Widening Participation: How Cypriot Peacebuilding Practitioners are Responding to the “Usual Suspects” Problem

Grassroots or “people-to-people” (Track 3) diplomacy is widely regarded as an indispensable tool of successful peacebuilding (Jones 2021). “Unofficial, constructive interaction between adversaries in political conflicts” is largely welcomed by official negotiators and policymakers, who understand it as supplementing, rather than replacing or limiting, formal Track 1 (T1) diplomatic efforts (Montville 2006: 15). There is a widespread belief that informal interaction and dialogue stimulate and grow a “peace constituency” by challenging and replacing preexisting stereotypes with a shared impetus for peaceful coexistence, thereby creating conditions where official negotiations are more likely to succeed (Burgess and Burgess 2010: 16). The idea is related to “contact theory” and the “contact hypothesis,” which claim that intergroup contact can reduce prejudice if necessary conditions are met, such as equal status among participants (Tropp and Pettigrew 2005). Several factors influence the success and effectiveness of grassroots interventions, including dialogue forums and peace education programs. One factor is practitioners’ ability to engage broad sectors of adversarial communities and prevent interventions from succumbing to the “usual suspects” problem: domination by people who already are persuaded of the benefits of reconciliation and peaceful relations (Çuhadar and Dayton 2012), thus turning interventions into silos of activity. Such interventions do not encompass sectors of society that continue to oppose—or remain indifferent to—reconciliation, thus failing to instigate individual attitude change and help communities to overcome their differences (De Vries and Maoz 2013). This is a particularly acute problem in Cyprus, the focus of this investigation. Though an increasing number of grassroots-level interventions take place on the island, which has remained divided since 1974, researchers note that they fail to attract “new blood.” There is, rather, a “recycling process” whereby the same cohort of people—those already committed to bridging divides—attend activities (Tziarras 2018: 8). One explanation for this phenomenon is the country’s weak civil society, which lacks “formal support, institutional coherence and momentum for mobilisation” (Lönnqvist 2008: 2), meaning there is a severely limited “culture of activism” or participation in voluntary, community-based activities (Kanol 2010: 38). Although this problem is widely discussed in the literature as a reason for the Cypriot conflict’s continued intractability, comparatively less attention has been placed on the strategies employed by peacebuilding practitioners in their attempts to widen participation and thereby engage a broader spectrum of the population. Studies often conclude by arguing that practitioners should employ alternative strategies (Kanol 2010)—such as organizing “discussion events on specific topics” or projects shaped around everyday tasks that can appeal to target audiences “beyond the usual suspects” (Gillespie, Georgiou, and Insay 2011: 15)—without critically analyzing whether any such strategies already have been tried and their success in attracting a greater diversity of participants.

This investigation adds to this body of literature by focusing on the main practices and theories of change employed by a set of Cypriot peacebuilding civil society organizations (CSOs), here defined as voluntary organizations formed around shared interests, purposes, and values and distinct from organizations affiliated with the state, the market, or the family. CSOs include religious associations, women’s organizations, and human rights groups—organizations that facilitate activities aimed “at building broken relationships across lines of division among ordinary citizens in communities” (Chigas 2005: 135). Given practical constraints, four organizations were chosen for this study based on their continued attempts to bridge the divide between Greek and Turkish Cypriots:

1. Avli: Avli is a primarily youth-based CSO that formed in 2020 during the COVID pandemic. It is committed to the intersectionality between climate change and peace, believing that climate change can provide an opportunity for all Cypriots to work together in safeguarding the island’s future. Avli sees the lack of cooperation between administrations as the main barrier to progress on climate and peace-related efforts.

2. CyprusInno (CIN): CyprusInno is an intercommunal social venture aimed at using entrepreneurship as a mechanism for peacebuilding. It believes that economic growth, job creation, and entrepreneurship can bridge the gap between Greek and Turkish Cypriots by inspiring collaboration. It was founded in 2016 and is located at “The Base,” a building within the UN Buffer Zone.

3. Hade: Hade is a bicommunal organization representing the views of young Turkish Cypriots (TCs) and Greek Cypriots (GCs) that brings teenagers together to discuss the issues or attitudes they believe prevent the formation of peace. Hade formed online during the COVID pandemic, when restrictions were temporarily placed on free movement between the Greek and Turkish areas of the island.

4. Winds of Change (WOC): WOC launched in 2023 with the vision of using sports as a means of engendering peace and bicommunal relations. It organizes a sailing competition and other bicommunal sporting activities to promote friendship, dialogue, and understanding between TCs and GCs.

There are fundamental similarities between these organizations. Most notably, they regard a united Cyprus as the only acceptable means of resolving the conflict. They all facilitate a range of different peacebuilding interventions and primarily are based in the capital city, Nicosia. However, they approach peacebuilding in diverse ways. Avli and Hade are focused on representing and working with young people, though the former has a specifically climate-focused agenda. CIN uses entrepreneurship and economic growth as a means of building connections between Cypriots, whereas WOC sees sports as a means of fostering bicommunal relations. The differences between these CSOs add an interesting dynamic to this discussion.

