Toward a Normative Turn in Track Two Diplomacy? A Review of the Literature

The year 2021 marks forty years since the term “Track Two diplomacy” was coined by American diplomat Joseph Montville and psychiatrist William Davidson (1981). The term originally referred to a burgeoning practice—pioneered by scholar‐practitioners—of facilitated informal interactions between unofficial but influential actors in armed conflict. Track Two Problem‐Solving Workshops (PSWs) (Kelman 1972) within the framework of “interactive conflict resolution” (ICR) (Fisher 1993) were conducted in armed conflict settings around the world as a complement to conventional dispute resolution conducted in formal settings by government, military, or diplomatic officials (Bercovitch 2009). Today, Track Two initiatives are an established part of peacemaking² policy and practice and the definition of Track Two has expanded to cover a greater range of activities. In a complex and decentralized peace and conflict landscape, large‐scale national dialogues (Paffenholz, Zachariassen, and Helfer 2017) and large‐scale parallel processes that feature the inclusion of civil society actors (Hellmüller and Zahar 2018) are also understood to include Track Two actors, especially within a multitrack peace process setting (Palmiano Federer et al. 2019). At the same time, professionalized conflict resolution nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are increasingly viewed as Track Two facilitators that work with both unofficial and official actors in Track Two dialogue settings. These modalities reflect a large paradigm shift in conflict resolution literature in which Track Two has become more professionalized, more dynamic, and more normative (Hellmüller, Palmiano Federer, and Zeller 2015; Turner and Wählisch 2021) as mounting empirical evidence points to the benefits of civil society inclusion (Nilsson 2012; Krause, Krause, and Bränfors 2018). Based on recent calls for Track Two scholars to look at how more inclusive peacemaking affects Track Two (Çuhadar and Paffenholz 2019; Gamaghelyan 2020; Jones 2020), this article asks how paradigm shifts, in particular this recent “normative turn” toward inclusivity in conflict resolution (Donais and McCandless 2017; Hellmüller, Pring, and Richmond 2020), are reflected in Track Two scholarship. Aside from a few notable exceptions focusing on the strong regional normative frameworks in the Asia Pacific region (Job 2003; Capie 2010; Acharya 2014), the impact of the inclusivity norm in Track Two literature has not been examined systematically, and there is a need to take stock of these new developments.

Based on the assumption of the “action‐oriented” nature of Track Two scholarship (Jones 2015a), I seek to answer the question through analyzing literature on Track Two from 1970 to 2020. In a first step, following the approach of Wall and Dunne (2012) to reviewing mediation literature through different paradigms and the process‐oriented approach of Duursma (2014), I review relevant literature on Track Two from 1970 to 2000 to draw out the main constitutive components of a Track Two initiative. In a second step, I look at Track Two literature from 2000 to 2020 with inclusion literature in conflict resolution and use my analytical framework to compare how this second “generation” of Track Two literature (Çuhadar and Paffenholz 2019) impacts each constitutive component.

My analysis of these strands of literature finds that much of Track Two scholarship has been increasingly influenced by a greater emphasis on the role of international norms in resolving conflict. This “normative turn” has broadened conceptualizations of what Track Two is and why it is conducted. Definitions of Track Two have broadened beyond small, discreet dialogues between unofficial actors toward more robust forms of “inclusive mediation” (Hirblinger and Landau 2020) that feature expanded conceptualizations of the modalities, participants, facilitators, formats, and objectives. By taking stock of how Track Two has been influenced by the normative turn, this analysis contributes new understandings of the actors, practices, and goals that constitute Track Two today and where it is headed.

This article begins with a discussion of theoretical and methodological factors that I considered as I undertook this literature review. It then discusses the first and second generations of classical Track Two theories throughout various paradigm shifts in conflict resolution and presents an analytical framework of the constitutive components of Track Two. The following section applies this framework to inclusion literature in conflict resolution and analyzes the similarities and differences. The article concludes with a discussion on the implications of the shift in Track Two toward more normative imperatives of conflict resolution and a future research agenda.

