Abstract
The author uses a behavioral perspective to survey theory that may be useful in mediation. He notes the lack of diffusion of knowledge of theory among practitioners and argues that mediators should pay more explicit attention to theory. He presents a matrix comprising the behavioral factors of perception, emotion, cognition, communication, and intervention at the micro, meso, and macro levels of conflict and uses this matrix to organize and review some mediation theories. Several types of intervention theory are identified: integrated, generic, dialectical, developmental, and dialogical. The article closes by posing some outstanding theoretical issues and questioning whether current mediator training programs are adequate to bridge the gap between theory and practice.
Introduction
Modern mediators have often acknowledged the importance of theory (Jackson 1952; Walton and McKersie 1965; Rubin and Brown 1975; Coogler 1978; Irving and Bohm 1981; Herrman et al. 2001). And many mediation scholars and educators have taken significant steps to encourage the development of theory in mediation and to bring it to the attention of practitioners. This journal, for instance, has included a section devoted to theory from its inception, while educational institutions, foundations, and associations have sponsored several theory‐oriented initiatives (William and Flora Hewlett Association 2002; Convenor Conflict Management 2006a, 2006b; Association for Conflict Resolution 2008; Susskind and Susskind 2008). Despite these efforts, however, it seems that many mediators have had little exposure to theory (Schultz 1989; Macfarlane and Mayer 2005a, 2005b; Honeyman, Mcadoo, and Welsh 2006).
In this article, I survey and review some of the theory that is available to mediators to help fill gaps that have been identified in accessibility and diffusion of theory among practitioners (Bush and Bingham 2005). I will first consider the role and importance of theory for mediators then describe a matrix in which various theoretical approaches can be related to each other in order to make them more accessible and understandable to practitioners. A survey of this sort cannot include all contributions to theory that mediators may find useful, but it can offer a conceptual framework (the matrix) in which theory can be placed. Viewing such a matrix may encourage mediators to extend their knowledge in new areas, educators to include more theory in mediator training, and researchers to identify gaps in knowledge for investigation.
Why Theory?
Why is knowledge of theory important for mediators? I suggest four answers: first, acknowledging theory encourages its honest use; second, theory is inescapable in practice; third, certain theories are central to functioning as a mediator; and fourth, theory is useful in all aspects of mediation.
Honesty about Theory
Chris Argyris and Donald A. Schön (1974) drew attention to practitioners who go about their work according to tacit theories of action, or “theories‐in‐use,” that are incongruent with the theories they publicly endorse, their “espoused theories.” If mediators behave in a similar way to the practitioners studied by Argyris and Schön, there is reason for concern.1 To avoid such incongruity between practice and principle, Argyris and Schön suggest that explicit attention to theory is necessary. If such examination reveals a gap between theory and practice, practitioners may then see the need to work toward a better implementation of the principles they profess.
Renewed attention to theory, I believe, will also advance the field of conflict resolution as a whole as the diversity of theoretical approaches that have developed over the past decades are acknowledged and debated (Della Noce 2002; Della Noce, Bush, and Folger 2002).
Faulty Theory
The second answer to the question, “Why theory?” builds on the first: if the implicit theory actually used by mediators is faulty, then that error can create a host of problems. We are creatures of theory fully as much as we are creatures of conflict and always operate with some form of “lay theory,”“implicit theory,”“naïve theory,” or “folk theory” (Antaki 1981; Furnham 1988; Levy, Chiu, and Hong 2006a, 2006b).
We expect, therefore that mediators will subscribe to a variety of personal theories that can affect their practices — perhaps without conscious awareness that they are doing so — especially if explicit discussion of theory is not a significant part of their training (Dweck and Ehrlinger 2006). Dean G. Pruitt (1986) called such guides to action used by mediators “maxims” and “aphorisms,” and recommended a more scientific approach.
Those who intervene in others' lives through positions of power should take care not to act on questionable theories and assumptions. Feminist legal scholars, for example, have exposed the faulty reasoning associated with gender roles that has affected laws and legal institutions (Menkel‐Meadow 1992). Today, many judges take courses to learn new theories that are more compatible with doing justice to both genders in the courtroom (Schafran 1993).2 These efforts to reveal and critique theory, both implicit and explicit, have resulted in legal change and, one would hope, increased justice.
A similar attention to the theories of conflict that guide mediators should also bring beneficial results. For instance, research has called into question some of the common theories that mediators have held, including the obstructive role of emotions (Friedman et al. 2004; Dunn and Schweitzer 2005; Lewicki 2006) and the need to change attitudes in order to change behavior (Stacy, Bentler, and Flay 1994).
Informal theory is ubiquitous and influential (Dweck, Chiu, and Hong 1995). It should not be left implicit, unchallenged, and undeveloped so that hidden biases and prejudices are allowed to infect practice. Research has shown that gender and professional background can be predictors of mediators' orientations to their work, including the preferred outcomes of mediation (Herrman et al. 2003). Public, debated theory is preferable to private, untested “lay theory” in the field of mediation.
Naive Realism
The theory of “naïve realism” proposed by Lee Ross and Andrew Ward (1996) sheds light on many of the central problems of conflict resolution. According to this theory, first, each of us believes that what we make of the world is “real,” or true and objective. Second, we overlook the possibility that others derive a different meaning from the “same” situation or event. Third, if others do not appear to derive the same meaning as we have from shared experiences, we tend to think there must be something wrong with them or faulty about their reasoning.
Ross and Ward (1996) have demonstrated that attempts to compare world views can lead to more entrenched suspicion of the other side and that perceived differences in values are often greater than they actually are. The importance of “naïve realism” and related theories for the work of mediators is, I believe, another reason why mediators should take theory seriously. Mediators, I argue, must start by questioning their own “naïve realism.”
Useful Theory
The value of theory to a practicing mediator is much debated. Theory as a guide for action presents general concepts, propositions, and relationships that must be adapted and applied to particular circumstances. Whether a mediator has the time and opportunity to analyze and categorize events as they occur in mediation in order to relate them to theory in real time is questioned by many. Intuitionists such as Greg Rooney (2007), for instance, advocate letting go of all analysis so that the mediator can simply “experience the experience” by “refraining from your memories, desires, and understanding” (244). According to this view, a mediator's course of action will become apparent to her through immersion in the moment and without the need for theoretical guidance. However, if we accept the limitations of naïve realism, this is simply not possible, or at least not reasonable, to expect from a mediator — theory is not so easily escaped and will always help to form our view of the situation.
