Transfer Effects from Problem‐Solving Workshops to Negotiations: A Process and Outcome Model

The problem‐solving workshop (PSW) is an innovative method of social interaction involving dialogue, conflict analysis, and peacemaking that the interdisciplinary field of conflict resolution can claim as its own. Based on the pioneering work of John Burton and his colleagues in the 1960s, the PSW has been further conceptualized and applied by a number of scholar‐practitioners (Burton 1969, 1987; Fisher 1972, 1997; Kelman 1972, 1992; Mitchell 1981; Mitchell and Banks 1996) and is seen as a core method of the broader approaches of interactive conflict resolution (ICR) (Fisher 1997, 2009) and track two diplomacy (Montville 1987; Jones 2015). Although the method is usually identified with the resolution of destructive and violent conflicts at the intercommunal and international levels, it also has been applied with success in organizational and community settings (Fisher 1983).

Essentially the PSW involves bringing together unofficial yet influential individuals from conflicting parties into small‐group, problem‐solving discussions that are moderated and facilitated by an impartial, skilled, and knowledgeable third‐party team of conflict resolution practitioners. The discussions typically move from initially adversarial and argumentative interaction to dialogic and diagnostic interaction that provides for a shared analysis of the conflict, before considering options for resolution or more humbly directions toward peacebuilding and peacemaking. The third party provides a facilitative and diagnostic role that guides the participants through an unstructured problem‐solving agenda and adheres to a collection of ground rules that are clearly articulated to participants. The off‐the‐record and noncommittal discussions usually take place over a period of a few days in a neutral and secluded location with logistics managed by the third‐party team. It is generally agreed that a series of PSWs is required to have noticeable influence on the conflict proper (Fisher, Kelman, and Nan 2013).

Although Burton and his colleagues initially saw the PSW as a means of preparing the way for negotiations, it was soon recognized that the method could make contributions at any stage of the negotiation process (Kelman and Cohen 1976). At the same time, it has consistently been recognized that PSWs are distinct from negotiations and can make unique contributions to the overall conflict resolution process. As indicated by Fisher, Kelman, and Nan (2013), negotiations are undertaken only by officials with the authorization to reach binding agreements, whereas workshops are nonbinding, which enables them to provide a forum for sharing perspectives, exploring options, and engaging in joint thinking. At the prenegotiation stage, PSWs can change attitudes and create a political environment supportive of negotiations. During negotiations, parallel PSWs can help overcome obstacles, create momentum, reframe issues, and identify new options. In the post‐negotiation stage, workshops can help manage implementation issues and contribute to peacebuilding and reconciliation.

In regard to negotiation, the pioneers of the PSW addressed the nature and mechanisms of transfer from the workshops to the official domain (Burton 1969; Kelman 1972; Mitchell 1981). In line with these efforts, the following is a working definition of transfer: the process by which individual changes (e.g., improved attitudes, new realizations) and group products (e.g., frameworks for negotiation, principles for resolution) are moved from the unofficial conflict resolution interventions to the official domain of negotiations, policy making, and the surrounding political culture. Although transfer is acknowledged as essential to unofficial efforts, there has been limited theory about the process or detailed evaluation of it. Fisher (1997) offered a schematic model of transfer that will be described below, but beyond that there is a clear need for a fuller understanding of the process and potential impact of transfer so that its nature can be better understood and its effects can be evaluated more effectively. Thus, there is a need for a process and outcome model of transfer that would specify the changes and outcomes of interventions in relation to the mechanisms and potential impacts that might be expected. At the same time, it is acknowledged that there are severe constraints on documenting the transfer process and in attributing any impacts to particular interventions.

The pioneers of the PSW method developed different ideas about the transfer process, especially as related to contributions to official negotiations (Fisher 2005). Burton (1969) considered his approach of controlled communication to be most useful before negotiations—focusing on the exploration of the relationship between the parties in order to reveal the underlying causes of the conflict. He stressed that the workshop interactions did not involve bargaining over issues and positions, although preconditions for settlement could be established. Once viable options for resolution had been revealed, discussions were to be transferred to the administrative level, where negotiations were initiated to agree on the administrative details and planning required to implement the outcomes from the unofficial interactions (Burton 1969, 1987). When Burton adopted a human needs analysis to explain destructive and protracted conflicts, he saw even less utility for official negotiations, maintaining that “deep‐rooted conflicts” based in the frustration and denial of basic human needs, which must be satisfied without compromise, made negotiation irrelevant (Burton 1990: 16). However, it should be pointed out that the more specific satisfiers of basic needs are open to negotiation, given that various combinations of satisfiers can be agreed to by the parties for addressing their basic needs.

For his part, Kelman has always acknowledged the central role of negotiations in resolving ethnopolitical conflicts, in the context of assumed complementarity between unofficial and official interactions (Fisher 2005). He and his colleagues made it clear that the PSW was not intended as a substitute for negotiations, but could play a useful role alongside the official track at all stages of negotiation (Kelman and Cohen 1976). It has been consistently emphasized that the communication taking place in the PSW can assist the parties in overcoming the common barriers to starting negotiations, to achieving settlement, and to improving their relationship after settlement (Kelman 1992). Given decades of experience in applying PSWs to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, Kelman has identified a number of ways that PSWs contribute to successful negotiations, including helping the parties to understand each other’s priorities, rock‐bottom requirements, and areas of flexibility (Kelman 1995). In terms of specific mechanisms, he has identified three ways that his decades of unofficial interventions contributed to the 1993 breakthrough of the Oslo Accord: (1) the development of cadres of past participants who were prepared to negotiate productively, and did so, through their subsequent involvement as negotiators or advisors; (2) the provision of substantive inputs to negotiations through the sharing of information and the formulation of new ideas; and (3) the development of a political atmosphere favorable to negotiations and to a new relationship between the parties. It is most unfortunate that subsequent adversarial policies and actions on both sides of this conflict have squandered the opportunities provided by Kelman’s work and the Oslo breakthrough.

The challenge of transfer is taken up by Christopher Mitchell, a protégé and then colleague of Burton, in his comprehensive treatment of the PSW method cast as a form of third‐party consultancy in peacemaking (Mitchell 1981). He first distinguishes between the internal effectiveness of workshops that brings about changes in participants’ thinking about the conflict, such as improved attitudes and new insights, and external effectiveness that occurs in parties’ decision‐making as a result of the transfer process. Mitchell notes that for this to occur, participants must first restructure their views of the conflict, the parties, and the future possibilities; retain these changed perceptions; and then transfer these new insights to the leaders, and we assume negotiators, following the re‐entry process back into their societies. He notes that the greater the access and involvement of participants to decision‐making, the more likely the impact on the future course of the conflict. While it is clear that participants will need to convince decision makers of the genuineness and utility of such insights, Mitchell notes that there is unfortunately a lack of both relevant theory on transfer and systematic evidence on the implementation of new insights.