Following Mitchell (2001), Çuhadar and Paffenholz (2019), and Allen (2020), this review looks at the evolution of the iterative process between practice and theory development in Track Two. This is a core element of Track Two, as stated by one of the pioneers of the field, Herbert Kelman:

Thus, critical to a review of this field is an understanding of the paradigms of conflict resolution theory and practice in which Track Two is situated. The first generation of Track Two literature was written during the Cold War and immediate post‐Cold War period, roughly between the 1970s and the turn of the millennium, in which dominant approaches to conflict resolution were heavily influenced by strategic bargaining, rational actor frameworks, and game theory (Ramsbotham, Miall, and Woodhouse 2011). It brought a novel approach of social psychology into a heavily positivist environment, resulting in a niche collection of theoretical work highlighting the socialized nature of intractable conflict (Azar 1990). The second generation of Track Two literature reflects the advent, growth, and upheaval of the liberal peacebuilding paradigm that started in the 1990s and gathered pace between the 2000s and the 2020s. In this generation, Track Two theories expanded to include more sophisticated notions of multitrack processes and focus on how outcomes within Track Two initiatives can be transferred to Track One official processes or political processes writ large.

Methodologically, I followed the requirements for an effective systematic review as outlined by Higgins et al. (2021) and exemplified by Van Baalen and Mobjörk (2018): the articulation of a clearly stated set of objectives with selection criteria; an explicit methodology; a systematic search to identify relevant studies that meet the selection criteria; and an analysis and synthesis of findings (Van Baalen and Mobjörk 2018). My main objective was to take stock of Track Two theoretical literature since its emergence in the 1970s to investigate how paradigm shifts, in particular the recent normative turn toward inclusivity in conflict resolution, impact Track Two scholarship. I answer this question with a systematic review based on the iterative relationship between theory and practice described above. My departure point was to analyze the core theoretical outputs of the small group of scholar‐practitioners who are commonly seen as pioneers of the field, including John Burton (1969), Herbert Kelman (1972), Leonard Doob (Doob and Foltz 1973), Edward Azar (1990), Ronald Fisher (1972), Davidson and Montville (1981), and Christopher Mitchell (1981). I analyzed the bibliographies of texts that had widespread impact on the field such as Burton (1969) and Kelman (1972); bibliographies of standard overview texts such as Fisher (2005), d’Estrée (2008), Davies and Kaufman (2003a, 2003b), and Jones (2015); and several works on Track Two from policy literature, such as Palmiano Federer et al. (2019) and Christien (2020). Using the University of Ottawa OMNI database, ProQuest, and Google Scholar, I also performed keyword searches of peer‐reviewed articles published between 1970 and 2020 using search terms such as “Track Two,” “interactive conflict resolution,” “problem‐solving workshop,” “multitrack,” and “inclusion.” As I am primarily interested in theoretical developments in the field, I focused on theoretical essays rather than empirical case studies, but included case studies that advanced an explicit theoretical proposition. I only analyzed articles published in English. In sum, I included seventy publications that discuss Track Two (thirty‐two articles, thirty books or book chapters, and eight policy publications) in my analysis.

Track Two was borne out of an increasingly popular social‐psychological approach to peacemaking that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s at the tail end of the Cold War. Concepts were drawn from informal meetings between conflicting parties that were facilitated by a small group of European, Australian, and North American scholar‐practitioners. Concepts such as “controlled communication,” “problem‐solving workshops,” and “interactive conflict resolution” (Burton 1969; Kelman 1972; Fisher 1993), which promoted an unofficial, problem‐solving approach to peacemaking through an informal workshop setting, developed alongside the concept of “Track Two diplomacy.” Many of these terms were used interchangeably. The first use of the term “Track Two” is often attributed to American diplomat Joseph Montville, who—along with his colleague, William Davidson—in 1981 defined Track Two diplomacy as “unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary groups or nations that aim to develop strategies, influence public opinion, [and] organize human and material resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict” (192). Their understanding of the merits of such an approach drew from political psychology and social psychology (Montville 1990). Applying this approach to conflict resolution constituted a growing departure from the conventional understanding that diplomacy operates in a Track One setting, in which official government representatives negotiate within a framework of strategic bargaining (Kydd 2010). Montville and Davidson’s (1981) coining of Track Two was nested within a larger paradigmatic shift within conflict resolution and international relations, in which conflict was viewed as intrinsic to human relationships between different social groups. From this perspective, conflict was something to be mitigated, rather than eliminated as a dysfunctional by‐product of interstate relationships (Burton 1969, 1972; Azar 1990).

