Abstract
Theorists often claim that being bigger than one's counterparts offers advantages in multilateral negotiations. In this article, I examine that argument using data from negotiations in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). The article analyzes and compares the activity levels of smaller and larger states in international negotiations, and sheds light on the conditions under which the latter “punch below their weight.”
My analysis indicates that size directly affects participation, but not success rates. Bigger states can better formulate national positions on a broad range of issues, enabling their diplomats to more actively participate in negotiations, while smaller states are absent more often. Activity is conducive to success, which helps bigger states. But not every negotiation strategy is equally effective. In the UNGA's one‐state, one‐vote context, bigger states are not able to systematically exert disproportionate influence despite their often superior financial resources and bargaining strategies.
Introduction
Unlike smaller states, larger states usually have greater financial resources, large ministries back home, and are able to send well‐equipped delegations to the negotiation table. One might thus assume that size matters in international relations (Waltz 1979; Keohane 1984; Moravcsik 1998; Vasquez 1998). Most international negotiations taking place within regimes and international organizations operate on the “equality‐of‐states” principle, however, according to which each state has one vote irrespective of its size. Does this rule operate as an equalizer, allowing smaller states to actively participate in the negotiations more effectively than their size would suggest (“punch above their weight”)? Or are bigger states able to exploit their size advantage and dominate international negotiations despite the equality‐of‐states rule?
To answer these questions, this article takes a closer look at the conditions under which states actively and successfully participate in multilateral negotiations, analyzing data from the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). The UNGA has the largest membership of any worldwide organization of states. Accordingly, the variation in size is enormous, ranging from such microstates as Tuvalu or Liechtenstein, to such huge world powers as the United States and China, although formally all states have equal rights within the assembly (Panke 2013b).
This article explores the conditions that facilitate active participation and success in multilateral negotiations, with particular focus on the process of domestic preference formation and the impact of a state's financial and bureaucratic resources on its ability to swiftly develop a wide range of national positions. This is important, because without knowing their national positions, diplomats cannot actively participate and make their voices heard in international negotiations (Panke 2013a).
The article further explores how and under which conditions active participation translates into negotiation success, with a focus on the role of negotiation activities and strategy‐specific resources. We would expect larger states with greater financial capacities, larger staffs, and greater economic leverage to outperform smaller and less well‐equipped states. The analysis reveals, however, that while greater size does correlate to more active participation, size has no strong direct effect on negotiation success.
Size Differences, Activity, and Success Patterns in the UNGA
The UNGA has the largest and most heterogeneous membership, and the member states differ tremendously in the size of their national populations, delegations, and budgets.1
Some academics have argued that smaller size can hamper states' chances of international negotiation success (Waltz 1979). Likewise, diplomats from both large and small states have argued that their size hinders smaller states' participation in UNGA negotiations (Anonymous Interviewee 17 2010; Anonymous Interviewee 18 2010; Anonymous Interviewee 29 2010).
Does size really matter in negotiation contexts that are formally based on the “equality‐of‐states principle”? Is larger truly better in international relations? Are Palau and Somalia less active than Peru and Tanzania because of their smaller populations, their more limited budgets, or their smaller staffed missions? Can Brazil and Germany pass a greater number of resolutions that are favorable to them than Uzbekistan and Namibia because they are larger countries?
In this article, I seek to answer these questions by examining the extent that variables related to size have influenced states' active engagement and success. I have looked specifically at 994 items that were contentious among the states from the 1999/2000 session to the 2009/2010 session, and therefore put to a formal vote in the UNGA. I chose this period because the membership remained relatively stable. Do bigger countries cast their votes more frequently than smaller ones? Do smaller countries join the winning coalition less often than bigger ones because larger countries have superior negotiation capacities?
According to Chapter IV of the United Nations Charter and the rules of procedure of the UNGA, being absent (i.e., a state does not push a button to vote yes, no, or abstaining at all) is a proxy for inactivity. Nonparticipation in voting varies considerably between states. For example, the countries with the lowest levels of participation, such as Equatorial Guinea or Tonga, participate in less than 50 percent of the votes, while such countries as Sweden and Spain participate in all votes (see Appendix One).2
In the period of observation, all resolutions that were put to a vote achieved the required majority to be passed. Because no resolution failed during either of these sessions, all states that voted “yes” are part of the winning majority, while those states that expressed opposition by voting “no” or indifference by abstaining from a vote can be seen as members of the losing minority, for example, all voting options other than “yes” votes indicate a lack of success.
States in the losing minority are either insufficiently satisfied with the text of a resolution to support it, have failed to achieve sufficient text changes in line with their own positions, or are unable to prevent the resolution altogether. Vice versa, “yes” votes indicate agreement with a particular resolution, and they are therefore used as a proxy for success in the voting stage of the UNGA policy cycle.3 It varies considerably between the UNGA members (see Appendix One). For example, Kiribati only pushes the “yes” button in 2.41 percent of all voting occasions, followed by Palau, the U.S. and Israel with around 20 percent of yes votes, while Ecuador and Mexico vote “yes” about 95 percent of the time.
Why do some countries vote less frequently than others? Are smaller states absent more often than bigger states, and if so why? Which aspects of size are most likely to enable or hinder states' active participation in the multilateral negotiation environment? Likewise, does size play a role in success? Are bigger states more often on the winning side? Despite the “one‐state, one‐vote” rule, are larger states better at passing resolutions and thus more successful than smaller states? Under what conditions, if any, are smaller countries sometimes able to outperform bigger ones?
Participation and Success in the UNGA
Participation in UNGA Voting
The first dependent variable in this study (DV1) is a nation's rate of participation in UNGA votes. In order to actively participate in multilateral negotiations, states need to know what they want. Liberal theory points out that national foreign policy positions are not just preexisting, but need to be developed in the domestic sphere (e.g., Putnam 1988). Usually, ministries of foreign affairs (MFAs) are responsible for the foreign policy of their states. On the basis of the national position, delegates negotiate in the UNGA (Panke 2013a). When they fail to receive instructions stating a national position on a particular issue, delegates are likely to not participate in the negotiations of that issue.
The more administrative capacities a state has, the less likely are situations in which it lacks a national position in regard to an UNGA agenda item and the higher is its participation rate. Government effectiveness is a proxy for how good the ministerial bureaucracy works, as it captures the quality of public administration, the ability of ministries to efficiently formulate policies and implement them, as well as the credibility of the government to effectively deliver public services. Therefore, the first hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis One(a): The greater a state's administrative capacities, the less likely it will be to fail to develop a national position in regard to an UNGA agenda item and the higher its participation rate will be.4
Presumably, financial capacities might also affect a state's negotiation conduct (Axelrod and Keohane 1986; Downs 1998; Zartman and Rubin 2009). The wealthier the state, the better staffed its ministries are likely to be and the more experts it can employ. Access to such resources could speed up the process of constructing national positions and increase the range of items covered. Ministries facing staff shortages and lacking legal and subject‐specific experts may need to prioritize, and consequently they may develop positions on only the most important UNGA resolutions rather than all UNGA items. Hence, countries do not develop national positions for all resolutions, leaving the delegations in New York without instructions and with uncertainty about what their national interests are for some of the resolutions on the UNGA agenda. This, in turn, increases the chances that the delegates will remain absent. Thus, the second hypothesis regarding capacity is as follows:
Hypothesis One(b): Nations with lower financial capacities, as indicated by their gross domestic product (GDP), will have lower rates of participation in UNGA resolution votes.
The size of staff in the missions in New York can also influence participation rates. Diplomats from well‐staffed missions might have more time to assist the domestic preference formation process, which could compensate for inadequate domestic staff capacity and enhance the state's ability to develop national positions and participate in UNGA votes. In addition, even when a state has developed a national position, to participate in UNGA negotiations its delegation in New York must have staff members physically available to attend meetings. Obviously, small delegations with only a few members are more likely to face staff shortages, which could reduce their countries' average participation rate. Accordingly, our final hypothesis regarding capacity is as follows:
Hypothesis One(c): The more staff posted in a national mission in New York, the higher that country's participation rate will be.
A state's ability to conduct a particular course of action is contingent upon that state's capacity to carry it out (Chayes and Handler‐Chayes 1995; Bräutigam 1996). The fewer capacities a state possesses, the greater its need to prioritize its goals. In such situations, the saliency of U.N. affairs becomes important as the motivation to invest scarce resources depends on expected payoffs (Segal, Epstein, and Martin 2000; Ringquist, Worsham, and Eisner 2003). In principle, we would expect countries to be more likely to allocate limited resources to issues that will affect their own domestic concerns, rather than to less salient international concerns. In particular, states struggling with such severe domestic problems as extreme poverty (famines), epidemics, and civil wars could be expected to strongly prioritize domestic over international issues and would be less inclined to develop positions for a broader range of issues.5 Thus, the next hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis Two: The more severe the domestic problems with which a state struggles, the lower will be its participation rate in UNGA negotiations.