Following on Kelman, Mitchell, and others, Ronald Fisher has articulated a social‐psychological rationale of how PSWs can increase the likelihood of successful negotiations in protracted ethnopolitical conflicts (Fisher 1989, 2005). He noted that the outcomes of workshops include more open and accurate communication, more accurate and differentiated perceptions and images, increased trust, and a cooperative orientation, all conditions that may be transferable to official interactions. These changes underpin a perceptual shift that must take place for antagonists to enter into and maintain negotiations. The PSW requirement that participants be influentials with the potential to impact the leadership’s thinking supports the rationale that such participants can persuade decision makers that a shift in perceptions of the adversary and in negotiation strategy is necessary to move toward resolution. This also requires a shift in group norms among influentials and decision makers in the direction of sanctioning mutuality, reciprocity, and cooperation with the adversary in order to move toward negotiation (Fisher 1997). It is assumed that a continuing series of workshops is necessary to induce and sustain such a perceptual shift, and that corresponding activities toward rapprochement at other levels of society are necessary to support the related shift favoring negotiation. Furthermore, it is essential for the field of conflict resolution to bring forward conceptualizations of how transfer may occur to support the claims that scholar‐practitioners of the PSW have made.

Herbert Kelman was the first to acknowledge that the transfer process is complicated and difficult and to note that the ultimate goal of PSWs is to affect policy making (Kelman 1972). He identified two basic elements of transfer: the changes in individual participant perceptions, attitudes, etc.; and the effect of these changes on the policy‐making process. Between these two elements lie the considerable challenges of re‐entry, wherein participants going back to their home communities are subjected to many types of normative pressure to drop their new realizations and orientations. Then there is the challenge of complexity, wherein a small number of influentials attempt to persuade decision makers that a system change is required to reach resolution.

Regardless of these difficulties, it is important to conceptualize how the outcomes of PSWs could be fed into negotiations and policy making. Fisher (1997) has developed a schematic model of transfer from ICR interventions such as PSWs that identifies the major constituencies, lines of communication, and interactions that influence policy making in a situation of international or intercommunal conflict (see Figure One). The model distinguishes between the international level of government‐to‐government interactions, and the intersocietal level of interactions among all manner of transnational organizations and individuals, including unofficial conflict resolution interventions.

The lines of transfer run from ICR interventions, including PSWs, in three directions to the leaderships, diplomats in negotiations and other interactions, and public‐political constituencies that have input into policy making. Participants who are advisors or informal representatives can persuade the leadership to initiate or sustain negotiations. Influentials (writers, journalists, academics, political activists) can affect the thinking of public‐political constituencies through disseminating ideas and options, both directly to the public at large and through institutions such as think tanks, research institutes, and so on. Certain participants connected to the negotiations as advisors or members of negotiating teams can have direct influence through providing analyses or options to the official process. These types of influences have occurred in cases where workshop interventions are regarded as having made important contributions to the negotiations (Fisher 1997, 2005). What is required to illuminate these positive cases is a more detailed elucidation of the necessary conditions of the workshop environment, the individual effects that can occur along with the substantive outcomes or products, the mechanisms by which these changes and outcomes are transferred to the official domain, and finally, the impacts on negotiation or policy making.

Most of the indications of successful transfer effects come from case study descriptions reported by the interveners themselves as opposed to more rigorous research designs, thus creating the perception of a positive bias. A review of twenty‐five published case studies by Fisher (1997) included seventy‐six workshops over a period of thirty years with a view to the effects that were claimed by the scholar‐practitioners who undertook the work. A content analysis found that approximately 40 percent of the interventions claimed a positive influence on the overall peace process (regardless of agreement), with 26 percent claiming substantive contributions to negotiations in the form of frameworks or formulations, and 17 percent claiming more general contributions to peace processes in the form of initiatives, plans, or other documents.

A more rigorous analysis of nine cases of sustained interventions in a variety of intercommunal and international conflicts is reported by Fisher (2005), who chose programs of workshops that are generally regarded as successful by commentators in the field. Using a focused and structured comparative case analysis, the study identified the characteristics of the interventions, the nature of the conflicts, and the types of transfer effects that were claimed. Five of the accounts were provided by the scholar‐practitioners who completed the work while four were examined by researchers who carried out interviews with participants and policy makers as well as examining documents related to the interventions. The nine cases came from across the four decades of the recent history of such interventions and from every region of the globe; all could be characterized as highly escalated and destructive ethnopolitical conflicts between identity groups/nations that evidenced severe escalation and a degree of intractability. Academic centers figured prominently as the bases for the conflict interveners, and almost all interventions could be characterized as classic PSWs, although there was some degree of variety in methodology and in descriptions of the interventions along with differing labels (e.g., sustained dialogue). All of the interventions involved a series of workshops or sessions and took place in the prenegotiation phase of the conflict, before official mediation was attempted, or after a period where such efforts had failed and needed to be restarted.

With respect to transfer, most interveners expressed a rationale of preparing the ground for or supporting negotiations, as well of creating new insights and ideas to feed into the policy‐making process. In terms of the targets of transfer, all interventions identified the leaderships of the parties, while five identified negotiators as well, and four targeted the public‐political constituency. The predominant mechanism of transfer was personal contact with the decision makers or negotiators, with only three of the interventions making efforts to affect all levels of the societies in conflict. In line with the above rationale, the objectives of transfer were mainly to influence negotiations, although improving relations between the parties and influencing public opinion and policy toward peace also received mention. In concert with that, the interventions were predominantly concerned with serving a complementary role to track one work and “paving the way” for official peacemaking efforts.

In terms of transfer effects that were documented, cognitive changes in the form of changed attitudes or new realizations were evident in all nine cases, with most also producing creative ideas or proposals for conflict resolution. Additionally, most interventions resulted in participants concurrently or subsequently joining official efforts as negotiators or policy makers and also in creating relations across lines of the conflict or building civil society toward peace within the parties. Overall, the analysis indicated that unofficial conflict interventions, using mainly PSWs, can make significant contributions to resolving violent ethnopolitical conflicts. At the same time, it must be noted that the rigor and scope of evaluative efforts in the nine cases were highly variable and generally anemic, with the predominant measure of success being positive comments from members of the parties or from the official mediators. Thus, it is clear that more focused and detailed methods of evaluation are required as well as a better theoretical understanding of the transfer process.