The core method of Track Two diplomacy became the PSW (Burton 1969; Fisher 1972; Mitchell 1981), which reflected a larger approach of ICR in which facilitators, in essence, supported parties in moving from a zero‐sum bargaining mindset to a joint problem‐solving one. The unofficial nature of PSWs distinguished Track Two initiatives from the methods used in Track One. Track Two participants were not official government actors but influential private citizens and thought leaders in their communities. They were invited by panels of scholar‐practitioners to discuss sensitive issues in an informal setting and generate ideas to bring into the Track One formal process (Kelman 1972). These scholar‐practitioners, often social scientists who subsequently conceptualized this practice in academic scholarship (Kelman and Cohen 1976), took on the role of third parties practicing a facilitative approach that focused on changing attitudes, developing common ground, and influencing social thinking and learning (Deutsch 1973) through a participative design process (Saunders 1999).

Track Two initiatives, conducted in the throes of the Cold War in which realism and power brokerage reigned supreme in conflict resolution, were sometimes met with uncertainty and suspicion by Track One actors (Chataway 1998). Nevertheless, the concept of Track Two diplomacy caught on and an increasing number of PSW workshops took place discreetly (Hare 1992) between conflicting groups in Northern Ireland (Doob and Foltz 1973) and—most prominently in the literature—Israel and Palestine (Kelman 1972; Rouhana and Kelman 1994).

In the 1990s, Track Two theory was influenced by an increasingly liberal international world order and an emerging peace research field, broadening to include multiple tracks featuring many modalities, formats, settings, and actors. By the end of the Cold War, conflict resolution scholarship had shifted from strategic bargaining as a dominant conceptual framework toward a different type of conflict resolution that reflected the emerging liberal international order (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 1999; Kriesberg 2001). Research increasingly described the need to transform societies in conflict beyond simply managing or resolving conflict. Track Two literature reflected this theoretical shift in its expansion beyond formal diplomacy to include more actors. Diamond and McDonald (1996) expanded on the systems thinking approach that had influenced early Track Two scholars by introducing a conceptual framework of “multitrack diplomacy” that featured nine tracks of actors ranging from private citizens to business actors to media institutions. These tracks are interdependent and rely on each other’s unique characteristics and comparative advantages to contribute to peace. Lederach’s seminal work on conflict transformation further broadened the “Track” concept by adapting three levels of tracks to represent different levels of society in a pyramid format that features different types of actors conducting various types of peacemaking activities depending on the level of society they represented (1997). In Lederach’s pyramid track model, Track One consists of top leadership in societies (e.g., military, political, and religious leaders) conducting high‐level official negotiations, while Track Two is viewed as middle‐range leadership from ethnic or religious groups, academic institutions, and humanitarian organizations conducting problem‐solving workshops, training in conflict resolution, and working within insider‐partial mediation teams (Wehr and Lederach 1991).

While Diamond and McDonald’s multitrack diplomacy model offers a systems approach to divide Track Two into different tracks (1996), Lederach adds a third track to incorporate the growing consensus around a bottom‐up approach to sustainable peace. Track Three represents the grassroots level of society in which local and community leaders of indigenous groups, health institutions, and refugee camps are integrated into peace processes by conducting local peace commissions, psychosocial (trauma healing) work, and community activism. Track Two in this regard becomes an important form of linkage (Chataway 1998) and also signals the rise of “dialogue” as a prominent form of conflict resolution (Rothman 1998). Harold Saunders’s development of dialogue methodologies around a “public peace process” (1999) and “circum‐negotiation” (2001) and Ronald Fisher’s work on connecting Track Two dialogues to broader segments of society beyond official actors (1997) highlight the shift toward creating impact beyond Track One level processes. Norbert Ropers provided a useful taxonomy of different types of dialogues and how these relate to various forms of conflict management (Ropers 2004). These conceptual additions represent the broadening of the actors and objectives of Track Two, dovetailing with the broadening notion of peace beyond the cessation of hostilities into something more sustainable, legitimate, and effective.

