People‐to‐People Dialogue between North and South Korea: Looking Ahead

Human beings live with various conflicts as individuals and in groups. Some of those conflicts last for only a short time with no great effect, while some continue for many years or even generations and affect millions of people. We seem, however, to give a great deal of attention to only immediate conflicts while peace building and longer‐term conflict resolution are generally overlooked (Davies and Kaufman 2003). This is unfortunate, for long, protracted, and deep‐rooted conflicts have substantial social costs and can ruin the lives of multiple generations.

By the end of 2009, a total of 18,009 North Korean defectors were living in South Korea, with a substantial number of them feeling like “second‐class citizens” due, in part, to “being treated with contempt” and “discrimination” (Onishi 2006: 3). Many people in the South think North Korean defectors are aggressive and combative, and try to keep them at a distance, while the North Korean defectors think that people in the South are selfish and treat them as an “unusual” or “special” kind of people based on negative images about the North Korean government (Jo 2004). This raises the question: what would happen if the 47 million people of the South were to reunite today with the 23 million people of the North?

Until now, efforts to reduce or resolve inter‐Korean relations have focused on military, political, and economic issues, but unfortunately, little has been done to restore the relationships of the people in the divided sides over the half century. Relationships broken and wounded over several decades will not heal by themselves. Therefore, such new approaches as people‐to‐people dialogue (PTPD) should be considered as ways of rebuilding these relationships.

When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, many people were surprised by the suddenness of the collapse. Despite the fact that the West German government had implemented policies and programs to narrow the gap between East and West Germany beginning in the 1960s, reunited Germans have continued to experience enormous social and psychological difficulties.

In work in other regions of the world, some pioneering scholar‐practitioners — including Herbert Kelman in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, Ronald Fisher in the Cyprus conflict, and former diplomat Joseph Montville in East/Central Europe — have tried to initiate informal dialogue among long‐standing enemies. They have accumulated valuable expertise about processes that have been called interactive problem solving or track two diplomacy. I will try to apply some of the ideas these scholars have generated to the design of a possible dialogue between North and South Korea.

Because the Korean peninsula has been divided for more than a half century, the two sides display different values, beliefs, lifestyles, behaviors, and even physical appearances. Without a doubt, there will be many problems when and if the parties resume life together, whether as one united country or as two countries with a much more normalized and harmonious relationship.

How many generations will it take to reach the point where everyone involved can talk about capitalism, freedom, responsibility, and the work ethic? Is it likely that these two “sides” will listen to and learn from each other? Problems of inequality of opportunity and resources could erupt into serious violence and potentially into uncontrollable chaos. Conflict scholars have argued that situations characterized by long‐standing and deeply rooted conflicts cannot be resolved by legal or coercive means. Appealing to traditional concepts of law and order, the common good, or majority decision making will not work either (Burton 1987). Formal mechanisms for resolving social conflicts, particularly in cultures in which a legal approach is not commonly used, are not likely to be of much help. In fact, if the government attempts in such situations to instill new values from above, it often fails (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987).

The term “track two diplomacy” was coined by Joe Montville, a former American diplomat (McDonald 2003). He wrote: “Track two diplomacy is unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary groups or nations which aims to develop strategies, influence public opinion, and organize human and material resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict. It must be understood that track two diplomacy is in no way a substitute for official, formal, ‘track one’ government‐to‐government or leader‐to‐leader relationships” (Montville 1987: 7). The emphasis of track two diplomacy is on informal communication at an unofficial level in order to resolve conflicts between hostile parties. Track two diplomacy is a complementary approach to track one (formal) diplomacy, not an alternative (Kelman 2005).