The schematic model provides a useful overview of the transfer process but only shows the general connections among groups and constituencies involved and the directions and destinations of potential transfer effects. What is required to better describe and understand the transfer process and its outcomes is a flow model that specifies the major components of transfer and illustrates some of the elements to be included in each component in order for successful transfer to occur. This model could then be linked to the various foci and methods that could be used to evaluate transfer effects. As noted in the above definition, the challenge of transfer actually involves two major elements—individual changes and political effects. This reality was first articulated by Kelman (1972):

The dual nature of transfer means that we cannot accept a simple outcome evaluation approach to the assessment of transfer effects. That is, we must ask questions about the effective design and implementation of the workshop intervention from start to finish, as many elements of the experience will affect the likelihood of positive transfer effects occurring, in negotiations or policy making. According to Fisher (1989), “The selection of participants, the design of workshops, and their interface with the wider relationship are all important facets of the transfer process” (217). He goes on to specify that participants should be informal yet influential representatives of the parties who are members of decision‐making elites with the potential to influence policy but no accountability for policy. They should be in a position to persuade decision makers that a perceptual shift to cooperation and a decision to enter negotiations are realistic and desirable. The design of the workshops must enable productive confrontation of the conflict issues, including the constraints that influence the parties. Thereby, the conflict analysis and creative options generated will be transferable to the wider relationship and its context. The setting for the workshop should be isolated and relaxed to facilitate open and creative discussion. Nonetheless, a sense of reality must be maintained so that re‐entry and transfer are likely to be successful. Finally, Fisher (1989) agrees with best practices and supporting research indicating that a series of PSWs is necessary for effective transfer.

A comprehensive flow model of transfer must therefore begin with a consideration of the identity and the nature of the participants in terms of their potential to bring about successful transfer. It must assume that the identity and capability of the moderators or facilitators are adequate to the method as specified in the model of third‐party consultation (Fisher 1972). The flow model must indicate the conditions of the interaction in the workshop that need to be established through the behavior and functions of the third party. The model must also identify the qualities of group and intergroup development that the workshop should achieve before the likelihood of any changes in participants are possible. Given that many scholar‐practitioners who undertake this work are not knowledgeable about theories and processes of group development, this is an area that is often left unspecified in their theories of practice but is critical to the implementation of the workshop design. These initial elements of a flow model are the typical focus of the method of process evaluation, in which one asks whether or not a given intervention has been adequately designed and implemented before even thinking of evaluating outcomes.

In terms of outcomes, the specification of effects must begin with the individual changes experienced by participants through their engagement in the workshop interaction. If such changes do not occur for most participants, then any thoughts of transfer are unrealistic. At the same time, PSWs typically create outcomes or products in the form of ideas or documents that can be transmitted to negotiators, decision makers, and/or the public‐political constituency. How these outcomes are communicated needs to be specified through the mechanisms of transfer, which must be appropriate and adequate to the task. Finally, the model needs to speak to the targets of transfer (individuals, groups, constituencies) and the ultimate effects of transfer on policy making and the political cultures of the parties. The remainder of this article will be devoted to identifying and elaborating these eight elements of transfer as well as commenting on some of the challenges, barriers, and limitations facing practitioners who work to implement and evaluate the PSW method.

Prior to describing the flow model, consideration must be given to the question of how to evaluate PSW interventions, which is intimately related to assessing the processes and outcomes of transfer. The manner of evaluating this form of practice is a contested issue in the field, with some assuming that relatively standard forms of evaluation research can be applied, others proposing the development of unique evaluation methods tailored to the workshop experience, and others developing broader frameworks of evaluation that take into account the unique character and sanctity of the interventions. Regardless of approach, Nadim Rouhana (1993) correctly identifies three essential questions that must be asked: First, does the workshop process really happen in that participants learn about each other and produce joint ideas based on this learning? Second, do the participants experience attitude change and does this last beyond the workshop? Third, do the changes in participant attitudes and behavior affect the larger society through participants’ reports, writings, and other activities? In applying a template from the field of program evaluation, Fisher (1997) proposed that first, workshop objectives be clearly specified, plausible, and measurable, and that they be logically linked to workshop activities, which are also clearly delineated (a task labeled evaluability assessment). Second, workshops should be subject to process evaluation that assesses if activities are implemented as intended—otherwise further evaluation is futile. Third, outcome evaluation is carried out to see if the intervention has been successful in meeting its stated objectives. While these ideas have merit, the techniques of evaluation need to be chosen and applied with great care so that they do not damage the sanctity or integrity of the workshop experience or place the participants at risk in any fashion, such as revealing their identity in sensitive situations of violent intergroup conflict.

Based on an extensive information search, Tamra Pearson d’Estree and her colleagues developed an innovative framework for evaluating ICR interventions and for providing a different way of discussing success in conflict resolution that involves contingency thinking about what forms of intervention achieve what goals more effectively, rather than trying to evaluate which form is best overall (d’Estree et al. 2001). In relation to PSWs, the framework identifies four categories of criteria that can be used for evaluation. The first three relate to goals that may be achieved during the process of an intervention, while the last one identifies criteria related to achievements after the workshop(s):

1. Changes in thinking, which identify new cognitive representations, different ways of seeing or approaching the conflict, or improved communication or language

2. Changes in relations, which include indicators such as empathy and improvements in the relational climate (among the participants)

3. Foundations for transfer, which identify achievements that establish the groundwork for transfer, such as artifacts or products (e.g., an agenda for negotiation), structures for implementation, or a sense of empowerment

4. Foundations for outcome/implementation, which include outcomes or structures that support transfer, such as networks or reforms in political structures

D’Estree and her colleagues point out that the challenge for interveners is to identify which criteria are intended for a given intervention, so that it may be evaluated appropriately. In terms of the flow model of transfer, the four categories and their specific criteria can be seen as relating to a number of the model’s components, especially qualities of intergroup development, individual changes, and products or outcomes.