Peter J. D. Carnevale, Rodney G. Lim, and Mary E. McLaughlin (1989) have proposed three possible strategies for effective practice as a mediator that do not involve theory: trial and error, following procedure (sticking to predetermined steps), and using heuristics (abbreviated decision‐making protocols). Most would agree that the first strategy is risky, while the second may be too rigid. Perhaps the third (heuristics) is a valuable alternative to theory?
Heuristic decision making has been praised by Herbert Simon (1982, 1992) who found it to be efficient in situations of complexity and limited information. On the other hand, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman have demonstrated over many years how faulty heuristics can adversely affect decision making (Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982; Kahneman and Tversky 1992). Mistaken lay theories may operate as faulty heuristics that lead a mediator to engage in ineffective, or worse, counterproductive interventions.
But is it practically possible for mediators to engage with theory in the midst of the messy, confusing and complex dynamics of human conflict? Donald Schön (1983, 1987) found that the effectiveness of professionals is based on a capacity for the continuous cognitive “reflection in action” that occurs as the practitioner goes about his or her work while evaluating ongoing action against internalized concepts, metaphors, models, and schemas that are based on “overarching theory.” Although Schön did not study mediators, his research suggests that professional expertise is based in part on drawing on theory in the midst of practice. There is no reason this should not be the case for mediators as well.
I believe that mediators should avoid what Howard Gadlin (2002) has described as “practice romanticism” when talking about accomplished mediators. It is a romantic notion that good mediators are born and not made, that they have superior intuition and unique innate personal qualities, all of which cannot be taught. Instead of waiting for intuition, following prescribed steps, or repeating the folk wisdom of the field, mediators should seek out theory that makes sense of human behavior in conflict and provides reasons for intervention. Explicit and contestable theory is at the heart of expertise. Theory is truly useful in practice (Carnevale 1992).
The Matrix
In recent decades, a wealth of conflict resolution theory has been developed, and much of it can be useful for mediators. Much of it has been published as journal articles (sometimes collected in volumes), as books (Kressel and Pruitt 1989; Deutsch, Coleman, and Marcus 2006; Herrman 2006), and presented at conferences. But it has rarely been surveyed as a whole in a way that practitioners may easily grasp. The matrix that I have developed (see Table One) is a way of organizing and presenting a wide range of mediation theory in order to make it more accessible to mediators. It can serve as a guide to areas of theory that practitioners may be unfamiliar with or may want to explore in more depth.
Mediation Theory Matrix
Behavioral Focus . | Scale of Conflict . | ||
---|---|---|---|
. | Micro . | Meso . | Macro . |
Perception | |||
Emotion | |||
Cognition | |||
Communication | |||
Intervention |
Behavioral Focus . | Scale of Conflict . | ||
---|---|---|---|
. | Micro . | Meso . | Macro . |
Perception | |||
Emotion | |||
Cognition | |||
Communication | |||
Intervention |
This matrix is a conceptual framework for thinking about the relations between theory and mediation. It is not a model of any necessary connections between them, much less a theory in itself. The “pigeonholes” found in the matrix (“Perception/Micro”) do not reflect the interpenetration of theories and the fluidity of social levels of analysis. They are there merely as conceptual “anchors” around which discussions of the implications of theory for mediation can take place. Thus, theories of perception are intimately connected with, and shade into, theories of cognition and emotion. Nevertheless, it seems useful to me to be able to speak about theory that tends to stress one or the other behavioral factor, and I hope it proves useful to readers.
The horizontal scale reflects the fact that mediators intervene in conflicts at all scales of human interaction, and some theories are more appropriate to or better adapted for use at a particular scale (Addor et al. 2005). The micro level refers to conflicts that have traditionally been described as “interpersonal.” Thus, theories dealing with this level will emphasize individuals as their primary unit of analysis.
Theories that fall under the meso level category primarily concern conflict between such organizations and institutions as commercial corporations, unions, political parties, pressure groups and lobbyists, or government agencies. When an individual is in conflict with such bodies, both micro‐ and meso‐level theories may be relevant. At the macro level, I would place conflicts between large nonvoluntary groups such as ethnic and language groups and national governments.
The vertical scale is based on behavior, defined broadly to include thoughts and feelings, although these may not manifest themselves in observable action. Because mediation is generally understood as a practical intervention intended to bring about changed behavior in relation to conflicts or disputes, I think it is appropriate to focus on behavior as a guiding concept for a survey of theory. (Behavioral views of conflict have a long history; see Lewin 1948; Walton and McKersie 1965; Deutsch 1973; Carnevale 1986; Tracy and Peterson 1986; Ashton 2007).3
For many theorists, the categories of perception, emotion, cognition, and communication overlap and interact in complex ways, but for clarity of presentation and discussion they will be considered separately. Theories of intervention are those that focus on the behavior of mediators in their interaction with the disputants.
Cheryl Picard (2004) investigated how mediators think of mediation and their role in it. She found that some individual mediators displayed a mix of attitudes and orientations to mediation and could not easily be placed on a linear continuum (between evaluative and facilitative approaches, for instance). To describe this complex pattern she envisaged an “integrated framework” or “matrix,” suggesting that mediators may draw from a variety of theoretical approaches as their work requires. Picard did not attempt to collect and categorize those theories but focused instead on mediators' attitudes and beliefs. The matrix proposed in this article complements Picard's findings by providing an integrated framework for thinking about the theory that is available to support mediators' varied conceptions of their work.
Some will question the absence of a category for “personality,” and others, “culture.” Although some theory has linked conflict behavior to the concept of personality (Shell 2001; Heen and Richardson 2005), that category has not been singled out because I consider it to be a construct arising out of the interplay of (at least) the first four other categories.
Culture is another important concept in conflict resolution. For some, culture is constitutive of the individual in a fundamental way and therefore a key variable in many conflicts (Avruch and Black 1990). In this article, I consider culture primarily as a force that influences people's perceptions by supplying the ready‐made frames, meanings, and attitudes that we habitually use to make sense of our environment (Bercovitch and Elgstrom 2001; Le Baron Duryea 2001; Kahane 2003; Macduff 2006; Wanis‐St. John 2006; Kimmel 2006; Pederson 2006; Ting‐Toomey and Takai 2006; Tjosvold, Leung, and Johnson 2006).