In recent decades, conflict resolution, including ideas about both track one and track two diplomacy, has received ever‐increasing international attention. Track two ideas have been initiated and studied by a number of scholar‐practitioners. Herbert Kelman (2006) would call them a “family” (p. 212):

Thus, interactive problem solving involves an unofficial approach to conflict resolution, involving private, direct, and continuing communication over a period of time with individuals who are politically influential, actively interested in finding a negotiated solution, part of the mainstream of their communities, and have credibility (Kelman 1995). Ronald Fisher uses the term “interactive conflict resolution,” describing it as “small group, problem‐solving discussions between unofficial representatives of identity groups or states engaged in destructive conflict that are facilitated by an impartial third‐party panel of social scientist‐practitioners” (Fisher 1997: 8). The underlying idea behind this approach is that nonofficial and informal communication can play a vital role in catalyzing official negotiation processes that will ultimately be necessary. The “family” of interactive tools mentioned by Kelman and Fisher are future oriented and relationship oriented, and put an emphasis on understanding the way the situation looks from the perspective of the other side.

I prefer the term “People‐to‐People Dialogue,” which emphasizes ownership of the negotiation process by the people involved, in contrast to a government‐to‐government or formal approach overseen by officials, diplomats, or experts, or even an informal problem‐solving dialogue managed by high‐profile intermediaries.

It is important to avoid promoting a track one approach in a situation in which political negotiations are not trusted by the communities. A genuine people‐to‐people approach can require a long‐term ongoing process in a situation in which one side, for example, North Korea, is very sensitive to political slights both domestically and internationally. The people‐to‐people approach offers an advantage in this situation because the North Korean people — rather than their leaders — will need to come to grips with the changes that have occurred in South Korea, where modern civil society has been a major source of its social strength (Steinberg 2007). Whatever conflict resolution efforts are required will have to go well beyond monetary compensation, recreation of social infrastructure, and the building of massive amounts of housing. The idea of “unification” looms large on the Korean peninsula, but it is probably not a good place to start because it prompts unrealistic dreams of better and happier lives almost immediately.

My suggestion is that a small group of carefully selected dialogue participants from each side who are unofficial, but influential or preinfluential people (such as young professionals), be brought together in a sequence of confidential exchanges aimed at generating understanding and building personal relationships. In addition to getting to know each other, the participants — who should be asked to act as if they are at least to some extent representing their societies — might try to develop a written set of suggestions that could subsequently be transmitted to officials on both sides.

In his recent book, Ronald Fisher (2005) has collected nine case reports of track two diplomacy. Each was written by a prominent scholar and practitioner involved in interactive conflict resolution in different regions. He examined those case reports for transfer effects, breaking them down into such categories as new realizations, creative ideas, principles, changed relations, and connections through new roles or structures. According to his analysis, the targets of transfer were leaders, negotiators, governmental, and public–political constituencies. The products of the informal dialogue were used in the context of personal contact, briefings, writings, and speeches. In his analysis, formal leaders were designated as the primary targets for the products of the informal dialogue, while personal contact and relationship building was the primary objective for the direct participants.

The reported effect of the track two efforts is clear in the literature. Harold Saunders (2005) wrote, for example, “Did the Dialogue play a role in paving the way of negotiation? Yes, certainly” (p. 138); and Kelman (2005) concluded that “our work — the sustained, systematic use of an unofficial third‐party micro process as a vehicle for influencing the political debate and official policy at the macro level — was well placed to help lay the groundwork for the Oslo accord” (pp. 51–52).

Some say bringing peace is an endless process. For example, Kelman's thirty‐year effort to bring together the parties in the Middle East has not yet born the fruit that he and his colleagues have sought. He wrote: “[w]ith the breakdown of the Oslo process, it may seem strange to continue claiming my bit of credit for a process that seems to have been so widely discredited” (Kelman 2005: 52). According to him, the strong public support and explicit commitment from both sides necessary to implement a mutually acceptable solution such as the Oslo agreement were never created.

Track two diplomacy has usually occurred at the prenegotiation stage, prior to official negotiations between two governments or with other states. For example, the nine intervention cases previously mentioned were mainly focused on preparing for a track one approach. These occasions can present a useful opportunity to explore the other party's interests and the underlying concerns of those involved in the conflicts before official negotiations begin.

