How It Helped: The Role of Track Two in Protracted, Asymmetric, and Ethnonational Conflicts Open Access

This article investigates the extent to which Track Two diplomacy (Track Two) contributed to the resolution of protracted, asymmetric, and ethnonational (PAE) conflicts.¹ Specifically, we ask: What role, if any, did unofficial and informal dialogues across different “tracks” play? Track Two refers to informal, facilitated dialogues between influential representatives of conflicting parties to develop insights and ideas that can be “transferred” to formal negotiations and also communicated to the broader public (Davidson and Montville 1981; Fisher et al. 1997; Jones 2015).

More specifically, we discuss the ways in which Track Two pushed a larger peace process forward, with a focus on the role of the third party, the inclusion of civil society actors, and how broader public opinion in the respective conflict contexts impacted negotiations and dialogue.² We do this in two ways. First, we develop an original typology of roles that Track Two can play, which provides a framework for our analysis. Second, we present a conceptual tool based on this typology to illustrate multidirectional transfer from Track Two to various recipients.

Track Two refers to informal, facilitated dialogues between influential representatives of conflicting parties to develop insights and ideas that can be “transferred” to formal negotiations and communicated to the broader public (Davidson and Montville 1981; Fisher et al. 1997; Jones 2015). This body of scholarship developed from an iterative relationship between research and practice in the 1970s and 1980s by a group of scholar-practitioners who conducted dialogues between conflicting parties, called problem-solving workshops (PSWs), and later conceptualized these workshops (Mitchell 2001). In these PSWs, small, carefully selected groups attempt to generate ideas that could not be generated in more formal negotiation settings between official actors. The role of the third-party facilitator is to move parties from bargaining to joint problem-solving and, in the process, cultivate trust, build relationships, and create possibilities for new thinking (Kelman 1992; Jones 2015; Lehrs 2016).

Track Two developed as a mode of conflict resolution to complement official Track One processes in environments where interstate conflicts using rational-actor and bargaining approaches to conflict resolution were the dominant research paradigms (Palmiano Federer 2021). Track Two scholars contributed important theoretical work on unofficial mediation (Burton 1972), dialogue as a form of conflict transformation (Ropers 2004), how such informal dialogues can be measured and evaluated (Rouhana 1995; Jones 2019), and how the ideas generated in workshops can be transferred to decision-makers and the broader public (Cuhadar 2009; Fisher 2020; d’Estrèe and Fox 2021). The concept of Track Two was also expanded by scholars toward a system-based view of conflict and conflict resolution initiatives that organized society into different “levels” or “tracks” and proposed various activities for unofficial dialogue on each of these levels that would make up a complementary “system.” These levels are generally regarded to be Track One (top leadership and official state actors), Track One and a Half (unofficial dialogues that take place among officials or very close to official diplomacy), Track Two (middle-range influential non-state actors such as civil society elite or academia), and Track Three (grassroots leaders of community-based organizations) (Diamond and McDonald 1996; Lederach 1997; Palmiano Federer, Pickhardt et al. 2019). A figure commonly known as “Lederach’s pyramid” outlines the concept; see Figure 1.

By focusing on unofficial dialogues and informal peace initiatives, the relationship between Track One and Track Two, and Track Two’s positive impacts on formal negotiations, this article fills research gaps in conflict resolution literature and provides an innovative lens through which to analyze the conditions for success in resolved conflicts. Mainstream scholarship focuses on the material conditions under which formal negotiations at the Track One level are necessary to reach a peace agreement (Kleiboer 1996; Clayton and Dorussen 2022), while the impacts of unofficial mediation activities on formal agreements are less understood (Duursma 2014). Furthermore, informal mediation and dialogue often are underappreciated in Track One circles, but have proven critical in protracted or frozen conflicts, as illustrated through Azar’s seminal body of work on intractable conflicts (Azar, Jureidini et al. 1978).

Understanding the unofficial dialogue space that underpins many of these negotiations is critical to understanding “why it worked.” As peace processes have become more fragmented and decentralized, the multiplicity of armed actors and fraught negotiations at the formal Track One level have led to growing scholarly interest into how unofficial talks can lead to more effective, sustainable, and legitimate peace process outcomes. Given the broad scope and scale of the focus area, the suite of theories developed over decades in Track Two on different aspects of the content, process, outcome, facilitation, and critical normative questions of inclusion and ethics provides a coherent analytical framework on which to ground our research.