In sum, because small states tend to have fewer financial capacities, less well‐staffed MFAs, and fewer diplomats than larger countries, on the basis of Hypotheses One(b) and One(c) I expect that bigger states will be more active in UNGA voting.
Success in the Voting Stage
This study's second dependent variable (DV2) is a nation's rate of success in UNGA voting, for example, how frequently that state votes with the winning majority. According to liberal theory, a state's affairs at the domestic and the international level are interlinked (Putnam 1988; Moravcsik 1997). Until states determine their national positions domestically, their diplomats cannot actively represent those positions in negotiations. By contrast, the more actively diplomats exert influence over international norms in using negotiation strategies, the more likely it will be that their state regards the final text of the resolution as acceptable (Panke 2013a,b).
Hypothesis Three(a): The more actively a state participates in the UNGA, the more negotiation strategies it can employ and the more likely it will be to achieve success (e.g., be part of the winning majority) in UNGA voting.6
The greater the size of a national mission's staff in New York, the lower the individual workload is likely to be, allowing diplomats in well‐staffed missions to spend more time working on each issue than their counterparts in less well‐staffed missions. In theory, this should enable diplomats to prepare more thoroughly and develop stronger negotiation strategies.7 We would thus expect well‐staffed missions to be better able to generate support for their own position using a variety of negotiation tactics (persuasion, concession making, issue linkage, etc.) (Panke 2010). Thus, we would expect states with larger diplomatic missions to more successfully advocate for their own resolutions, but also to more effectively block unwanted resolutions and/or change the content of the latter to reflect their own preferences so that they vote “yes” in the UNGA more frequently. Accordingly, the next hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis Three(b): The greater the number of people posted to a country's U.N. mission in New York, the more time that each diplomat will be able to devote to the usage of negotiation strategies, which increases the prospects of the country's success.
This study also explores which state‐related variables are likely to increase success in the voting stage of the UNGA policy cycle. To establish a causal mechanism between resources on the one hand (the independent variables) and the dependent variable (success) on the other hand, I have also examined negotiation strategies. In theory, the more influential a state is during the negotiation stage, the more likely it will be to regard the final policy outcome as acceptable and vote “yes.” Hence, if states possess specific resources that render their negotiation activities even more effective during ongoing negotiations (e.g., expertise for persuasion, pivotal position for bargaining), they will be more likely to vote with the winning side in the UNGA and should consequently have higher success rates (Schelling 1980; Pruitt 1991; Risse 2000). Although the use of negotiation strategies in this context cannot be easily observed, the qualitative interviews provide some insights on the relationship between resources and voting success (for nuanced, in‐depth case studies, see Panke 2013b).
Whether a diplomat uses cooperative bargaining strategies (issue linkages, concessions, and side payments) or uncooperative strategies (threatening the withdrawal of aid or the termination of economic relations), his or her endeavors are more likely to be effective if his or her state possesses a high bargaining leverage (Keohane 1984; Martin 1992; Panke 2010). In such instances, bargaining offers have a greater appeal and threats are more threatening, and thus more effective in influencing the conduct of other delegations. In the UNGA one‐state, one‐vote setting, bargaining leverage is not per se determined by the number of votes a state has — instead, states may gain leverage from the ability to offer or withdraw various side payments, development aid, or other economic rewards (Kegley and Hook 1991; Wang 1999; Dreher, Nunnenkamp, and Thiele 2008). For this study, I used a country's GDP as an indicator of its financial resources. Moreover, the net contribution a state makes to the U.N. budget could constitute bargaining leverage if states threaten to freeze payments to the U.N. Also, states giving the greatest shares of developmental aid should be the ones with the most bargaining leverage in the UNGA. Hence, the next hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis Three(c): The greater a state's bargaining leverage, the more effective its bargaining strategies become and the higher its success rate in UNGA negotiations will be.
Most members belong to smaller subgroups within the assembly, through which they are able to engage in collective bargaining (e.g., Meyers 1966; Newcombe, Ross, and Newcombe 1970; Vincent 1970; Haas and Rowe 1973; Iida 1988; Holloway 1990; Kim and Russett 1996; Panke 2013c). The largest of these groups is the Group of 77 (G77) developing countries, which was established in 1964 and comprises approximately one third of all member states. This makes it easier to reach the required majority of votes cast than for members of smaller coalitions, such as the European Union (EU) with its 27 members, and increases the collective bargaining leverage of the group members as negotiations in the UNGA take place in the shadow of a possible vote.8 Members in regional organizations can play two‐level games. They can flag that they have coordinated a common stance within their group, and that they can therefore not compromise at the U.N. level. When a country's particular position is more aligned with a group's position, it can use this “tied‐hands” strategy as a bargaining chip in the UNGA (Putnam 1988; Lehman and McCoy 1992; Mo 1995). Because membership in a larger group increases a country's leverage, we would expect countries with membership in large groups to be more successful in UNGA negotiations. Accordingly, the next hypothesis states:
Hypothesis Three(d): The larger the size of the largest group that a state belongs to, the more effective its tied‐hands strategy will be and the more successful that state will be.
A greater level of expertise in the relevant subject matter can be expected to enhance a delegate's ability to negotiate using such persuasive techniques as arguing and framing (Risse 2000; Checkel 2002; Panke 2009). Thus, the next hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis Three(e): The greater a state's level of subject matter expertise, the more effective its persuasion‐based negotiation strategies will be and the greater its rate of success in UNGA negotiations.
For the quantitative analysis, ideational capacities can be operationalized only through more general proxies, while the qualitative interviews specifically measure U.N.‐specific knowledge and its impact on success rates. First, the more a government spends on education in general, the higher the qualification of its bureaucrats. This, in turn, could increase the expertise in U.N. affairs.9 Also, the longer a state has been a member of the U.N. (in years), the greater the likelihood that its national mission will have accumulated substantial institutional knowledge about the workings of the U.N. system, the legacy of past resolutions, and past negotiation dynamics and outcomes (cf. Cohen and Sproull 1996).
Are bigger states more often part of the winning majority than smaller ones? Two of the activity hypotheses, Hypotheses Three(b) and Three(c), predict that bigger states have size‐related advantages in influencing UNGA resolutions. But the other activity hypotheses point toward the relevance of variables that are not determined by the size of states. This might create a window of opportunity for smaller states to catch up with or even outperform bigger actors (cf. Panke 2011, 2012a).
Results
Participation
This section empirically tests the hypotheses on absence rates (DV1) as well as on success (DV2) with binominal logit regression analysis on the basis of fixed‐effects models. To this end, it uses a data set with all individual votes for all 192 member states in the period from GA54 to GA64. The unit of analysis is the country average no‐shows (absenteeism) as well as the success rate (yes‐votes), in this period in percentage of a country's chances to participate and exert influence (cf. Appendix One).This has the advantage of controlling for the number of voting occasions of each country. Almost all states were members of the U.N. for the period 1999/2000 to 2009/2010 and had 994 items to vote on, but some joined later. Switzerland and Timor‐Leste became U.N. members in 2002 and had only 718 chances to participate. The findings are robust, as ordinary least square regression results support the binominal logit models. (For reasons of space, the former are not separately reported in this article.)
Additionally, I conducted more than one hundred interviews with diplomats between 2010 and 2012, which I used to analyze the causal mechanisms underlying the hypotheses, and to illustrate that differences in participation and success between states cannot simply be attributed to wealth but relate to different variables, such as staff size, administrative capacities, or expertise. I conducted the interviews with national diplomats between 2010 and 2012 in New York and via phone. To protect the anonymity of the interviewees, this article cites them anonymously, omitting name and state affiliation, but providing the chronological interview number and the date of the interview.10
Absenteeism is a strong proxy for inactivity in the UNGA (DV1). As expected, the variables “government effectiveness” and “staff” have the correct signs and are significant. Models One and Two show that those states seriously grappling with shortages of administrative and staff capacities are the ones that are most frequently absent from UNGA voting. In line with Hypothesis One(a), interview evidence supports these findings. Diplomats often report that the more ineffective the process of developing national positions is back home, the greater are the chances that national positions are delayed or that no instructions arrive in New York at all (Anonymous Interviewee 5 2010; Anonymous Interviewee 9 2010; Anonymous Interviewee Number 7 2010; Anonymous Interviewee 23 2010; Anonymous Interviewee 10 2010; Anonymous Interviewee 14 2010). Thus, an official explained that political administrative capacity is the most determining factor when it comes to being present at GA meetings (Anonymous Interviewee 5 2010). When delegates in New York do not know their state's position on an issue, they do not participate (Anonymous Interviewee 7 2010). Another diplomat also stated that delegates must have clear instructions in order to be vocal and influential (Anonymous Interviewee 25 2010).
