U.S.–Iran Nuclear Track Two from 2005 to 2011: What Have We Learned? Where Are We Going?

For several decades, intensive track two dialogues have been under way between Iranians and Americans. Some have been primarily focused on general discussion — trying to enhance mutual political understanding and open channels of communication around the general issue of relations between the two countries. Others have been primarily focused on specific problem solving, often around the nuclear issue. Of course, none of the projects has been an “either/or” proposition — those that focused primarily on the nuclear question have also recognized that the wider political context is important and vice versa. (There have also been other track two efforts focused on such matters as cultural and sporting exchanges, but these are not under discussion in this article.)

“Track two diplomacy” is not new in relations between the United States and its adversaries. Contacts between Americans and Soviets, through groups such as the Pugwash and Dartmouth conferences, were an important feature of the Cold War and helped develop ideas that later featured in arms control and other agreements (Evangelista 1999; Voorhees 2002; Schweitzer 2004). But these contacts sought primarily to complement or lead already existing official diplomacy. The case of the United States and Iran is therefore different — in the absence of ongoing official relations between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran, informal and unofficial contacts between people on both sides have assumed a much greater degree of significance than might otherwise be the case.

But while there have been many track two interactions between Americans and Iranians, there has been relatively little analysis of this activity (DiMaggio 2010; Slim 2012). How successful has it been? Indeed, what is meant by “success?” Can lessons be learned that may enhance the prospects for such dialogues in the future?

I begin with a discussion of what track two is and explore some of the major issues and questions that surround the field. I then examine several Iran–U.S. track two projects that were undertaken between 2005 to 2011, a period that corresponds roughly with President George W. Bush's second term and the beginning of President Barack Obama's first term. Obama's attempt to implement a policy of “reaching out” to Iran should have been propitious for track two, especially after the bleak period of the Bush years. But such did not prove to be the case.

This article draws on my own experiences of both track one and track two interactions between the United States and Iran over many years, including the period covered by this article. Since 1995, I have been involved in discussions with Iranians regarding Middle East regional security and also Iran–U.S. relations as both a Canadian government official and an academic. More specifically, I have led multiyear track two efforts involving Iranians and Americans while at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in the 1990s and at the University of Ottawa since 2007 and have participated in many others. For this article, I also engaged in anonymous discussions with others who have run and participated in such dialogues. From these discussions, I gained insights on structuring projects for success, measuring results, funding considerations, and ripeness, as well as the impact on track two in this period of the respective domestic political contexts and institutions. Finally, I conclude the article with recommendations for the planning of future U.S.–Iran track two projects.

The term “track two diplomacy” was first used in the 1960s and has evolved steadily since (Fisher 2002; Jones 2008). Generally speaking, track two dialogues tend to share certain characteristics (Jones 2008; Jones 2015):

• They emphasize small, informal dialogues, referred to in the literature as problem‐solving workshops, which are usually facilitated by an impartial third party.¹

• Although the dialogues are unofficial, it is expected that participants have access to decision makers in their societies.

• Within these dialogues, participants attempt to “step back” from official positions to jointly explore the underlying causes of the dispute in the hope of jointly developing new ideas.

• These dialogues are ongoing processes, rather than “one‐off” workshops.

• Most practitioners tend to emphasize the value and importance of addressing the deep‐seated, psychological aspects of disputes.

• While usually not “secret,” the dialogues are conducted quietly and the so‐called “Chatham House Rule” is applied to encourage “outside‐the‐box” thinking.²

The results of such processes can include the following:

• Perceptions of the conflict and the “other” undergo a change.

• New communication channels are built.

• New options for negotiation emerge.

• The ground for the transition of ideas developed in track two to the official track is prepared.

• Networks of influential people who can work to change views in their countries are created.

Two key issues that arise repeatedly in any attempt to assess track two are the questions of how to determine the optimal moment to initiate a track two process and how to “transfer” the results of track two processes into the official realm.

Regarding timing, much research has explored the idea of ripeness. According to this concept, the optimal moment to intervene in a conflict occurs when both sides perceive themselves to be in a so‐called mutually hurting stalemate, but at least some individuals also perceive a possible way out through compromise (Haas 1990; Zartman 2000; Greig 2001).