The matrix presented here can be related to one influential model of mediation for purposes of cross‐reference: the comprehensive descriptive framework for analyzing the mediation process proposed by Margaret S. Herrman, Nancy Hollett, and Jerry Gale (2006). The behavioral factors in this matrix relate to the parts of their model that they refer to as “personal characteristics” of the disputants and the mediator, and “disputant beliefs and attitudes” (both included in their phase “antecedent conditions”). The theories of intervention in this matrix correspond to Herrman, Hollett, and Gale's “process used.”
Theories Concerning Perception
The most important theoretical insight concerning perception and its relationship to conflict is that individuals perceive reality in different ways and their perception influences the behaviors they use to deal with it (Deutsch 1973). Daniel Bowling and David Hoffman (2000) agree with Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, who stated that “the world everyone sees is not the world but a world which we bring forth with others” (Maturana and Varela 1998: 245). This is the question considered by theories of epistemology, or how we come to know the world we live in (Jones and Hughes 2003). Such a viewpoint has been called “perspectivism” by Joseph P. Folger, Marshall S. Poole, and Randall K. Stutman (1997).
A major theoretical issue in this area is how to explain such individual differences in perception. One answer is that the social environment in the form of culture provides a perspective and worldview that largely shapes the perceptions of those who identify with it (Kimmel 2006). Another response is more individualistic and describes varied perceptions as the result of personality differences (some of which are genetic) (Sandy, Boardman, and Deutsch 2006). Still others suggest that an ongoing interplay between societal and personal/biological factors influences perception. (This is the view most widely held by cognitive scientists today.)
Mediators, like everyone else, have unique perceptions of the world, and thus the mediator and the parties to a conflict can be expected to each have different perceptions of the conflictual situation they find themselves in. Researchers have attempted to identify variations in mediators' views of conflict and relate them to factors in their backgrounds and education (Carnevale 1986; Pinkley 1990; Herrman et al. 2003; Picard 2004). Because individuals have different perceptions, one theory postulates there may be a key difference in the perception of conflict itself as a description of the situation — whether it is associated principally with competition or with cooperation. Some theorists believe mediators should strive to bring all parties to a shared perception of interdependence and encourage cooperation (Tjosvold and van de Vliert 1994), while a different theory suggests that an individual's perception of conflict is related to his or her psychological development and accordingly advocates a mediation process that encourages increased capacity for empathy leading to more cooperative behavior (McGuigan and Popp 2007).
At the macro level, perceptions of the nature of intractable conflict have been identified as appropriate for intervention strategies. Helen S. Desivilya and Reuven Gal (2003) suggested that “improving escalated relationships means transforming the perception of intractable conflict into a belief that it is solvable by means of joint efforts, rather than by each party's unilateral pursuit of its objectives” (157). Some theorists, however, have questioned the effectiveness of one very common intervention in ethnic conflict, which is the promotion of contact between disputing groups; they argue that this practice in some situations may actually have adverse impacts on the perceptions of those involved by reinforcing stereotypes and distrust. Accordingly, proponents of “single identity” work suggest that working with homogenous groups can have more impact on intergroup prejudices when contact seems dangerous or counterproductive (Church, Visser, and Johnson 2004). This approach is based upon reinforcing confidence and perceptions of efficacy in separate communities as a necessary prelude to more productive contact between them.
Tests of the theory of “naïve realism” suggest other insights, such as that when people perceive others to have differing perspectives on the same events they become highly sensitive to the possibility that a third party (i.e., the mediator), may be affected by the same bias that they assume affects the party with whom they have a conflict (Ross and Stillinger 1991; Pronin, Lin, and Ross 2002). As Lee Ross and Constance Stillinger (1991) pointed out, however, the theory of naïve realism also gives some hope to mediators because differences in how people view the “same” object or objective can create opportunities for value creation. If parties have different perceptions of the value of transferable items, the possibility of mutually beneficial exchange arises — each party may obtain what is most desirable in his or her eyes.
Perception is the basis of the theory of “reactive devaluation” according to which a proposal may be treated differently based upon its perceived source, that is, perceived negatively if it is made by a person or party with whom the recipient of the proposal has a conflict (but see Ross and Stillinger 1991).
Theories concerning perceptions about the power and motives of others are important for conflicts at the micro, meso, and macro levels. Deborah Larson suggested that the perceived motive of international actors may greatly influence the probability of reciprocal behavior (Larson 1988). Jeffrey Z. Rubin and I. William Zartman (1995) noted the importance of perceived power on international negotiations that outside observers might consider to be unbalanced or “asymmetric.”
Culture is often cited as a strong influence on the way people perceive their environment. Ian Macduff (2006) has explored culturally mediated differences in the experience of time and their impact on cross‐cultural negotiation. David Kahane (2003) noted the importance of culturally influenced perceptions of neutrality and justice when Western processes of dispute resolution are introduced into cross‐cultural conflicts.
Theories concerning perception remind us that mediation begins in as many subjective worlds as there are participants, each of them perceiving the conflict differently. One of the challenges for mediators is to help those in conflict understand the impact of their differing perceptions on the development of the dispute. Going beyond understanding, the mediator can also assist disputing parties to develop a new shared perception of their situation while preserving those unique perceptions that may catalyze settlement.
Theories Concerning Emotion
Emotions are powerful influences on behavior (Linder 2006), but early theorists of conflict resolution focused most often on negative emotions and considered them primarily as obstacles to rational discussion; an example is Roger Fisher and William Ury's (1981) advice to “separate the people from the problem.” From that viewpoint, the task of the mediator is primarily to manage and contain “negative” emotions such as anger, hostility, envy, and distrust so that effective negotiation may proceed (Shapiro 2006; Moran and Schweitzer 2008; Potworoski and Kopelman 2008; Schroth 2008). Christopher W. Moore (1996) described such work as a process of “neutralizing” emotions.
At both the micro level in the area of family and community disputes and the macro level in relation to ethnic conflict, theorists have made attempts to integrate emotions into conflict resolution theory instead of excluding or ignoring them (Maiese 2006). Divorce has from the beginning been recognized as an emotional as well as legal experience (Coogler 1978; Haynes 1981; Power 1985; Buck 1991; Barsky 1993; Golann 2004). Psychologists have chronicled the emotional cycle common to divorcing spouses, likening it to the grieving process. Family mediators are taught to expect emotions such as anger and indignation in domestic conflicts (Taylor 2002) and therapeutic family practitioners help their clients work through emotions in order to accept practical adjustments in their lives (Irving and Benjamin 2002).