My findings support Hypothesis One(b) as well: greater financial capacities significantly increase a country's participation level (Table One, Model One). Although interviewees emphasized that the preference‐formation stage is crucial because diplomats need to know what their country wants before they can make their voices heard in international negotiations, they argued that the knowledge and efficiency of the MFAs were more important than the budgets of the U.N. mission. In fact, financial capacities indirectly increase a state's ability to swiftly formulate national positions on a broad range of UNGA resolutions. Better resourced states can afford more and better qualified staff in the ministries as well as in the missions, who in turn can cover more issues, which increases a country's participation rate.
Regression Results for Participationa
| Model One: Dependent Variable One‐Absence | Model Two: Dependent Variable One‐Absence | |
|---|---|---|
| Hypothesis One(a): Bureaucratic capacity (government effectiveness) | −0.575*** (0.012) | −0.546*** (0.012) |
| Hypothesis One(b): Financial capacity (GDP) | −0.005*** (0.000) | |
| Hypothesis One(c): Staff capacity (number of staff in the New York missions) | −0.154*** (0.002) | |
| Hypothesis Two: Incentive (e.g., lack of severe domestic problems) | −0.018*** (0.001) | −0.0255*** (0.001) |
| Constant | −0.833*** (0.057) | 0.679*** (0.063) |
| Number of observations | 183,873 | 183,873 |
| BIC | 116,757.1 | 109,098.1 |
| LL | −58,354.26 | −54,524.76 |
| Model One: Dependent Variable One‐Absence | Model Two: Dependent Variable One‐Absence | |
|---|---|---|
| Hypothesis One(a): Bureaucratic capacity (government effectiveness) | −0.575*** (0.012) | −0.546*** (0.012) |
| Hypothesis One(b): Financial capacity (GDP) | −0.005*** (0.000) | |
| Hypothesis One(c): Staff capacity (number of staff in the New York missions) | −0.154*** (0.002) | |
| Hypothesis Two: Incentive (e.g., lack of severe domestic problems) | −0.018*** (0.001) | −0.0255*** (0.001) |
| Constant | −0.833*** (0.057) | 0.679*** (0.063) |
| Number of observations | 183,873 | 183,873 |
| BIC | 116,757.1 | 109,098.1 |
| LL | −58,354.26 | −54,524.76 |
Binominal logit regressions with ***p < 0.001. aIn order to avoid multicollinearity problems, I tested the financial and staff capacity in separate models.
In line with Hypothesis One(c), states with big missions in New York can compensate for insufficiencies in the capitals to some extent, while staff shortages in the missions increases absence rates (Anonymous Interviewee 7 2010; Anonymous Interviewee 6 2010).11 In addition, states with smaller delegations find themselves more often in a position in which they lack the manpower to physically cover all negotiations and attend all voting sessions. Accordingly, these smaller states tend to participate less actively in the UNGA than states with bigger delegations.
States with limited incentives to invest resources into multilateral negotiations on international policies are more often absent from UNGA voting altogether. In line with Hypothesis Two, the signs for the severity of domestic problems robustly point to the expected prediction (Table One, Models One and Two). Severe domestic problems significantly increase absenteeism. Countries whose populations have a low life expectancy, such as Congo, Sierra Leone, or Swaziland, have pressing domestic problems, and thus comparatively fewer incentives to participate in international negotiations on other topics. For example, interviewees explained that some countries chose not to participate in negotiations about environmental problems because they would rather focus on more severe problems back home (Anonymous Interviewee 20 2010; Anonymous Interviewee 22 2010), while another reported that extremely poor countries will try to be present when issues of greater importance to them, such as questions of development, are being negotiated (Anonymous Interviewee 27 2010).
Poor states with small delegations in New York, such as Nauru, the Central African Republic, Somalia, and Guinea‐Bissau, typically face difficulties that diminish their active participation in UNGA voting. Their ministries at home are often unable to swiftly develop national positions on all agenda items, while their missions in New York are too understaffed to systematically compensate for such deficiencies at home. One interviewee explained it this way:
And if they don't [have instructions from the MFA] then they're not at the negotiations. So they're not in a position to write instructions, for their capitals, to be fair to them, are at a disadvantage. And maybe they don't even want to tell their capital because then it'll just highlight the fact that they haven't been reporting on them previously. So yes, I think that it does come down to that. There's a lack of resources on the New York end and … chances are if they're poorly resourced in New York, then they're often poorly resourced in the capital. It's a kind of vicious cycle of under‐resourceness (Anonymous Interviewee 10 2010).
Some smaller states, however, such as Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, Iceland, and Singapore, have smoothly working MFAs that help them compensate for the small sizes of their New York delegations, resulting in very low absence levels (Anonymous Interviewee 7 2010; Anonymous Interviewee 23 2010; Anonymous Interviewee 27 2010).
We have also seen that incentives matter as well. States with pressing domestic problems have fewer incentives to place an emphasis on international affairs. Such small, poor states as Trinidad, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Suriname, Kiribati, and Chad have low participation rates, while, as we would predict, larger and wealthier countries, such as the U.S., Germany, and Canada, have considerably lower rates of absence from voting (see Appendix One). But interestingly, some relatively populous states, such as Cote D'Ivoire, Vietnam, and Gambia, have missions in New York that are larger than the average size of fourteen, but have low levels of administrative capacities back home and struggle with pressing domestic problems. These states participate in UNGA voting considerably less actively than the size of their mission alone would lead one to expect.
Small states with staff shortages have difficulties actively participating in the UNGA and are absent more often than their larger counterparts with well‐staffed missions in New York. But how much does size matter to success? Are bigger states not only more active in general, but also more successful?
Success
The second set of hypotheses involves the relationship between size and voting success in the UNGA. To avoid multicollinearity between staff capacities, economic bargaining leverage, and U.N.‐specific bargaining leverage, I used six different models. Models One through Three focus on the duration of U.N. membership as a proxy for U.N.‐specific knowledge to test Hypothesis Three(e), while Models Four to Six use school life expectancy as a proxy for expertise. This section also draws on interview material with members of missions to the U.N. to trace the underlying causal mechanisms.
Hypothesis Three(a) is supported empirically because the signs are correct and the coefficients are highly significant. The more a state is active in the preceding stages of the policy cycle, the higher their successes rates. Interviewees also emphasize that delegations that remain silent or are not present during the committee discussions at all have no chance to actively influence the negotiation dynamics and outcomes (Anonymous Interviewee 6 2010; Anonymous Interviewee 7 2010; Anonymous Interviewee 12 2010; Anonymous Interviewee 27 2010). One of them explained that “they have to be omnipresent, they have to be there all the time, because if they are not, by definition, they lose influence” (Anonymous Interviewee 5 2010), while another reported that “states that are more active are surely often more successful” (Anonymous Interviewee 154 2012).
While being absent negatively affects a country's chances of shaping negotiation outcomes, having a larger staff available to devote their time to negotiations does not, as expected, increase a country's prospects of success. As the regression analysis shown in Table Two reveals, Hypothesis Three(b) is not supported because the signs are pointing in the wrong direction.12 Larger missions employ enough staff to be represented at all committee meetings, but having more time to devote to issues does not automatically translate into higher success rates. Diplomats explained that negotiation skills are essential: “A big country can have wonderful note‐takers and wonderful instruction readers but that's a very different thing to being skilled negotiators and having an impact on the outcome” (Anonymous Interviewee 10 2010).