Two of the pioneers of the workshop method, Herbert Kelman and Harold Saunders, have called for evaluation approaches that protect the workshop process and participants and that are uniquely tailored to the nature of the interventions. Kelman (2008) proposed a “links‐in‐the‐chain” model that breaks the workshop process into a series of steps that can then be assessed one by one, using methods appropriate to that step and protective of the intervention and the participants. Accumulating evidence from the implementation and outcomes of successive steps thus provides an assessment of the overall intervention and ultimately the theory of practice over many interventions. Kelman’s approach involves elements of both process evaluation (e.g., participant engagement in the process) and outcome evaluation (e.g., attitude change and impact on policy makers), and thus provides a comprehensive evaluation framework uniquely tailored to PSWs. Saunders (2011) similarly used his stage model of sustained dialogue to provide a framework for evaluation that addresses two major questions: First, does the dialogue experience change participants and their relationships? Second, do participants move out of the dialogue setting to change their larger environment? He notes that while the first question can reasonably be answered by observations and reports, the second is largely unknowable, as many factors will determine political outcomes and the contribution of any one factor is impossible to judge. Nonetheless, the five stages of the sustained dialogue process can be used to track the learning and changes that initially occur among participants, and then to describe the development of recommendations and the design of scenarios that are intended to influence the conflict writ large.

A systematic and rigorous study of transfer by Esra Cuhadar (2009) provides one of the few detailed assessments of transfer through focusing on two central issues in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict: Jerusalem and water. Accepting Fisher’s (2005) definition of transfer, Cuhadar analyzed the contributions of two programs of PSWs to the negotiations on each of the two issues, and then provided a structured‐focused comparative case analysis that revealed some common findings. She examined documents on the negotiations (minutes, statements, reports, and interviews) and carried out interviews with approximately 80 percent of the PSW participants and organizers as well as with a sample of Israeli, Palestinian, and American negotiators and policy makers involved in the two issues. The first set of interviews with participants focused on intergroup relations, types of learnings, and the nature and implementation of transfer strategies, while the second set asked about the respondent’s level of information regarding the workshop initiatives and the implementation of transfer strategies. The data was content analyzed based primarily on the transfer categories developed by d’Estree et al. (2001).

Cuhadar made an important distinction between transfer to the process of negotiations and policy making versus transfer to the outcomes of these deliberations. In the case of Jerusalem, she found that the interventions generated useful products that both sides used in the process of negotiations, but that compromise outcomes that could embody the ideas did not accrue. More positively, in the case of water, many insights and innovative ideas were transferred to both the process and the outcomes of negotiations, although many of these gains fell away in the implementation process due to political changes on the Israeli side. She also documented the problem of asymmetric transfer, such that successful contributions to process and/or outcome may occur on one side of the negotiations but not on the other, thus reinforcing the common assumption that transfer needs to be mutual in order to be successful. Two other conditions of successful transfer were identified: an openness to outside ideas on the part of the negotiating and/or policy making teams, and supportive political preferences for the ideas that are transferred. This raises the question as to what is regarded as successful transfer. Perhaps a phase conceptualization is required to do justice to the transfer process: an initial phase where information, ideas, and skills are effectively fed into the negotiation or policy‐making interactions; second, an incorporation of these into the outcomes of the deliberations; and finally, a successful political implementation of the agreements or policies produced. Embedded here are the questions of where unofficial conflict resolution’s mandate and accountability start and finish, and of what should be regarded as successful transfer in the first place.

The flow model of transfer is presented diagrammatically in Figure Two, and the various components will be elaborated in turn.

The identity of invitees to a workshop should relate to the objective of the intervention, whether it is to increase mutual understanding on a particular issue, to analyze roadblocks to negotiations, or to create ideas to feed into a peace process. In the initial formulations of the PSW focusing on ethnopolitical or international conflicts, the objectives typically included developing input into policy making, encouraging entry into negotiations, or creating options for peacebuilding. Thus, the ideal participants were identified as nonofficials with considerable influence in policy‐making circles and in shaping public opinion. Later formulations broadened the scope to allow for officials coming in their personal capacity, often under the rubric of track one‐and‐one half diplomacy (Nan, Druckman, and El Horr 2009).

On the personal side, interveners are looking also for participants who possess certain characteristics, including openness to ideas from the other side, motivation to engage in problem‐solving, and respect from people on both sides of the conflict. From an evaluation perspective, Kelman characterized the ideal participants as follows: “Thus, the first question to be asked in evaluating our efforts is whether we succeeded in attracting participants who both have the capacity to learn and change as a result of the interaction and are in a position to transfer what they learn into the public debate and the decision‐making process in their own societies” (2008: 44). In thinking about transfer upward, PSW practitioners often speak of inviting participants who “have the ear of the leadership,” and thus have access to the highest levels of policy making, but do not suffer the restrictions placed on official policy makers. In a similar vein, the framework developed by d’Estree et al. (2001) identifies “influential participants” as one of the criteria for assessing whether foundations for transfer have been established. However, Cuhadar (2009) noted that involving influential people is not a strategy of transfer by itself, but needs to be accompanied by actions the participants take, such as working closely with negotiators and influencing mediators to accept the ideas and products produced by track two. While that is true, the first challenge in implementing the sequential steps of effective transfer is the recruitment and engagement of participants who exhibit openness, motivation, and respect, adapted to the nature and goals of the particular intervention. Available evidence and experience in the field would seem to indicate that this is a manageable barrier to implementation or transfer, assuming that the third party embodies the requisite identity, stature, connections, and skills to attract appropriate participants (cf. Fisher 1972, 1997, 2005; Mitchell 1981; Jones 2015).

In line with process evaluation, it is necessary that the social environment of the PSW develop a set of qualities that permeate the interaction. Often workshops begin with an adversarial, competitive orientation wherein participants feel obligated to air their grievances, to blame the other party for the conflict, and to make their case for outcomes that meet their concerns and objectives. These assertions by one party are usually diametrically opposed by the other party, and it is essential for the discussion to move slowly toward the open, analytical, and respectful interaction called for in the various models of practice.

One way of conceptualizing this shift is to note that the strategic functions of the third party—as conceptualized by Fisher (1972)—are designed to establish related conditions in the workshop interaction. Inducing positive motivation for problem‐solving, improving communication, diagnosing the conflict, and regulating the interaction encourage the participants to be cooperative, attentive, analytical, and respectful. Focusing on the shared problem rather than the parties and facilitating open and accurate communication enable the participants to see both parties’ intentions and objectives more clearly, leading to greater congruence in interpretations and an increased level of trust (Fisher 1990). Similarly, Kelman speaks of participant engagement in the process. For Kelman, such engagement involves participants stating their views openly, engaging in active listening, sharing different perspectives, exploring each other’s needs, analyzing the dynamics of their conflict, and engaging in joint thinking, all of which leads to a sense of mutuality and reciprocity in the workshop (Kelman 2008).