Theorists of restorative and therapeutic justice and community‐based processes such as circles and conferences include emotional factors in their models. Anger, shame, remorse, and sorrow are often mentioned in descriptions of victim–offender mediations and related processes (Umbreit 2001; Stokkom 2002). In these contexts, they are seen as necessary catalysts for healing disrupted relationships and communities (De Cremer 2007). Expressions of genuine remorse leading to apology and forgiveness have been found to be significant in addressing serious human rights violations at the macro level (Allan et al. 2006). Kenneth Cloke (1993, 2001) has described the ways in which feelings of hatred and revenge can be channeled toward positive outcomes at both the micro and macro levels.
More recently, both “negative” and “positive” emotions have been given more prominence by those who see them as forces that can be harnessed to resolve conflicts constructively (Jones 2006; Shapiro 2006; McClellan 2007/2008). Ray Friedman and his colleagues (2004) have found that even anger may have beneficial effects in some disputing contexts. Others have suggested that playfulness and humor may stimulate beneficial pleasurable emotions in disputants (Schulz 2006; Sclavi 2008). Mediators are now being advised to pay attention to their own emotions (Schreier 2002; Gray 2003) and reminded to mediate with “heart in mind” (Yale 1993; Jones and Bodtker 2001). In other words, theories of emotions suggest that mediators should connect with their clients at the level of heartfelt feeling as well as rational understanding.
The role of emotion in conflict resolution is increasingly being studied and integrated into theory (Fisher and Shapiro 2005). Emotion is no longer seen to be off limits in the process of mediation. The challenge for mediators is to learn how to work with emotions rather than against them.
Theories Concerning Cognition
It is often practically difficult to distinguish cognition from perception and behavioral theories acknowledge this. For the purpose of the present matrix, cognition is equated with instrumental thought — thinking to achieve an objective. In other words, cognition is thought about what should be, while perceptual thought is about what simply is.
The topic of cognition in relation to conflict is the most highly developed area of theoretical analysis, reflecting the modern Western world's emphasis on rationality in human affairs. The goal of theorists in this area has been to show how thought may lead to constructive responses to conflict and also to highlight those thought processes that lead people into conflict in the first place and that underlie their responses to conflict situations. At the micro level, theory suggests ways to improve the thinking of individuals in conflict. Meso level theory is concerned with how ideas are shared and shaped in organizations, and at the macro level many micro‐level approaches are replicated on the assumption that national actors and involuntary groups can be approximated to individuals.
The first focus of theories of cognition in conflict resolution was instrumental thought, in other words, the use of ideas for the purpose of achieving goals. The analytical framework typically used was negotiation, viewed as an exchange of ideas between people pursuing their individual objectives. Such theories tend to assume that each party's primary goal is utility maximization, based upon a stable set of personal preferences. These assumptions form the core of the theoretical conception of the rational actor in conflict situations, well described by Kevin Avruch and Peter W. Black (1990).
Theories of instrumental thought in conflict resolution can be divided into those concerned primarily with generating, evaluating, or correcting ideas. The theory of “brainstorming” as a group activity is the most prominent one about how new and creative ideas may be stimulated within negotiating situations. This theory can be traced to the work of Alexander Osborn (1957), as popularized by J. Geoffrey Rawlinson (1981), and has since been incorporated in many models of the mediation process.
Another theory of idea generation may be described as “cognitive role reversal,” in which a party may, by thinking about the conflict from the perspective of the other party, become aware of ideas that the other party may find attractive as part of a solution (Fisher and Ury 1981). Some describe this approach as aiming at “cognitive empathy” or “transactional empathy” between the parties (Della Noce 1999). A further theory of how new ideas may be brought forth in the context of conflict is the development of “insight” by the parties, which allows novel and creative solutions to emerge (Picard 2003; Picard et al. 2004).
Another group of theories of cognition in conflict concern how to evaluate ideas in order to respond to them most effectively. A prominent example of this approach is “game theory” as proposed by John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (1944, 2004). This theory of how to make and respond to ideas framed as offers has been applied at both the micro (White and Neale 1991; Bent 2003) and macro (Bacharach and Lawler 1986; Brown 1986; Bazerman and Sondak 1988; Hampson 2006) levels and has been incorporated in many bargaining models of negotiation and mediation.
A multitude of negotiation models have been proposed that are designed to allow parties to maximize their gains based upon predictable patterns of interaction (Raiffa 2002; Heen and Richardson 2005). Some theorists propose that diagrams and other visual aids should be constructed to assist understanding and evaluating ideas generated in negotiation (Chaudry and Ross 1989; Aaron 2005). Others have proposed questions as the best way of persuading others to value our ideas (Ledgerwood et al. 2006).
Some theorists have noted that “cognitive dissonance,” in which people hold two or more apparently contradictory ideas, must be addressed in order to resolve dilemmas of valuation (Festinger 1962). Richard E. Walton and Robert B. McKersie (1965) proposed that the cognitive process of resolving dissonances in thinking about the other party could be deliberately activated to help change attitudes and thus bargaining behavior. Attitudes have a cognitive component in the sense that they are general valuations of ideas or objects (there is also an emotional aspect to them). Changing minds may therefore sometimes involve changing attitudes, but some research questions whether attitude change always leads to behavioral change (Stacy, Bentler, and Flay 1994).
A final branch of instrumental cognitive theory of conflict resolution is based on research that indicates that people habitually make common mistakes that can diminish the chances of resolving conflict. This branch of theory is corrective in its aims and seeks to lead parties to engage in more logical and precise thinking (Thompson, Nadler, and Lount 2006). Defects in our thinking processes have been called “cognitive illusions.” They include faulty evaluation of probabilities and framing effects that may cause suboptimal risk aversion (Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982; Korobkin 2006). Kenneth J. Arrow and his colleagues (1995) provided a useful summary of some thought patterns that can obstruct constructive responses to conflict. Another theoretical approach is that of behavioral economics, which questions the basic assumptions of the rational actor model. It sheds light on behavior that might seem counterproductive from the viewpoint of an optimizing individual (Kahneman 2003). (For a comprehensive review of several decades of research on decision making and its impact on negotiation, see Tsay and Bazerman 2009.)