Regression Results for Success in Voting
| Model One | Model Two | Model Three | Model Four | Model Five | Model Six | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hypothesis Three(a): Participation frequency (resolution sponsorship) | 0.054*** (0.001) | 0.055*** (0.001) | 0.0577*** (0.001) | 0.070*** (0.001) | 0.071*** (0.001) | 0.073*** (0.001) |
| Hypothesis Three(b): Participation intensity (size New York mission) | −0.008*** (0.000) | −0.005*** (0.000) | ||||
| Hypothesis Three(c): Bargaining leverage (economic power) | −0.000*** (0.000) | −0.000*** (0.000) | ||||
| Hypothesis Three(c): Bargaining leverage (contributions U.N. budget) | −0.000*** (0.000) | −0.000*** (0.000) | ||||
| Hypothesis Three(c): Bargaining leverage (developmental aid received) | −0.000*** (0.000) | −0.000*** (0.000) | −0.000*** (0.000) | −0.000*** (0.000) | −0.000*** (0.000) | −0.000*** (0.000) |
| Hypothesis Three(d): Collective leverage (regional group size) | 0.009*** (0.000) | 0.009*** (0.000) | 0.009*** (0.000) | 0.011*** (0.000) | 0.011*** (0.000) | 0.011*** (0.000) |
| Hypothesis Three(e): Expertise‐based arguments (school life expectancy) | −0.019*** (0.002) | −0.019*** (0.002) | −0.020*** (0.002) | |||
| Hypothesis Three(e): Expertise‐based arguments (duration of U.N. membership) | 0.006*** (0.000) | 0.006*** (0.000) | 0.006*** (0.000) | |||
| Constant | −0.496*** (90.018) | −0.504*** (0.000) | −0.522*** (0.018) | −0.328*** (0.034) | −0.340*** (0.034) | −0.336*** (0.034) |
| Number of observations | 186,471 | 185,483 | 186,471 | 159,305 | 158,327 | 159,315 |
| BIC | 209,419.6 | 208,236.3 | 209,928.5 | 177,907.6 | 176,710.6 | 178,285.8 |
| LL | −104,673 | −104,081.7 | −104,927.8 | −88,917.37 | −88,318.89 | −89,106.5 |
| Model One | Model Two | Model Three | Model Four | Model Five | Model Six | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hypothesis Three(a): Participation frequency (resolution sponsorship) | 0.054*** (0.001) | 0.055*** (0.001) | 0.0577*** (0.001) | 0.070*** (0.001) | 0.071*** (0.001) | 0.073*** (0.001) |
| Hypothesis Three(b): Participation intensity (size New York mission) | −0.008*** (0.000) | −0.005*** (0.000) | ||||
| Hypothesis Three(c): Bargaining leverage (economic power) | −0.000*** (0.000) | −0.000*** (0.000) | ||||
| Hypothesis Three(c): Bargaining leverage (contributions U.N. budget) | −0.000*** (0.000) | −0.000*** (0.000) | ||||
| Hypothesis Three(c): Bargaining leverage (developmental aid received) | −0.000*** (0.000) | −0.000*** (0.000) | −0.000*** (0.000) | −0.000*** (0.000) | −0.000*** (0.000) | −0.000*** (0.000) |
| Hypothesis Three(d): Collective leverage (regional group size) | 0.009*** (0.000) | 0.009*** (0.000) | 0.009*** (0.000) | 0.011*** (0.000) | 0.011*** (0.000) | 0.011*** (0.000) |
| Hypothesis Three(e): Expertise‐based arguments (school life expectancy) | −0.019*** (0.002) | −0.019*** (0.002) | −0.020*** (0.002) | |||
| Hypothesis Three(e): Expertise‐based arguments (duration of U.N. membership) | 0.006*** (0.000) | 0.006*** (0.000) | 0.006*** (0.000) | |||
| Constant | −0.496*** (90.018) | −0.504*** (0.000) | −0.522*** (0.018) | −0.328*** (0.034) | −0.340*** (0.034) | −0.336*** (0.034) |
| Number of observations | 186,471 | 185,483 | 186,471 | 159,305 | 158,327 | 159,315 |
| BIC | 209,419.6 | 208,236.3 | 209,928.5 | 177,907.6 | 176,710.6 | 178,285.8 |
| LL | −104,673 | −104,081.7 | −104,927.8 | −88,917.37 | −88,318.89 | −89,106.5 |
Binominal logit regressions with ***p < 0.001.
Moreover, while larger missions may send people to all meetings, their mere presence in the room does not automatically translate to success. A delegates' effectiveness as a negotiator depends more on his or her individual qualities than on the number of diplomats in the mission (Anonymous Interviewee 2 2010; Anonymous Interviewee 7 2010; Anonymous Interviewee 10 2010; Anonymous Interviewee 14 2010). Thus, smaller states with fewer delegates are not per se less successful in the one‐state, one‐vote negotiation context of the UNGA.
The division of labor within alliances is also relevant — states with few staff members can sometimes rely on the information and negotiation efforts of others. One official explained that there “is one way they [small states] get around the capacity‐issue, they work in groups” (Anonymous Interviewee 3 2010). Similarly, another interviewee explained that “all small countries benefit more from the participation in regional groups because that spreads the capacity which they don't have. It helps them also analyze issues, to get to know issues” (Anonymous Interviewee 2 2010). Another diplomat reported that being a member of a regional group “enables small countries to cover and to follow the whole broad agenda that the U.N. is dealing with, General Assembly included. You don't have to have a big enormous staff to cover all meetings which are going on simultaneously” (Anonymous Interviewee 104 2011).
Alliance partners are also motivated to support one another, so that a smaller state can benefit from a collective effort to shape a resolution (Anonymous Interviewee 15 2010). Hence, alliance‐based strategies enable smaller states to achieve their goals in the UNGA more frequently than the size of their missions would suggest.
According to Hypothesis Three(c), having greater individual leverage should foster higher success rates. Contrary to this expectation, none of the three bargaining resources constitute power in the UNGA in the statistical analysis. Models One and Four in Table Two indicate that an increase in economic bargaining leverage does not increase a state's prospects of success in the UNGA. This is by and large confirmed by interviewees. States with more financial means do occasionally invite colleagues from poorer countries for lunch or dinner, trying to talk them into support, but offering financial payments or economic payoffs for voting support is not common (Anonymous Interviewee 29 2010). Also, significant contributions to the U.N. budget do not seem to improve a country's prospects of successfully influencing UNGA resolutions. This was echoed by interviewees — only one diplomat argued that the U.S. gains bargaining leverage through its net contributions to the U.N. (Anonymous Interviewee 1 2010). Many others, in contrast, pointed out that contributions to the U.N. do not increase the influence of states in the UNGA (Anonymous Interviewee 5 2010; Anonymous Interviewee 12 2010; Anonymous Interviewee 94 2011).
On the other hand, wealthy countries use development aid to poorer countries to create loyalty and discourage a country receiving aid from voting against its creditor's interests (Anonymous Interviewee 3 2010; Anonymous Interviewee 33 2010). One interviewee pointed out: “What the US can do is to use the carrot and stick of aid. This is one thing. They could say if you stop doing this we will stop giving you aid (…) So I think it's really using the financial material leverage they have in absolute aid and the ability to move around and make contact and make their case everywhere that they need to do it” (Anonymous Interviewee 2 2010; Anonymous Interviewee 7 2010 said something similar).
Officials often stress, however, that such a strategy is not applied by many states, but only in exceptional cases and only by a few of the big donors, such as the U.S. or the EU. Several diplomats from both larger and smaller states argued, by contrast, that developmental assistance is not a source of influence in the UNGA (Anonymous Interviewee 53 2011; Anonymous Interviewee 35 2011). For example, a member from a smaller and poorer state explained: “sometimes people might have the idea of the big ones saying ‘if you do not do this, then we are not going to give you development assistance’ — it is far more complicated in the U.N. Whenever you upset somebody, you also have to remember two days from now they will need you again on a different issue. So it is not quite that simple” (Anonymous Interviewee 4 2010). Likewise, a diplomat from a smaller EU member state said: “there was no like, big brother, absolutely not on our part, if other EU delegations, I never witnessed it, certainly not overtly. You might be disappointed if some bilateral aid partner opposed you on a certain issue, you might be disappointed but that's where it ends” (Anonymous Interviewee 105 2011; see also Kegley and Hook 1991; Wang 1999; Dreher, Nunnenkamp, and Thiele 2008).
Interview evidence does not suggest that aid‐receiving countries are less influential in the UNGA negotiations.13 The quantitative analysis shows that states that receive increasing levels of developmental aid do not have significantly lower success rates in the UNGA (all models, Table Two). Diplomats mentioned that the U.S. and the EU repeatedly and China and Japan rarely — but none of the other developmental donors — occasionally link developmental assistance to their request for voting support on highly important issues (Anonymous Interviewee 2 2010; Anonymous Interviewee 68 2011; Anonymous Interviewee 75 2011; Anonymous Interviewee 94 2011). While a few rich countries may indeed use developmental aid payments as bargaining assets on occasion, the phenomenon of buying voting support is not widespread among the developmental donors and not used for each and every resolution. Consequently, it is not the case that the more aid a country receives, the less successful it will be in UNGA negotiations.
The significant and negative correlations between these possible points of leverage (wealth, contributions to the U.N., contributions or receipts of development aid) and success rates are counterintuitive. These correlations are likely to be statistical artifacts and explained by Hypothesis Three(d), which predicted that states with membership in other groups will have greater success in UNGA negotiations. The largest group in the UNGA is the G77, which now comprises one hundred member states, most of which have relatively small economies, make comparatively small contributions to the U.N. budget, and are more likely to be on the receiving, rather than contributing, side of developmental aid. In 2009, the average net contribution to the U.N. budget of G77 members was about $2 million, compared with an average of all 192 UNGA members of about $13 million and an average of $31 million of the non‐G77 countries.
Hence, the negative correlation between bargaining leverage and success rates is misleading. It is explained by the fact that the size of the group has a strong and positive effect on the members' chances of success in UNGA negotiations, and that most of the countries with small economies and that make only small contributions to the U.N. budget are also developmental aid receivers and members of the G77.