The investigation required closely analyzing the work and operations of the four CSOs. This could not realistically be achieved from afar, so an ethnographic approach was taken. This involved spending considerable time in Cyprus interviewing members and employees of each CSO and, where possible, attending their activities to get a full understanding of contextual considerations and the innovative strategies they employ to increase participation. In addition, attendance figures were obtained to help establish whether the CSOs’ interventions are successful in attracting participation among those not already committed to peaceful coexistence. The investigation does not assess whether participation in bicommunal activities directly leads to individuals viewing members of the other community more positively—although elsewhere, strong evidence has been found for such a correlation (Malhotra and Liyanage 2005; Kelman 2008; Çuhadar et al. 2015). The investigation nonetheless makes several contributions. Firstly, it adds to our understanding of the effectiveness of grassroots diplomacy by focusing on one of the main factors that can inhibit and prevent the success of Track 3 interventions. Secondly, it shows the lengths to which Indigenous organizations will go to make effective peacebuilding contributions. Finally, it illustrates how, despite the continued failure to resolve the Cypriot conflict, local and Indigenous actors remain committed to building a society that is open to formal peace negotiations.

Grassroots diplomacy refers to local or community-level activities focused on initiating engagement and dialogue between citizens of adversarial communities to promote trust, respect, and understanding. These unofficial activities are sometimes described as “Track 3” (T3) diplomacy, the premise of which “is that peace can and must be built from the bottom up as well as from the top down . . . . For any negotiation to be undertaken or to be successful, a ‘peace constituency’ must exist . . . .” (Chigas 2005: 136–137). T3 activities, also referred to as “people-to-people dialogues” (Fisher et al. 2023: 6), complement and assist conventional conflict resolution and diplomatic efforts “conducted in formal settings by government, military or diplomatic officials” (Palmiano Federer 2021: 428) by “stimulating conflict ripeness” across society and thereby laying the ground for the successful implementation of a formal peace agreement (Burgess and Burgess 2010: 12). Grassroots diplomacy is—at least in theory—broadly welcomed by policymakers and officials, largely because it makes peace processes more inclusive (Palmiano Federer 2021). “By opening peace negotiations to a wider range of social and political actors, the process can gain broader public legitimacy and in turn become more durable” (McKeon 2004: 2). Such efforts help to overcome the accusation that peace processes are exclusionary and confined to high-level negotiations (Zartman 2008).

Researchers often define T3 diplomacy by differentiating it from Track 2 (T2) diplomacy, which also consists of unofficial dialogue-based activities and trainings, but ones centred on “mid-level unofficial participants like academics, journalists and experts” as opposed to the wider community or population (Fisher et al. 2023: 6). T2 interventions are also commonly outcome oriented as they focus on developing “new ideas for resolving the conflict” (Chigas 2005: 133). In contrast, T3 interventions are predominantly “relationship-based activities” (Çuhadar & Kotelis 2010: 198), including “dialogue, training, mediatory activities helping people to overcome trauma, arts events to bring people together, joint business projects and peace education” (Chigas 2005: 135–136).A range of actors facilitate and coordinate unofficial activities. Scholar-practitioners (typically social scientists with expertise in conflict) are regarded as particularly effective in mediating T2 workshops and interactive dialogue sessions. It is also relatively common for official T1 negotiators, officials, and political leaders to carry out T2 measures, in addition to high-level peace talks. Additionally, Indigenous domestic civil society groups and activists are widely conceived as effective in coordinating T3 activities (Çuhadar & Kotelis 2010). Policymakers and officials believe that Indigenous CSOs understand the “cultural context and nuanced dynamics” of particular conflicts (Jewett 2019: 119), given that their members typically have a personal awareness of ongoing tensions and disputes. Unlike external actors, they are assumed to be skilled in forming positive relationships between disputant communities and in building trust and understanding between them. It is a belief stemming from the “local turn” theory, which emphasizes that peace implementation requires local ownership and agency, i.e., active involvement in peace efforts by local communities represented by CSOs, including in the creation and implementation of peace agreements (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013; Leonardsson and Rudd 2015; Odendaal 2021).

The idea that contact and structured dialogue between adversaries significantly helps to reduce prejudice and foster positive community relations—a central premise of grassroots-level interventions—(Malhotra and Liyanage 2005) stems from the “contact hypothesis.” Developed by psychologist Gordon Allport in 1954, the hypothesis suggests that intergroup contact prevents people from committing violence and helps them to build trust (Psaltis and McKeown 2017). The four optimal conditions for reducing prejudice are equal status between groups, common goals, intergroup cooperation, and institutional support (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). A range of empirical studies have found a strong correlation between intergroup contact and positive attitude change. Some of them have evaluated grassroots activities by testing whether participants felt a higher level of trust and empathy toward the adversarial community compared to nonparticipants. Malhotra and Liyanage’s analysis of peace workshops in Sri Lanka (Malhotra and Liyanage 2005) and the study by Çuhadar and colleagues of peace education workshops with Greek and Turkish students both found participants to have “significantly higher degrees of trust and empathy than non-participants” (Çuhadar et al. 2015: 576).