Key concepts and methods of Track Two scholarship, particularly the concept of “transfer,” help us answer our research question regarding the role of Track Two in resolving conflicts. First, Track Two scholarship offers sophisticated theoretical frameworks that shed light on how thorny issues in negotiations can be addressed, such as how parties move from positional to interest-based bargaining within facilitated dialogue spaces that can be discreet or informal, and how the ideas and insights generated in unofficial spaces are “transferred” to formal Track One negotiations and to the larger public. Second, Track Two theories and methods analyze the relationship between process and outcome, since the elusive relationship between informal peace talks and public peace agreements requires rigorous analysis. A large set of literature is dedicated to measuring and evaluating the impact of Track Two processes, specifically how critical junctures in the process lead to different outcomes. Third, studying multitrack approaches to peace processes encourages a systems approach to studying the different initiatives undertaken in both the formal and informal levels of society, and how they may be linked.

This body of scholarship has developed from an iterative relationship between research and practice, beginning in the 1960s with a group of scholar-practitioners who conducted informal and private dialogues between conflicting parties in the form of problem-solving workshops (PSWs) and conceptualized the outcomes of these workshops (Mitchell 2001). In these discreet workshops, a small and carefully selected group of influential but non-official actors attempt to generate ideas for resolution that would not be possible in more official negotiation settings. The role of the third-party facilitator (Chataway 2002; Jones 2015) is to move parties from a standpoint of bargaining to one of joint problem-solving and, in the process, cultivate trust and build relationships.

Another way to categorize different types of Track Two dialogues is in terms of the influence that the dialogue participants seek to have on the conflict; whether they want to manage, resolve, or transform it. Conflict management takes the view that the conflict is not amenable to proposals to bring it to an end. Instead, the focus is on “managing” the conflict in hopes that this will reduce violence and lay the stage for efforts to end the conflict. Conflict resolution takes the view that the time has come to develop proposals aimed at a final resolution of the conflict. It is important to note that the participants in Track Two dialogues can be well ahead of official positions; in other words, they can take the view that the time has come to begin developing resolution proposals even if the official positions are not close to this. Finally, conflict transformation takes the view that the official diplomatic process is inherently flawed, as it represents elites who have created the conflict and often have interests in keeping it going. For this reason, conflict transformation initiatives often seek to empower marginalized communities, as a means of laying the stage for the transformation of the underlying situation.³ In many respects, while Track One and a Half and Track Two recognize that the structure of the conflict (the governing elites and their preferences) is a given that must be worked with over time, Track Three dialogues seek to change that structure through projects aimed as much at advocacy as at dialogue (Jones 2015; Gamaghelyan 2021).

To answer our research question regarding what role(s), if any, unofficial and informal dialogues across different tracks play, we develop an analytical framework in two steps. To do so, we draw from the concept of “transfer” in Track Two scholarship to understand how solutions for negotiation impasses (ideas) and participants (people) were transferred from unofficial to official negotiations, and how this increased the negotiations’ effectiveness.

The concept of “transfer”—defined by Fisher as “the process by which individual changes (e.g., improved attitudes, new realizations) and group products (e.g., frameworks for negotiation, principles for resolution) are moved from unofficial conflict resolution interventions to the official domain of negotiations, policy making, and the surrounding political culture” (Fisher 2020: 443)—is a key element of our analytical framework. There is a rich literature on conditions for transfer, the targets of transfer, and the role of facilitators in transferring outcomes of PSWs to formal negotiations (Chataway 2002; d’Estrèe and Fox 2021), which makes our typology and model a powerful departure point from which to study the transfer of ideas and of people from Track Two to Track One and how this increased the effectiveness of negotiations. Based on rich theoretical work existing in Track Two literature on the concept of transfer (Fisher et al. 1997, 2020; Cuhadar 2009; Jones 2015; d’Estrèe and Fox 2021), we want to understand, in the specific context of each case, what gets transferred and to whom (Jones 2015), and how such transfer takes place. Transfer takes place over time, and is complex and specific to each process.