Others have taken ripeness and applied the concept to a cycle of conflict phases. They have found that specific kinds of track two processes are more likely to succeed in the low, rising, and declining phases of a conflict, while the high intensity conflict phase tends to be where official diplomacy alone has the best chance of success. They have also found that, in some cases, tracks one and two should be utilized in a sequenced manner, whereas simultaneous application is called for in other cases (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2003). Similarly, Ronald Fisher has developed what he calls a “contingency model” of track two that calls for the application of certain kinds of processes at certain points, depending on the specific circumstances (Fisher and Keashly 1991; Fisher 2012). Others argue that the important question for track two, as opposed perhaps to track one, is not so much when a conflict may be “ripe” for resolution, but rather when some participants are “ready” to begin to talk (Pruitt 2007). From the results of such discussions, as well as other factors beyond the control of such talks, ripe conditions may emerge.

Regarding the question of transfer, early track two efforts assumed that the ideas generated would make their way to the official process because the track two efforts involved people who had close links to the official process. Consequently, participants in these processes spent little time planning for transfer. This idea was decision‐maker–centric; the assumption was that if one could get ideas to the decision makers, conflicts could be resolved.

Herbert Kelman and his collaborators began to consider transfer in more depth in the 1970s. They identified two basic elements: the changes in the individual perceptions and attitudes of the participants in a track two discussion and how these changes affect the policy‐making process on both sides (Kelman 1972). An associated issue is known as “re‐entry” — how those who have participated in track two projects, and whose attitudes have been altered by them, are affected when they “re‐enter” their own side in their interactions with officials and with their broader public. How can track two processes be designed to encourage participants to introduce into their domestic debates the notion that change is possible? Christopher Mitchell acknowledged that objective factors on the ground influence how extensively decision makers choose to use the results of track two, even if they are disposed to do so (Mitchell 1981; Fisher 2005).

Kelman developed further ideas on how transfer takes place and identified key ways in which track two assists track one and also transfers its results to track one (Kelman 1995; Chataway 2002). These include:

• the development of cadres of people who may take part in future official negotiations;

• the provision of specific substantive inputs into a negotiation process, or even discussions about the possibility of negotiations; and

• the development of a political environment in which negotiations may be possible.

Esra Çuhadar has explored transfer in the context of specific track two projects between Israelis and Palestinians (Çuhadar 2009). Her findings indicate that track two is relatively poor at transferring specific policy proposals into official negotiations, particularly if they are expressed in terms of “draft agreements.” Officials tend to prefer to come up with written agreements themselves and are skeptical of draft agreements that are “negotiated” between nonofficials, even those who once were officials. Where track two can make a contribution, if officials are prepared to receive its results, is in the development of new concepts and ideas that officials can then take and develop. Furthermore, track two can help break down the previously monolithic interpretations that each side may have held of the other. In cases where transfer was particularly successful, it was because participants in a track two process went on to partake in the official process or had close connections to officials.

David Capie's analysis of transfer in the case of track two in South East Asia identified successful transfer as requiring: “structural opportunity” (moments when officials are looking for new ideas), “sound ideas,” and “influential, respected proponents” (Capie 2010: 302–311). All these must come together to create conditions that enable track two ideas to influence official diplomacy. Capie does not argue that this means that track two should only be active when these three conditions are present — it takes time to develop networks of people who can generate ideas and to create the levels of trust required for the development of alternate approaches to intractable problems. Waiting for these moments would likely mean that there would be no products for track two to put forward when such opportunities do arise. Thus, track two dialogues are worth undertaking even when the three elements of timeliness are not present. Of course, all of this work takes the view that the primary objective of transfer is to move ideas developed in a track two setting to track one. Harold Saunders reminded us, however, that real reconciliation and peace requires more than that — it requires that transfer also take place between and within larger societies through sustained dialogue (Saunders 2009).

The study of track two is a complex undertaking. Many projects take place out of the limelight, if not in secrecy. Producing a complete account of them — and all of the ideas and insights that have come out of them — is therefore difficult. The Iran–U.S. track two projects discussed in this article are the following:

• Pugwash (International, 2008–2009);

• United Nations Association of the United States of America, Rockefeller Brothers Fund (RBF) — discussions held in Stockholm with the assistance of the SIPRI (2002–2008);

• The Stanley Foundation (U.S.A, 2006–2007);

• Landau Network (Italy, 2004–2008);

• The University of Ottawa (Canada, 2007–2010).