At the meso level, we find theories of how ideas are diffused, transformed, and adopted in organizational contexts and exchanged between such bodies (Ancona, Friedman, and Kolb 1991; Brett 1991; Pruitt 1994; Watkins 2001). One such theory is that of “groupthink,” which suggests that suboptimal results may come from the tendency of groups to agree on ideas without thoroughly analyzing them first (Janis 1972). Cass Sunstein (2007) has suggested how this phenomenon can lead to increased polarization between groups in conflict situations. At the macro level, Peter T. Coleman (2004) noted the importance of cognitive structures involved in framing intractable conflicts.
More recently a new type of cognition theory that may be called “constitutive” to distinguish it from instrumental approaches has begun to have some impact on conflict resolution theory. Constitutive cognitive theory is concerned with how we think about ourselves and others and how we form our self identity and conceptions of the identities of others (Goffman 2005; Bader 2009). These theories examine some of the sources of human desire, such as the materialistic preferences assumed by the rational actor model, and complement them with other psychic needs that must be addressed in conflict (Smyth 2002; Fisher and Shapiro 2005; Littlejohn and Domenici 2006; Atran and Axelrod 2008).
Exchanging ideas is an essential component of nonviolent conflict resolution. Mediators thus need to understand how ideas are formed, evaluated, and reciprocated in the context of conflict. Mediators must also interrogate their own thought processes, which are subject to the same flaws as those they try to assist.
Theories Concerning Communication
Negotiators and mediators have for many years been advised to be effective, active listeners (Weiss‐Wik 1983), and training in listening skills is part of many mediator preparation programs. Mediators, however, have less exposure to theories that describe the patterns and clues in what they are listening to — communication between the parties. The field of communication studies is rich in these theories.
Conflict scholars have focused extensively on negotiation and mediation as a verbal and nonverbal communicative interaction (Krauss and Morsella 2006). Concepts such as turn taking, genre, semantics, metaphor, structuration, escalation, and de‐escalation have been used to analyze exchanges between those in conflict. Such theory leads to models of intervention that emphasize the role of the third party as a monitor and manager of communication in the mediation process (Donohue 1989) and also encourage new forms of interaction in response to conflict (Oetzel and Ting‐Toomey 2006).
Communication theory applied to conflict can be divided into three strands. The first is analysis of communication strategies and processes that take place within negotiating and bargaining interactions, the second strand focuses on the wider communicative context (or lack of it) of conflict interactions, and the third strand is concerned with exploring alternative forms of communication in addition to negotiating and bargaining.
The first strand of theory attempts to provide a more nuanced understanding of communicative processes and strategies that are observed in negotiation. At the micro level, Whitney Scott (2008) has conceptualized cooperative and conflict behavior as reflective of preferences for differing communication strategies and found complex relations with other behavioral factors in his research with adolescents. Angela Garcia (2000) used conversation analysis to shed light on how ideas for settlement emerge in the give and take of negotiation. (See also articles on conversation analysis and negotiation elsewhere in this issue.) Paul J. Taylor and Sally Thomas (2008) have shown how “linguistic style matching” can affect the outcome of hostage negotiations. Anthony Giddens's (1986) “structuration” theory has been used to analyze changes in discursive patterns in mediation, including those precipitated by mediators, which may lead to constructive or destructive behavior (Sinclair and Stuart 2007). Andrew F. Acland (1996) asserts that the field of neurolinguistics offers insights as to how mediators may influence parties' behavior in constructive ways.
At the macro level, David Bell (1988) has directed attention to the importance of choice of terminology, conceptualized as “linguistic strategies,” as an influence on international negotiation. Raymond Cohen (2001) addressed the problems for multicultural interaction posed by the differing “semantic fields” constituted by multiple mother tongues. “Communicative signaling” is a concept used by Kristine Höglund and Isak Svensson (2006) to show how conciliatory behavior may be communicated in international conflicts. Thomas C. Schelling (2008) employed the concept of “tacit bargaining” where communication is limited or impossible, to show how “unilateral negotiation” may help to avoid wars. Robert Mnookin, Scott Peppet, and Andrew Tulumello (1996) described the ability to express empathy as a communicative skill that may be used by negotiators at all levels of conflict. These theoretical approaches illuminate the dynamics of negotiation and provide ideas for interventions that may improve that process.
The second strand of communication theory emphasizes the context (including cognitive, physical, and psychological contexts) in which conflict communications occur and the influence it can have on the interaction. Jonathan Millen (1994) notes that participants may enter mediation with differing views of what the process is as a context for interaction, views that mediators may try to reshape. Electronic media as the context for conflict communication has been considered by Elaine Landry (2000), Christopher Hobson (1999), and Ethan Katsh and his colleagues (Katsh, Katsh, and Rifkin 2001), among many others. Jonathan Cohen (2003) has directed attention to the importance of a strategic choice of metaphors within negotiations — an example of reframing that can change the context within which communication proceeds (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Balachandra et al. 2005; Smith 2005; Gadlin, Schneider, and Honeyman 2006).
At the macro level, Aaron Cicourel (1988) has conceptualized the various formal and informal contexts in which international negotiations take place and how they help to structure those interactions. The impact of mass media (Davison 1974; Gilboa 2006) and the phenomenon of propaganda (Coser 1964) are also contextual elements to be considered at the macro level of conflict.
The final strand of communication theory suggests that argument, dialogue, and narrative may be more productive forms of communicative interaction than negotiation in some conflict situations. Argument has often been considered to be antithetical to constructive conflict resolution possibly because of its connection with emotional expression. Jürgen Habermas (1984) has pointed out, however, that argumentation may proceed in a constructive way when based on shared “presuppositions” that help to maintain respectful meaningful discourse. Stephen Chilton and Maria S. Wyant Cuzzo (2005) adopted his approach in advocating communications within mediation that honor such presuppositions even though the result may be that the parties “agree to disagree.” For them, argumentation need not necessarily impair or destroy relationships. David Greatbatch and Robert Dingwall (1997) analyzed argumentative exchanges in mediation and found that parties sometimes manage to avoid escalation of hostility through the use of exit practices that are independent of mediator intervention.
Dorothy Della Noce (1999) suggests that dialogue is the path to “relational empathy,” the way in which parties can forge shared new understandings of each other and of the conflict between them, whether or not solutions are found. Carrie Menkel‐Meadow (2004) has suggested that dialogue may be the only communicative form appropriate to a world fraught with basic value differences.
Dialogue is used at the meso level for community consultation in both formal (Littlejohn 2004; Wade 2004; Susskind 2005) and informal (Pyser and Figallo 2004; Barge 2006) ways. At the macro level, dialogue has been the predominant form of communication designed to reduce hostility between groups in conflict (Broome and Hatay 2006; Wayne 2008). Dialogue has been found to be an effective format for bridging differences that are sometimes considered to be “nonnegotiable.”