To allow for cross-cutting research into the ways Track Two has impacted peace processes, we have developed an original typology of the ways in which Track Two/Unofficial Peacemaking can impact different stages of a peace process to provide a framework for our analysis of the cases. In particular, we have sought to move beyond the traditional approach of “linking” the role and function of Track Two to the “phases” of an official negotiation. The new typology comprises five distinct stages that a Track Two process can go through and posits particular roles and functions for different types of Track Two at each stage. It is important to note that the application of these stages is not linear; the role and function of Track Two in a peace process can move between the different stages in various directions over time. Moreover, different levels/kinds of Track Two can be active at the same time at different levels of a peace process, sometimes unknown to each other. Finally, not all Track Two processes will exhibit each of these stages during their lifetime; some will not have a role or function at a particular stage while others will have all of them at one time or another.

This typology enables us to consider much more dynamic and multidirectional aspects of transfer and other concepts than is the case at present. Most considerations of transfer are focused on exploring how Track Two influences Track One (Fisher 2005). In addition to this classic consideration, we wish to consider more broadly how ideas from Track Two “seep” into societies at large over time; how they subtly but profoundly change what is regarded as “common wisdom” (d’Estrèe and Fox 2021). We thus are seeking to consider transfer as a multidirectional and dynamic process (Cuhadar 2009).

In this section, we apply the typology to consider which facilitation methods and approaches hold the most promise at its different levels. By comparing cases, we hope to gain insights into the micro-dynamics and mechanisms of transfer in each situation. Here, we focus on identifying the direction of transfer, the actors involved in the transfer process, and the impact of transfer on the receiving context. We do not have the space in this article to go into the detail that will be contained in our forthcoming book; much of the detail from our case studies had to be removed. Instead, here we draw on our cases in general terms to illustrate each stage. Moreover, each stage is described only once. However, in reality, stages can be mixed in a variety of ways and occur multiple times (i.e., “life support” can precede a “great leap forward” or an alternative “in the beginning” stage). The process is never linear.

The first stage of the Track Two dialogues, “in the beginning,” involves establishing initial contact between hostile parties. Here, Track Two manifests as exploratory missions, fact-finding activities, or informal dialogues, often, but not always, brokered by a go-between perceived as legitimate by both sides. From the cases under consideration in the wider “Why it Worked” project we have identified the following cases as illustrative of this stage: France–FLN, Colombia–FARC, South Africa–ANC, Myanmar, Northern Ireland (UK–IRA), and Guatemala–URNG.⁴ Often, this stage begins because some individuals exhibit “readiness”—the motivation and optimism that comes from recognizing the possible existence of an interlocutor and even the possibility of talks (Pruitt 2007, 2015).

The primary challenge faced at this stage within our case studies stemmed from the lack of political or personal will to engage in dialogue for fear of public backlash due to stereotypical images of the other side. The warring parties were labeled terrorists, communists, or separatists and subjected to propaganda. Groups such as FARC in Colombia, EAOs (ethnic armed organizations) in Myanmar, and the ANC in South Africa were outlawed. Hence, any official talks may have discredited a party—often the government in question—as weak or one that cedes to violence. Since Track Two processes are by nature unofficial, they help the sides explore the possibility of creating a process without fear of criticism from constituencies such as the broader institutions, organizations, or communities that Track Two participants claim to represent.

There was not a single type of facilitator. For example, Track Two dialogues were initiated by religious leaders in Guatemala and Sudan;⁵ by politicians, businesspeople, and journalists in South Africa and Algeria; and by NGO representatives and businesspeople in Myanmar and Northern Ireland. Involvement of businesspeople also catalyzed political processes by providing much-needed funding for Track Two dialogues. In Colombia, initial contacts were established by a Colombian economist who previously had started talks between Bogotá’s government and the FARC and set up a communication channel between the armed group and newly elected President Santos.

The roles of facilitators/mediators “in the beginning” included shuttle dialogue and the creation of a trusting environment “in which the people in the conflict will gradually feel safe enough to open themselves up to the third party and each other” (Jones 2015). This is exemplified in the Northern Ireland case by businessman Brendan Duddy’s role as an intermediary over many years (O’Dochertaigh 2011; Lehrs 2022).⁶

In our cases, resistance to international intervention rendered the notion of Track One third-party intervention inappropriate at this stage. However, dialogue facilitation by individuals or NGOs often was accepted by warring parties, since they have a lower profile compared to foreign governments seeking to establish similar lines of talks, and they have no official standing. This stage also often exhibits an interesting mix between local and international facilitators. In the Colombia–FARC case study, early dialogues were bilateral, “for Colombians by Colombians.”⁷ Likewise, third-party involvement from outside Northern Ireland, Southern Ireland, or Great Britain was relatively rare in the case of Northern Ireland at this stage.