However, this ability to facilitate attitude change and help members of adversarial groups become more trustful of one another is dependent on interventions appealing to people who have opposed, or been indifferent to, reconciliation with their adversaries (Boehmelt 2010). Bicommunal activities are failing to meet their objectives if they only appeal to the same people over and over again (Kanol 2010)—those who are “already predisposed toward bilateral peacebuilding efforts” and have a positive attitude toward reconciliation (Çuhadar and Dayton 2012: 174). The usual suspects problem is by no means isolated to Cyprus, with grassroots interventions in other conflict settings, including Israel-Palestine and Bosnia, facing the same challenge (Paffenholz 2009; Çuhadar and Dayton 2012; De Vries and Maoz 2013). There are multiple explanations for the usual suspects problem. Practitioners often conduct their activities without formal support networks, meaning there are few opportunities to access advice and support on how better to engage the wider population. Relatedly, practitioners rarely coordinate their work with each other (Çuhadar and Dayton 2012), so interventions among them are similar and repeatedly attract the same group of people. Competition for financial support from donors is fierce and practitioners may lack the resources to coordinate activities that can appeal to wider demographics (Boehmelt 2010). Practical constraints around travel or communication, defined as “minor inconveniences” or “hassle factors,” can deter participation, especially in areas where citizens are more focused on their “immediate safety from present dangers” (Martin et al. 2022: 10). The reality is that individuals living in conflict zones are unlikely to attend activities unless they feel there is a clear and tangible benefit to doing so.

Increasingly, practitioners are responding to the usual suspects problem by employing “theories of change,” described as “causal processes through which change comes about as a result of a program’s strategies and actions” (Çuhadar and Dayton 2011: 283). These processes entail constructing and designing peacebuilding interventions in ways that appeal to a broad spectrum of the population. Multiple theories and practices are mentioned in the literature. Joseph Montville and Esra Çuhadar have spoken of “functionalist” activities that use “tangible development challenges and technical issues to bring the sides together to solve a common problem,” such as environmental issues or urban planning challenges (Çuhadar 2021: 113). Examples include joint management of water resources in Israel-Palestine (Çuhadar 2009) and technical cooperation between Turkey and Armenia in the renovation of a historical bridge over the Aras River (Çuhadar 2021). Such joint ventures target “functional cooperation” while simultaneously seeking to improve relationships between parties (Çuhadar 2021: 114). They involve “forming a superordinate group identity” around shared jobs and professions, such as water management and construction (Çuhadar and Dayton 2011: 289).

Another theory of change addresses how programs are framed. Behavioral scientists stress that it is important not to frame activities in broad terms—such as peacebuilding—but instead connect them to everyday life, such as people’s work or financial circumstances (Martin et al. 2022). There is growing resistance to labeling interventions as “trust-building projects” and a trend toward framing them as projects that “bring people together for reasons other than reconciliation and dialogue,” as Thania Paffenholz notes in the Bosnian context (Paffenholz 2010: 397). While experimenting with the labeling and branding of interventions may sound relatively subtle, social scientists in other contexts have demonstrated how changing the way a task is presented, by elevating certain pieces of information over others, can significantly impact its effectiveness (Levin, Schneider, and Gaeth 1998).

Exploring which theories of change have been adopted in Cyprus first requires an understanding of the Cypriot conflict, including how the usual suspects problem has become so pervasive across the island.

Despite being a hotspot for international tourism, Cyprus has been a conflict zone since 1974, divided between two constituent parts. The Republic of Cyprus (RoC)—internationally recognized as the governmental authority for the island—comprises the southern two-thirds and is dominated by the Greek Cypriot community. Of the RoC’s total population of approximately 650,000, around 98% are Greek Cypriot. The northern one-third of the island is de facto governed by the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which is recognized only by Turkey. The TRNC has an estimated population of around 382,000, of whom around 220,000 are Turkish Cypriot and 160,000 are Turkish settlers who have permanently moved to Cyprus from mainland Turkey. The political and ethnic divisions originate from the island’s long history of colonization. For example, during the British colonial period (1878–1960), the Turkish and Greek Cypriots were governed independently, with both communities given considerable autonomy over their own affairs.

The years preceding the Turkish intervention of 1974 saw radical GC factions violently campaign for enosis—the term given to political union between Greece and Cyprus. Supported by the military junta that recently had come to power in Greece, these GC factions attacked TC villages and enclaves, culminating in an assassination attempt against the Cypriot president, Archbishop Makarios (Ker-Lindsay 2011; Barrow 2023). This spate of violence fundamentally altered the country’s future.

The Turkish intervention of 1974 precipitated the current phase of the Cyprus conflict. In intervening militarily, Turkey acted upon a provision in the 1960 constitution that gave the island’s guarantors (Britain, Greece, and Turkey) the right to take such action if the country’s independence, territorial integrity, and status as a single, bicommunal state were deemed under threat (Fisher 2001). Turkey occupied 37% of the northern part of the island. The island was subsequently split into two after the UN brokered a ceasefire (Papadakis, Peristianis, and Welz 2006; Hadjipavlou 2007). The TCs came to control the part of the island occupied by Turkey, and were no longer dispersed in enclaves throughout Cyprus. Around 160,000 GCs were displaced, as they were forced to leave their homes in northern areas and move to the south. Many TCs previously living in the south relocated to the north and were given properties deserted by fleeing GCs (Ker-Lindsay 2011).