These projects do not represent the totality of efforts that occurred during the period covered by this article (2005–2011) (DiMaggio 2010). Moreover, many of them began earlier and some have continued beyond this period. I was involved in each of these projects as either a participant or leader (in the case of the University of Ottawa project) or have spoken with participants. Although some of the projects discussed here have been mentioned in the press or in books on Iran–U.S. relations, such discussions have tended to be of the breathless “secret talks discovered” variety, rather than analytical pieces (Rozen 2009a; 2009a,2009b). Many of the observations in this article thus arise from my own experiences and discussions with colleagues involved in these projects. This is not new for writing about track two generally and is recognized as a limitation on the academic study of track two (Rouhana 2000). On the other hand, no one has discovered a way around this problem, short of treating track two sessions as social science laboratories and subjecting the participants to study by observers as the sessions are under way. Few people who actually participate in track two dialogues would permit this, however, as it would tend to affect the discussion and distract from the primary purpose of the exercise.

By way of general background, the early years of the Obama administration were generally seen as an increasingly hopeful time for U.S.–Iran relations. President Obama had specifically campaigned on a platform of seeking a constructive dialogue with leaders in Tehran. This should, therefore, have been a “ripe” moment, or a time when Capie's three elements of timeliness could have come together. But among those who took part in track two during these years, opinions differ as to what Obama's promise of a fresh start in U.S.–Iran relations meant in reality.

For many who participated in track two during this period it was apparent in retrospect that the Obama Administration's practical approach was somewhat different than the campaign rhetoric might have suggested. According to their argument, for much of the first Obama term, the administration concentrated on putting in place a structure of sanctions and penalties before seeking a real engagement with Iran. The objective was to be in a position to put pressure on Tehran when the negotiations did begin. But the effect of this policy was to put American diplomacy in such a tight straightjacket that it could not engage Iran with flexibility, and it missed its opportunity. A debate continues as to whether this policy was the result of ineptitude, out‐of‐control bureaucratic politics, or a sinister plot on the part of some involved to miss the moment deliberately (Parsi 2012). This strategy has been linked publicly to Dennis Ross, who was a senior official dealing with Iran in the Obama Administration, in part because he wrote about the idea before joining the administration (Ross 2008; Ross and Makovsky 2009), and in part because other authors have mentioned his prominent role in the administration's deliberations over Iran and have linked policy outcomes to his earlier study (Graham‐Silverman 2009; Kessler 2009; Parsi 2012).

For those who subscribe to this interpretation of events (regardless of who the author of the strategy was), this strategy significantly diminished the potential for track two dialogues to influence the administration during this period. Simply put, proponents of this argument believe that the administration was not ready to do anything other than listen politely to ideas generated by track two until it perceived that it had sufficient economic levers in place to pressure Iran; whereas many active in the field had hoped that the Obama Administration would be willing to make use of their ideas from the outset. According to proponents of this view, it is thus questionable as to whether the first Obama Administration ever really offered a “moment” when track two could have helped — although this was not apparent in the early years of the Obama presidency.

Others (a minority) argue that the reality was far more complex and that blaming a particular individual or strategy as the reason for the lack of progress is simplistic. They say that the White House sincerely tried to reach out during the first Obama term, but a combination of Iranian obduracy, Israeli pressures, and Congressional activism sunk the attempt. These people have also argued that such events as the aftereffects of the contested 2009 Iranian presidential election made it difficult for the Obama Administration to promote a new approach to U.S.–Iran relations, that trying to “sell” the American people on the possibility of a dialogue with Iran was difficult when thousands of Iranians were being beaten in the streets of Tehran for demanding to know where their votes had gone. In addition, the state of internal Iranian politics was such that the Obama Administration did not want to be seen as favoring any particular faction within Iran and it was thus very difficult to know who to talk to. More generally, these people argue, the attitude in Washington toward the idea of talks with Iran was negative because the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel was effectively promoting a hard‐line attitude toward Iran in the U.S. Congress. The Obama administration listened to the results of track two dialogues, but the political reality made it impossible to move on them. On the other hand, those who perceived that a moment had been missed believed that the Obama Administration never really made the effort required to break free of past strictures on U.S.–Iran dialogue.

Meanwhile, Iranians involved in track two projects during these years said that the prospects for useful Iran–U.S. track two processes had already been constrained by developments occurring before the Obama election. The Bush Administration's rejection of the idea of cooperation with Iran and the securitization of U.S.–Iran relations had reinforced the narrative pushed by the hard‐line elements in Tehran that such cooperation was impossible. More specifically, President Bush's inclusion of Iran in the so‐called “axis of evil” speech, despite U.S.–Iranian cooperation on Afghanistan shortly after the ouster of the Taliban in 2001, had cooled the atmosphere considerably. Iranians who took part in track two dialogues specifically mentioned that this incident had the effect of discrediting within Iran those who were prepared to work for improved relations.