Several scholars have also looked at the use of storytelling, or narrative, as an alternative response to conflict. Sara Cobb (1993) noted the importance of the narrative construction of mediation sessions and the need for mediators to sometimes “destabilize” the narrative coherence of a story to allow another story to be heard. John Winslade and Gerald Monk suggest that the conflicting parties should jointly author a new narrative as a way to engage productively with each other (Winslade, Monk, and Cotter 1998; Monk and Winslade 2000; Winslade and Monk 2006). Kathy Douglas (2007) has noted the importance of the skill of improvisation in storytelling about conflict. Samantha Hardy (2008) has suggested that the genre of stories told in mediation is significant and that tragedy may be more appropriate in some situations than the usual “melodrama.” Storytelling is a powerful way of expressing conflict and may also be an effective way of responding to it.
Mediators should be comfortable with argument, dialogue, and storytelling in addition to communications consisting primarily of offers and counteroffers. Communication theory also highlights the importance of the structure, dynamics, and context of communication, factors often overshadowed by the subject matter of conflict. Mediators should be competent communicators and knowledgeable analysts of the flow of communication in mediation.
Theories of Intervention
Scholars agree that theories of mediation as an intervention are relatively undeveloped (Pruitt 1986; Folger, Poole, and Stutman 1997; Conbere 2001; Herrman, Hollett, and Gale 2006). Most mediation theories remain primarily descriptive in nature rather than predictive. They outline a process of interaction intended to bring about positive change in the parties but do not explain in any depth the conceptual framework used or put forward explicit propositions and hypotheses that can be empirically tested.
Such outlines of mediation have often been drawn from the authors' own experiences plus the observed and reported experience of other practitioners of “what works and what doesn't” (Kressel and Pruitt 1989). They are presented as models of effective practice and have been proposed as benchmarks of mediator competence (Honeyman 1993; National Institute for Dispute Resolution 1995; Herrman et al. 2001). Acknowledging the lack of “big‐picture models of mediation,” Margaret Herrman, Nancy Hollett, and Jerry Gale proposed a model of the mediation process intended to encourage further theory building (Herrman, Hollett, and Gale 2006).
Christopher Moore (1996) recommended using theory of conflict to generate hypotheses about the causes of the differences between the parties, from which a mediator can derive strategies to induce them to engage in problem solving. As mentioned previously, the matrix presented here is focused on behavior within mediation. Theories of the causes and course of conflict more generally, such as Moore's, are therefore not included in this survey. Further, Moore's approach relies almost entirely on cognitive processes. Theories of intervention to be considered here encompass other behavioral factors in addition to instrumental thinking.
Integrated and Generic Intervention Theory
Writing in 1981, Alison Taylor (1981) called for the development of a generic “mega‐theory” of mediation. There has been little progress toward that goal although some efforts have been made (Noll 2001). Recently Cheryl Picard and her colleagues (2004) studied how mediators think about the work they do and found a range of understandings, sometimes coexisting within the same practitioner. They grouped these ideas about mediation into three broad approaches they labeled “pragmatic,”“socioemotional,” and “mixed.” The first type of understanding of mediation emphasizes the importance of cognitive behavior, the second communicative and emotional factors, and the third a mixture of the first two. Picard (Picard et al. 2004: 308) also suggested the need for a more integrated vision that “offers a more holistic and complete view of mediation and is one that draws attention to its richness and complexity.” From the behavioral perspective, such an integrated theory of mediation would pay equal attention to perceptual, emotional, cognitive, and communicative factors. Most mediation models, however, continue to privilege one behavioral element and to “bracket” or minimize the importance of the rest. Integrated theory of mediation as an intervention thus remains largely undeveloped.
John Burton and Dennis Sandole (1986) advocated the development of a “generic” conflict theory that can guide processes of resolution at all levels of society — micro, meso, and macro. Like Picard, they saw the need for “a synthesis, a holistic approach” (1986: 353) that is “adisciplinary” in orientation. For Burton and Sandole, universal human needs transcend the boundaries of family, organization, and nation, making it possible to design interventions for all levels based upon an overarching theory.
Kevin Avruch and Peter Black (1987) have questioned whether this is possible given the strong influence of differentiating factors such as culture and class. Developing a grand generic theory of mediation remains an aspiration for some mediation scholars, but others see such a development as unlikely (Menkel‐Meadow 2003).
Andrew Schwebel and his colleagues (1994) identified four models of divorce mediation: “legal,”“labor management,”“therapeutic,” and “communication and information.”Roy Lewicki, Stephen Weiss, and David Lewin (1992) described forty‐four models of conflict, negotiation, and third‐party processes. In this article, I consider mediation intervention theories grouped within three categories based upon their emphasis on different behavioral factors. Dialectical intervention theory privileges cognitive processes, developmental theory attends most strongly to emotional factors, and dialogical theory emphasizes communicative aspects of mediation.
Dialectical Theories of Intervention
A majority of current mediation models can be classified as based on dialectical theory. The process of dialectic, associated with the eighteenth‐century philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1807, 1977), is considered to be a rational path to human progress and enlightenment through the contest of ideas. Two versions of dialectic can be identified as they appear in mediation theory: competitive and cooperative. In the competitive version, mediation functions as a “market of ideas” from which settlements emerge that benefit the parties and also society as a whole because they allow the parties to move forward to pursue their separate interests and reduce the social and economic costs of continued conflict, that is, litigation, war, etc.
The cooperative version of the mediation dialectic encourages parties to mediation to work together to synthesize their individual interests in ways that advance the interests of all of them to the greatest extent possible. Progress occurs through cooperation because each is better off than they would be without the agreement arrived at through mediation. Distributive bargaining (dividing a fixed “pie”) is more likely to occur in competitive dialectical processes while integrative negotiation (expanding the “pie”) is more likely to be found in the cooperative versions of dialectic. In practice, most mediations probably involve both competitive and cooperative elements.