Though resentment and hostility between both communities stretches back well before 1974, their contrasting perceptions regarding the causes of the Turkish intervention and subsequent divide strongly influence their mutual distrust. A “blame game” exists between the communities. TCs typically regard the Turkish intervention as a “legitimate and necessary act to prevent enosis” and protect them from GCs, while GCs see it as a “premeditated and illegal act of aggression” (Barrow 2023: 299). This narrative has been built into the northern and southern sectors of society, thereby “socializing people into accepting an ‘us versus them’ dichotomy that demonizes and dehumanizes the other community” (Barrow 2023: 299). According to Sanem Şahin, “the news media took on the mission of defending their communities’ nationalist projects,” thus aggravating tensions between them (Şahin 2022: 556). GC and TC news outlets portray both sides in familiar dichotomous and divisive dualities, with a “victim vs perpetrator,” “intransigent vs flexible” and “blame-game” narrative (Christophorou et al. 2010: 184). Attempts by journalists to diverge from the official line are regarded as undermining and betraying their own community’s cause while benefiting and legitimizing the “enemy.”

Since the 1974 division of Cyprus, the international community periodically has tried to resolve the conflict, with official peace negotiations—under the auspices of the UN—taking place every decade or so. The first peace talks occurred in 1977 and centered on proposals to form an independent, nonaligned, bizonal, and bicommunal federal republic (often referred to as the “BBF” approach). The main sticking point was the question of the division of powers between a central government and the two constituent administrations (Ker-Lindsay 2011). The 2003–2004 Annan Plan—often regarded as the approach most politically consequential for the island—offered a similar solution, whereby a new United Republic of Cyprus would be created consisting of Greek and Turkish Cypriot states joined by a federal government (Lönnqvist 2008; Jarraud, Louise, and Filippou 2013). The plan was tied to Cyprus being admitted into the EU (Ker-Lindsay 2011). Put to a referendum, the plan was accepted by 65% of TCs, who largely felt that EU membership would bring economic and social benefits to their community. However, 72% of GCs rejected the plan, believing that some of their main concerns had not been addressed, since Turkey was allowed to maintain its role as a guarantor power and keep troops on the island (Papadakis, Peristianis, and Welz 2006; Şahin 2022; Barrow 2023). The plan therefore failed, but Cyprus nonetheless became an EU member state. Cyprus has subsequently benefitted from its EU status, through infrastructure funding, increased trade through the single market, and adoption of the Euro as its currency. However, Cyprus can no longer use accession to the EU as an incentive for unification. In previous times, EU accession was seen by both communities as the primary benefit of resolving the conflict, even if accession did not ultimately require a peace settlement.

One stumbling block toward resolving the conflict is that the present situation provides citizens with tangible benefits. The economic disparity between the two sides, aggravated by their utilization of different currencies, means that while some TCs travel south for employment opportunities where they are paid in the Euro rather than the weak Turkish Lira, their GC counterparts head north for cheaper goods and services, including alcohol, cigarettes, and petrol (GC journalist 2023 interview). These practical and structural benefits of the island’s division only serve to derail efforts at resolution.

The failure of official peace talks to resolve the conflict has led to greater emphasis on community-level interventions. Initial T2 efforts involving influential figures and experts from both sides of the island, such as teachers and business leaders, were led by UK and US-based academics and international nongovernmental organizations. A variety of problem-solving workshops took place during the 1980s and 1990s, generally focused on initiating controlled communication between influential TCs and GCs and generating new ideas relating to the official peace process (Hadjipavlou and Kanol 2008). Between 1988 and 1993, Professor Ron Fisher held several of these workshops, with a particular focus on the role of education in peacebuilding. In 1991, the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy and the Conflict Management Group formed the “Cyprus Consortium,” designed to create a social peacebuilding process that did not infringe on T1 diplomacy. Like the problem-solving workshops, the consortium sought to generate innovative ideas on improving the peace process, while also helping participants to redefine the conflict by emphasizing areas of compatibility (Fisher 2001).

The island’s peacebuilding efforts shifted gears in 2003, when restrictions preventing TCs and GCs from crossing the divide were relaxed. This led to a growth in T3 interventions, since there was more opportunity for people-to-people dialogue events to take place among the wider population. Though the Annan Plan ultimately failed, “[i]t was accompanied by the first opening of crossings across the Green Line,” enabling those TCs and GCs committed to peace and reconciliation to meet and communicate safely for the first time in decades (Lönnqvist 2008: 3). This increased contact led to a proliferation of bicommunal CSOs in subsequent years, including women’s groups, youth-based organizations, and educational associations, all committed to contributing to the peace process by facilitating grassroots activities. Their efforts have coincided with growing calls for a “Cypriot-led, Cypriot-owned” peace process involving the wider Cypriot society rather than just the political elite. The phrase “Cypriot-led, Cypriot-owned” stems from a speech made by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan during the aftermath of the failed Annan Plan. He asserted that the responsibility for future peacebuilding efforts laid “first and foremost with the Cypriots themselves” if they are to have any realistic chance of success (Michael 2013: 531).