After the election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005, a high‐level decision was made in Iran to cool involvement in track two, pending a review of policy toward the United States (Personal recollection of discussions in Tehran with senior Iranian officials 2006, 2007; DiMaggio 2010; Slim 2012). Track two projects did go forward during these years, but there were far fewer of them and the atmosphere was much more difficult. Western facilitators of such dialogues noted a trend toward the “tightening” of centralized control over the decisions about who would participate from Iran, usually through government‐controlled institutions that insisted on being the sole interlocutor on the Iranian side.

Thus, the period under review in this article (the second Bush Administration and the first Obama Administration) was not an easy time for Iran–U.S. diplomacy generally, or track two dialogues in particular, despite a popular perception that the warming of relations should have been possible during the latter phase of this period. Both sides doubted whether official diplomacy could “deliver” results, unless — in each side's view — it was conducted under favorable terms.

Participants in track two in this period debated with each other the extent to which these projects may have represented an Iranian Government attempt to convey a willingness to talk and seek compromise that was not really there. As one leader of an Iran–U.S. track two project of the period asked, rhetorically, “I sometimes wondered if we were not playing the role of ‘useful idiots’ for the Iranians.” Although it is impossible to conclusively know the answer to this question, most non‐Iranian participants thought that the Iranian ruling elite was, at this time, sufficiently diffuse as to contain a variety of viewpoints and perspectives, even if contacts became more constrained during this period. It is therefore difficult to imagine that all, or even most, of those who came to the table from the Iranian side were simply sent there to waste time and convey false messages, although several Iranian participants were clearly influenced by an atmosphere at home that was increasingly less supportive of track two as the Ahmadinejad Administration consolidated its power after the 2005 election.

Moreover, at least some participants thought that, if anything, events proved to the Iranians that it was the American government that was not talking in good faith. More specifically, one version of this argument is that, having raised prospects for a genuine U.S.–Iran dialogue, Obama was either playing a game by dangling the possibility of such talks, but only after tough sanctions had been put in place as a punishment if Iran failed to accept the American approach. The other version is that he was not prepared to fight for the idea of a new relationship against pressures from Congress; pressures that the administration should have known would be coming and should have been prepared for if it were really serious about a new start to Iran–U.S. relations.

This argument extends to the administration generally, but also to some of the American participants in the dialogues themselves. Some participants thought that at least a few American participants failed to argue forcefully in Washington for the ideas that came out of these talks, especially when confronted with the growing realization, as the first Obama Administration unfolded, that doing so would go against the grain of prevailing opinion in Washington and perhaps weaken their influence as “insiders.” If this is true, it suggests that the problem of “re‐entry” had affected track two on both sides during this period. Others disagreed strongly with this notion and maintained that people returning from meetings did promote the ideas, but Iranian unwillingness to negotiate seriously at the track one level made these contributions moot.

As an outsider watching the two sides, and visiting Washington and Tehran frequently during this period, I have wondered if these arguments indicate that each side misunderstood what track two can deliver. Many participants reported having a sense (which I also detected) that each side regarded its own political system as complex and difficult to move, while believing that the “other side” could have changed its position relatively more easily “if it really wanted to” and could thus have taken the first step to jump‐start the process. If this is true, track two failed to break through the simplistic understanding that each side had of the other in terms of their being able, or willing, to convey to their authorities at home the complexity the other side faced in changing its position. One facilitator of track two during this period said that some projects were “victims of their own success.” By this, he meant that track two was able to bring senior people to the table, but those senior people were unable or unwilling to understand why their counterparts on the other side were unable to change their government's position despite the new ideas that had been developed through the discussions.

The projects examined for this article can be characterized, in terms of their structure, into two broad categories:

• bilateral and direct (no facilitator; includes the United Nations Association of the United States of America [UNA‐USA]/Rockefeller, although SIPRI did play a convening role); and

• multilateral — involving participants from other countries, as well as Iranians and Americans (includes Pugwash; Landau Network; Stanley Foundation; Ottawa).