In this stage, a facilitator is crucial in bringing the parties together while individuals work toward building a functional level of trust. As such, the transfer mechanisms outlined below often highlight the facilitator’s pivotal role in conveying messages between parties. It is not so much about transferring potential “solutions” to the conflict, as transferring, or even creating, sufficient trust to allow more sustained talks to begin. If the dialogue participants are willing to work through their challenges, transfer from Track Two to Track One is likely to take place. Furthermore, we noted that transfer involves the exchange of meeting notes or communication with Track One participants based on the local context and closeness of Track Two dialogue participants to power centers. Ultimately, “transfer” in this stage simply amounts to Track Two letting Track One know that useful and productive dialogue is possible. During this stage, many dialogue activities and transfer mechanisms focus on establishing contact with involved parties, informing them of intentions and building relationships.

This stage of a Track Two process explores in detail issues that Track One finds politically complicated or unacceptable to negotiate or even discuss. In addition, it is concerned with reinforcing relationships between the parties and broader societies. Of our case studies, we have identified the following cases where Track Two served a “heavy lifting” function at one or more points in the conflict: India–Pakistan, South Africa–ANC, Philippines–MNLF,⁸ and Northern Ireland–IRA. From the process-design aspect, this stage of dialogues exhibits the following standard features: (1) dialogue in a neutral environment, (2) significant time spent together, (3) dialogues taking place over some time, (4) equal treatment of both parties, and (5) facilitation to assist the dialogue.

Track Two dialogues during the “in the beginning” and “heavy lifting” stages focus, among other things, on trust and relationship building. These are critical factors that move the process forward. This was evident in the Colombian case where FARC representatives continued the dialogue even after the assassination of their leader by government forces. In the Philippines–MNLF case, Indonesian facilitators incorporated social gatherings into the Track Two dialogues to humanize the enemy (Cagoco-Guiam et al. 1999). Facilitators incorporate recesses (e.g., coffee breaks) during high-tension moments in substantive discussions to prevent the negotiations from breaking down (Burgess and Burgess 2010).

In South Africa, dialogues followed a similar social routine. In discussions at the Dakar Conference, Track Two meetings incorporated plenary sessions, smaller workshops, and informal sessions to establish comfort and explore political standpoints. A sense of equity that unfolded throughout the process helped parties to develop reassuring perceptions of each other. Also, many dialogue participants had received threats and were captured or imprisoned by the government or the other warring side. Hence, a “shared sense of danger” (Lieberfeld 2002) became another factor that brought parties together, as it did in the Sudan–SPLM and France–FLN cases.

As for the role and characteristics of a facilitator at this stage, we find Lederach’s description (2005) to be the most applicable. Lederach argues that the following qualities of a mediator help parties to construct an imagined future—a necessary step for moving ahead in negotiations:

1. the ability to help participants imagine a relationship with each other;

2. the capacity to avoid falling into the historical roots of conflict while maintaining a curiosity for new possibilities that work toward a common goal;

3. the ability to encourage and invoke participants’ creative capacity to imagine and embrace the possibility of change; and

4. the strength and willingness to risk working toward an imagined future.

We also find that the qualities of a facilitator emphasized by Saunders (2005)—a keen sense of empathy and emotional intelligence, combined with experience and/or a sense of how decision-making works at high levels—are highly useful.

In terms of substance, at the Track One and a Half level the “heavy lifting” stage can ground itself in conflict management or resolution. In the case of India–Pakistan, the Chao Dialogue brought together elites to discuss the future of bilateral relations. The Ottawa Dialogue, meanwhile, brought together groups like retired senior military officers to develop proposals for more effective ceasefires along the Line of Control in Kashmir (Jones 2022). The Carter Center dialogue in Sudan focused on negotiating local ceasefires for humanitarian relief. The early dialogues facilitated by Brendan Duddy in Northern Ireland focused primarily on determining the conditions needed for a ceasefire that would lead to formal talks. However, some take the view that interventions like these can affect the prospects for official negotiations negatively. The Carter initiative was criticized “for allowing Khartoum to use its unofficial contacts with the Carter Centre to avoid serious engagement with the official regional mediation, illustrating the risk of unintended consequences and the sensitivity of high-level Track Two involvement” (Simmons and Dixon 2006).