Sometimes informal and unofficial dialogue can be adopted after a considerable amount of traditional diplomatic effort has been unsuccessful. For example, four governments attempted official government‐to‐government resolution of conflict during the period of 1963–1965 in the confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia (Mitchell 2005).

No one general approach to the problems and conflicts between states or governments can be identified in a particular situation at a specific time. Even postnegotiation, dialogue efforts may play an important role in some cases. In relation to the North Korean nuclear issues, there have been sporadic meetings of the six‐nation group (China, Japan, Russia, United States, South Korea, and North Korea), which is typical track one diplomacy, but clearly these talks have far to go before this issue will be resolved.

Even if the government‐to‐government talks were to succeed, however, unofficial efforts such as PTPD could help and improve the wider ongoing relationship between the North and the South, in particular at the level of people's ordinary lives. Regardless of the stage of official negotiations between the states or governments — prenegotiation, during the negotiation, or after negotiation — PTPD can bring together such people as journalists, academics and educators, businesspeople, or experts in various areas to contribute to resolving conflicts and peace building in the Korean peninsula, complementary of or in parallel to the government‐to‐government approach.

The Cold War confrontation between the East and the West after World War Two caused national division in Korea. The separate governments, capitalist in the South and communist in the North, came to conflict in the Korean War during the years of 1950 to 1953. The ideological division and bloody civil war set the basic tone for the South–North relations in subsequent years, which continues today. As a result of the adversarial and hostile relations, the people in the peninsula have suffered at almost all levels of their lives.

As Cold War confrontations internationally diminished and transformed in the 1970s and 1980s, inter‐Korean relations began to turn. The turning point began with high‐level talks between the two prime ministers. When the Kim Dae‐jung administration came to power in South Korea in 1998, they began to improve relations with the North in accord with a policy of reconciliation and cooperation, later named the Sunshine Policy. This led to the first South–North summit in June 2000, which produced the June 15 South–North Joint Declaration. Since the summit, dialogue and exchanges between the two sides have been opened in various areas, and there was, until 2008, a steady increase in inter‐Korean exchanges of personnel and goods (Figure One).

One of the indicators of change in inter‐Korean relations is the exchange of personnel. The personnel exchanges dramatically increased over the last decade, and a total of 186,775 people on both sides traveled to each other's regions in 2008 alone. This number, however, dropped to 120,862 in 2009 as inter‐Korean relations again grew more tense. Another indicator of change is inter‐Korean trade, which has also increased very significantly over the last seven or eight years: the trade was valued at US$1.8 billion in 2008, although trade volume dropped to below $1.7 billion in 2009, as shown in Figure Two.

Encouraged by the dramatic developments in relations, the construction of North–South railroad transit facilities was completed on March 15, 2006. These facilities can now accommodate up to 12,000 people daily according to the governmental report (Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea 2006).

This advanced progress and cooperation between the South and the North persuaded the South Korean government to state “this deepening and developments of inter‐Korean relations prove that current South–North relations have entered into the road of the situation of actual unification” (Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea 2005: 2).

Despite the exchanges and developments between the two sides, much remains to be done before the two sides can live together in peace. Issues and problems related to people's lives now and in the future have rarely been discussed — and then only minimally — during the official meetings between the two governments.

North Korea has undertaken all means and measures to maintain its totalitarian political system and is expected to continue to do so as long as it can. Despite these strenuous efforts, the North has had to make some changes and, in the view of its leaders and people, take sometimes dangerous risks. Since the South–North Korean summit, the continuously increased exchanges and communications between the North and the South in personnel, trade, family reunions, economic cooperation, sociocultural activities, tourism, and other areas have been inevitable for North Korea.

In turn, both new circumstances and these exchanges have changed the views of its leaders and people in various ways. In their economic system, North Korea has “recognized the function of a market economy.” Kim Jung‐il, the North Korean leader, ordered the government to formally accept a market in March 2003 (Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea 2005: 6). The evidence for North Korea's changes includes the strengthening of its market mechanism and the introduction of an incentive system (Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea 2006). Now it is easy to find street vendors in some cities in North Korea.