In addition to their structures, the projects can be characterized by the basic approach taken by the respective projects:

• focusing primarily, although not exclusively, on specific policy problems, for example, designing initiatives to respond to particular policy issues, such as the nuclear question (UNA‐USA; Pugwash; Landau); and

• focusing primarily, although not exclusively, on broader relations between the two sides, for example, promoting mutual understanding, identifying root causes of differences, discussing regional security issues more broadly, etc., sometimes as a means to get at the nuclear issue indirectly (Stanley Foundation; Ottawa).

Participants in the various track two projects agreed that, in designing a project, the balance between these components is very important. While the two can be complementary, they can also work in opposition to each other if the proper balance is not struck. In retrospect, participants generally agreed, perhaps counter intuitively, that bilateral dialogues focused specifically on the nuclear issue had the least chance of success because such meetings tended eventually to become exchanges of zero‐sum positions. In addition, the inability of the track two process to “deliver” change at the official level (because such an outcome was far beyond its means) tended to mean that projects focused on “solving” specific bilateral problems usually ran out of steam and ended in frustration when their preferred policy prescriptions were not adopted by the two governments.

Participants cited certain benchmarks as possible markers of success. These included:

• the establishment of relationships around the table characterized by trust, respect, and mutual understanding;

• the high quality of the participants recruited into each project;

• the occurrence of changes in perception on each side; and

• the transfer of knowledge to government leaders on each side.

One specific measure of success that many projects achieved was the inclusion of high‐level retired, or future, officials known to have close contacts with their respective leaderships. Notable figures who have been publicly identified include, on the American side, former Secretary of Defense William Perry (known to be a senior informal Obama advisor), former senior diplomats Thomas Pickering and William Luers, and three people who subsequently joined the Obama Administration in senior positions dealing with Iran: Robert Einhorn, Gary Samore, and Puneet Talwar. On the Iranian side, Mojtaba Samareh Hashemi, a senior advisor to President Ahmadinejad, is publicly known to have participated in the Pugwash discussions (Rozen 2009a, 2009a,2009b; DiMaggio 2010; Parsi 2012). Additional senior people from both sides participated in these and other projects, but because their identities have not been reported publicly and the discussions of the various projects are covered under the Chatham House Rule, I cannot disclose their names.

Several participants on both sides also suggested that a minority of those involved in certain projects, particularly on the U.S. side, were more intent on pushing their own agenda for future U.S. policy than in faithfully attempting to convey and reflect the substance of the current reality in the United States or in trying to find ways forward that would have worked in the “real world.” In such cases, questions of ego and agenda may have complicated the development and transmission of ideas. Most participants, however, did not see this as a fatal problem nor was it present in a majority of cases. Most of the projects featured highly professional people trying to work out ideas according to what they understood to be reality. If a desire had existed at the official level in both countries to use the results of track two to make progress, it would have been clear which projects were serious and which were not. In an atmosphere in which some on both sides sought to discredit the possibility of progress, however, doubters could point to the less serious track two efforts to discredit them all.

In terms of the specific recommendations generated by these various track two projects, most remain confidential and covered under the Chatham House Rule. Participants in one project — the UNA/USA project — have broken cover, however, and made public statements about their understanding of the way forward. That project proposed the creation of a multinational consortium, to include Iran, for the production of enriched uranium inside Iran under close international supervision. This solution to the specific enrichment question would be accompanied by a wider cooperative political and diplomatic engagement with Iran to address such issues as Afghanistan, drug smuggling, and regional security in the Persian Gulf and wider Middle East (Pickering, Luers, and Walsh 2008, 2009; Luers and Pickering 2012). Without violating the Chatham House Rule, I can state that these suggestions are broadly in keeping with ideas discussed in other track two projects, although there are sometimes significant differences in nuance between the ideas developed by the different projects.

Although high‐level participation and specific policy proposals were achieved in at least some of the projects and evidence indicates that messages developed in these meetings were conveyed back to their respective leaderships at the highest levels (a measure of success), this was not, in itself, sufficient to achieve progress at the official level on either side. The mechanisms of transfer included personal briefings, working papers that were delivered to each side, and, of course, the presence of participants who themselves held senior official positions or went into them subsequent to their track two involvement. In some cases (the Pugwash and Ottawa projects), the third‐party convener also actively promoted transfer by meeting high‐level officials in both Washington and Tehran.