On the other hand, Track Two dialogues can focus on developing ideas and proposals aimed at bringing about a final resolution of the conflict (d’Estrèe and Fox 2021). This is evident in the Concordis International dialogues in Sudan, which were carried out in parallel with the official Track One process. Dialogues held by Track Two facilitators in Sudan helped both parties develop a shared diagnosis of Sudan’s problems, including economic policy discussions—an issue often overlooked in the official Track One peace process. Similar processes can be observed in the cases of India–Pakistan, Colombia, Guatemala, and South Africa.

Track Two dialogues help parties read each other’s red lines, assess the veracity of publicly uttered political comments, and understand the role of domestic politics in the bilateral relationship. In the case of Sudan, the positions that formed the basis of successful (official) negotiations already had emerged in prior talks. For example, individuals negotiating the Machakos agreement note that it “came as a result of a series of workshops and problem-solving exercises for the participants” (North 2007).

Parties at this stage maintained a sustained dialogue, focusing on concrete and detailed aspects of the political or social underpinnings of the conflict. In time, the dialogue comes to be aimed at the exploration of issues, not positional bargaining. For example, in the case of Sudan, the Conference on Human Rights, Democracy, and Development stressed the importance of a comprehensive and just peace. It rejected preliminary or partial agreements that did not resolve the war’s enduring causes and addressed the demand for human rights, democracy, and equitable, sustainable development. Similar effects were noted in the Guatemalan case.

In several cases, parties opted for a standing agenda item for each meeting. In Sudan, participants agreed “to hold three consultations per year, each four days long, each covering one socioeconomic issue and one political issue” with specific foci on federalism, self-determination, religion, and state (Sudan Peace Building Programme 2002). In some cases, such as South Africa, parties operated with a fluid agenda (Lieberfield 2002; Giliomee 2009). In other cases, such as India–Pakistan, the “open agenda” nature of Track Two has allowed participants to find points of synergy between all sides on issues that may be less controversial.

Notably, the heavy lifting stage was one where groups developed a much greater sense of “ownership” of their process, though this does not necessarily mean that there were no outside facilitators involved. In the South Africa–ANC case, for example, the ANC had initially been averse to involving outside parties, which “would invariably come with their agendas” (ANC 1985), but came to see the logic of having an outside facilitator—even one that had close business ties to white South Africans. Indeed, once the ANC recognized that assuaging the fears of the Afrikaner community (and the international investment community) that majority rule would mean the country’s economic ruin was a key goal of the talks, the logic of having those talks facilitated by a major UK mining company grew (Lieberfield 2002).

In this stage, we can observe several types of transfer mechanisms. In general, these mechanisms primarily involve the communication of ideas related to problem resolution to those in power. This is because participants delve into the issues in great detail during their dialogues through developing relationships and trust. Furthermore, the transfer mechanisms tend to align more closely with the chosen Track One target. Hence, we noted personal contacts and advice, endorsements from official parties, and the political involvement of dialogue participants.

This stage is concerned with Track Two serving as the place where breakthroughs happen that would not be possible by conventional diplomatic means. Often a breakthrough happens due to political shifts or ripeness brought about, in part, by Track Two dialogues or to a combination of both (Druckman 2001). Typically, this makes the stage interconnected with the heavy lifting spaces for informal conversations that become central to building relationships and maintaining trust.

The South African case illustrates how actor transformation and changes in the political perceptions of key decision-makers contributed to a “great leap forward.” While the South African president at the time the talks began was in favor of apartheid, the new president (de Klerk) had the disposition, pragmatism, and legal training that “inclined him toward rational debate and legal-constitutional approaches to dispute settlement” (Lieberfeld 2002), even though he had risen to prominence as a relatively conservative member of his political party. He received regular briefings from Track Two actors about abolishing the country’s repressive government system. In fact, his brother participated in the final stages of South African dialogues and regularly reported to him on the meeting contents. These insights, combined with rapidly eroding public support for apartheid, changed de Klerk’s position on negotiating to abolish the repressive governance system after he was elected. The other warring party, the ANC, also registered a shift in positions based on knowledge gained throughout Mells Park (UK) meetings facilitated by Consolidated Goldfields, a UK-based mining company with substantial interests in South Africa (Lieberfeld 2002).