Although CSOs continue to organize a range of peacebuilding activities (as is outlined in the section on “Findings” below), grassroots diplomacy has continued to face multiple social, political, and economic challenges. One of the most notable challenges has been the difficulty in attracting individuals to participate in peace efforts. As mentioned, there is an absence of volunteerism and activism across Cyprus. Historically, the GC and TC communities have lacked a strong sense of civic engagement, so citizen participation in associations, networks, and democratic movements is limited (Vasilara and Piaton 2007). This can only be understood by looking at the dominant role that political parties play across Cypriot society, effectively dictating economic decision-making and mediating citizens’ involvement in the peace process. Indeed, there is something of a clientelist relationship between political parties and the Cypriot population. Citizens tend to consider parties as the only channel through which to convey their concerns and to assume that politicians will deal with all issues facing society. Besides ensuring that political parties control much of the island’s political debate, this has resulted in an underdevelopment of civil society (Ladini 2009; Kanol 2010). Moreover, citizens perceive activism in relatively transactional terms, expecting renumeration for participation in projects and initiatives, rather than regarding it as a civic duty or responsibility. Of course, this is a generalization; the TCs and GCs who have formed bicommunal CSOs are engaged in civic affairs but these individuals are a minority and not representative of the wider population.

As noted, Cypriot grassroots activities have failed to engage the whole society and are reliant on the same group of people (Kanol 2010). Participants in efforts to build bridges between the GC and TC communities and to replace divisive narratives with a culture of peace typically are well-educated and speak fluent English (Lönnqvist 2008). This is at least partly a result of English being commonly used as the language of choice in bicommunal settings. Relatively few Cypriots speak both Greek and Turkish, so they usually communicate with each other in English. However, this results in the “exclusion of sections of the population who may speak little or no English” and cultivates the perception that events are “exclusive and elitist” (Gillespie, Georgiou, and Insay, 2013: 1081–1082). The use of English also gives the impression that CSOs are focused more on promoting the interests of foreign and international institutions than those of Cypriot communities, a sentiment expressed by 46% of GCs and 34% of TCs in a 2012 survey conducted by the United Nations Development Program (Jarraud, Louise, and Filippou 2013). It is also the case that fluent English speakers are already more likely to be in regular contact with members of the adversarial community, and to favor reconciliation, than those who cannot speak with each other.

Another commonality among participants is that they are based overwhelmingly in the country’s capital, Nicosia, which is widely seen as the center of the island’s peace and reconciliation efforts. Nicosia is a divided city, with its southern half serving as the capital of the RoC while the northern half is the de facto capital of the TRNC. Two of the island’s five active crossing points are based in the city and most of the Cypriots who cross the divide on a regular basis, for work or social purposes, live in the Nicosia region. As a result, people living in the capital see and interact with the island’s division on a regular basis, with this proximity encouraging them to take a more active role in resisting hostility and division. In contrast, Cypriots living in other parts of the country, particularly in more rural areas, are much more removed from the dividing line and it does not directly affect their lives. They are thus less motivated to engage in reconciliation activities, finding it “easier to adhere to official polarising narratives” (Tziarras 2018: 25).

As mentioned, researchers note that if Cypriot peacebuilding practitioners are to have a greater impact, they should develop strategies to improve participation. Researchers cite a range of strategies that practitioners could adopt, including working with the media to gain greater coverage of their events (Kanol 2010), though this is easier said than done in a country where news outlets largely ignore bicommunal peace efforts. Activities framed around people’s livelihoods and other aspects of everyday life are regarded as an effective means of bringing people together from across the divide, as they appeal to people who would not attend events whose stated objectives are peace and reconciliation (Paffenholz 2009; Gillespie, Georgiou, and Insay 2011). Such activities include business-focused events that can inspire cooperation in economic sectors and encourage people to view each other as equals (Kanol 2010). Making events accessible, notably by translating English materials into Greek and Turkish, is another way to ensure that more people have the opportunity to participate, while providing financial support can facilitate the coordination of new activities that reach underrepresented sectors of the population (Gillespie, Georgiou, and Insay 2011). However, little empirical attention has been given to whether any of these strategies—or others—have been implemented and, if so, whether they have succeeded in attracting a wider diversity of participants. This is the aim of this investigation—not only to speculate on strategies that practitioners could adopt, but to uncover evidence relating to the implementation and success of such strategies.

This section outlines the most prevalent theories of change adopted by the CSOs in their attempts to broaden participation. It also provides some insights (from attendance and interview data) as to whether CSOs are ultimately successful in appealing to people other than the “usual suspects.”

CSOs are striving to make their activities as inclusive and accessible as possible to increase the level of participation (Hade member 1 2023 interview). Avli and Hade, in particular, plan initiatives and events in different areas and regions of the country—rather than solely in Nicosia—to make them more accessible to large sections of the population. It is all too easy for practitioners to host events in Nicosia’s “buffer zone” (the UN-controlled land separating both communities), as it contains infrastructure and space designed for T2 and T3 diplomacy. Most notably, the “Home for Cooperation” community center, which builds bridges between the two communities by providing space for individuals to “design and implement innovative projects,” is in the buffer zone (HFC website entry 2023). As discussed, Nicosia’s residents are more likely to support reconciliation-based activities than people from other areas, while the general lack of volunteerism means it is unlikely that many Cypriots will travel to Nicosia solely to participate in peacebuilding efforts.