Thus, of Capie's three determinants of successful transfer (structural opportunity, sound ideas, and influential respected proponents), I argue that the second and third ones existed on both sides. But it was the first of Capie's requirements for successful transfer, “structural opportunity,” that seems to have been lacking during the time covered by this article. Despite rhetoric on both sides regarding the desirability of a new start to U.S.–Iran relations, the real conditions that might have led to the creation of such a moment appear not to have been present.

The results of at least one of these projects were also transferred via public outreach. More specifically, three members of the UNA/USA project published high‐profile articles that outlined the ideas that had been developed in their discussions (Pickering, Luers, and Walsh 2008, 2009; Luers and Pickering 2012). Their decisions to “go public” were controversial, however, and had a (temporary) chilling effect on other track two discussions.

The projects discussed in this article were either primarily funded by U.S.‐based foundations (the UNA/USA project was supported by the RBF; the Stanley Foundation project was self‐supported; and the Ottawa project was also supported by the RBF) or by European governments (Pugwash and Landau, which were funded by Scandinavian countries and by Italy). In most cases, the specific funding arrangement did not deter any high‐level participants from taking part, nor did they impede the transfer of results to high‐level audiences, nor generate the suspicion of the U.S. or Iranian governments as to funders' ulterior motives. The personal integrity of the organizer of each project seems to have been the key issue, rather than where the money came from. That said, each of the funders was a well‐established foundation or a government with a solid reputation for integrity in supporting such projects.

The question of ripeness is sometimes conflated with the issue of funding — some funders ask whether they should support a project when there appears little chance of a breakthrough. Scholars have hypothesized that such ripe moments occur when political circumstances on either or both sides are such that progress is possible on key issues because there is a perception of a “mutually hurting stalemate.” Many who have taken part in Iran–U.S. track two during this period have noted, with some frustration, that a feature of U.S.–Iran relations for the past three decades or more is that the two sides have developed an exquisite capacity to “miss” each other's moments of ripeness. But discussions with participants in Iran–U.S. track two during these years as to how track two might help to overcome this, and perhaps bring the two sides into some sort of alignment, did not yield any decisive suggestions. Instead, they have generally agreed that the domestic political “clocks” on both sides are attuned to issues largely beyond the reach and scope of track two, but that track two should go forward regardless because waiting for domestic clocks to align before launching dialogues would run the risk that no ideas or networks of people would be in place once progress became possible.

More generally, participants think that track two's role lies in quietly supporting those on both sides who do favor rapprochement by helping to identify and develop possible alternatives to present policies. Thus, while track two itself could not induce “ripeness,” it could play a role in helping to generate ideas and get them into the hands of leaders with greater capacity to take advantage of them when such moments do surface. Capie calls these moments of “structural opportunity” (Capie 2010: 310). (The election of Hassan Rouhani, a political moderate and former diplomat, as Iran's president in 2013 may well prove to have been such a moment.) In this way, in a sense, track two could help create conditions under which ripe moments could be more effectively utilized. Thus, the majority of participants I have spoken with stated that debates over “ripeness” are not necessarily salient to decisions about whether and when to launch a track two dialogue. The issue in such cases is not whether the moment is “ripe” for a resolution or not, but whether useful dialogue can take place involving credible people who are willing to try to develop new approaches to difficult issues.

Obviously, this approach is profoundly unsatisfying to those who expect track two dialogues to “break through” a particular impasse (such as the nuclear one) within a given political time‐frame, and it points to the real limitations of such dialogues. It also raises the question of how long parties can maintain a dialogue and how frequently parties should implement a dialogue if progress on the official track is not forthcoming. A practical implication is that those who fund such dialogues should be prepared to make a long‐term and consistent funding effort that is not tied to the vagaries of day‐to‐day political events on both sides; track two in this case requires patience and a long‐term vision.

Several participants in Iran–U.S. track two during this period noted that most track two processes are designed to confront policy problems and encourage cooperation on the basis of developing joint solutions for those problems. The real challenge, however, is often to find the political space on each side to address those problems. The discussion of the impact of the domestic political contexts in both countries on track two centered on this problem of creating political space.

On the American side, many participants stated that in the first term of the Obama Administration, diplomacy and sanctions were both used, but the emphasis largely tilted toward sanctions — following the logic that one must make the threat of pain real before the other side will begin seriously to engage. While coherent conceptually, this policy had the practical effect of hampering true engagement. As one former official said publicly, “I was in the (State) Department when they kept talking about the so‐called two‐track policy, and it was clear the whole thing was nonsense; there never were two tracks … The sanctions took all the air out of the room. It was 95 percent sanctions, and that was on a good day” (Peterson 2013). Others disputed this notion, however, arguing that opponents in Congress and Israel were the key impediments to progress during this time, not the administration. More broadly, President Obama's major goal in 2009 was to implement his health‐care agenda and he needed every Congressional vote he could get.