As Table Two illustrates, the bigger the grouping to which a state belongs, the more likely it is to vote “yes” with the successful majority. Interview data also supported the finding that membership in large coalitions increases the collective leverage of countries (Anonymous Interviewee 19 2010). “If we speak with one voice,” said one of the interviewees, “we certainly have a big role to play in all situations including of course the U.N. system” (Anonymous Interviewee 29 2010), an idea that was echoed by several other interviewees (Anonymous Interviewee 2 2010; Anonymous Interviewee 15 2010; Anonymous Interviewee 33 2010).
In addition to increasing collective leverage, membership in regional groups allows states to engage in “tied‐hands” strategies as well. Interview evidence suggests that members of groups engage in two‐level games as part of their negotiation strategies at the General Assembly level. Several interviewees reported that the state speaking on behalf of the EU, for example, often indicates that the EU needs flexibility on certain issues or requires concessions so that all EU members will be able to agree to a resolution (Anonymous Interviewee 17 2010); other interviewees described similar situations (Anonymous Interviewee 18 2010; Anonymous Interviewee 19 2010; Anonymous Interviewee 77 2011; Anonymous Interviewee 76 2011).14
The quantitative findings are mixed. While states are significantly more successful in the UNGA if they have been in the U.N. for some time (Models One to Three), the correlation is reversed for the second proxy of expertise, the number of years people spend in school on average (Table Two, Models Four to Six). The second quantitative proxy, however, captures the quality of arguments imperfectly because diplomats and high ranking officials usually receive far more than the average school education; thus, Hypothesis Three(e) should not be rejected on the basis of this finding. Because qualitative interviews as well as the duration of membership proxy indicate that the accumulation of U.N.‐specific expertise positively affects states' chances of being successful in the UNGA, Hypothesis Three(e) is supported in tendency.
Hypothesis Three(e) expects that the more conceptual capacities the respective state possesses, the more increasingly effective persuasion‐based negotiation strategies will be. Because making arguments is an integral part of UNGA negotiations (Anonymous Interviewee 7 2010; Anonymous Interviewee 17 2010; Anonymous Interviewee 23 2010; Anonymous Interviewee 29 2010), states should be more successful, the more expertise they have to back up their arguments. Interviewees strongly support the role of expertise in effective negotiations in the UNGA. They frequently point out that making effective arguments and displaying strong expertise are essential to persuading other delegates and obtaining favorable UNGA resolutions (Anonymous Interviewee 10 2010; Anonymous Interviewee 22 2010; Anonymous Interviewee 27 2010). One diplomat explained: “small states may fill mentioned gaps [on staff shortages and slow MFAs] in order to accomplish desired goals with stronger argumentations and skillful expertise during the consultations and negotiations” (Anonymous Interviewee 30 2010). Another diplomat explained that, on an issue‐specific basis, the recipe for success for a small state is “… really the content of the issue and how appealing that issue is and how well you can present it and put it across. I think that is the most important thing. You very quickly get people to support the idea if it is good in terms of the content and the cause and if it is very well presented and argumented” (Anonymous Interviewee 2 2010).
The quantitative findings are mixed. While states are significantly more successful in the UNGA if they have been in the U.N. for some time (Models One to Three), the correlation is reversed for the second proxy of expertise, the number of years people spend in school on average (Models Four to Six). But the second quantitative proxy captures the quality of arguments imperfectly, as diplomats and high ranking officials usually receive more than the average school education; Hypothesis Three(e) should not be rejected on the basis of this finding. Because qualitative interviews as well as the durations of membership indicate that the accumulation of U.N.‐specific expertise positively affects states' chances of being successful in the UNGA, Hypothesis Three is supported in tendency.
Conclusions
This study has examined the role that size plays in multilateral negotiations in an institution whose decision‐making process follows the equality‐of‐states principle. One‐state, one‐vote arenas are more common at the international level than weighted voting systems, in which bigger states have more votes than smaller ones.15
The UNGA is a good laboratory for studying what role larger size and greater resources play in participation (first dependent variable) and success (second dependent variable) in international negotiations, because the capacity differences among members are immense, with microstates, such as Tuvalu or Kiribati, facing such big powers as India or the U.S.
The study data indicate that size‐related variables do indeed influence a country's ability to actively participate in the UNGA. Bigger and wealthier states are able to afford larger delegations in New York. Consequently, they struggle less than smaller states to formulate national positions on a broad array of issues and are more likely to be present to vote. In addition, larger missions in New York are able to contribute more to the preference‐formation process back home in the ministries by providing information and proposals for national positions. Thus, bigger states are generally in a better position to actively participate in multilateral negotiations across a broad range of topics than smaller states.
Large size alone, however, does not automatically guarantee a high participation rate. Larger countries whose New York missions employ more than the average fourteen officials, but which have lower levels of administrative capacities back home or which grapple with severe domestic problems, are absent considerably more often from UNGA voting than the sheer size of their mission alone would lead one to expect.
While size strongly influences the active participation of states in the UNGA, the study findings indicate that it does not determine a state's success (see Figure One). Active participation and success are interrelated, but size only indirectly affects a state's prospects for success. Countries in which neither the missions in New York nor the MFAs swiftly produce national positions cannot effectively participate in the UNGA over a wide range of issues, especially if they also grapple with severe domestic problems. This applies to many of the poorer and smaller states. Low participation in voting goes hand in hand with a low level of negotiation activities in the UNGA committees, as states with high levels of absenteeism during voting sessions are likely to have negotiated actively prior to the vote. Active participation increases the likelihood of success in the UNGA, so size variables indirectly influence a country's performance. Active countries, regardless of whether they are big or small, have better chances to make their marks (Anonymous Interviewee 14 2010).
Once a country becomes active in UNGA negotiations and voices its national position, however, the study data indicate that size does not in itself influence its chances of negotiation success. Bargaining on the basis of superior economic or financial means is not per se effective in the one‐state, one‐vote rule context. In this context, not only do alliances matter, but the relative size of the alliance matters more than the size of the alliance's constituent members. The bigger the alliance to which a state belongs, the less likely it is that General Assembly resolutions will not reflect that alliance's interests, and therefore its members will less frequently vote no. Because many of the smaller states are members of large alliances, such as the G77 or the Non‐Aligned Movement, they have a chance to compensate for the disadvantages that arise from having smaller diplomatic staffs and less economic and financial leverage. Thus, inadequate staffing does not automatically translate into significantly lower voting success rates. The length of membership in the U.N. can also be a relevant factor. States with a longer tenure often accumulate U.N.‐specific expertise that enhances their negotiation effectiveness, while states with less knowledge of the UNGA and previous resolutions are less influential.
In sum, the UNGA's one‐state, one‐vote rules function as an equalizer that empowers smaller states to have more say in international affairs. As one diplomat reported, the “idea of sovereign equality, which comes out through the one country one vote, primarily is something that we guard very closely as a small state and I think it is in a sense an equalizer among the states, big or small” (Anonymous Interviewee 49 2011).
Smaller member states often engage in strategies that compensate for the disadvantages of having smaller missions. Some smaller states, such as Singapore, Liechtenstein, and Luxembourg, have well‐functioning MFAs and allocate significant resources to international affairs, which help them swiftly formulate national positions on a broad range of issues and enable their diplomats to participate in negotiations and advocate for their country's interests. The more often a small country participates, the greater its chances of success. In addition, smaller states are better able to exert their influence when they have particular expertise, such as Iceland's expertise on the Law of the Sea. Small countries are also able to compensate for the disadvantages of size through membership in large alliances through which they can engage in burden sharing and collective bargaining.16 Small states that fail to engage in compensation strategies, however, do not benefit from the equality‐of‐states principle and have low participation and success rates in multilateral negotiations.
Conversely, larger countries do not automatically perform better in multilateral negotiations under the equality‐of‐states principle. Most bigger states are well equipped to formulate national positions on a broad range of international issues and have a sufficient number of diplomats on the ground to attend negotiations. But their negotiation activity does not in all instances translate into negotiation success. If bigger states fail to engage in debate, lack sufficient subject‐related expertise, and in particular are not members of large alliances (e.g., the U.S.), their bargaining efforts are less effective despite their greater economic leverage.
NOTES
I would like to thank Sam Brazys, Nicole Deitelhoff, Koji Kagotani, Tobias Hofmann, and Lora Viola, as well as the participants of the International Studies Association, American Policical Science Association, and German Policical Science Association panels, and the Friday seminar in Trinity College Dublin for their helpful comments. Moreover, I am also extremely grateful to the diplomats in the national missions in New York, who volunteered for the interviews. Last but not least, I would like to thank Sally Hayden, Finbar Hefferon, Stephen Massey, Stephanie Pollhammer, and Michael Verspohl for their research assistance and proofreading.