Hade organizes dialogue-based events, workshops, and excursions to different regions of the country on a regular basis. For example, they planned a series of activities in Larnaca in early 2023 that included a walking tour of the city and a workshop focused on how public spaces can influence interpretations of the island’s division and sociopolitical dynamics. It was an opportunity for people from the region to participate in Hade’s activities and learn more about the CSO’s objectives. Hade facilitated carpooling so that individuals living in other parts of the country could join them in Larnaca, in the hope of enabling informal interaction between Cypriots from different regions. This demonstrates Hade’s attempt to be inclusive and representative of all Cypriots. They have planned similar events and excursions, such as a trip to the Sourp Magar Armenian Monastery in Northern Cyprus and the villages of Fikardou and Lazania in the Troodos Mountain region. One of the taglines used to describe these trips is “let’s mingle,” indicating their objective of encouraging dialogue and interaction between Cypriots (Hade Facebook post 2023).

Avli organizes its annual three-day “Summer Peace Camp” in a different part of the country each year. To engage and be accessible to young people living in the north, in 2023 the camp took place in the Maronite village of Kormakitis, on the northern coast of the island in the TRNC (Avli member 1 2023 interview). There are instances of some young TCs being formally restricted from crossing into the south, so Avli works to engage such individuals. They include those born into mixed GC and TC marriages who cannot cross the border because the TRNC administration prevents them from obtaining RoC citizenship. The two previous summer camps took place in Akanthou and Rizokarpaso, respectively—two towns also situated on the northern coast. Cypriots living elsewhere are also welcome to attend, with transport arranged from Nicosia. The summer camp has a different focus each year, with the most recent concentrating on the “intersections of the political economy with the environment and peace in Cyprus” (Avli Facebook post 2023). It was specifically designed and labeled to enthuse people who are interested in “environmental peace-building,” with dialogue-based sessions and activities structured around this agenda (Avli Facebook post 2023). Avli has made efforts to ensure that other events and initiatives take place in other parts of the country. An “antifascist march” was organized in Limassol in September 2023, designed to attract support from anyone who opposes intercommunal violence and racist attacks (Avli member 2 2023 interview).

In addition, to overcome the charge that they only cater to middle-class English speakers, Hade and Avli provide written communication in three languages—Greek, Turkish, and English—as much as possible (Gillespie, Georgiou, and Insay 2011). For instance, Avli set up a public Facebook page to advertise their summer camp that was entirely translated into all three languages. Ensuring that initiatives take place in multiple languages is logistically difficult and simply not feasible in certain situations, which is why CIN and WOC place less emphasis on this practice. Verbal communication, which is central to live events such as workshops and dialogue forums, overwhelmingly takes place in English, since few Cypriots speak both Greek and Turkish. Though the language spoken at Avli’s camp was English, they provided linguistic support by ensuring anyone who was not a fluent English speaker could receive informal simultaneous translations from fellow participants (Avli Facebook page 2023). Similarly, Hade helped to organize a World Cultural Diversity Day celebration event in May 2023, with Facebook posts advertising the event in English, Greek, and Turkish (Hade Facebook post 2023).

However, these efforts to make interventions more accessible and inclusive have not gone far enough to broaden participation. Hade struggles to engage with new people when visiting different regions on both sides of the country—particularly those further away from the Green Line—while they have limited success in tempting people beyond Nicosia to join them in traveling to different areas (Hade member 1 2023 interview). Consequently, the events and workshops they have facilitated outside Nicosia have become dominated by the usual suspects who travel to these events as part of an excursion. Similarly, there is little evidence to suggest that efforts to communicate in multiple languages have led to increased participation. Despite Hade advertising its events in Greek, Turkish, and English, they are still overwhelmingly dominated by the same group of English-speaking activists. Reportedly, their World Cultural Diversity Day celebration was attended by around 50 individuals who participate in interventions on a regular basis.

Avli’s summer camps also have remained dominated by the usual suspects, despite being organized in different regions of the country. Their most recent camp was attended by “30 friends from across the island,” though the majority traveled from the Nicosia region and previously had attended Avli’s summer camps or other activities (Avli Facebook post 2023). This further suggests that efforts to make peace workshops more accessible are unlikely to attract new demographics and alternative strategies are required.

As explored in the literature review, grassroots interventions designed to resolve conflicts between adversarial groups are increasingly structured around technical and functional cooperation rather than peace and reconciliation (Çuhadar 2021). The Cypriot CSOs are no exception, as they regard this approach as an effective way to engage people who would not ordinarily attend activities. CIN has utilized this strategy as part of its mission to create an “island-wide entrepreneurial ecosystem” and connect Cypriots across the divide (CIN website entry 2023). The organization facilitates several events and initiatives especially designed to provide new and young entrepreneurs, both GC and TC, with expertise and exposure to help them develop their idea or business. For example, CIN co-organizes an annual Cyprus Networking Festival that gives entrepreneurs an opportunity to bring their work to the attention of over 200 key professionals and business stakeholders, both GC and TC. The festival is designed to facilitate interaction between individuals who have a common business or professional interest but may come from different sides of the divide (Çuhadar 2021). Similarly, CIN’s Startup Mentorship Program connects successful entrepreneurs and business leaders with early-stage founders or new businesspeople to aid their future growth and success, often leading to cross-community pairings of new entrepreneurs and mentors. Thus, a program that is advertised as an opportunity for individuals to take their business idea to the next level also serves as a bicommunal initiative (CIN website entry 2023).