The case of Guatemala shows that when participants work together and build familiarity with each other, they connect on a human level, where they learn “that they share the same fears, needs, and concerns,” moving the process forward through the foundation of respect, trust, and friendship (Burgess and Burgess 2010). In the Philippines, informal dialogues pushed negotiations toward agreement at critical junctures (Cagoco-Guiam et al. 1999).

Additionally, it is worth considering the role of the third party during the great leap forward. In Guatemala, the mediator helped negotiators “identify and work towards an imagined future” (Jones 2015) because he possessed the “moral imagination” described by Lederach—the ability to help the participants visualize themselves as being “in a web of relationships that include our enemies” (2005). Depending on the parties’ perceptions of the process, there was a preference for quiet mediators or mediators who were more prominent and strong. In the framework of the 1993–1996 Philippines–MNLF negotiations in the lead-up to the 1996 Final Agreement, the Indonesians were instructed to refer to themselves as facilitators instead of mediators, which was “based on the perception that the Moro problem was an intra-state conflict, and that Indonesia did not want to be seen as interfering in the domestic affairs of another country” (Flores 2019: 193, quoting historian Anak Agung Banyu Perwita).

Dialogues at this stage are part of, and contribute to, so-called critical junctures. These events can arise due to various factors, such as a change in leadership, a shift in public opinion, or a significant event, such as a major act of violence. While Track Two, in itself, does not bring these junctures about, it helps the sides to take advantage of them by having in place a respected set of individuals and ideas that could be used to take advantage of the momentum that such moments generate. Had these not been present, the impetus of a critical juncture might have been unrealized—the window of opportunity would have closed. Whether this was achieved through building trust between key people, informing them of the key conflict resolution ideas, or providing reports—this stage impacted policymaking.

The “life support” function of Track Two refers to a stage of a conflict in which such a point of hostility or stalemate exists that official communication has largely ceased (or never began in the first place). Track Two (and Track One and a Half and even Three), therefore, functions as one of very few—or even the only—channel of communication between the sides, and is focused on sustaining the possibility of eventual resolution of a conflict by keeping any dialogue going. Those of our cases in which Track Two served a “life support” function at one or more points in the conflict are: India–Pakistan, Guatemala–URNG, Philippines–MNLF, and Northern Ireland–IRA. In this phase, Track Two meetings are often covert due to the highly charged atmosphere. Similarly, we also observed that in this phase, Track Two facilitators may find themselves beginning and continuing dialogue either unbeknownst to, or with the general disapproval, of senior Track One level(s).

In the India–Pakistan conflict, the relationship between the two countries greatly deteriorated following the 2008 bombings in Mumbai, which killed 175 people and were allegedly supported by elements of the Pakistani government. It is during this period of the hostilities that two of the most prominent Track Two processes in the region, the Ottawa Dialogue and the Chao Track, were formed. They became useful platforms to allow the two governments to read each other’s red lines, assess the veracity of publicly uttered political comments, and understand the role of domestic politics in the bilateral relationship (Jones 2022).

In Northern Ireland, the “Duddy Backchannel” was largely the only means through which the British government could communicate with leaders of the IRA while still adhering to its “no communication” policy with terrorists or those associated with them. The talks, held between British intelligence officers and senior members of the IRA, were hosted by Duddy in his home in the 1970s and 1980s and kept the thread of communication and (perhaps weak) hope for resolution alive (O’Dochartaigh 2011; Lehrs 2022). In the Philippines–MNLF negotiations, informal dialogues were used to overcome “impasses over substantive issues” during formal negotiations. The efforts of the International Contact group, a consortium of four international NGOs specialized in conflict resolution, is a case in point (Taniguchi 2022). In the Guatemala–URNG conflict, even though the government and the guerilla groups met and set out a road map to peace, the peace process saw an impasse in 1992 (Elgueta 2018). Track Two “life support” actions that were pursued at the time by Norwegian facilitators helped maintain contacts and convince the military to take a more pragmatic approach, communicate with insurgency, and work for democratization.