The proliferation of PSWs and other ICR workshops led to scholars calling for greater empirical evidence evaluating the positive and negative impacts of such Track Two initiatives, including greater conceptual and theoretical work on the fit for purpose of methodology, objectives, and the nature of the third parties facilitating such workshops (Rouhana 1995). These calls were met with studies increasingly focusing on the notion of “transfer” (Kelman 1972), studying the mechanisms through which the outcomes of unofficial Track Two initiatives influence, impact, or affect official Track One processes or larger political environments beyond the workshop.

Throughout this accumulated body of knowledge (e.g., Pearson d’Estrée 2008; Çuhadar and Paffenholz 2019), a common set of constitutive components of a Track Two initiative emerge. I apply Wall and Dunne (2012) and Duursma’s “staged conceptualization” (2014: 81) approach of a mediation process to this subfield of dedicated Track Two scholarship and suggest a categorization of the four constitutive components of a Track Two process: (1) the participants, (2) the third party, (3) the format, and (4) the objective of the particular process or initiative (Table One).

In the 2000s and 2010s, an increasingly globalized world order characterized by conflict complexity was accompanied by more nuanced understandings of how to study, resolve, and transform conflict (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2004). Scholars began to focus on the interactions between the tracks (Chataway 1998; Strimling 2006) and developed the notion of “Track 1.5,” which describes activities in which unofficial actors work with official representatives of the conflict parties (Mapendere 2005; Nan 2005; Nan, Horr, and Druckman 2009) in order to bring about changes in how the parties perceived each other. This development dovetailed with the conflict resolution field’s turn toward change (Mitchell 2005) and process‐oriented thinking (Stern and Druckman 2000) about the design process and “theories of change” underlying an intervention (Shapiro 2006; Anderson, Chigas, and Woodrow 2007). Jones (2015a) described theories of change applied to Track Two initiatives as facilitators’ or practitioners’ intentional thinking around how the specific initiatives bring about change at an individual, intergroup, or societal level. This process‐oriented thinking and intentional approach to change in Track Two diplomacy in turn influenced the way Track Two scholars thought about transfer. Studies in this period also focused on understanding what “success” looks like in a Track Two initiative (Pearson d'Estree, Fast, and Weiss 2001; Fisher 2005; Benziman 2016) and how to measure it empirically (Çuhadar 2009; Böhmelt 2010; Çuhadar and Dayton 2012; De Vries and Maoz 2013; Jones 2019).

Track Two scholars also increasingly contributed case studies focusing on regional security aspects of Track Two in Africa (Bartoli 1999; Lieberfeld 2002), Asia (Job 2003; Ball, Milner, and Taylor 2006; Evans 2009; Capie 2010), and the Middle East (Kaye 2009; Jones 2015b). Past ICR workshops focused on the Cold War (Voorhees 2002), the Israel–Palestine conflict (Maoz 2000; Çuhadar 2009; Kellen, Bekerman, and Maoz 2012), and the conflict in Northern Ireland (Dochartaigh 2011) were analyzed using both quantitative analysis and case studies. Scholars studied ICR workshops to learn from them so they could advance Track Two scholarship on the concept of “transfer.” These new developments also facilitated more comprehensive overviews of the concepts, theories, and cases that illuminate what Track Two is and what it seeks to achieve (Jones 2015a).

In the following section, I analyze this normative turn in conflict resolution and its effects on Track Two theory.

Peacemaking mechanisms such as mediation and dialogue have become established ways of resolving conflict. In this post‐Cold War period, conceptions of internationally mediated settlements of armed conflicts have evolved from being an exercise in strategic‐bargaining negotiations into complex, fragmented, and highly internationalized peace processes (Kriesberg 2001). The liberal peace paradigm—the imperative to develop democratic markets and institutions in post‐conflict and transitioning societies (Richmond 2018)—while highly critiqued for the exportation and proselytization of a liberal democratic order and, at its worst, grossly ahistorical, apolitical approaches to conflict (Mac Ginty 2008; Lidén, Mac Ginty, and Richmond 2009; Autesserre 2010; Sabaratnam 2011), has prevailed into the present day, but with important discussions about local resistance and the nature of international norms and the role they play in peacebuilding.