As of 2009, the populations ranged from 12,000 people (Tuvalu) to 1.3 billion (China) (Central Intelligence Agency 2010). The mission sizes range from no diplomats (Kiribati) to 126 (U.S.) (United Nations Protocol and Liaison Service 2010). The data on inhabitants in 2009 stem from the CIA factbook (accessed May 2, 2010). UNGA members differ considerably in regard to their budget size as well (U.S. GDP of $11,533.23 billion versus Nauru or Palau, which have GDPs of less than $1 billion). The data on the average GDP (1999–2008) in 2008 U.S. dollars are from http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/downloads/Download‐GDPcurrent‐USD‐countries.xls (accessed in December 2010). Among the U.N. member states, the average GDP is $214.56 billion.
I compiled the data on the dependent variables on the basis of UNGA session reports (United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld Library 2011), available from http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/gares1.htm (last accessed February 22, 2011).
This article analytically distinguishes between success in the voting stage of the UNGA policy cycle and influence in the negotiation stage of the UNGA policy cycle (Panke 2013b). Influence over policy content requires the application of strategies to shape a resolution in line with one's own preferences (Panke 2012b). Thus, influence relates to the negotiation behavior of states and measures whether it had an effect on the content of the negotiation outcome. By contrast, success concerning the passing of resolutions refers to the acceptability of the final outcome. Usually, influence in the negotiation stage and success in the voting stage of a policy cycle in the UNGA are linked. The more influential a state is, the more text changes it obtains concerning the final negotiation outcome in the negotiation stage, and the greater the likelihood that it is sufficiently satisfied with the outcome to vote yes in the decision‐taking stage. However, a state can also support the passing of a resolution (success) without having participated actively in the negotiations itself, for example, in instances in which the draft and final versions of a resolution were in its win‐set from the very beginning or in instances in which a state remained passive, but benefited from negotiation efforts of third actors. For reasons of space, this article only examines success, as the study of influence requires in‐depth case studies that trace the initial positions of actors, reconstruct their negotiation behavior, and analyze how effective their strategies were in changing the content of negotiation outcomes (for case studies on influence, cf. Panke 2013b).
Data for the variable ranges from −2.5 (lowest) to +2.5 (highest), and covers the period from 1998 to 2009 and are from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2009).
I operationalized the severity of domestic problems using life expectancy in years as of 2009 (Central Intelligence Agency 2010). This indicator is available for all U.N. members with the exception of Montenegro. Other indicators, such as the share of population below the poverty line, are available only for 139 states, and thus I chose not to use them.
I operationalized the nonparticipation level in UNGA negotiations using the average sponsorship rate of UNGA resolutions, during the period from GA54 to GA64 (United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld Library 2012, available at www.un.org/depts/dhl).
Persuasion‐based strategies can include arguing, problem solving, and reframing. Cooperative bargaining strategies can include compromise, concession, fostering coalitions to increase the collective leverage, and offering side payments. Uncooperative bargaining strategies can include flagging red lines, using “tied‐hands” strategies, and making explicit threats (Panke 2010).
There are several groupings in the UNGA, such as the Group 77, the EU, Association of South East Asian Nations, the Andean Community, Alliance of Small Island States, the Eastern European Group, the Latin‐American and Caribbean Group, the Asia‐Pacific Group, the African Group, the African Union, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Data on the number of members were gathered via the respective homepages (cf. Meyers 1966; Vincent 1970; Haas and Rowe 1973; Holloway 1990; Kim and Russett 1996; Newcombe et al. 1970; Young and Rees 2005; Peterson 2008; Panke 2013c).
The data on school life expectancy (duration of schooling for primary to tertiary education) stem from the CIA factbook (www.cia.gov/library/publications/the‐world‐factbook/fields/2001.html?countryName=Afghanistan&countryCode=af®ionCode=sas&Numberaf) and cover periods from 2004 to 2010, last accessed January 2011.
In order to avoid multicollinearity between some of the independent variables, the regressions use different models to test the hypotheses. There are three highly correlated variables as financial capacity and staff capacity correlate with 0.79 and GDP and U.N. contributions with 0.95, while other explanatory variables are not highly correlated (e.g., financial capacity and administrative capacity correlate with 0.26).
The strength of the finding, however, does not indicate the presence of an alternative causal mechanism, according to which an increase in staff causes a decrease in negotiation success, but is a spurious correlation, and the effect is due to the high correlation between staff numbers on the one hand and the economic as well as the U.N.‐specific bargaining leverage (0.79 and 0.75, respectively). The latter variables are logically linked to the number of alliance partners states have in their biggest grouping as the G77 is by far the biggest group, but also composed of economically weaker states that do not contribute much to the U.N. budget.
This reflects the important role of the G77, in which most of the developing countries can coordinate their stances in order to increase their collective leverage in ther UNGA negotiations (see Hypothesis Three(d)).