In the meantime, on the Iranian side participants noted a growing (if misplaced) sense of confidence about Iran's place on the international stage — because of the quagmires of Afghanistan and Iraq and the faltering U.S. economy — and a suspicion that invitations for dialogues contained hidden efforts to constrain Iran. Participants in track two projects perceived that the conventional wisdom in official circles in Washington was that the United States should only talk when it felt strong, while Iran would only talk if it felt weak, while the conventional wisdom in Iran was exactly the opposite. Participants perceived both of these tendencies as wrong. They created dynamics whereby signals and opportunities were missed.

On the American side, participants perceived a sense among some officials during the early years of the first Obama Administration that there was an opportunity to capitalize on the difficult state of internal Iranian politics, as exemplified by the country's troubled 2009 presidential elections. Participants in the track two projects, however, thought that the complexities of the Iranian political environment make such perceptions of opportunities difficult to translate into reality. The relationship between Supreme Leader Sayyed Ali Khamenei, Iran's highest‐ranking political and religious authority, and the political elite is in constant flux and difficult to fully comprehend; it is difficult to get a clear sense of the balance between the various decision‐making entities in Tehran.

A key takeaway from this analysis is that while some observers may want to dissect the intricacies of tactics and timing in the search for a “ripe” moment, track two practitioners and supporters believed that they should accept the case for dialogue and exploration of issues regardless of the exigencies of the moment. The understanding held by outsiders as to the situation in Iran could be flawed, and it could change quickly. Therefore, track two dialogues should be engaged at all times as a means to open channels and develop ideas for use in those moments when progress seems possible.

Furthermore, many participants suggested that two long‐standing U.S. narratives about Iran made progress on the issue difficult during this time. The first relates to the entanglement of human rights, democratization, and the transformation of the Iranian body politic. Human rights in Iran are an American policy priority, but this has been interpreted by many in power in Iran as synonymous with a campaign for regime change. This association embitters the relationship, brings skepticism to any invitation to participate in a dialogue, and renders any effort to make progress on both the nuclear and the human rights files next to impossible. Indeed, some participants believed that this was exactly the point of such attempts at issue linkage.

The second narrative that hampers progress is the narrative surrounding the nuclear issue. Participants reported that there was a perception in the American government at this time that isolating Iran internationally because of its nuclear program would give the United States negotiation leverage. Efforts to broaden the agenda beyond the nuclear issue thus met with difficulty. Participants generally acknowledged that depoliticizing the nuclear issue or taking it off the table was not a realistic option, but they thought that it was necessary to at least pursue dialogue on other political issues as well as the nuclear question.

While these errors of judgment sometimes clouded approaches to track two on the U.S. side, participants in the track two projects, including the Iranians who participated in this study, reported that there were also errors of judgment on the Iranian side. They noted that the approach taken by the Iranian government toward dialogue with the United States was, as everything else, caught up in the exceptionally complex internal political dynamic of Iran. At the individual level, many in Iran wanted to explore the possibility of rapprochement, but collectively it was difficult for the system to arrive at the same conclusion. The nature of the Iranian system made it easy for “spoilers” to sabotage such processes — neither the organizers nor the facilitators ever knew where they stood in these projects or how the leaders in Iran really viewed them. More importantly, neither did most of the Iranian participants. While some Iranian officials tested the ground for dialogue at various times, using track two as one mechanism to do it, most others awaited the reception that such efforts received from power centers in Iran to determine their own level of involvement. This placed Iranian participants in these dialogues in the uncomfortable position of being “the canary in the coal mine,” and the organizers and funders of these dialogues never quite knew what the “right” people in Iran thought of all this.