Transfer mechanisms at this stage focus on managing the conflict by keeping the dialogue going. This aim defines observed transfer mechanisms: quiet contacts or shuttle dialogue, relationship building to create stability, and occasional joint statements to ensure that some sort of dialogue is ongoing and not everything is lost. What is being transferred is simply the idea that some sort of dialogue remains possible.

“Broadening the scope” refers to the stage at which dialogues integrate a wider range of actors with the aim of creating broader cultural and societal conditions that foster peace and resolution between the sides. This level of unofficial activity is commonly at the Track Three or multitrack level. The cases we have identified for this category are India–Pakistan, Northern Ireland, Bangladesh–JSS/SB, Guatemala,⁹ and Myanmar. In our case studies, we have identified several types of actors: civil society, business groups, armed groups, and NGOs. The actors were involved in different ways, including as observers, direct participants, or consultants, or through working groups, panels, commissions, or collective action.

Myanmar’s 2016 Union Peace Conference, or the 21st Century Panglong, had a mandate for civil society inclusion and sought to consult with several society organizations. These “consultative forums” included a number of issue-based forums that were reserved for civil society organizations. These forums lacked a formal mechanism for transfer to the official (Track One) level and were criticized by civil society organizations for this reason. While the consultative approach was largely ineffective in Myanmar, community dialogues may tell a different story. Community-based dialogues in Myanmar have had the potential to influence the Track One level (Jones et al. 2021). While formal transfer mechanisms through these past consultative approaches have proven void or ineffective in the present political crisis, due largely to the fact that the military junta is simply not ready to listen, there remains a vibrant community of civil society organizations that are working to address root causes of conflict and may one day complement a future formal peace process.

Historically, Myanmar’s formal peace processes barred communication with EAOs in the region. However, a series of Track Two and informal dialogues, such as the dialogues from 2011 to 2015 run by General U Aung Min and the Euro-Burma Office, engaged with EAOs and were an integral part of the peace process because they were able to skirt the official policies outlawing engagement with EAOs. These meetings “were integral to creating the foundation of mutual trust and respect needed to move forward in creating or renewing ceasefires bilaterally, and, eventually, moving towards a nationwide ceasefire” (Pring and Palmiano Federer 2020).

Similarly, in the case of Bangladesh, the Asia Indigenous Peoples’ Pact was founded in 1992 by several Indigenous peoples’ movements across Asia, including in Bangladesh. Although these multilateral community dialogues have proven to be effective ways of amplifying the voices of peoples of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, as with Myanmar’s ineffective consultative process, there is no formal mechanism of transfer from these dialogues to Track One. This is largely because there is no formal engagement between officials in Bangladesh and these movements—even at the consultative level.

In Northern Ireland, however, both civil society consultative forums and community-based dialogues proved highly effective at influencing policy in the 1990s and even earlier. Peace People is a grassroots organization founded in 1976 by Mairead Maguire, Betty Williams, and Ciaran McKeown, the former two receiving the 1976 Nobel Peace Prize. The organization was created to advocate for peace in Northern Ireland and encouraged Catholics to speak out against the IRA and Protestants to speak out against paramilitary violence from Loyalist groups. The organization did not appear to convene Track Two level dialogues, but rather community-based (Track Three) dialogues that ultimately garnered significant attention from the Track One level. The organization kicked itself off by a declaration that was created by the founders and signed by over 100,000 people. The popularization of the declaration led to a number of cross-community dialogues between Catholics and Protestants at the local level (Smithey 2017; Kadioglu 2018). Byrne (1995) notes that the ethnoreligious discrimination against Catholics in Northern Ireland throughout the twentieth century was a key barrier to relationship building, making Protestant-to-Catholic dialogues (as opposed to British-to-Northern Irish dialogues) important to building lasting peace (see also Arthur 1990; Kmec and Ganiel 2018).

