes less important in the negotiator's mind than winning the dispute. We also found that respondents representing labor were much less relationship oriented (trusting) than were the management respondents.

Why does a relationship orientation correlate to a greater past use of IBB but not to overall preferences for this bargaining approach or to the intent to use it in the future? We believe the answer lies in the track records of IBB for labor and management negotiators. The variables that predicted general preferences for IBB include (1) the positive experience of other carriers or unions with this approach, (2) a positive personal experience with the quality of settlements generated by IBB, and, to a much lesser extent, (3) the good financial health of the carrier. Personal experience with high‐quality settlements under IBB strongly correlated to the intent to use IBB in the future, as did having a general preference for IBB. In essence, it appears that a relationship orientation was important for encouraging negotiators to try IBB, but as they gained experience with this approach, it was the quality of the results that mattered.

These results should also be considered in light of the significant negative correlation that we found between affiliation with labor and general preferences for IBB. Recalling three previous studies (Paquet, Gaetan, and Bergeron 2000; Cutcher‐Gershenfeld, Kochan, and Wells 2001; Cutcher‐Gershenfeld et al. 2007) that found greater concessions for labor (and corresponding wins for management), the somewhat negative reaction of labor to IBB appears to have a rational basis. In addition, the FMCS data collected by Cutcher‐Gershenfeld, Kochan, and Wells (2001) were from the mid‐1990s. The results of that study indicated that the use of IBB appears to have some effectiveness in addressing issues related to work arrangements (e.g., relaxing work rules) and benefits reduction but has little or no effect on other economic issues. Because the relaxation of work rules and benefits reductions are both more favorable to management than labor, the study does provide some basis for union skepticism. Cutcher‐Gershenfeld, Kochan, and Wells (2001: 19) further speculated “should this pattern persist, it would likely reinforce a fear often expressed by union negotiators, that is, that adopting a more problem‐solving approach will make them more vulnerable to traditional management power tactics”. It appears now, over ten years later, that IBB continues to create a feeling of vulnerability among many union negotiators.

The following open‐ended responses provide a glimpse of some of the IBB failures that union negotiators report in the airline and rail industry. As can be seen from the excerpts, the union negotiators sense that IBB did not ultimately serve the interests of their constituents, or in the worst case, was used by management to gain a tactical advantage over the union.

Union Respondent 1 said, “My most recent negotiation is a perfect example of IBB failure. It was the discussion and cooperative spirit that made my committee agree to concessions. They didn't notice, through all the false niceties, that the company did not agree to even one minor improvement. I put a stop to IBB. Traditional bargaining is the only way to know what the company wants because they put it in writing. There are no hidden surprises. It's more honest and upfront than IBB.”2

“The company has bargained traditionally when I have been involved in an ‘IBB’ process,” Union Respondent 2 reported. “We put our cards on the table and the company has held back on information to find out what our position or needs were.”

Union Respondent 3 said, “The problem with IBB is my members think I am bargaining in secret with the company because of confidentiality clauses I have signed, and an attitude of mistrust among my members evolves.”

In addition, we received a letter (in lieu of the survey) from David A. Rosenfeld, a partner in the union‐side law firm of Weinberg, Roger, and Rosenfeld. He writes, “I have written a book for the National Labor College entitled Offensive Bargaining (1995), which has been widely circulated among union negotiators. In effect, interest‐based bargaining in my experience allows employers to take advantage of unions by engaging in what you call positional bargaining to take advantage of the union's position. I would almost never advise or allow a client to engage in that kind of bargaining.”

On the other hand, one union respondent (Respondent 4) told us that IBB should be used in the airline industry: “Airline bankruptcy bargaining and IBB would seem to go hand in hand. Such a bargaining approach defines the mutual problems facing the parties and encourages a full exploration of joint solutions. What we have come to define as traditional bargaining, the more adversarial approach, would seem to have diminishing support in an industry wracked with problems.”

In contrast, very few management respondents offered any commentary on the questionnaire despite their generally positive views of IBB. Those who did simply mentioned the need “for fair and balanced contracts,”“to put the issues on the table,” and “to focus on the long‐term interests of the corporation,” concluding that “IBB is the best long‐term [solution].” The open‐ended commentaries highlight the differences between labor and management, a difference that was also clearly evident in the Cutcher‐Gershenfeld, Kochan, and Wells (2001) study involving the FMCS.

Another surprising result of the survey was the relative lack of importance of the financial condition of the company in determining bargaining approaches. We had included this as a control variable because the airline industry, in particular, has had a steady stream of bankruptcies and acrimonious cuts in wages and benefits. In our sample, only 39 percent of our respondents indicated that their carrier was in “excellent” financial health, whereas 45 percent indicated that the carrier's financial condition was only “fair” and 15 percent indicated it was “poor.” Two of the carriers in the sample were in bankruptcy.

Nonetheless, the financial condition of the carrier did not significantly correlate to the relationship between the parties, nor was it related to the past use of IBB. This is consistent with the FMCS finding (Cutcher‐Gershenfeld, Kochan, and Wells 2001) that relationships were more important than economics in predicting the choice of bargaining approach. In the present study, the financial condition of the industry was positively related to IBB preference in the regression results; however, it was not significant in predicting the intent to use IBB in the future. We believe this reflects an underlying belief that IBB is philosophically preferred in the absence of severe financial pressures, when substantive issues are less pressing. Even for financially sound carriers, however, philosophical preferences are overshadowed by actual experiences with IBB, which ultimately influence intentions to use IBB in the future. It is also possible that there is a curvilinear relationship in that severe financial difficulties ensure that substantive issues will prevail, whereas good financial health reduces the impetus to work together cooperatively.

