In this time of “false facts” and manipulated history, what can we learn about negotiation from a novel? A lot! Deepak Malhotra, longtime professor of negotiation, dealmaking, and conflict resolution at Harvard Business School, has written a thriller and science fiction novel that puts flesh (both earthbound and “alien”) on the bones of many of our negotiation concepts. I will not spoil the much‐recommended reading of this book by revealing plot points here but instead will extract the teachings and process observations that come from this novel.
What if the United States and the rest of Earth were to be invaded by “aliens” from another planet/world/solar system and we did not know if they meant us harm? Do we assume ill will and the inevitability of war or do we approach with peace in our hearts and communication strategies in our brains? How do we decide how to negotiate and what offers (if any) to make when we don’t speak the same language and may not even have congruent values? This is the premise of The Peacemaker’s Code, whose protagonist is Distinguished History Professor D. Kilmer—adopted son of a math teacher and a nurse, and author of Heirs of Herodotus. Kilmer is asked to advise US President Whitman (the nation’s first female commander in Chief) and her Cabinet and staff—a group that includes love and intellectual interest CIA Agent Renata Silla and a few of Kilmer’s former students. The President has called on Kilmer to recommend strategies for approaching the aliens, based on his presumed expertise from history’s past lessons. Will there be war or peace, conflict escalation or conflict resolution? How do we negotiate for peace and continued human (and alien) flourishing? What should be our “first offer” (if any)? Can this “problem” in fact be solved?
Whatever you think of sci‐fi (I am not usually a fan), this projection into scary, but increasingly possible, future scenarios is a tour de force of a negotiation teacher’s hypothetical hypotheticals—a rich source of simulations, role‐plays, what‐ifs, and mini‐exercises to explore in class. In this review, without spoiling plot points, I will discuss how Malhotra skillfully employs dialogue, increasingly complex situations, a variety of characters, and many unknowns to illustrate, in situ, how negotiators must combine theory, history, strategy, and negotiation’s canonical concepts to make decisions, act, and then interpret, evaluate, and act again (or not) in dynamic situations. As one of the decision makers says: “A professor of mine once said something like…don’t reward people for the right answer. Reward them for coming up with good arguments. Only good arguments can guide you to the right answer” (35). By having different characters make arguments for different tactics (use of force, coded messages, waiting passively for further information), we can see the enactment of different negotiation theories and strategies in “real” (OK, fictional) time.
As the characters and complex plot move backward and forward in time, with occasional “interludes” of extracts from Kilmer’s history book, we discover that we can learn only so much from analogical thinking. Was Khrushchev like Hitler? If the US warred in Korea to stop Chinese aggression, how did that work out in Vietnam? Do we “speak softly but carry a big stick” as Theodore Roosevelt advised (what does that mean in an atomic age?) and how did we do when analogizing from the war in Afghanistan to the war in Iraq? What lessons can we extract from these historical moments? What options did the parties have and how would different choices have led to different narratives? In fact, as good historiography (and good negotiation theory) tell us, history is full of contextual details that make case studies interesting but insufficient when looking to the past to inform the present (Vivet 2019). Moreover, as Professor Kilmer tells us through his scholarly writings excerpted in the novel, it is not only the “victors” who write history—these days losers tell their stories, too.
Malhotra’s characters inform us didactically with both questions and mini‐lectures (yay for professors as characters in novels!) as they analyze history and explore “what if” scenarios. But they also draw from other disciplines as they negotiate with the aliens. Kilmer, Cabinet officers, and other advisors suggest the use of science, logic, speculation, and yes, feelings! They also look to literature—especially Sherlock Holmes mysteries—in deciding how to solve problems, as they eliminate the impossible but consider the improbable.
When Kilmer is brought in to advise the US government on its response to the aliens and their possible threats, rich discussion of the process of problem‐solving ensues, and Kilmer recalls the claim of his father—the math teacher—that “every problem wants to be solved” (30). A variety of strategies is considered, including conventional adversarial approaches like military force and, more familiar to readers of this journal, efforts to communicate and gather information before acting. In a wonderful illustration of the concept of “backward mapping” (Sebenius 2004), decision makers are asked to engage in “backward induction” (15) to understand alien motivation. Why would the aliens come to Earth if they were not fairly confident of “winning” a military encounter? Consider that although they are not on their “home court,” the very fact that they have arrived to Earth demonstrates a likely superior intelligence and certainly superior technology. Contexts matter and even the same context can have different effects—being at “home” in negotiations is not always an advantage. The aliens are physically closer to Earth, perhaps with great resources and technology, and likely have the means to exit if they choose to. What does the mere fact of their arrival convey about their comprehension of Earth and its inhabitants? Decision makers must consider what the aliens know and what has yet to be revealed, and certainly must be wary of assuming that they even know what they don’t know (the “unknown unknowns” as Donald Rumsfeld liked to say). Is this group of “aliens” like others whom earthlings have battled or a totally different “species”?