Surprisingly, the change in people's thinking has been occurring much more rapidly than have actual economic changes in North Korea, and free‐market values are beginning to spread among the people (Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea 2005). According to the same report by the South Korean government, changes include recognition of private ownership (of course, in a limited way), hiring government officials based on ability (not family background), and giving more autonomy to higher‐level governmental officials. In the North, the urban private sector expanded rapidly after the collapse of the state ration system, and informal network resources such as kinship networks play a key role (Choi 2008). North Korea is gradually breaking away from the “classical socialist system” (Hamm and Koo 2008), and their markets are now beyond their own controlled system (Kang and Ahn 2010).

These days, North Koreans informally express their desire for “development,” not just humanitarian aid, to some outside groups. “Development” is understood as the process by which a society organizes itself to adapt to change in its physical and social environment (Azar 2003).

In spring 2006, a people's dialogue meeting (called CityPD hereafter) was held in an American city between delegates representing North Korea and Korean communities in North America.¹ There were fifteen participants. The dialogue meeting did not correspond perfectly to the concept of PTPD described above but had some similarities, particularly in the aspects of the meeting's substance and objectives: joint problem solving and relationship building.

With no neutral facilitator and no preagreed ground rules, the discussions were much more substantive than procedural. Two informal leaders served as cofacilitators, one from each side. They did a competent job of leading the whole group — everyone was able to participate in the dialogue in one way or another.

The following table shows a comparison of CityPD with a typical track one meeting such as the sporadic South–North higher military officers talks (SNMOT).

The North American individuals who participated in CityPD have worked on various humanitarian projects for North Korea over the last decade and have developed a strong working relationship with the other side, even at high levels of the government. They started with typical philanthropic activities including building homes for abandoned children, food manufacturing, cow and goat milk production, and others. They began in a town assigned by government officials but now work in several towns they have selected in North Korea. Seeing with their own eyes the changes in people's lives and the extent of governmental cooperation has motivated them to visit North Korea quite often each year.

The concerns of CityPD have gone beyond physical survival or the basic human needs of one side. It has been amazing to see the degree to which both sides are preparing for the future. For example, part of the CityPD agenda was to expand education and training opportunities in North Korea, and the group has already initiated computer education and training for the students at one North Korean university, educating potential future leaders. An English‐language program has also been offered by the CityPD group and has become one of the most popular classes among students.

That North Korean university students would learn English and computer technology from outsiders would have been unimaginable until recent years. Given the North Korean government's desire to keep its people sealed off from the outside world, it is not difficult to imagine how hard it must have been for the North Korean government to make the decision to allow this, as the use of computers and the ability to communicate in English enable greater contact with the outside world.

Early education provides another example of the changes in North Korea. Presumably, North Korea's government has believed that tightly structured early childhood education is essential to maintaining political control. Even so, it has allowed outsiders such as CityPD from the capitalistic and democratic societies of the United States and Canada to participate, even in part, in early childhood education programs such as computer training there.

Whatever reasons and needs compel the North Korean government to make these changes, they should be welcomed as helping North Koreans adjust to a new course for their society in the years to come. Some skeptics may downplay the importance of these changes by saying that such education and training is permitted to only a few students selected by the government and that given North Korea's poor infrastructure, such a change will not spread into North Korean society as a whole. But even ifonly a limited number of young people are affected, they are an elite group that will soon become influential, and in North Korea one or even a few leaders may change many things.

North Korea's relations with other countries over, for example, the nuclear issue could engender skepticism about the likelihood of successfully engaging the North in dialogue and about the possibility of building mutually beneficial relations. On the other hand, whatever motivation North Korea may have for engaging in such bridge‐building activities, some of the country's leaders do support the value of a new approach aimed at achieving common goals.