These programs have proved successful in attracting people from across the island. Though an estimated 60% of regular participants are from Nicosia, this leaves a sizeable minority of people who travel to events from different regions north and south of the divide, including Paphos in the west and Kyrenia in the north. Many of them have an interest in developing their own business idea, while others are still studying or working at a company full-time. They also have varied English language skills (CIN employee 1 2023 interview). CIN is adamant that making the “peace” element of their initiatives more subtle has succeeded in increasing participation in events. Although only around 100 people now attend their “Business Mixer” networking events (where developing entrepreneurs meet with professionals), CIN believes they would struggle to engage more than 30 people if events were specifically framed around peace and reconciliation—a belief based on their experiences organizing different types of activities. This again highlights the importance of effectively labeling the activities of CSOs (CIN employee 2 2023 interview). Moreover, many of their events, including their “Mentorship Program” sessions, take place in the UN buffer zone. As a result, participants are often visiting the buffer zone and interacting with the Green Line divide for the first time, indicating that individuals are willing to travel to the buffer zone if there is a good and beneficial reason for them to do so (CIN employee 1 2023 interview). Feedback collated by CIN indicates that most of their participants are politically neutral and represent the middle ground (CIN employee 1 2023 interview). They are not the hardline nationalists who oppose all reconciliation efforts, or the usual suspects attending peace activities, but a third constituency of people who fall in the middle—those not passionately for or against a peace settlement but who are happy to attend events that cater to their needs and interests (CIN employee 2 2023 interview). Tapping into this more moderate and centrist group of people—which is believed to represent “around 50%” of all Cypriots—seems a more realistic and credible strategy than targeting those who are unequivocally opposed to any form of peace (Cyprus High Commission representative 2023 interview). While engaging moderates is a good peacebuilding strategy, it is also good for the moderates themselves, who are often “marginalized as a result of the polarization of the parties . . . and driven into exile, intimidated into silence by political oppression, or threatened by their authorities or extremist groups” (Chigas 2005: 145).

Hade and WOC also have designed functionalist initiatives that are not explicitly framed around building peace. One of Hade’s most frequently held activities is their language classes, in which individuals may learn Cypriot Greek or Cypriot Turkish in a dialogue-based group setting, with the bicommunal classes led by volunteer language teachers. Although Hade is clear that one aim of these classes is to facilitate “community building and people getting to know each other” across the divide (Hade member 1 2023 interview), they are marketed in functional terms as “free online language classes” open to anyone hoping to learn a language for any purpose (Hade Facebook post 2023). Participants may be learning for practical reasons, such as to assist them in their work, rather than to demonstrate support and solidarity with the peace movement (Hade member 2 2023 interview). Language classes may not seem like a grassroots-level peace intervention, but according to Hade they are an essential tool for enabling cross-community interaction between students and teachers, providing participants with the language proficiency required to engage in interethnic dialogue.

The language sessions are also unique in that they are more casual and informal than classes taught by other organizations, such as the Association for Bilingualism. They are not organized in a “formal classroom environment” but rather follow a group-based conversational format that appeals to individuals who may be less comfortable with a more academically structured approach (Hade member 1 2023 interview). That sessions are free of charge is also clearly a huge benefit that is not necessarily found elsewhere, and participants are not pressured to attend every session during the 12-week course, though this is encouraged. Hade emphasizes the distinctive characteristics of their classes as a means of encouraging wider participation. In 2023, around 500 people registered for their classes—300 to learn Cypriot Greek and 200 to learn Cypriot Turkish. Hade is somewhat overwhelmed by these high numbers, with their other initiatives not receiving anywhere near this level of participation. It is not just the total number of sign-ups that is impressive, but also the varied demographics they represent. There is diversity across age ranges, geographical regions (facilitated by the online format), and professions, with diverse levels of English proficiency (Hade member 2 2023 interview). A large proportion of the participants do not attend Hade’s other—more conventional—activities, indicating that many of them are not the usual suspects and are more likely to represent the middle ground rather than the nationalist demographic. Though the classes are not labeled as a peacebuilding activity, but as an inexpensive and relatively informal way to learn a language, they have led to the formation of long-lasting, cross-border relationships. Some participants have become friends with their language teacher (who often is not from the student’s community) and have interacted with each other after the classes have concluded (Hade member 1 2023 interview). Hade also has observed that many of the participants cross the border more frequently after learning Cypriot Greek or Cypriot Turkish, often traversing it for the first time.

As Hade uses language classes to build bridges between the two communities, WOC uses sport. The organization assembled the first bicommunal Cypriot sailing team tasked with sailing around the island (United Nations Peacekeeping 2023). Much of the discussion around this initiative focused on the unique opportunity it provided for young adults (largely university graduates aged 18–35) to participate in a project that sought to “challenge, empower, and inspire [them] to connect” with each other (United Nations Peacekeeping 2023). WOC hoped to attract people who are not ordinarily engaged in peace efforts but are enthused by sport—particularly sailing—as well as people living in coastal areas far removed from Nicosia (WOC member 1 2023 interview). Though the initiative also was intended to promote understanding and collaboration between the communities and “contribute to peacebuilding on the island,” these goals were framed as secondary or additional to the primary objective, which required functional cooperation. Successfully completing a unique sport-related challenge was the hook or pitch used to attract participants. WOC is one of the very few Cypriot CSOs to have used sport for reconciliation purposes.