This study is limited in several important ways. First, the low response rate (19 percent) is problematic. While we have no way to determine the characteristics of the nonrespondents, we suspect they are disproportionately represented by negotiators who have no experience with IBB and therefore did not feel compelled to participate. We suspect that the high (70 percent) rate of experience with IBB among our respondents is not representative of the actual rate of usage of IBB in negotiations in these industries and, accordingly, our sample overrepresents negotiators with IBB experience. At the same time, because our sample was fairly well divided between the rail and air industry and between labor and management, we believe that it provides a reasonable glimpse of the views of those who have actually experienced IBB in negotiations.

An additional limitation is the cross‐sectional nature of the data. This eliminated our ability to assess causality. As a result, all of our hypotheses are stated as relationships. Also, the use of cross‐sectional data precludes the ability to detect changes in groups over time.

With regard to measurement, the IBB variable itself was generalized. Rather than examining specific behaviors and techniques (e.g., brainstorming, problem solving, facilitation), IBB was treated as one distinct process. This left it up to the respondent to interpret his or her own behaviors in order to determine whether they had used IBB. Even among proponents of integrative approaches to negotiation, opinions can vary about which techniques to use and how and when to use them.

It should also be noted that the data were collected from self‐reports, leading to potential problems of common method variance. Common method variance may occur when data are collected through self‐reports in which respondents strive to be consistent in their answers. As a result, relationships between attitudinal variables, for example, may be inflated. Unfortunately, there is no alternative to self‐reports for directly measuring individual attitudes or intentions and using established techniques (Podsakoff and Organ 1986), we found no evidence of common method variance in the present study. Nonetheless, there is still debate regarding the actual effects of common methods bias and the effectiveness of methods to estimate or control for such bias (Lindell and Whitney 2001).

Despite these limitations, we believe the current study sheds light on the IBB phenomenon among negotiators who have experience with this approach. These data were collected more than a decade after the FMCS study and in a more narrow set of industries (air and rail). Our results suggest that IBB approaches remain suspect among union negotiators. Their skepticism toward this approach may arise from their perception that IBB has produced less favorable settlements, as reported in previous studies. Most importantly, the comments from our study suggest that IBB approaches may be subject to “gaming.” In other words, the problem with IBB may not be its conceptual properties but rather its implementation by the parties. As predicted by Cutcher‐Gershenfeld, Kochan, and Wells (2001:16), “IBB is likely to diffuse and gain further acceptance in collective bargaining if it delivers on its promise of generating mutual gains for the parties. On the other hand, it is likely to lose support over time if, in the end, it is perceived to be, or in fact is, simply used as a power tactic to achieve one party's objectives at the other's expense.” Based on this study, we believe that this has been a problem for some parties utilizing IBB in the rail and air sectors.

Future studies could examine how IBB's conceptual properties are implemented in actual practice. Are negotiators actually using IBB's behaviors and techniques as envisioned by those who have advocated their use? Is IBB only useful in dealing with complex problems that do not involve distributive issues? Are the parties using IBB in good faith or in an effort to gain a tactical advantage? Answers to these questions would enable the development of future public policy and training initiatives that are designed to facilitate the full realization of IBB's promise.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that in light of the acrimonious relationships that have historically existed in the airlines and railroads and the tremendous financial pressures each have faced, this may be one of the most difficult labor relations settings for successful IBB implementation. As Walton, Cutcher‐Gershenfeld, and McKersie noted (1994) in their case studies in the railroad industry, fostering (IBB) strategies that focus on the social contract are often accompanied by forcing (traditional, adversarial) techniques that are focused on substantive issues. This observation seemed to manifest in this study, as our labor respondents openly lamented the substantive concessions they were making through the IBB process. It may be the case that IBB will continue to have lackluster results until both industries are healthy, power imbalances between the parties are alleviated, and relationships between labor and management have a chance to mend.

Suggestions for Practitioners

As noted by Roger Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce Patton (1991), principle‐based bargaining (IBB) is the most difficult to implement when the parties have a long history of acrimonious, positional bargaining in which the prerequisite of trust is virtually nonexistent. The challenge becomes even greater when economic issues force a focus on substantive issues. Taken together, the history of bargaining and the financial conditions in the railway and airline industries suggest a particularly difficult environment for the effective use of IBB, but the ability to work together effectively seems particularly important in these industries. As such, we recommend that the parties undergo extensive training in IBB, which has been demonstrably important in earlier IBB successes (Kolb 2004) and experiment with this approach on nondistributive issues (e.g., continuous improvement initiatives) in an effort to improve their relationship. As the relationship improves, if it improves, it would then be possible to engage the more distributive issues (e.g., pay and benefits) that must inevitably be resolved. In addition, Susan Eaton, Robert McKersie and Nils Fonstad (2004) suggest that the organization can improve the climate for integrative bargaining by employing its principles in its daily operations. In so doing, the use of IBB in bargaining is just a natural extension of an overall, participative, problem‐solving management philosophy.

The authors thank Daniel Rainey, Rachel Barbour, and Linda Puchala of the NMB for their assistance with this study.

1.

This potential explanatory variable was suggested by representatives from the NMB.

2.

It should be noted that one of the tenets of IBB is informality and minimization of written materials whereas traditional bargaining involves the exchange of written proposals (Lewicki, Barry, and Saunders 2007).

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