From 2008, the first year of the current South Korean administration, policies toward the North became more pragmatic and result oriented. This differentiated it from the previous government, which tended to generously give such items as food, clothes, and economic aid to North Korea. As a result, both sides participated in only one governmental meeting that year, while fifty‐five meetings had been held in 2007.

In spite of this change at the governmental level, the number of cross‐border visitors between the two increased by 17 percent in 2008 (Ahn 2009). In 2009, the strain in inter‐Korean relations was reflected in the reduced numbers of the cross‐border visitors, trade, and other exchanges between the two Koreas. But in the second half of 2009, North Korea began to shift from its hard‐line policy and started to make some conciliatory gestures (Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea 2010).

These examples also show the ways in which North Korea continues to move forward to fulfill its basic needs by dealing with problems such as disease, inadequate food supply, and clothing, and is preparing for the future. In a situation in which governmental mechanisms have limits, a people's approach can go beyond formal barricades and makes things happen, even in a seemingly impossible situation.

When we think of people‐to‐people dialogue between the North and the South, the first issue is whether or not the North will be willing to participate. Of course, leaders there may fear a possible political change that would destroy their own system and diminish their power. But they may think that a new approach to joint problem solving that can help them to solve their own problems may be worth it if the risk to their system is minimal. But so far, the North has consented to such changes. Indeed, having an actual dialogue event actually take place in North Korea is worth considering.

Another significant issue is who should be invited to participate from each side. Should we focus on the younger generation, in their thirties and forties, who will take top positions in their societies in the near future, at the cost of “skipping generations?” For people‐to‐people dialogue, the participants should be individuals who are politically influential and actively interested in finding a negotiated solution, and whose positions also allow them to speak relatively freely (Kelman 1995).

Many people in South Korea would agree that the key determinant of a South Korean's attitude toward North Korea is when he or she was born: before or after the Korean War (1950–1953). Those who were born before the war (at least fifty‐seven years old) may still feel bitterness toward the North (Rhee et al. 2000). For those people, historical traumas serve as the points of reference for current events and for predicting future relations (Kelman and Fisher 2003). Often South Koreans of this group are critical of the government's conciliatory policy, believing it too soft.

In theory, conflicts should be resolved by the parties directly involved (Mitchell and Banks 1996). In this case, the directly involved parties represent older generations, those who were born before the Korean War. But they may find it difficult to discuss historically entrenched issues with each other. These conflicts may be more easily resolved by younger Koreans who are more open to different values and ways of thinking.

A third issue is the fact that North Korea does not have a “civil society” in the usual sense. But participants from the South, such as educators, nongovernmental organization (NGO) leaders, journalists, or members of other professions, do have counterparts in North Korea. And while it is true that there are no NGOs in the North, there are counterparts who welcome outside NGO leaders and always show up when they visit. One who functions in a particular role for a significant number of years and becomes a leader in the field may share commonalities with others in their field, even those who live under a very different political system. And, in fact, those North Korean professionals who visit South Korea or meet with their counterparts at an outside meeting seem to interact with others relatively well.

As mentioned above, one window of opportunity to engagement with North Korea is the fact that it has already begun to change dramatically, even if reluctantly. These changes may have been the result of pragmatic considerations after the leadership saw its original goals as unattainable (Kelman 1991). But in consequence, there is more common ground now than in the past.

Another window for dialogue is the current circumstances of North Korea. Just to survive, the North Korean government must respond, even if at the minimum level, to people's basic needs and must permit some openness to the outside world. But for the North Korean leadership, an approach at the official and governmental level has many limitations, especially at a time of increased tension over the nuclear and missile issues.