Also, “[s]ometimes the EU delegation says ‘sorry I have to refer to my group on that position’ Let's say you have an agreement of twenty seven on certain things and during the negotiations some people want to go back on what was almost agreed, because nothing is agreed until everything is agreed you'll have to say ‘I'm sorry, because if you touch those paragraphs I'll have to go back to my group and say I'm not sure’ so of course, as the EU we use our bargaining power” (Anonymous Interviewee 55 2011; similarly Anonymous Interviewee 25 2010).
Exceptions include the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund, the Council of Europe, the International Energy Agency, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), and in some policy areas the EU's Council of Ministers.
If a small state is not a member of a big alliance, such as Israel or Tuvalu, its bargaining efforts are less likely to be effective and its success rate drops even more.
REFERENCES
Appendix One
U.N. Voting Rates
| MS | Yes% | Abstaining % | Absent % | MS | Yes% | Abstaining % | Absent % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AD | 69.01 | 18.01 | 0.6 | LA | 78 | 4.94 | 16.15 |
| AE | 83.27 | 11.19 | 3.33 | LB | 81.57 | 10.27 | 5.44 |
| AF | 69.28 | 0.7 | 28.7 | LC | 85.08 | 5.54 | 8.57 |
| AG | 80.32 | 5.75 | 13.22 | LI | 69.62 | 18.61 | 0.4 |
| AL | 54.28 | 17.32 | 15.71 | LK | 90.53 | 7.55 | 0.6 |
| AM | 79.25 | 14.4 | 2.92 | LR | 54.96 | 3.79 | 40.96 |
| AO | 75.05 | 5.23 | 19.52 | LS | 73.14 | 5.03 | 21.33 |
| AR | 85.79 | 13.31 | 0.1 | LT | 67.3 | 18.31 | 0.5 |
| AT | 70.09 | 18.23 | 0.1 | LU | 67.4 | 18.21 | 0.4 |
| AU | 60.87 | 20.22 | 0.5 | LV | 65.09 | 19.72 | 1.71 |
| AZ | 77.34 | 12.99 | 8.16 | LY | 83.3 | 10.46 | 1.21 |
| BA | 57.72 | 13.93 | 17.76 | MA | 84.09 | 10.07 | 3.52 |
| BB | 88.52 | 4.63 | 6.04 | MC | 59.13 | 17.15 | 10.29 |
| BD | 90.03 | 5.74 | 1.31 | MD | 65.28 | 19.64 | 4.76 |
| BE | 66.87 | 18.63 | 0.5 | ME | 67.81 | 18.46 | 1.47 |
| BF | 87 | 6.75 | 5.85 | MG | 72.37 | 5.47 | 21.96 |
| BG | 67 | 17.91 | 1.31 | MH | 34.58 | 15.73 | 21.07 |
| BH | 84.19 | 10.57 | 2.22 | MK | 67.37 | 19.34 | 1.61 |
| BI | 77.48 | 7.09 | 14.75 | ML | 88.72 | 4.93 | 5.44 |
| BJ | 77.5 | 5.85 | 15.74 | MM | 79.36 | 13.49 | 4.13 |
| BN | 89.13 | 7.24 | 0.91 | MN | 86 | 4.93 | 8.46 |
| BO | 89.73 | 3.93 | 6.04 | MR | 79.69 | 7.79 | 10.15 |
| BR | 91.55 | 7.75 | 0.3 | MT | 74.32 | 13.49 | 0.81 |
| BS | 86.2 | 6.04 | 7.15 | MU | 86.2 | 8.66 | 4.83 |
| BT | 69.39 | 14 | 16.11 | MV | 89.43 | 2.72 | 5.34 |
| BW | 80.08 | 5.43 | 13.78 | MW | 61.92 | 8.08 | 29.7 |
| BY | 83.18 | 11.18 | 3.02 | MX | 93.55 | 5.44 | 0.3 |
| BZ | 84.09 | 3.52 | 11.78 | MY | 89.02 | 6.55 | 0.4 |
| CA | 63.08 | 18.61 | 0.5 | MZ | 85.6 | 5.14 | 9.16 |
| CD | 34.61 | 4.83 | 59.36 | NA | 87.31 | 5.74 | 6.34 |
| CF | 56.62 | 3.35 | 40.03 | NE | 75.98 | 2.89 | 19.68 |
| CG | 70.52 | 4.02 | 25.15 | NG | 91.55 | 4.93 | 2.11 |
| CH | 69.5 | 18.8 | 0.84 | NI | 83.48 | 7.45 | 8.46 |
| CI | 75.93 | 10.57 | 13.09 | NL | 67.51 | 17.2 | 0.3 |
| CL | 91.85 | 4.63 | 1.81 | NO | 68.08 | 17.93 | 0.5 |
| CM | 67.88 | 18.73 | 13.29 | NP | 88.33 | 8.05 | 3.22 |
| CN | 82.19 | 11.37 | 2.41 | NR | 41.09 | 9.47 | 40.68 |
| CO | 89.64 | 8.45 | 1.51 | NZ | 73.34 | 14.99 | 0.7 |
| CR | 89.24 | 5.23 | 4.33 | OM | 85.61 | 7.55 | 3.32 |
| CU | 81.89 | 10.56 | 4.02 | PA | 91.35 | 4.43 | 2.72 |
| CV | 84.11 | 5.77 | 10.02 | PE | 89.74 | 8.45 | 1.31 |
| CY | 74.35 | 14.49 | 0.2 | PG | 70.81 | 14.04 | 13.94 |
| CZ | 67.4 | 17.91 | 0.5 | PH | 90.54 | 7.24 | 1.41 |
| DE | 67.57 | 17.42 | 0.5 | PK | 75.75 | 16.7 | 2.01 |
| DJ | 86.34 | 8.1 | 3.24 | PL | 67.1 | 17.1 | 0.8 |
| DK | 67.81 | 17.2 | 0.2 | PT | 68.48 | 17.52 | 0.7 |
| DM | 61.23 | 3.95 | 34.31 | PW | 18.33 | 9.37 | 46.63 |
| DO | 88.62 | 6.34 | 4.63 | PY | 88.73 | 5.94 | 4.63 |
| DP | 65.42 | 6.77 | 22.14 | QA | 85.41 | 9.26 | 2.21 |
| DZ | 86.62 | 10.16 | 0.7 | RO | 67.61 | 18.41 | 0.8 |
| EC | 94.85 | 3.23 | 1.41 | RU | 70.72 | 21.63 | 1.11 |
| EE | 65.76 | 19.34 | 1.91 | RW | 40.44 | 6.77 | 50.86 |
| EG | 83.3 | 11.47 | 0.5 | SA | 81.79 | 9.76 | 5.13 |
| ER | 87.81 | 5.54 | 6.45 | SB | 76.29 | 9.38 | 14.13 |
| ES | 67.37 | 19.23 | 0 | SC | 31.4 | 0 | 68.6 |
| ET | 79.15 | 9.26 | 10.88 | SD | 84.49 | 6.65 | 3.63 |
| FI | 68.28 | 18.83 | 0 | SE | 70.26 | 17.74 | 0 |
| FJ | 75.93 | 11.58 | 11.98 | SG | 86.49 | 11.49 | 0.2 |
| FM | 29.38 | 19.66 | 23.51 | SI | 67.57 | 18.23 | 0.91 |
| FR | 55.99 | 23.36 | 1.71 | SK | 68.58 | 17.72 | 0.3 |
| GA | 64.42 | 1.92 | 33.37 | SL | 66.43 | 5.86 | 26.79 |
| GB | 56.54 | 21.13 | 0.3 | SM | 69.99 | 17.32 | 1.21 |
| GD | 81.09 | 3.84 | 12.64 | SN | 90.51 | 3.63 | 4.54 |
| GE | 64.18 | 21.39 | 4.64 | SO | 55.89 | 4.99 | 36.34 |
| GH | 88.92 | 8.96 | 1.81 | SP | 68.79 | 18.95 | 1.63 |
| GM | 45.95 | 2.43 | 49.19 | SR | 74.5 | 4.64 | 20.26 |
| GN | 82.83 | 5.69 | 10.67 | ST | 44.1 | 2.61 | 53.17 |
| GQ | 37.9 | 3.33 | 58.37 | SV | 86.78 | 4.64 | 8.07 |
| GR | 68.28 | 18.33 | 0.2 | SY | 77.64 | 11.58 | 5.24 |
| GT | 87.6 | 8.97 | 2.72 | SZ | 68.91 | 5.13 | 25.55 |
| GW | 58.99 | 2.9 | 38 | TD | 32.55 | 2.87 | 63.15 |
| GY | 91.35 | 4.73 | 2.82 | TG | 88.69 | 6.46 | 3.33 |
| HN | 79.74 | 7.36 | 12.3 | TH | 90.04 | 9.66 | 0.1 |
| HR | 68.51 | 19.82 | 0.6 | TJ | 68.57 | 8.46 | 21.54 |
| HT | 81.41 | 8.38 | 9.7 | TL | 69.68 | 1.25 | 28.23 |
| HU | 66.5 | 18.01 | 1.31 | TM | 51.72 | 2.32 | 44.14 |
| ID | 90.44 | 5.73 | 0.5 | TN | 85.51 | 9.46 | 3.02 |
| IE | 71.73 | 17.4 | 0 | TO | 46.12 | 15.31 | 37.56 |
| IL | 22.18 | 24.4 | 4.54 | TR | 71.6 | 12.08 | 4.53 |
| IN | 72.84 | 15.49 | 0.7 | TT | 86.72 | 4.63 | 8.15 |
| IQ | 61.02 | 6.57 | 31.82 | TV | 30.62 | 8.02 | 59.66 |
| IR | 79.98 | 10.06 | 5.13 | TZ | 88.83 | 6.24 | 3.72 |
| IS | 68.11 | 17.51 | 0.5 | UA | 73.49 | 17.24 | 1.11 |
| IT | 68.11 | 17.1 | 1.01 | UG | 67.4 | 10.36 | 19.72 |
| JM | 89.64 | 6.14 | 3.32 | US | 21.45 | 14.6 | 0.5 |
| JO | 86.62 | 8.75 | 2.52 | UY | 88.72 | 9.16 | 1.71 |
| JP | 69.62 | 20.42 | 0.2 | UZ | 55.89 | 13.97 | 28.93 |