Given appropriate engagement, Kelman (2008) described the expected change in interaction over time as including increases in empathy, joint thinking, conciliatory language, and reassurances and acknowledgments. These forms of communication should then lead to the discovery of mirror images, differentiation of enemy images, and identification of potential joint gains. Overall, Kelman (2008) saw these conditions culminating in creative joint thinking and cooperative problem‐solving, compatible with Morton Deutsch’s (1973) conceptualization of constructive conflict resolution.

In his stage model of sustained dialogue, Saunders (1999) identified stage two as mapping and naming problems in the relationship, and in the context of evaluation, Saunders (2011) described the purpose of this stage as creating a space where participants feel safe in sharing their fears, analyses, and hopes, so that they can then listen thoughtfully enough to be changed and to realize a common interest in changing the relationship. Stage three (probing problems and relationships to choose a direction) extends the analytical process in that participants now talk with rather than at each other in order to analyze the problem further and probe the relationship with a view to improvement. In addition, participants may tentatively identify a direction and contemplate a scenario that would address the identified challenges in the relationship.

Bringing about these changes in participant orientation and behavior is a significant challenge for the workshop method and for the process of transfer. Nonetheless, practitioner experience and available evaluations indicate success in this regard, which is likely brought about by a number of factors in workshop design and implementation. In recruiting participants, the third party should be clear in communicating the nature of the interaction that is called for in the PSW as part of the informed consent process. These prescriptions are then reinforced by laying out ground rules and ensuring that they are adhered to in the discussions. This is part of the wider third‐party function of regulating the interaction in support of the norms calling for open, analytical, respectful, and cooperative behavior.

By their nature PSWs are a small‐group phenomenon, and an understanding of group dynamics is essential in their design and implementation. John Burton’s colleague Anthony de Reuck was experienced in small‐group problem‐solving and saw the parallels and differences between the initial workshops and the more generic method. In particular, de Reuck (1974, 1983) noted the significance of the fact that a PSW begins as three groups: the two parties and the third party. As the interaction proceeds and group development occurs, the three groups of participants form a temporary group that develops a shared analysis and moves toward creating joint ideas for addressing the conflict. In line with de Reuck’s awareness, some current scholar‐practitioners have provided analyses of the role and importance of group dynamics and development in the execution of the workshop method (Rouhana 1995; Kelman 1997; Fisher 1998).

Fisher (1998) applied a generic theory of group development (Tuckman and Jensen 1977) to the flow of the PSW, and noted that the initial stage of forming, while facilitated by the third party’s statements of introduction, workshop rationale and objectives, and ground rules or norms of interaction, is actually short lived as participants launch into their obligatory, adversarial statements of making their case, thus exhibiting the second stage of storming. As the interventions of the third party shift the interaction toward understanding and analysis, the group moves toward the stage of norming, in which a degree of cohesion develops and participants come to share expectations of appropriate behaviors that are similar to that of an academic seminar. In line with the tenets of conflict resolution, the participants enter into confrontation, in which the issues of the conflict are addressed directly. The related cooperative and respectful atmosphere helps move the group into the stage of performing, wherein participants begin to take responsibility for jointly creating ideas for new directions and activities supportive of conflict resolution. This temporary problem‐solving group is now in a position to move into the final stage of adjourning, such that planning for re‐entry and back‐home activities, often across conflict lines, becomes the order of the day.

Although we can see the general developmental process of groups at play in the PSW, we must remain cognizant of Rouhana’s (1995) point that the dynamics are also different, because we are dealing with two distinct and cohesive groups who are in conflict and not interested in erasing borders or merging their memberships. Thus, we must understand that the phenomena we are dealing with are intergroup development and intergroup problem‐solving, which are not coterminous with the simpler group‐level phenomena (Fisher 2014). With regard to the qualities of interaction that are essential to the method and to transfer, these evolve through the stages of group development and are strengthened through the stages of intergroup development, a phenomenon that is barely touched on in the PSW literature.

Rouhana (1995) developed the logic of intergroup development through articulating a phase model that is relevant to a continuing PSW of multiple sessions, although the same sequence occurs in a single workshop at a superficial level. Rouhana noted that the movement through the phases is determined by three factors: the sequence of steps that is planned through the intervention model (as usually expressed in the broad workshop agenda); the natural process of group development; and the ongoing interaction between the conflict parties that will permeate into any joint meeting. Based on his experience with Kelman in co‐facilitating a continuing workshop of four meetings with Israeli and Palestinian participants, Rouhana (1995) outlined four phases of the intergroup interactions:

1. Cognitive empathy, in which the participants slowly move from unilateral expression of their own needs and concerns to cognitive comprehension of the needs, concerns, and aspirations of both parties.

2. Responsiveness to the other’s needs, in which the participants engage in serious exploration of the other party’s readiness and willingness to respond to their basic concerns as valid and legitimate. Toward the end of this phase, the workshop begins to form as one cohesive and cooperating group, and ultimately the two sets of participants establish a working relationship.

3. The shift to joint thinking, in which participants consider the needs, concerns, and constraints of both parties as they jointly develop ideas and options to improve the intersocietal relationship in the direction of conflict resolution.

4. Working together, in which participants jointly consider how to disseminate or implement the new ideas and formulations they have created.

In relation to group development, Saunders (2011) noted that when the end of stage three in his model is attained, the relationship between the two groups of participants has clearly changed in that they are not only listening empathetically and defining problems or directions together, they are also thinking strategically as a bridge between analysis and action. This changed relationship is deepened in his stage four wherein participants design a scenario that will draw other members of the conflicting parties into constructive interactions. Stage five then involves deciding what can be put into practice and placing the design and implementation of the scenario in the hands of people who have the ability to bring it into fruition. Clearly, a cohesive and cooperative temporary group drawn from both sides of the conflict is essential to the implementation of these later stages.

To create a cohesive and cooperative group with its own identity from a collection of enemy participants is a significant challenge, even on a temporary basis. Nevertheless, successes in this regard are captured in the transfer literature (e.g., Fisher 2005; Jones 2015), thus attesting to the power of workshop design and the skills of PSW practitioners, not to mention the common humanity and goodwill of most participants.

The model of third‐party consultation (Fisher 1972) identified improved attitudes as a primary objective of the PSW, in the sense that participants’ attitudes would become not only more positive toward the other group, but also more realistic and complex. In addition, the action component of attitude, usually cast as behavioral orientations toward the object of the attitude, is predicted to become more cooperative and trusting, so that working together to address the conflict becomes conceivable. Evaluations of subsequent interventions in various intergroup relationships have tended to show attitude change in these directions using a variety of indicators but typically with weak research designs (Fisher 1983, 1997, 2005). A rare control group study of participants and nonparticipants of four‐day peace workshops in Sri Lanka with young adult Sinhalese and Tamil individuals found the individual effects of increased attitudinal empathy for members of the other ethnicity and positive behavior of donating more money for poor children of the other group a year after the workshops (Malhotra and Liyanage 2005).