Effective dialogue with North Korea at the people‐to‐people level will require seeing and treating North Koreans as individuals. Outsiders have a picture of North Korea as monolithic and of North Koreans as brainwashed. Defector reports, however, indicate that young people in the North like movies, dancing, and pop songs, which they have found a way to listen to, even though the government has banned all music that is not officially approved. Some are critical of the government in private, even though such thoughts cannot be expressed in public. Their thoughts and concerns are not totally different from those of South Korean young people.²

Given what North Korean leaders face inside and outside the country, it must be difficult for them to make political compromises, or to deal with the outside at a formal or official level. If the leadership feels that an idea from outside is linked to sensitive issues that are on the table at the diplomatic (track one) level, they will reject it. People‐to‐people dialogue is a less threatening way for the North to accomplish change.

As discussed above, the current relations between the two Koreas, in terms of both personnel exchange and trade, make this a ripe moment for new initiatives, a time when one side can give “the other the opportunity to change, helping the other to change, and not exploiting the existence of deformities that may otherwise lead one to some desperate act of survival” (Burton 1987: 20). In that spirit, an effort to create informal dialogue could allow the two sides to resolve their differences in a less costly and more effective manner (Fisher 1997).

Remembering that “humanitarianism is not enough” for resolving conflicts and escaping from chronic and violent human suffering (Urquhart 2005), South Koreans should approach North Korea with flexibility and compassion. Offering alternative formats for dialogue and giving the North opportunities for input may help them respond positively.

The actual venue of the dialogue is a crucial factor for the North because they may fear loss of control. This implies that allowing North Korea to decide the location is one way to promote the dialogue. An academic setting has the advantage of providing an official but nonbinding context (Kelman 2000).

Giving the North choices in terms of participants, or offering recommendations of the South's preferences, should be strongly considered. This would reduce the problems associated with North Korean delegates' re‐entry, when they have to go back to their community after the dialogue sessions end. One implication is that it is appropriate to set up a mechanism to institutionalize such logistical decisions as the format for dialogues, their frequency, etc. The institutionalization would protect those efforts from fluctuations in the political atmosphere no matter whether the two sides live separately or as one united nation.

Lack of financial resources could hinder North Korean participation. Perhaps South Korea could cover expenses, while North Korea could provide facilities and logistics. Of course, all such approaches can be considered only if North Korea's suggestions and inputs do not defeat the goals of the dialogue.

As noted earlier, the single biggest obstacle to people‐to‐people dialogue between the North and the South is the reluctance of the North to come forward. North Korea may be afraid of any official negotiation, particularly in these days of heightened tension. Therefore, an attitude of “getting in their shoes” and “helping them make their decision easy” as Roger Fisher (2005) has suggested, should be adopted. The mutual‐gains approach provides good guidance both before and during the dialogue. The principles of the approach include “Act in a trustworthy fashion at all times” and “Focus on building long‐term relationships” (Susskind and Patrick 1996: 37–38). It is important not to give the other side a sense of being “used” or “exploited.”

It can be tempting to take an easy and convenient course, saying “We need to bring in South Korean political and governmental officials eventually; why not do so now?” Such a course is very risky. These officials have resources and access to make things happen, but they also have their own interests. Moreover, overt political involvement could harm the credibility of people‐to‐people dialogue in both North and South Korea.

To take an opportunity for both sides to overcome some of the pain and suffering resulting from being arbitrarily divided in two, as well as to help bring peace and prosperity to the region, North and South Korea should accept the immediate challenge of launching track two informal dialogue. Merely naming the two sides as one nation, were unification to occur, would not alone restore their relationship. The real challenge is to bridge the differences between the two in terms of values, way of life, and thinking. Narrowing the economic gap and the disparity in political and social systems between the two are further challenges. A great deal of effort will be required to overcome these discrepancies and to resolve the related issues.

The current approach to the issues on the Korean peninsula seems to focus too heavily on political, military, and economic dimensions. One of the most critical misconceptions is that conflict resolution or unification between divided states will usher in peace automatically. A neglected issue for the country and its people is rebuilding the human relationships of the divided societies. A fresh approach is desperately needed in the Korean peninsula to overcome the past and share fears, problems, and responsibilities for the future. People‐to‐people dialogue, in parallel with or as acomplement to governmental efforts, can be a response to this historical challenge.