As advisors and government officials debate and argue, they consider both process and substance. Early on in the novel, the mapping of strategy sessions for considering first responses illustrates major negotiation concepts. Government officials, for example, may need reminding that it is almost always harder to de‐escalate, than to escalate a conflict (Pruitt and Rubin 1986), suggesting that use of force may backfire (especially where the military strength of the other side may not be known). And a plethora of questions must be contemplated: How do we consider what the other party wants (interests?) What are the possible negotiated solutions? What alternatives do we have to such solutions, and what alternatives do the aliens have? Who is with us and who might have a different perspective? What are possible coalitions? In what order should we notify NATO, Russia, and China? How can we communicate with an unknown “adversary”? Discussion of communication strategy here replicates some of the early days of negotiation theory—Cold War pre‐red telephone, acting notwithstanding a lack of communication. (See Axelrod’s “tit for tat” computer tournament [Axelrod 1984]). If we use force, what is our Plan B (BATNA, WATNA)? Should President Whitman make decisions on her own? Or should she act by consensus or in accordance with a Cabinet vote? (Clearly, a Harvard Business School professor‐author has his characters consider different leadership models, all in the middle of the world’s biggest crisis!)
For this reader, the novel brought to (fictional) life the teachings of one of the founders of our field, Howard Raiffa, who asked how we advise negotiators if we are not the primary negotiators ourselves. Should we engage in normative/prescriptive advice suggesting “moves” we hope will improve outcomes for one side or both? Is the goal to pursue peace and continued existence? Or is this just an exercise in description, dissecting possible moves, and their pros and cons, and the “predicted” responses (especially, as here, where we know very little about our “opponent” or “partner”)? When should we counsel for breaks or “wait and see” strategies (or as Bill Ury would say—“go to the balcony” for a time out [Ury 1991]), understanding that sometimes no action is better than overaction? In an excerpt from Kilmer’s history book, Malhotra presciently fears that people will act without consulting experts. What is the gap between those “who know and those who don’t know?” (142) How much danger do we face when the latter are in power, making decisions? Good advisors can move us to consider the long‐term effects of short‐term choices. This is especially so where it is unclear whether we are considering self‐interests or interests that are national, joint, or international. These are complex questions of foreign policy and diplomacy, as well as more mundane matters related to business and the law.
The novel does a wonderful job of showing us the brave new world we have entered—negotiating with artificial intelligence as the American team tries to develop a “code” or communication system with seemingly more advanced aliens. What do they know of English? How can we use lights, timing, and other symbols to test communication? Trial and error? What has meaning to one “side” may be illegible to others. What symbols of our culture should we send in a “care package” (like a time capsule) to indicate US intentions to the other side—books, a cell phone, a telescope? What would you, dear reader, suggest to telegraph who “we” are to an unfamiliar negotiation partner? Here we “see” what the aliens have learned about “us” from scouring the Internet—yikes!—what kind of picture does that create of earthlings?
And we come to see the limitations of our work. Our good advice to government leaders may be for naught as they act within political constraints, answerable to complicated constituencies, the public, and the press. Moreover, mistakes are inevitable. How we use and learn from them is not. The negotiators in The Peacemaker’s Code must regroup, use contingent plans, and show patience and resiliency. Not everything can be scripted in advance and so even with all the pages devoted to planning and strategy sessions, Malhotra demonstrates the complexity, ambiguity, omnipresent uncertainty, and dangers of meeting face‐to‐face with the aliens. The drama and suspense mount, as they would in “real life.” Question, dear reader, if aliens really did hover over us, would you want to know about our leaders’ negotiations with them? Do we want transparency in all aspects of our lives, or do we trust others (leaders, experts, family members, professionals) to do the hard work and keep us “safe”? When would we rather have advisors/agents than be principals? Kilmer is both—is he also a hero? His communications with the aliens have somewhat of the quality of Dostoevsky’s great Grand Inquisitor scene in The Brothers Karamazov—what are humans and aliens really seeking? Will we get honest answers from our adversaries? From a God? Modeling a good ambassadorial negotiator, Kilmer tries to make sense of what he has learned from a cryptic communication, to understand why the aliens are engaging with Earth, what they want or need. They must need us for something, as all negotiators do. Who is bearing risk for the encounters and for what purposes? These are the universal negotiation questions brought to the fore here in a large existential crisis, with what lessons for our more mundane earthly encounters?
In the dramatic last section of the book, the alien civilization (ultimately identified as the “Citadel,” with its own learned historian) and Kilmer engage in a fraught direct negotiation replete with debates about historical events (were they alterable?), the inevitability of war and conflict, the role of law in making war or peace, and our respective philosophical heritages, all while failing to totally avert violence. The “keys” to the problem are encoded in letters and symbols worthy of the drama of The Da Vinci Code. For those, like me, who prefer a good romance novel to sci‐fi, there is also plenty of that. But to Malhotra’s credit his women are powerful (President of the United States), strong and smart (Silla as CIA operative), and active in the arguments made and actions taken. So, at least in historical, sci‐fi fiction, there is hope that some knowledge of negotiation concepts by actors who are both well‐informed and well‐intentioned might still save our world. We certainly need that now. In the meantime, while we wait to be invaded or saved, students of negotiation would do well to read this book; they will be entertained as they learn. We humans should be capable of multidisciplinary learning, and literature deepens and makes real the actual dilemmas that characters face and the decisions they make (Menkel‐Meadow 2000). I don’t know what the sequel will be, but I am hoping we can crack “the Peacemaker’s Code.”