All this speaks to the different U.S. and Iranian negotiating cultures and the possible impacts that these had on track two during this period. Although generalizations are dangerous, the literature on this subject holds that part of the problem in U.S.–Iran negotiations arises because the two sides approach talks with very different styles and expectations, based on differences of culture and experience (Jones 2009; Limbert 2009, 2012). For many Americans, the issues that divide the two countries are perceived to be primarily technical, and solutions can be found at that level. Discussions therefore should focus on what separates the two sides and should try to narrow differences. For many Iranians, more complex and frustratingly ambiguous issues such as “respect” and “justice” are at play: a need to believe that the United States accepts the Islamic Republic. While the Iranians are not above using these ideas as tools to cloud the issues, this does not mean that they are not genuine concerns as well. Once again, this speaks to the need for an approach that goes beyond the specifics of the nuclear issue. But such an approach raises concerns on the American side that Iran is simply playing for time while it continues its nuclear research.

In reviewing the experience of selected U.S.–Iran track two projects during this period, one point stands out: despite a popular perception at the time of President Obama's inauguration that his administration would aggressively pursue a new opening to Iran, at least one of the conditions that David Capie has identified as critical to the success of track two dialogues was never really present — “structural opportunity,” a “policy‐window in which governments are more likely to turn to outside epistemic communities for ideas” (Capie 2010: 312), was missing. While many blame President Obama and his senior advisors for this, many involved in track two at this time believe that the Iranian government was also less willing to accept the ideas generated by track two than might have been apparent.

Despite this, an overwhelming majority of those who took part in track two during these years (including myself) continue to believe that there is no alternative to steady and patient engagement. Track two cannot create the ripe moment, but it can help bring that moment about and help to create the ideas and networks of influential people that will be necessary to take advantage of that moment when it arrives. To those who say that this is an unacceptable situation, track two practitioners would reply that it took decades for the track two processes during the Cold War to bear fruit, but this does not invalidate these efforts. In retrospect, while it would be wrong to claim that track two efforts played the major role in ending the Cold War, we know they played an important role in helping to open channels, change thinking, and prepare ideas and groups of influential people for the moment when change became possible.

Another observation that stands out from my discussions with participants in track two during these years is the fact that facilitated dialogues generally seem to have been more productive than direct bilateral conversations in at least developing ideas. When Iranians and Americans met without a third‐party facilitator, the conversation seems to have degenerated into an exchange of positions, rather than the kind of mutual problem‐solving exercise that stood a better chance of creating possible solutions. (Admittedly, neither approach proved ultimately successful during these years for reasons beyond the control of track two).

A third noteworthy observation is that practitioners of track two must be willing to engage Iran during moments that do not seem particularly favorable. In the service of this imperative, practitioners must be willing to try to induce in both sides a sense that such dialogues must move forward no matter what the immediate tone of the official relationship. Once a dialogue has been initiated, it is necessary to encourage patience. This is especially important in response to the demands of the American and Iranian political systems and also to those of the funders of such processes.

Finally, track two organizers and participants must fully appreciate the limitations of the field; the tendency to promote, consciously or unconsciously, unrealistic expectations should be avoided. This largely reflects the complexity of each side's political process and the fact that real change, when it happens, is likely to be in response to factors and events over which track two has little control. But track two processes can help those who would take advantage of such moments to be ready with good ideas and influential people when those moments occur. Indeed, such an appreciation is needed on both sides.

An examination of the history of Iran–U.S. track two during this period is not encouraging, perhaps in part because it reflects the failure to achieve the high hopes of the early Obama Presidency. But it also reflects the sober reality that the U.S.–Iran relationship is one of the most vexed and complex in the world. It would be unrealistic to assume that track two could, in itself, fix this. But most proponents of track two remain convinced that it has an important part to play if progress is ever to be made in improving this difficult relationship.

We are now in a fundamentally different situation than the period covered by this article — there is an official dialogue between the United States and Iran (and others) and it appears for the first time that high‐level players on each side want it to succeed. This is no guarantee that it will, of course, but the signs are more auspicious than they have been since the 1979 Revolution. What should be track two's role in this new situation? To this point, track two has served as a quasi‐alternative to official dialogue. Now, if it is to be useful, track two must complement official dialogue and find a way to get in front of the official talks and serve as a sounding board on issues that are not yet on the table but should be. Track two processes must provide the sense of what might be possible and must generate ideas and proposals to lead the official process.

Finally, if a deal is reached as a result of the current track one process, it will be interesting and instructive for both scholars and practitioners to see what, if any, elements of it were influenced by the ideas generated by all the track two dialogue that went on during these years. As of this writing it is not possible to make a definitive judgment on this question — the official negotiation process remains secret. But track two veterans are mostly of the view that their work will prove to have been useful in preparing the ground for a breakthrough, both substantively and politically, if and when it happens.