The WOC succeeded in attracting widespread participation in the event. Their launch event in April 2023 (financially supported by the International Olympic Committee), which included a “peace run” around Nicosia’s old town and a series of talks and discussion sessions, was attended by “around 50 people from more than 6 nationalities” and geographical regions, most of whom were in the 18–35 demographic pursued by WOC (WOC Instagram post 2023). Organizers believe that the unusual nature of the event helped attract a diverse crowd, including TCs and GCs from different regions of the country, such as the Kyrenia area of Northern Cyprus (WOC Instagram post 2023). The sailing competition took place in September 2023 and involved TCs and GCs who underwent an intensive program of team development and sailing skills training, giving participants little choice but to become well acquainted with individuals from across the divide. WOC maintains that most participants were enthused by the challenge of the competition and are not regular attendees of conventional interventions.

Activities require funding and other types of support, a factor that has received little attention in the literature. Functionalist activities, in particular, require financial support and dedication from employees if they are to succeed. An increasing number of CSOs must compete with one another for donor support, and not all receive funding. A CSO that is fortunate to have access both to money and staff is CIN, boasting a full team of employees and receiving financial support from a variety of donors, including the EU. These resources allow CIN to dedicate time and effort to developing interventions that incur start-up and ongoing operational costs. Other CSOs, such as Avli, are reliant on volunteers, so are more likely to organize conventional interventions that are relatively inexpensive to operate, such as peace camps and dialogue sessions. Such interventions commonly require a classroom or public space (in Nicosia, practitioners can use space at the Home for Cooperation); a mediator or facilitator, who is often a trained volunteer; and a group of participants, who typically heard about the event through word of mouth or social media. No significant investments are needed.

Thus, a CSO’s financial situation may determine whether it undertakes unconventional activities. The main dividing line is between CSOs that are reliant on volunteers and those that employ permanent staff members. However, relying on external financial support brings its own risks. International donors are renowned for shifting “funding levels across countries, programme areas and recipients” owing to evolving ambitions, financial constraints, or the belief that a certain initiative is not delivering positive outcomes (Parks 2008: 214). Donors may pull their financial support of programs without much prior notice, leaving practitioners with little option but to end them. This has occurred in Cyprus. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) stopped funding Cypriot projects in March 2016, principally owing to the amount of financial support offered by the EU (USAID employee 2023 interview). This meant that all programs supported by USAID, including some facilitated by Indigenous CSOs, could not continue unless alternative funding could be secured.

This investigation has sought to examine how Cypriot peacebuilding practitioners are responding to the oft-cited usual suspects problem. It empirically evaluated the strategies employed by Cypriot practitioners trying to engage a broader spectrum of the population, building upon research undertaken in other conflict zones. Though a very initial exploration, the findings should be of great interest to scholars who are interested in the effectiveness of grassroots diplomacy and peacebuilding efforts more broadly. They illustrate how the design and framing of grassroots interventions are pivotal to their success. Activities that are conventionally framed around furthering peace and reconciliation, such as peace workshops, struggle to reach beyond the usual suspects in places where there is much apathy and fatigue with the peace process. However, initiatives that are more subtle in their connection to peacebuilding, and that center upon functional or technical cooperation, are more likely to engage those who have been indifferent to reconciliation efforts and have not attended peace-related activities. Though not explicitly framed as peace initiatives, these functionalist interventions are effective in instigating interaction between members of adversarial communities. These findings are significant, as the success and effectiveness of grassroots interventions depend on engaging people who are not already committed to living in peaceful coexistence with adversarial communities. Such interventions cannot influence attitudes and reduce prejudice (as per the contact hypothesis) if the usual suspects are their only audience, but will instead remain silos of activity.

Furthermore, the findings outline how Indigenous organizations remain committed to peacebuilding and reconciliation, as shown by the innovative strategies employed to engage with a more diverse range of the population and grow the island’s peace constituency. It is remarkable to see the enthusiasm and commitment of these CSOs, given that official T1 negotiations have continued to end in failure and there is no indication they will succeed any time soon. The most recent set of official peace talks took place at the Swiss resort of Crans-Montana in 2017. Despite initial optimism, they collapsed amid anger and recrimination—a familiar tale in Cyprus (Miles 2017). Yet, these recurring setbacks seem to spur on the CSOs, who know that it is left to them to keep the idea of peace and reconciliation alive.

There are plenty of avenues to develop this investigation and it is hoped that this initial study will spark additional research. Further work is needed on comparing the theories of change discussed in this article with those applied in other conflict settings. Research is also needed to further evaluate whether grassroots interventions are successful in positively influencing attitudes and reducing prejudice; such research may be conducted by adopting the methodological practices used elsewhere to evaluate the correlation between contact and trust-building. This is hinted at in this article, as evidence suggests that individuals taking part in initiatives develop positive relationships with their counterparts across the divide, but categorically testing attitude change was beyond the scope of this initial exploration.