D’Estree and her colleagues identify “attitude change” as one of the criteria in their first category of changes in thinking and representation (d’Estree et al. 2001). Similarly, Kelman’s (2008) model of evaluation shows attitude change as providing the most direct evidence that the first core purpose of workshops has been achieved, in that participants have experienced change, not only in their attitudes and images, but also in their insights into the conflict, ideas about solutions, their capacity to take the perspective of the other, and their understanding of the constraints that bear upon the other.

Cuhadar’s (2009) analysis of transfer effects not only identifies new information, concepts, and skills that participants acquire, but also learning about the other side that enables each to engage in more complex thinking about the nature of the conflict and the other’s society. The acquisition of information and skills was particularly important for the Palestinian participants, especially in the water case, as it placed them on a more equal footing with the Israelis in the workshops and also in the negotiations to which some of them subsequently transferred.

In calling for improved evaluation in the field of ICR, Rouhana (2000) discussed the micro‐objectives of the PSW, and included intended outcomes such as reducing mutual stereotypes, changing the enemy image, and increasing perceived differentiation of the other side, all of which reflect changes in participants’ attitudes. He made the point that practitioners need to better formulate how the activities of the PSW are linked to these micro‐objectives so that hypotheses stating the connections can be tested through evaluation.

Fisher (1999) offered a social‐psychological explanation of how the PSW experience can meet the considerable challenge of bringing about serious changes in individual attitudes and knowledge regarding the other party. Open and authentic interaction with the hated enemy produces cognitive dissonance, which can be dissipated by developing a more positive and differentiated image of the other. In addition, the confrontation of misattributions, particularly in explaining escalation, can lead to the placing of greater weight on external forces in explaining the other party’s behavior, as opposed to insidious internal dynamics. Available evidence on the outcomes of PSWs, although often anecdotal or descriptive, indicates that successful interventions do bring about new learnings and attitude change on the part of participants.

During the history of the PSW, a wide variety of ideas and formulations have been produced in workshops and transmitted to targets of transfer. Fisher (1997) listed numerous examples, while in his comparative case analysis of nine intervention programs (2005), he used five categories to content analyze their products, beginning with individual cognitive changes noted above. Second was the simple outcome of creative ideas or options that were produced and communicated to others outside the workshop. Third, more substantive products, such as proposals, frameworks, or principles, were produced in some of the workshops. Examples included a joint communiqué on the conflict, a statement of principles for a reunited country, a constitutional document to resolve a case of secession, and a proposal for a cross‐border park in a boundary dispute between two states. Fourth, were changes in relations between antagonists that could be attributed in part to the transfer effects of the workshop, such as the development of a peace coalition across the lines of the conflict. Finally, some interventions were linked to connections of participants to structures and processes in their societies, such as joining negotiating teams or achieving political office.

These latter two effects demonstrate the importance of what d’Estree et al. (2001) termed the meso‐level of change, which is in between the micro‐level of individuals and the macro‐level of societies. Transfer effects may not move easily or directly between the micro‐ and macro‐levels, but may require direct connections or developments in structures or institutions that link the two in most societies. These include entities such as professional associations, religious communities, political parties, communal groups, and other organizations that are often captured under the umbrella of “civil society.” According to d’Estree et al.: “Changes at this level link those micro‐level changes most conflict interventions hope to achieve and the macro‐level changes most often used as criteria for intervention” (2001: 108).

As a more general indicator of workshop effectiveness, Kelman (2008) noted the impact on participants’ political behavior, such as seeking political office. In particular, he noted that participants may have opportunities to express what they have learned in the workshop through writings and speeches, through giving advice to political leaders, or through other political actions. The basic question here is whether the changed attitudes and orientations or the new information or realizations gained in the workshop are expressed in subsequent behavior, which is of course essential for transfer effects to occur. As noted above, in Saunders’ (2011) stage four of sustained dialogue, participants jointly design a scenario as a product that can draw others outside the dialogue into a course of action. Examples from such work include a framework for a peace process and a memorandum on starting negotiations. Participants in sustained dialogue have also moved into official roles, such as negotiators, thus making direct connections with official peace processes. In his final stage five, products are delivered to decision makers, and Saunders noted that here the question of evaluation becomes much broader and more complex. Although it can be known if the products were delivered to decision makers, potential transfer effects occur among a myriad of actors, with ideas circulating and influences occurring simultaneously, and thus their specific impact may be unknowable.

Thus, it appears that the creation of products by workshop participants is not a major barrier to transfer, although the adoption of such products by policymakers seems to be a serious limitation, partly because these proposals or plans are often in competition with similar products from other activities or interventions. While there are a few examples of the direct transfer of ideas from PSWs to negotiations, serious resistance to such occurrences appears to take place at the point of delivering and considering the transfer products or influences, the last step identified in the model.

In the PSW method, the advice to those working in the political domain is to invite participants who have access to, and are a trusted source of, information and advice at the highest levels. Such a connection to decision makers is a prime mechanism of transfer, and indeed in the nine cases analyzed by Fisher (2005), personal contact was the most frequent mode of transfer, although little was generally known about that contact, other than that leaders or negotiators were briefed in some fashion on the outcomes of the workshops. Other mechanisms included formal briefings, and writings and speeches by participants directed toward changing the political discourse and ultimately the political culture in relation to the conflict. When participants subsequently became involved in official activities, then role acquisition and ongoing role enactment as negotiators, policy advisors, bureaucrats, or other influential positions became a mechanism of transfer. Similarly, if a meso‐level organization or network or some other entity was formed as an effect of an intervention, its ongoing activity and influence on decision and policy making can be regarded as a transfer mechanism. In all cases, transfer mechanisms involved the changed behavior of participants who decided to engage in pro‐resolution activities as a result of the PSW experience.

When a practitioner follows closely the political activities of participants, as Kelman has done with his Israeli–Palestinian workshops, it is possible to observe participants’ subsequent behavior and to discern a variety of transfer mechanisms in the domain of political involvement. Kelman (2008) identified a step of “impact of participants’ political behavior on others,” which can be seen as involving a mechanism of transfer, a target of transfer, and potential effects of transfer. Clearly, the influence of participants through various connections needs to be dispersed and continued throughout the decision‐making and political sectors and to the public at large in order to make a supportive contribution to the peace process. At the same time, more focused transfer to negotiations can occur in a relatively direct fashion, for example, through the provision of creative ideas, plans, or proposals.