Conflict resolution literature, in particular scholarship on mediation and peacemaking, is experiencing a “normative turn” (Hellmüller, Palmiano Federer, and Zeller 2015; Hellmüller, Pring, and Richmond 2020). It has begun to focus on the increasing normative mandates and parameters set out for mediators and the impact they have on the conduct and outcome of peace processes. Mediators are increasingly mandated to incorporate rights‐based norms such as gender equality and transitional justice into their interventions (Fuentes Julio and Drummond 2017; Hayner 2018; Lorentzen 2020). While scholars have focused on how mediators promote such norms (Vuković 2020), the situations and dilemmas where norms and values clash (Kraus et al. 2019), and case studies on the spread and diffusion of specific norms (Zahar 2012; Pring 2017; Hellmüller 2019b), analysis of the role of norms per se is still emerging in Track Two literature. There is dedicated scholarship on the ideational parameters of conducting Track Two diplomacy in the Asia‐Pacific region (Job 2003; Acharya 2014), given the strongly held normative frameworks of quiet diplomacy and nonintervention in the region (Ramcharan 2000), but more broadly framed scholarship around norms of inclusivity and local ownership (Çuhadar and Paffenholz 2019; Allen 2020; Gamaghelyan 2020) urge further research into these themes.

The norm of inclusivity, defined by the United Nations Guidance for Effective Mediation as “the extent and manner in which the views and needs of conflict parties and other stakeholders are represented and integrated into the process and outcome of a mediation effort” (United Nations 2012: 11), has become ubiquitous in conflict resolution, specifically literature on mediation, dialogues, and peace processes (Hirblinger and Landau 2020). This broad call for inclusive processes without defining how, why, and for whom, has prompted mediation scholars to theorize different rationales for inclusive peace processes (Hirblinger and Landau 2020). These rationales exist on a spectrum, ranging from the strategic inclusion of armed actors for reasons related to durable peace agreements (Nilsson 2012), a need for power sharing (Raffoul 2020), and incentives for actors identified as spoilers (Blaydes and de Maio 2010; Zahar 2010; Nilsson and Söderberg Kovacs 2011); to the inclusion of civil society (Wanis St‐John and Kew 2008)—particularly women (Lorentzen 2020), youth (Grizelj 2019), religious leaders (Kmec and Ganiel 2019), and business actors (Alluri 2013)—for normative imperatives of empowerment and rights‐based participation.

Track Two is increasingly considered by peace practitioners and policymakers as a way to make peace processes more inclusive. According to experts from the United States Institute of Peace, “More successful track 2 processes consider the importance of diverse stakeholders, work to fill in the gaps of the larger peace effort, and address power asymmetry among participants” (Staats, Walsh, and Tucci 2019). The Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 notes gender disparities between Track 1 and Track 2 participants:

The assumption that Track Two creates more opportunities for civil society inclusion has not yet been explored systematically in Track Two literature.

Inclusion literature focusing on civil society participation in peace processes has centered the imperative to include representatives from civil society categories and groups (Hellmüller 2019a), such as women, youth, business actors, and religious leaders (Hellmüller 2020).³ While the unofficial nature of participants has been noted in Track Two literature (Kelman 2000; Chigas 2007), the normative imperative that they should be included at the Track One level has become more explicit.

The first generation of literature focuses on identifying who takes part in a Track Two initiative. Because of the large variation in individuals who are unofficial actors but able to influence the political culture (Fisher 2020), scholars have tried to distinguish how participants from different societal levels take part in a given Track Two activity. This includes distinguishing between “hard Track Two” and “soft Track Two.” Hard Track Two activities are relatively exclusive, discreet dialogues between a small number of officials acting in a private capacity, as well as retired officials, influential thought leaders, and civil society elites. Soft Track Two activities include a broader gambit of conflict resolution experts, influential citizens, academics, and journalists (Agha, Feldman, and Khalidi 2004). This generation of scholarship tends to view participants in terms of their potential for effective “transfer”—either to political decision‐makers or broader segments of society (Fisher 1972).