The role of the third party varies with the type of dialectic pursued in mediation. In the competitive version, the mediator functions primarily as a “market regulator” to ensure the contest of ideas is free from distorting factors such as violence, coercion, emotion, or deception. According to the cooperative dialectic, the mediator would be considered a “promoter” who encourages the parties to recognize the potential value in integrative solutions. In both versions, the mediator may also act as “cognitive auditor,” helping the parties to avoid faulty thinking resulting from cognitive illusions, inappropriate heuristics, and other recognized cognitive traps (Gibson, Thompson, and Bazerman 1996). In evaluative forms of mediation, mediators may also exercise “cognitive authority” if they have expert knowledge of the substance of the dispute and how it might be decided by the court. This is particularly true of judges who act as mediators.
Competitive dialectic is found in modern mediation's roots in traditional negotiation theory, in particular in labor–management disputes. Legal theory also adopts a rational actor perspective on disputes and supports a view that mediation is best thought of as a cognitive problem‐solving process aimed at solutions that avoid the inefficiencies of litigation (Menkel‐Meadow 2004).
In both competitive and cooperative dialectic, mediation is considered primarily as a cognitive process. The goal of the exchange of ideas is to find ways to work through conflicting material interests and intangible ones such as self‐respect and self‐identity, which are sometimes acknowledged as aspects of human needs (Burton and Sandole 1986; Rothman 1997). In dialectical theory, the function of intervention is to stimulate effective, efficient problem solving and decision making by the parties. Knowledge of cognitive theory is thus useful to the mediator for this purpose.
Developmental Theories of Intervention
A second group of theories of intervention may be called developmental because they focus on improving the capacity and competency of people in conflict to empathize with opponents and see things from their perspective. This type of personal development is associated with changes in attitudes that have a strong emotional component (Thurstone 1931; Kelman 1974; Stacy, Bentler, and Flay 1994). Because mediation is not usually viewed as teaching (but see Picard 2003), this learning and development by the parties is best described as “social learning” or “socialization.”
Development of the capacity to empathize and to appreciate different perspectives is associated with the psychologist Jean Piaget (Inhelder and Piaget 1958), who viewed it as part of the maturation process of becoming an adult. Lawrence Kohlberg (1984) extended this theory into the area of moral development, defining several stages of ability to consider others' perspectives when making moral judgments and applying norms. More recently this perspective has been extended to include adult development through social learning Ellen Cohn and Susan White (1990) found that students who were given opportunities to engage in role taking during self‐governing disciplinary processes showed a higher capacity for reciprocity in their relations with others.
Lynn C. Holaday (2002) has shown how psychological development theory may be useful in thinking about mediation. Mediation is always conducted in the shadow of law and social norms, so it makes sense to think of it as one way in which people are socialized in their attitudes to, and behavior regarding, norms. As Ellen Waldman (1997) points out, mediation can also be a private norm‐generating process reflecting the possibility that mediation may contribute to the moral development of the parties. Richard Stuart and Barbara Jacobson (1986/1987) have also applied social learning theory to divorce mediation by describing the mediator and the parties as forming a social construct in which there are mutual reciprocal influences all around.
The most prominent developmental theory of intervention today is transformative mediation. Transformative mediation adopts a developmental approach in seeking to increase the parties' abilities to accord recognition to each other and to empower the parties through adopting new attitudes to the conflict. Sally Pope and Robert Baruch Bush (2000: 43) describe such development as based on “the human potential for shifts in both dimensions — weakness to strength and self‐absorption to responsiveness”. One of the most distinctive aspects of transformative mediation is the importance it attaches to expression of emotions (Folger and Bush 1996). According to transformative theory, attitudinal change can arise from emotional expression and change in emotions.
Herbert Kelman (1974) has shed light on some processes that can lead to attitude change. He found that the experience of discrepancies between attitudes and reality can bring about changes in preexisting attitudes. Discrepancies may surface in mediation, through interaction with the other party and the mediator. Transformative mediation seeks to foster such experiences in participants and may result in differentiation through socialization, a process through which one develops greater recognition of another person (and oneself) as a unique individual.
Jeffrey Seul (1999) has assessed the goals of transformative mediation in light of constructive‐developmental psychology. He concludes that the transformative mediation practices of empowerment and recognition need to be carefully tailored to the developmental level of the participants and may be difficult to implement if the parties are at different levels.
Melissa Manwaring (2006) has applied Robert Kegan's theories of adult development in the context of teaching and learning negotiation; Kegan's work could also be useful in thinking about changes in adults that may occur in mediation. Urie Bronfenbrenner (1999) suggests that “proximal processes” in the social environment (such as participation in mediation) will not have a developmental impact unless they occur regularly over an extended period of time.
Besides transformative mediation, other mediation practices and related processes also work with emotions as an avenue for personal development. Gary Friedman and Jack Himmelstein (2008) describe an approach to mediation based on the development of understanding by the parties (and the mediator) at an emotional as well as cognitive level. Their model contemplates that mediation may be an educational, if not transformative, experience if the parties are helped to better understand the dynamics of conflict and how it affects those engaged in it.
Restorative justice mediation and circle processes acknowledge the role of powerful emotions such as anger and shame in bringing closure to victims and offenders (Umbreit 2001; Braithwaite 2002; Van Stokkom 2002). At the macro level, reconciliation and truth processes encourage emotions of sorrow, remorse, and forgiveness in efforts to heal social wounds (Allan and Allan 2000).
Morton Deutsch and Mary Evans Collins (1951) described how community attitudes changed following the racial integration of a housing project. Neal Milner (1996) suggests that mediation can develop greater compassion among the parties, which may have the wider effect of combating oppression throughout society. He draws a connection between what happens in mediation and the possible impact of the parties' changed beliefs and attitudes on society more generally. At the macro level, mediation can engage groups in transformative processes that foster widespread social empowerment and recognition (Brigg 2007; Hansen 2008). The emphasis in these developmental theories of mediation as an intervention is on the beneficial effects it may have on individuals. Some go further to suggest that an accumulation of individual transformations will change society as a whole.
Some theorists have criticized the idea that mediation should be a social learning process. In one view, mediation that imposes social norms may result in continuing oppression such as the devaluation of women's perspectives and needs (Grillo 1991). Others suggest there are ethical problems with implementing a transformative process if the parties are not fully informed of its unique aims (Seul 1999). The more positive view of socialization through mediation is that it can open people's eyes to perspectives and ideas they may have been closed to, thereby empowering people to make constructive changes in their lives (Bush and Folger 1994 ).
Developmental theories of intervention suggest that the mediator should provide parties with the opportunity to engage in positive socialization processes. The hoped‐for outcome is greater understanding and acceptance by the parties of different perceptions together with changes in understanding that may foster new attitudes and more constructive behavior.