The comparative case analysis undertaken by Cuhadar (2009) identified four strategies or mechanisms of transfer in the Israeli–Palestinian water and Jerusalem issues:

1. exporting key influential participants from the track two initiatives to negotiations and policymaking institutions,

2. contacts and consultations with decision makers and/or official mediators,

3. serving as advisors to policymakers or negotiation teams, and

4. creating, publicizing, and sending artifacts comprised of ideas, maps, and policy recommendations for decision makers’ attention.

Given that Cuhadar’s (2009) study is the most detailed documentation of upward transfer to negotiations available in the literature, it is significant that her identification of mechanisms both confirms and elaborates earlier work on the process and outcomes of transfer as reflected in the model.

Because there are often multiple mechanisms of transfer available to workshop participants, this step would not appear to be a serious barrier to transfer. Although the evidence for this step is mostly anecdotal and often kept confidential to protect the anonymity of participants, in general a wide variety of mechanisms have been identified through case studies of the practice.

Mechanisms of transfer are directly related to the targets of transfer in that the channel of transfer typically has an end point of dissemination in mind. In Fisher’s (2005) analysis, leaders were the most frequent target of transfer, which is compatible with all the interventions being directed toward changes in policy and negotiations. Negotiators themselves were direct targets of transfer in five of the cases, while the public at large figured in four cases, with the governmental‐bureaucratic sector (policy makers) coming into three cases. Three of the interventions took a systems approach to transfer and worked to affect all targets of transfer simultaneously, thus aspiring to influence public opinion as well as policy making. These targets constitute a fairly common collection of the individuals and collectivities that interventions and participants work to influence in the direction of constructive conflict resolution. To the list can be added Cuhadar’s (2009) finding that in some cases, the participants (and organizers) of track two initiatives also carried information and ideas to the track one mediators. Although most work on transfer has focused on the upward effects on policy and decision‐making, public‐political constituencies and more broadly civil society are also legitimate targets of transfer in many interventions.

Identifying the targets of transfer in relation to the level of a PSW intervention and the motivations of the participants should not be a difficult matter, assuming that participants have connections to the intended targets. Certainly, some if not many high‐level decision makers and policymakers will be resistant to the products of unofficial conflict resolution interventions, but these reservations can be partly overcome by the judicious selection of participants and the seeking of tacit approval from authorities for the intervention beforehand.

The effects of transfer were presaged as objectives in Fisher’s (1972) model of third‐party consultation, which in addition to improved attitudes, identified an improved relationship and conflict resolution as desired outcomes. The improved relationship would involve open communication, a degree of trust, and a cooperative orientation to dealing with difficulties in the relationship. Conflict resolution was intended to denote a mutually satisfactory agreement on the issues in the conflict as well as the development of dispute management capacities so that future differences would be handled in a constructive manner.

In his evaluation model, Kelman (2008) identified influence on the policy makers, political atmosphere, and the nature of the agreement as the final steps in the chain of influences and results. He noted that the ideas created in PSWs by political influentials will generally follow the flow of diffusion in society from the elite level to the wider public. Through networking as well as public engagement, participants and those they influence can impact the political discourse and public thinking on the conflict and its resolution. Example effects include the prevailing moods or expectations and the types of options for resolution under consideration. More directly on policy, participants and those they influence can promote new ideas and options, which can be supported by the wider political effects included under atmosphere. As Kelman wrote: “According to this scenario, the approach of policy makers to the conflict and to negotiations would shift in the direction of seeking a reciprocal, mutually satisfactory agreement, conducive to a long‐term transformation of the relationship between the conflicting parties” (2008: 49). A high‐quality and lasting agreement is the final step in the chain, and along with it comes a changed relationship that is supportive of sustainable peace.

Over the past fifty years of developing unofficial methods of conflict resolution, the importance of changing relationships rather than simply achieving an agreement has come to be an essential ingredient of this work. Saunders summed it up well when he stated that the objective of sustained dialogue “is to transform conflictual or dysfunctional relationships so that people can work together to solve their problems” (2011: 262).

For the effects of transfer to come to fruition, they must survive the difficult re‐entry process by which participants go back to their home organizations, communities, and networks and attempt to influence others through their changed attitudes and behaviors. The proponents of PSWs are well aware that participants “encounter a wall of normative resistance upon their return” and that “the ability of participants to resist conformity pressures and to have influence on policymaking depends in part on their identity, stature, and political connections” (Fisher 1997: 199). Furthermore, the occurrence of transfer during and following re‐entry is typically assessed in an anecdotal rather than a rigorous or systematic manner for both methodological and ethical reasons (Fisher 1997; Kelman 2008). Nonetheless, the capacity to achieve transfer effects would appear to be the “Achilles Heel” of the PSW method.

The commentary on the challenges facing each component or step in the model, as provided at the end of each description above, demonstrates considerable variability in the strength of the barriers to transfer for the different steps. Given a strong design and an effective consultation process in addressing the conflict, well‐skilled practitioners should be able to invite appropriate participants and establish the required conditions of interaction and the qualities of a well‐functioning temporary group of problem solvers. Changing individual attitudes in a situation of highly escalated intergroup conflict is a major challenge, but one that theory and practice indicate can be overcome, thus achieving the first goal of transfer. This then enables the creation of joint products designed to de‐escalate and/or resolve the conflict, which are often unique and valuable outcomes. The mechanisms and targets of transfer appear to be in sufficient supply, and many targets are receptive to the process and products of transfer, given effective strategies and judicious choices by the participants.

The final step in the transfer process, that of effects that actually have influence or are implemented, turns out to be the greatest barrier to positive outcomes in relation to the conflict. The negative power of the re‐entry process to constrain or erase the individual changes experienced by participants can simply end their influence attempts on policymaking or public opinion. Even when individual changes persist, it appears that influence attempts meet a wall of normative resistance in the political culture and decision‐making systems of one or both societies in the conflict. A rare study of the effectiveness of track two efforts over an extended period of time in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict was undertaken by De Vries and Maoz (2013) through interviews with a small yet select sample of Israeli‐Jewish influentials who repeatedly had taken part in dialogue and problem‐solving meetings from 1992 to 2011. Using a grounded theory analysis, the researchers found that the majority of participants transformed their attitudes and views on the resolution of the conflict. However, they generally were unsuccessful in influencing the attitudes and behavior of policymakers or the general public. This lack of transfer effects is attributed to two primary limitations: (1) the lack of official support from political leaders for the track two efforts, and (2) a lack of representativeness of participants who did not mirror mainstream attitudes or the political spectrum, but were primarily peace activists. It is interesting to note that both these limitations can be prevented by following the principles for effective practice as articulated in earlier steps of the transfer model.