The normative turn has, moreover, centered “soft Track Two” actors in policy discourse and scholarship, namely, “civil society actors, diplomats, academics and other actors” (Dayal and Christien 2020: 70). The second generation of scholarship explicitly referring to inclusivity argues that Track Two has evolved from influencing elites and political decision‐makers to “influencing society writ large by transforming relationships and reconciliation among stakeholders” (Çuhadar and Paffenholz 2019: 658) in more complex and dynamic settings. In short, Track Two dialogues are no longer primarily about gathering unofficial actors who can influence Track One for quiet problem‐solving discussions, but about influencing society as a whole. This emphasis on broader and more systematic participation by civil society in peace processes is not exactly new, as both Diamond and McDonald (1996) and Saunders (1999) spoke of this many years ago, but it has been identified as crucial to the field and an increasingly critical marker of what constitutes best practice. For instance, burgeoning literature analyzing women’s contributions to Track Two suggests that “women pursuing Track II diplomacy have been more successful legitimating formal peace processes” (Dayal and Christien 2020: 71).

The normative turn has broadened not only who takes part in Track Two activities, but who facilitates them. The understanding of a Track Two intermediary has widened beyond the scholar‐practitioner acting in a private capacity (Kelman 1992; Lehrs 2016) to include professionalized NGOs. The first generation of Track Two literature focused on the functions of intermediaries, namely, the responsibilities of third parties to facilitate communication so that participants could move from a mindset of bargaining toward one of problem‐solving. It also focused on the methodology of the problem‐solving approach and the unofficial nature of the participants involved rather than the type of third party who organizes these activities (Chataway 1998). While the literature noted the importance of an academic setting in which to hold a problem‐solving workshop as well as the involvement of a scholar‐practitioner to lend credibility to the process, there is no consensus on who should conduct Track Two dialogues, nor is there a universally accepted certification process (Mandell and Fisher 1992; Jones 2015a). Relevant studies focus on interpersonal skills, communication skills, and expertise in the problem‐solving approach and often imply that Track Two third parties are private citizens that come from academic backgrounds in the conflict resolution field. Kelman is one of the few scholars to state explicitly that the third party is typically a panel of social scientists with expertise in group processes and at least some expertise related to the context of the dispute (2000). Track Two third parties do not propose solutions. As noted, they facilitate a shift in the parties’ approach from one of bargaining to one of problem‐solving (Jones 2015a).

The second generation of Track Two literature also has discussed the role that unofficial organizations play as third parties (Fitzduff and Church 2004; Chigas 2007; Schiff 2010). While rich scholarship exists on NGOs active in conflict resolution and peacemaking more broadly (Ropers 2004; DeMars 2005; Ahmed and Potter 2006), NGO‐led mediation remained a significant but rare occurrence at the beginning of the 2000s (Bartoli 2008). Kelman also envisioned a more institutionalized form of intervention that systematically applies Track Two diplomacy concepts and methods, with dedicated specialists and analysts that bridge context‐specific and thematic expertise on PSWs within an ICR approach (2000). Twenty years later, these types of institutions exist in the form of networks of professionalized NGOs, or “NGO mediators,” that have incorporated dialogue and mediation into their sphere of activities (Shea 2016; Palmiano Federer 2021a). The successful mediation by the Community of Sant’Egidio, a lay organization of the Catholic Church, in Mozambique’s long‐running civil war (Bartoli 1999) set an important precedent in NGO‐led mediation not just at the Track Two level, but at the Track 1 and Track 1.5 levels as well (Lehti 2018). This was followed by the emergence of secular NGOs taking on lead mediation roles and actively brokering agreements between conflicting parties, such as the Carter Center (Taulbee and Creekmore 2003), the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, and the Crisis Management Initiative (Martin 2006). Initial empirical analysis of the conflict resolution and peacemaking services provided by leading conflict resolution NGOs shows that NGO‐led mediation focuses on a set of activities leaning heavily on informal and unofficial facilitation, supporting parties on content matters and offering mediation support activities to mediators and the conflict parties themselves such as capacity building, advising/training, research, and study trips to other conflict contexts (Palmiano Federer 2020).