Dialogical Theories of Intervention
Dialogical theories of intervention challenge the boundaries of mediation on several fronts. First, they question mediation's traditional focus on instrumental verbal forms of communication such as negotiation and bargaining. Second, dialogical theories often contemplate interactions that are not private and confidential, but rather public and well publicized, such as intergroup dialogues. Third, the expected content of communication in mediation is expanded beyond even a broad conception of interests to include intangibles such as values, morals, identity, emotions, and prejudices. Intervention in these larger horizons often takes much different forms than the current common practice of mediators. Fourth, dialogic mediation is often designed with intergroup conflict in mind with a view to changing social attitudes and beliefs directly, unlike developmental approaches which focus on the individual.
Dialogue and storytelling (narrative) are the best‐known communicative forms that have been proposed as alternatives to negotiation, and even nonverbal interactions, such as art and ritual (Maiese 2006), are also considered to be useful. Some draw a distinction between dialogue and mediation (Dessel and Rogge 2008), but at the micro level, dialogue that involves mutual exploration of beliefs, values, and attitudes is clearly consistent with developmental processes such as transformative mediation. When dialogue takes the form of intergroup interaction, it may form part of mediation at the meso and macro levels.
Dialogical intervention theory stresses the need to create a context for interaction that is viewed as safe and respectful of all participants. In this it echoes Jürgen Habermas's theory of the communicative ideal (Chilton and Wyant Cuzzo 2005). However, the dialogical intervener is also expected to work with and not against power differentials, recognizing that dominant parties may also experience stress and anxiety through the interaction (Stephan and Stephan 2001). Dialogue is expected to have positive effects on empathy (Stephan and Finlay 1999) and cognition (Isaacs 1999) at all levels (Chasin et al. 1996; Le Baron and Carstarphen 1997; Saunders 2003). Dialogue may also offer opportunities for critical discourse on injustice and oppression, thus contributing to social change (Hansen 2008). Dialogue may form part of democratic deliberation and other “new forms of human engagement” as envisaged by Menkel‐Meadow (2006a, 2006b). John Forester (2004) describes how mediator humor, as a noninstrumental contribution to difficult conversations, can have an indirectly constructive effect.
Narrative mediation has developed through the work of John Winslade and Gerald Monk (Winslade, Monk, and Cotter 1998; Monk and Winslade 2000). In their view, storytelling about conflict can be used to help reorient parties to each other through the collaborative construction of a new narrative that will allow them to move forward. The mediator intervenes to identify divergent narratives and encourage cooperation in jointly authoring a new story.
The challenge for a mediator engaged in dialogic processes is to move beyond the role of a negotiation facilitator. This may involve foregoing some of the “expressive tactics” identified by Deborah Kolb (1985) that may be useful when trying to moderate the clash of interests but inappropriate to an intervener in dialogue. Dialogic theory calls for compassionate intervention that recognizes the difficulty of communication between those who often deeply mistrust each other. It requires skill in “crossing borders” and “building bridges” (Nagda 2006) and a strong belief in the necessity and value of doing so.
Finally, it should be mentioned that there is a significant body of theory in the areas of mediation ethics and mediation education. Many of those theories have a bearing on the issues discussed in this article but are beyond its scope.
Conclusion
This survey has missed much theory that would be useful to mediators. The wide range and multidisciplinary nature of the theory mentioned here reflects the complexity of mediation as an interaction embedded in a web of relations and significance that may extend across whole societies. Many intriguing theoretical questions remain to be answered. Here are a few:
Some models of mediation, such as Laurence Boulle's (1996), include discrete stages in the process. Boulle suggests that early stages allow the parties to express and observe emotions, followed by opportunities to exchange views that embody their perceptions about each other and the dispute. These stages are followed by creative brainstorming and evaluation where concrete ideas for resolution are proposed and deliberated on. Such a model seems to reflect an implicit integrated process theory of mediation intervention focusing on behavioral elements (emotion, followed by perception, followed by cognition), but this theory is rarely made explicit so that it may be tested and refined. Are these stages causally related or can they be reordered and remain effective? Is a process structured in this way equally useful at micro, meso, and macro levels?
How does theory explain the “artistry” of experienced mediators (Lang and Taylor 2000)? Does it lie in the ability to keep in mind simultaneously all behavioral elements of the interaction — seeing mediation as a multitrack process of continuously interacting ideas, emotions, perceptions, and communicative patterns?4 Or do master mediators specialize in perfecting skills and techniques that relate primarily to one behavioral factor?
Are learning theories that have been applied to promote changed attitudes in such areas as public health (National Cancer Institute 2005) applicable in the mediation context? If mediation is an opportunity for social learning, is there room for more cross‐fertilization of ideas and techniques with teaching activities such as conflict resolution education?
How can mediators best adapt to the variety of processes suggested by communicative theory? What communicative forms besides negotiation, storytelling, and dialogue can be accommodated in mediation? How can mediators contribute to consensus building and deliberation at the meso and macro levels?
The concept of empathy is frequently central to theories of mediation intervention, but it is modified with a variety of terms such as “relational,”“transactional,”“cognitive,” and “emotional.” This key idea needs to be clarified and relations between the various usages explored.
The most pressing questions that remain to be answered, however, are practical ones. Are current training programs adequate to educate aspiring mediators in this rich body of theory and prepare them to use it in their practice? If they are not, what should take their place? Perhaps education theory will be of some help in answering these questions.
NOTES
The research for this article was supported by a Research Incentive Grant from Athabasca University. I thank Jared Milne for his research assistance; John Lande, Catherine Morris, and the managing editor of this journal for their constructive comments; and an anonymous reviewer for suggestions for improvement.
Recent research (Charkoudian et al. 2009) has uncovered evidence that some mediators' “espoused theory” does not match their “theory‐in‐use.” These findings point to the existence of mediation ideology.
For example, Susan Estrich (1987) has chronicled the record of theories of sexual behavior used by police and the courts to deal with the crime of rape.
Behavioral approaches have not been that popular among mediators, likely for two reasons, perhaps because they associate such approaches with the work of B. F. Skinner, who adopted what some see as a deterministic approach to human action that many mediators find to be contrary to the principles of individual empowerment and self‐determination that they cherish. See also Benjamin (1990) and Brief and Dukerich (1991)
Adler (2006) suggests that “protean” negotiators are able to manage competitive, cooperative, principled, and pragmatic impulses with a “measure of grace” that may be considered artistry in practice.