The development of the process and outcome model of transfer demonstrates that transfer is exceedingly complex and needs to be understood from the beginning of an unofficial conflict resolution intervention through implementation and beyond to the effects on a variety of targets. Thus, assessing transfer is coterminous with comprehensively evaluating interventions, so that attention should be given to the initial logic of the design, the implementation of activities, and the outcomes of the intervention. A wide range of research methods would be required to comprehensively and sensitively evaluate the sequential elements of transfer, as Kelman (2008) has proposed. Suffice it to say that comprehensive evaluation of transfer is a daunting challenge, which also must address ethical issues around treating workshop participants as research subjects rather than as fellow participants, both in the workshop and in their back‐home settings. Even if all constraints could be managed and comprehensive evaluations performed, it is likely that the exact and ultimate contributions of unofficial interventions to peace processes are unknowable in the context of a complex and dynamic field of influences at multiple levels acting to determine peace outcomes.

In relation to this complexity, there is also the question of what transfer effects the conflict intervention can—and cannot—be held accountable for. As Cuhadar (2009) has pointed out, the transfer of products and people is ultimately successful when in addition to carrying out these strategies effectively, there is both an openness on the part of decision makers/negotiators to outside information and the political willingness to implement the ideas on both sides. The first step in this chain of determinants (that the effects are brought to bear on individual targets) is the responsibility of the intervention organizers and participants, but the latter two conditions are largely beyond their influence. Thus, the meso and macro effects of transfer specified in the model will only come to fruition if there are enabling conditions in the organizational and societal contexts of the parties involved. Therefore, the immediate accountability and evaluation of PSWs should end at the point of successful implementation of transfer strategies or mechanisms that are within the management and the mandate of the organizers and participants. Ultimate effects may also be documented over time with the understanding that they are the outcomes of social movements and political developments largely beyond the scope of unofficial interventions.

In considering the transfer effects from specific conflict resolution interventions—PSWs in this case—it is acknowledged that the complexity and inclusivity of peace processes and negotiations have increased significantly over the past two decades with the development of participative methods such as national dialogues, consultative forums, observer roles, and peace commissions (Cuhadar and Paffenholz 2019). The move to consider more local input from the parties to a conflict is paralleled by the inclusion of local actors as organizers and facilitators of track two efforts (Allen, in press). A third‐party team of internal coordinators and external convenors combines the strengths of each to provide for more effective implementation and increased transfer at the local level.

In response to the proliferation of participative methods, it has been proposed that the concept of transfer be broadened to include these additional modalities of influence so that their transfer effects can be conceptualized and profitably studied (Cuhadar and Paffenholz 2019). This is a useful development that can assist in answering some of the many questions about how to attain sustainable peace following destructive and protracted conflict. Nonetheless, it is apparent that each of these modalities for input into negotiations will require its own model of transfer to specify the steps that lead to desired outcomes. This task is simplified, because as Cuhadar and Paffenholz (2019) point out, transfer is not relevant to a number of the newer modalities, including direct representation (e.g., national dialogues), observer status, public decision‐making, and mass action, since they have their own linkages to negotiations.

This exclusion leaves only inclusive commissions and a variety of consultations alongside “high‐level workshops” for consideration in the study and practice of transfer from indirect, participative sources. As opposed to PSWs, these modalities take a variety of different forms and are often designed to increase bottom‐up input into peace processes in the interests of inclusion. Thus, they can play a complementary role to PSWs designed to take a top‐down or a middle‐out approach. In addition, these modalities should lead to a broadening of unofficial input into negotiations and policymaking, hopefully in a way that supports the transfer effects coming from PSWs.

There are a number of points in the model where PSWs have the potential to affect both the process and the outcomes of negotiations between the parties. The most salient connections are often identified in the products or outcomes of workshops, which can include creative options, principles, or plans that can be fed directly into negotiations. Participants may also move into the role of negotiator, and thus become a mechanism of transfer that may carry individual attitude changes and the perceptual shift to a cooperative orientation into the negotiation interactions. Thus, they may also affect other negotiators as targets. Finally, the effects of transfer include a mutually beneficial agreement, which may be based simply on compromises that carry some benefits for both parties, or may be a mutual gain outcome that enhances each party’s benefits beyond those that were initially perceived.

The fields of conflict resolution and negotiation have long prescribed a cooperative, “win‐win” orientation to negotiations, even though the conflict situation is a mixed‐motive one involving competition. Since the early 1900s when Mary Parker Follett posited integration to address both parties’ interests over compromise or domination, negotiation theorists have pursued the holy grail of interest‐based, integrative bargaining and have identified important distinctions between it and distributive bargaining. The initial key in integrative bargaining is for the parties to focus on and understand not only their own interests, but those of the other party as well, so that together they can jointly create options to satisfy both sets of interests. A number of creative methods for achieving integrative outcomes also have been suggested. The second key in integrative negotiation is for each party to achieve greater gains on those items that are of higher priority to it but of lesser value to the other party. Thus, the creation of mutually beneficial linkages among issues creates joint value in the agreement beyond what was initially envisaged or available through compromise.

The experiences of the PSW enable participants to advise or take part in negotiations that have greater potential of producing integrative outcomes. The open and extensive sharing of interests, as well as of underlying values and basic human needs, provides the participants with a much deeper and shared understanding of both parties’ motivations, objectives, and priorities. The open communication, increased understanding and trust, and cooperative orientation can all encourage mutually beneficial and integrative behavior if transfer effects to negotiations are successful. Agreements involving mutual gain provide the strongest possible support for an improving relationship and a sustainable resolution of the conflict.

The model appears to capture the reality of the process and outcomes of transfer as represented in the literature and PSW practitioners’ experience. As such, scholars and practitioners can use the model to identify the elements of each component, the former to help focus their research efforts, and the latter to check the comprehensiveness of their practice work. In essence, the model elaborates the principles of effective PSW practice, and can sensitize practitioners to the importance of each step and the sequencing of steps to maximize potential transfer. In the same vein, researchers can use the model as a guide for studying or evaluating PSW interventions in greater depth and with increased complexity. In terms of further research, there is a need to validate the model by assessing its application to a variety of cases in an analytical manner. In addition, it is important to carry out process studies to look at interactions in the early steps of the model and interview studies to identify the mechanisms, targets, and effects of transfer.