This “new” type of unofficial third party conducts activities at all levels of tracks. At the Track One level, NGO mediators can facilitate negotiations with official negotiating parties; provide mediation support to mediators; facilitate parallel informal dialogues between individuals from conflict parties (Track 1.5); conduct dialogues at the Track Two level; and work with grassroots community members at the Track Three level (Lanz, Sguaitamatti, and Siegfried 2009). While the literature on these actors mainly has analyzed Track One activities, several studies describe the array of “activities of Track Two diplomats” that includes organizing PSWs, acting as go‐betweens in dialogues, advising behind the scenes, and conducting knowledge production activities such as seminars and conferences (Naidoo 2000). The literature also has discussed the increasing number of NGOs leading and supporting multitrack mediation processes as intermediaries and dialogue facilitators in several African conflict contexts (Aeby 2021). Leading NGO mediators’ activities and initiatives often consist of conducting consultations and supporting parallel processes and dialogues among non‐armed actors (Palmiano Federer 2020) to promote their inclusion in Track One processes. These types of activities are sometimes categorized in policy discourse under Track Two as well as Track Three without enough discussion on how they influence or impact Track Two theory.

The first generation of Track Two literature focused primarily on the PSW as a core method of ICR. Recent Track Two literature argues that because of the emerging inclusivity norm, the meaningful participation of Track Two civil society actors is no longer viewed ambivalently by many official actors, but is prioritized as a key component of multitrack, multilayered inclusive peacemaking. This is evidenced by an increased interest in “multitrack approaches to peace processes” in which the Track Two label is given to a wide range of unofficial peacemaking activities in a larger “peace architecture” of organizations, actors, and mediators (Palmiano Federer et al. 2019).

Earlier second‐generation literature on Track Two reflected a broader understanding of what Track Two is, beyond the PSW. Track Two activities were described as a suite of “intergroup dialogues, training, interactive conflict resolution or problem‐solving workshops, and public peace education” (Burgess and Burgess 2010: 29). However, the inclusivity norm has rebranded many of these Track Two activities as vehicles toward greater inclusion. Workshops and dialogues are increasingly focused on how to foster greater inclusion of non‐armed civil society actors (Çuhadar and Paffenholz 2019). The Track Two “label” no longer just refers to a distinct form of unofficial dialogue with a specific set of methods and participants or a means to transfer into Track One, but is promoted as a platform for meaningful inclusion, especially within a multitrack or parallel‐process setting (Palmiano Federer et al. 2019). According to the European Union’s Peace Mediation Guidelines, “Multi‐track approaches strengthen inclusivity and can build the foundation for a solid peace architecture around which the broader peace partnerships mobilise” (European External Action Service 2020: 12).

Track Two objectives have evolved from a narrow focus on transfer into Track One to broader goals that increasingly encompass greater civil society inclusion in peace processes. Transfer into Track One remains a necessity, but the normative turn argues that it may not be sufficient for legitimate, sustainable, and implementable outcomes. This has led to the recognition of “stand‐alone” Track Two initiatives that do not necessarily need to feed into Track One, as well as the importance of linking tracks more systematically.

In the first generation of scholarship, the objectives of a PSW or ICR process centered around changing workshop participants’ perspectives toward each other and the conflict as well as the transfer of these attitudinal and behavioral changes outside the workshop setting toward political decision‐making and public discussion (Chataway 1998). Fisher (1997) has written on the question of transfer to whom, theorizing that transfer from a PSW is intended not only to leadership and diplomats in negotiations, but across public‐political constituencies. Jones (2015a) develops this line of thinking through multidirectional transfer, in which the effects of Track Two workshops are not only transferred vertically or upward to Track One elite‐level discussions, but across, horizontally, and downward toward other Track Two civil society actors or to Track Three. There is also rich scholarship on what outcomes are transferred (e.g., ideas for negotiated texts and the inclusion of participants in Track One processes themselves) as well as emerging scholarship on how, or the mechanisms through which, transfer occurs (Fisher 2020; Pearson d’Estrée and Fox 2020).