| KE | 82.29 | 9.05 | 8.25 | VC | 70.3 | 4.55 | 24.65 |
| KG | 78.53 | 9.83 | 10.48 | VE | 91.45 | 5.43 | 1.21 |
| KH | 88.13 | 5.33 | 6.24 | VN | 78.51 | 3.53 | 14.93 |
| KI | 2.41 | 0.2 | 97.18 | VU | 39.27 | 14.98 | 44.72 |
| KM | 66.26 | 5.78 | 25.33 | WS | 72.96 | 11.3 | 13.72 |
| KN | 30.18 | 1.41 | 68.01 | YE | 83.42 | 8.19 | 5.56 |
| KR | 64.89 | 25.86 | 1.91 | ZA | 88.32 | 8.86 | 1.81 |
| KW | 85.61 | 8.15 | 3.02 | ZM | 90.64 | 6.24 | 2.72 |
| KZ | 78.43 | 14.01 | 6.15 | ZW | 79.28 | 3.42 | 14.39 |
| MS | Yes% | Abstaining % | Absent % | MS | Yes% | Abstaining % | Absent % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AD | 69.01 | 18.01 | 0.6 | LA | 78 | 4.94 | 16.15 |
| AE | 83.27 | 11.19 | 3.33 | LB | 81.57 | 10.27 | 5.44 |
| AF | 69.28 | 0.7 | 28.7 | LC | 85.08 | 5.54 | 8.57 |
| AG | 80.32 | 5.75 | 13.22 | LI | 69.62 | 18.61 | 0.4 |
| AL | 54.28 | 17.32 | 15.71 | LK | 90.53 | 7.55 | 0.6 |
| AM | 79.25 | 14.4 | 2.92 | LR | 54.96 | 3.79 | 40.96 |
| AO | 75.05 | 5.23 | 19.52 | LS | 73.14 | 5.03 | 21.33 |
| AR | 85.79 | 13.31 | 0.1 | LT | 67.3 | 18.31 | 0.5 |
| AT | 70.09 | 18.23 | 0.1 | LU | 67.4 | 18.21 | 0.4 |
| AU | 60.87 | 20.22 | 0.5 | LV | 65.09 | 19.72 | 1.71 |
| AZ | 77.34 | 12.99 | 8.16 | LY | 83.3 | 10.46 | 1.21 |
| BA | 57.72 | 13.93 | 17.76 | MA | 84.09 | 10.07 | 3.52 |
| BB | 88.52 | 4.63 | 6.04 | MC | 59.13 | 17.15 | 10.29 |
| BD | 90.03 | 5.74 | 1.31 | MD | 65.28 | 19.64 | 4.76 |
| BE | 66.87 | 18.63 | 0.5 | ME | 67.81 | 18.46 | 1.47 |
| BF | 87 | 6.75 | 5.85 | MG | 72.37 | 5.47 | 21.96 |
| BG | 67 | 17.91 | 1.31 | MH | 34.58 | 15.73 | 21.07 |
| BH | 84.19 | 10.57 | 2.22 | MK | 67.37 | 19.34 | 1.61 |
| BI | 77.48 | 7.09 | 14.75 | ML | 88.72 | 4.93 | 5.44 |
| BJ | 77.5 | 5.85 | 15.74 | MM | 79.36 | 13.49 | 4.13 |
| BN | 89.13 | 7.24 | 0.91 | MN | 86 | 4.93 | 8.46 |
| BO | 89.73 | 3.93 | 6.04 | MR | 79.69 | 7.79 | 10.15 |
| BR | 91.55 | 7.75 | 0.3 | MT | 74.32 | 13.49 | 0.81 |
| BS | 86.2 | 6.04 | 7.15 | MU | 86.2 | 8.66 | 4.83 |
| BT | 69.39 | 14 | 16.11 | MV | 89.43 | 2.72 | 5.34 |
| BW | 80.08 | 5.43 | 13.78 | MW | 61.92 | 8.08 | 29.7 |
| BY | 83.18 | 11.18 | 3.02 | MX | 93.55 | 5.44 | 0.3 |
| BZ | 84.09 | 3.52 | 11.78 | MY | 89.02 | 6.55 | 0.4 |
| CA | 63.08 | 18.61 | 0.5 | MZ | 85.6 | 5.14 | 9.16 |
| CD | 34.61 | 4.83 | 59.36 | NA | 87.31 | 5.74 | 6.34 |
| CF | 56.62 | 3.35 | 40.03 | NE | 75.98 | 2.89 | 19.68 |
| CG | 70.52 | 4.02 | 25.15 | NG | 91.55 | 4.93 | 2.11 |
| CH | 69.5 | 18.8 | 0.84 | NI | 83.48 | 7.45 | 8.46 |
| CI | 75.93 | 10.57 | 13.09 | NL | 67.51 | 17.2 | 0.3 |
| CL | 91.85 | 4.63 | 1.81 | NO | 68.08 | 17.93 | 0.5 |
| CM | 67.88 | 18.73 | 13.29 | NP | 88.33 | 8.05 | 3.22 |
| CN | 82.19 | 11.37 | 2.41 | NR | 41.09 | 9.47 | 40.68 |
| CO | 89.64 | 8.45 | 1.51 | NZ | 73.34 | 14.99 | 0.7 |
| CR | 89.24 | 5.23 | 4.33 | OM | 85.61 | 7.55 | 3.32 |
| CU | 81.89 | 10.56 | 4.02 | PA | 91.35 | 4.43 | 2.72 |
| CV | 84.11 | 5.77 | 10.02 | PE | 89.74 | 8.45 | 1.31 |
| CY | 74.35 | 14.49 | 0.2 | PG | 70.81 | 14.04 | 13.94 |
| CZ | 67.4 | 17.91 | 0.5 | PH | 90.54 | 7.24 | 1.41 |
| DE | 67.57 | 17.42 | 0.5 | PK | 75.75 | 16.7 | 2.01 |
| DJ | 86.34 | 8.1 | 3.24 | PL | 67.1 | 17.1 | 0.8 |
| DK | 67.81 | 17.2 | 0.2 | PT | 68.48 | 17.52 | 0.7 |
| DM | 61.23 | 3.95 | 34.31 | PW | 18.33 | 9.37 | 46.63 |
| DO | 88.62 | 6.34 | 4.63 | PY | 88.73 | 5.94 | 4.63 |
| DP | 65.42 | 6.77 | 22.14 | QA | 85.41 | 9.26 | 2.21 |
| DZ | 86.62 | 10.16 | 0.7 | RO | 67.61 | 18.41 | 0.8 |
| EC | 94.85 | 3.23 | 1.41 | RU | 70.72 | 21.63 | 1.11 |
| EE | 65.76 | 19.34 | 1.91 | RW | 40.44 | 6.77 | 50.86 |
| EG | 83.3 | 11.47 | 0.5 | SA | 81.79 | 9.76 | 5.13 |
| ER | 87.81 | 5.54 | 6.45 | SB | 76.29 | 9.38 | 14.13 |
| ES | 67.37 | 19.23 | 0 | SC | 31.4 | 0 | 68.6 |
| ET | 79.15 | 9.26 | 10.88 | SD | 84.49 | 6.65 | 3.63 |
| FI | 68.28 | 18.83 | 0 | SE | 70.26 | 17.74 | 0 |
| FJ | 75.93 | 11.58 | 11.98 | SG | 86.49 | 11.49 | 0.2 |
| FM | 29.38 | 19.66 | 23.51 | SI | 67.57 | 18.23 | 0.91 |
| FR | 55.99 | 23.36 | 1.71 | SK | 68.58 | 17.72 | 0.3 |
| GA | 64.42 | 1.92 | 33.37 | SL | 66.43 | 5.86 | 26.79 |
| GB | 56.54 | 21.13 | 0.3 | SM | 69.99 | 17.32 | 1.21 |
| GD | 81.09 | 3.84 | 12.64 | SN | 90.51 | 3.63 | 4.54 |
| GE | 64.18 | 21.39 | 4.64 | SO | 55.89 | 4.99 | 36.34 |
| GH | 88.92 | 8.96 | 1.81 | SP | 68.79 | 18.95 | 1.63 |
| GM | 45.95 | 2.43 | 49.19 | SR | 74.5 | 4.64 | 20.26 |
| GN | 82.83 | 5.69 | 10.67 | ST | 44.1 | 2.61 | 53.17 |
| GQ | 37.9 | 3.33 | 58.37 | SV | 86.78 | 4.64 | 8.07 |
| GR | 68.28 | 18.33 | 0.2 | SY | 77.64 | 11.58 | 5.24 |
| GT | 87.6 | 8.97 | 2.72 | SZ | 68.91 | 5.13 | 25.55 |
| GW | 58.99 | 2.9 | 38 | TD | 32.55 | 2.87 | 63.15 |
| GY | 91.35 | 4.73 | 2.82 | TG | 88.69 | 6.46 | 3.33 |
| HN | 79.74 | 7.36 | 12.3 | TH | 90.04 | 9.66 | 0.1 |
| HR | 68.51 | 19.82 | 0.6 | TJ | 68.57 | 8.46 | 21.54 |
| HT | 81.41 | 8.38 | 9.7 | TL | 69.68 | 1.25 | 28.23 |
| HU | 66.5 | 18.01 | 1.31 | TM | 51.72 | 2.32 | 44.14 |
| ID | 90.44 | 5.73 | 0.5 | TN | 85.51 | 9.46 | 3.02 |
| IE | 71.73 | 17.4 | 0 | TO | 46.12 | 15.31 | 37.56 |
| IL | 22.18 | 24.4 | 4.54 | TR | 71.6 | 12.08 | 4.53 |
| IN | 72.84 | 15.49 | 0.7 | TT | 86.72 | 4.63 | 8.15 |
| IQ | 61.02 | 6.57 | 31.82 | TV | 30.62 | 8.02 | 59.66 |
| IR | 79.98 | 10.06 | 5.13 | TZ | 88.83 | 6.24 | 3.72 |
| IS | 68.11 | 17.51 | 0.5 | UA | 73.49 | 17.24 | 1.11 |
| IT | 68.11 | 17.1 | 1.01 | UG | 67.4 | 10.36 | 19.72 |
| JM | 89.64 | 6.14 | 3.32 | US | 21.45 | 14.6 | 0.5 |
| JO | 86.62 | 8.75 | 2.52 | UY | 88.72 | 9.16 | 1.71 |
| JP | 69.62 | 20.42 | 0.2 | UZ | 55.89 | 13.97 | 28.93 |
| KE | 82.29 | 9.05 | 8.25 | VC | 70.3 | 4.55 | 24.65 |
| KG | 78.53 | 9.83 | 10.48 | VE | 91.45 | 5.43 | 1.21 |
| KH | 88.13 | 5.33 | 6.24 | VN | 78.51 | 3.53 | 14.93 |
| KI | 2.41 | 0.2 | 97.18 | VU | 39.27 | 14.98 | 44.72 |
| KM | 66.26 | 5.78 | 25.33 | WS | 72.96 | 11.3 | 13.72 |
| KN | 30.18 | 1.41 | 68.01 | YE | 83.42 | 8.19 | 5.56 |
| KR | 64.89 | 25.86 | 1.91 | ZA | 88.32 | 8.86 | 1.81 |
| KW | 85.61 | 8.15 | 3.02 | ZM | 90.64 | 6.24 | 2.72 |
| KZ | 78.43 | 14.01 | 6.15 | ZW | 79.28 | 3.42 | 14.39 |