Second‐generation Track Two literature reflects broadened objectives: “[T]he former [generation] aims at track‐one negotiations and policymaking, while the latter aims at societal change and conflict transformation writ large” (Çuhadar and Paffenholz 2019: 659). Transfer into Track One official processes remains the priority, but the normative imperative of inclusive peace processes has cemented Track Two actors’ role as equally important in the durability, legitimacy, and sustainability of the implementation of peace agreements signed at the Track One level. The increased number of empirical studies that link the durability of peace agreements to the greater inclusion of actors is often associated with Track Two (e.g., civil society, including women’s organizations, youth, and religious actors). By extension, Track Two scholarship is starting to focus on the dynamics of local ownership in Track Two processes (Allen 2020) and critically examining the overemphasis on transfer into Track One and the assumption that linkage is inherently favorable and effective (Palmiano Federer et al. 2019). This signals a slight departure from the first generation of Track Two scholarship that assumes the necessity for transfer writ large; insights from empirical cases and practice suggest that the reality might be more nuanced.

The analysis of Track Two embedded in specific paradigms of conflict resolution theory show an evolution from a “narrow” to a “broad” conception of what modalities constitute a Track Two initiative. Now meeting a normative turn in conflict resolution, a swathe of additional actors and activities fall under the umbrella of Track Two. While the core components of participants, third parties, informal settings, and specific objectives have not changed, the modalities through which these occur are believed by many to have evolved greatly. The evolution of these constitutive components of Track Two initiatives is reflected in Table Two:

The evolution of these constitutive elements suggests a broader definition of Track Two: Informal dialogue activities between actors in their unofficial capacity, facilitated by third‐party intermediaries with the objective of resolving or transforming conflict. This broader definition has several implications for the conflict resolution field. First, the normative imperative to broaden participation of non‐armed actors in peace processes has centered civil society actors as target participants, moving beyond carefully selected influential elites (Jones 2015). Second, the field increasingly recognizes the institutionalization of NGOs as third parties in Track Two initiatives and as promoters of inclusion (Pring and Palmiano Federer 2020). Third, the inclusivity norm has embedded Track Two within the increasingly mainstreamed multitrack approach to peace processes as a modality for inclusion rather than a distinct form of unofficial conflict resolution with a specific history and methodology. No longer theorized only as an alternative space to Track One processes, Track Two is increasingly viewed as a way to foster greater inclusion by fostering linkages between the other tracks.

These developments present opportunities and risks for the conflict resolution field. Based on the assumption that greater inclusion fosters more effective peace process outcomes, the theoretical evolution of Track Two presents a tremendous opportunity to create materially positive outcomes in conflict settings. However, this conceptual stretching of the term “Track Two” can create the perception that Track Two is simultaneously everything and nothing. This risks Track Two losing its specific value and utility in the crowded market of conflict resolution supply and demand.⁴

This article aimed to take stock of the evolution of Track Two theory decades after its emergence in the conflict resolution field. Originally viewed with ambivalence by conventional peacemaking actors such as diplomats or envoys mandated by formal institutions, Track Two is currently a prominent and established part of peacemaking vernacular and practice. This review illustrates that Track Two initiatives have become more complex and dynamic. Such initiatives also have placed a greater emphasis on the promotion of certain norms and objectives. However, this normative turn is only beginning in Track Two literature, and more research on how Track Two initiatives can be a mechanism for the transfer of norms such as inclusivity is welcome, as the field already features sophisticated theories around the transfer of ideas generated in a PSW. Furthermore, Track Two scholarship has thus far focused on the resolution of armed conflict settings, often ethnic or identity conflicts that have turned violent. There is increasing interest in applying Track Two methods and concepts to nontraditional conflict settings. In the contexts of the climate crisis and the COVID‐19 pandemic, innovative interdisciplinary research is needed to understand how conflicts in such areas as the environmental and public health sectors could be mitigated through informal and unofficial dialogues in increasingly polarized societies. Track Two has evolved in scope and scale over time, but the iterative relationship between theory and practice, no matter the paradigmatic shifts of the conflict resolution field, will remain a central constant in understanding how to study and conduct this unique form of conflict resolution.