In Guatemala, civil society inclusion underpinned the success of peace negotiations and was itself directly transferred to Track One. The Civil Society Assembly sought to involve civil society actors, including from marginalized groups, in the peace process between the Guatemalan government and the URNG. This allowed for “a more symmetrical transfer of information in the peace process” (Eschmann and Nilsson 2022). In India–Pakistan, the inclusion of the business and trade sector in informal dialogues has been impactful and one of the few examples of clear-cut transfer from the Track Three level to Track One (Rid 2020). Unfortunately, due to upticks in violence in Kashmir in the early and mid-2010s, many of the fruits of this work still have not been realized. The case does, however, prove that trade and business actors can be involved at the multitrack level for effective dialogue that can transfer to Track One.

At this stage, transfer takes several directions. First, Track Two dialogues result in an upward transfer to the decision-makers. This can be accomplished through members of the official negotiating parties joining dialogues in their unofficial capacity; through mediators; through members of the Track Two dialogues with close contacts to the official parties; or through published materials. Often, Track Two dialogues produce ideas and documents that are included in the provisions or articles of the final agreement. Second, they produce larger coalitions of actors—the lateral transfer. This increases community capability and self-esteem, which facilitate cooperative problem-solving on matters of mutual interest and, therefore, impact the wider conflict. It is crucial for coordination, sharing of resources, and collaboration and planning to take place between civil society groups.

Civil society can play important roles in sustaining peace agreements or trying to “sell” them to the public. Also, our empirical analysis shows that lack of civil society inclusion at this and preceding stages may have been one of the factors that contributed to protests or votes against the final peace agreement or challenges with the agreement’s implementation. This was particularly the case with Oslo, for example.

This category in our typology refers to conflicts in which Track Two has become baked into a seemingly “endless” peace process, with no sign that a resolution is likely to be reached. In these contexts, peace processes may rely on Track Two for the management of a conflict—at the least, to help prevent it from worsening. However, there is the danger that if no resolution is found or no aim of resolution exists, the role of Track Two as a vehicle to help the sides manage the conflict becomes an end in itself. It can contribute—even if unintentionally—to prolonging a conflict by keeping fighting at a minimum “acceptable” level and thus removing pressure on official actors to make the hard decisions necessary to bring about concrete changes. The literature on the concepts of “frozen” and “intractable” conflicts is illustrative of this problem (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2004; Klosek et al. 2021).

The case we have identified for this category is India–Pakistan, in which the Track Two processes that began in the 1990s seem to have settled into this pattern (though the processes in Cyprus and Israel/Palestine can also fit into this category). Simply put, talks at the official level have not been able to tackle and resolve the key issue (Kashmir). In the meantime, officials also do not wish to see a major war erupt. The goal is thus to “keep a lid” on the conflict, but without confronting the hard choices necessary to really end it (Jones 2022, 2024). A related theme in this stage of Track Two is the question of the “peacebuilding industry” and its potential to impact a conflict negatively (Autesserre 2014). As mentioned above, dialogues at this stage can risk becoming “baked” into a conflict. When this happens, there is the risk that conveners will build their organizational infrastructure around a certain conflict, reducing their incentive to contribute to the conflict’s resolution. Moreover, if this occurs, some may mistake this heavy presence of dialogue as a sign of ripeness, and more dialogues may begin. While well-intended, this runs the additional risk of crowding out local peacebuilding operations and allowing for the opportunity to “dialogue shop,” wherein participants shift from forum to forum, creating the illusion of rich and ongoing dialogue when the discussion is actually somewhat artificial.

If it is deemed desirable to keep dialogues going, in hopes that they may serve to one day be a platform for progress when possible (thereby showing that this phase can be related to the “life support” phase), a strong financial component is critical for the sustained support and operation of dialogue organizations. Long-lasting dialogues like Chao or Ottawa can face ongoing financial pressure and stress. The survival of Track Two dialogues depends on continuous efforts. In the case of India–Pakistan, uncertainty about the continuity of the process and transmission to other levels can be problematic. To ensure the longevity of these dialogues, it is essential to broaden the scope of the dialogue constituents. Participants of Track Two dialogues in the India–Pakistan conflict can experience fatigue over time. Where it takes time for ideas to reach the government, building community-level contacts and bridges becomes crucial. Our case studies overwhelmingly support the idea that involving civil society in peace processes makes them more sustainable and long-lasting. This also highlights the importance of broadening the scope of dialogues where possible. A multitrack approach, involving civil society, grassroots organizations, and/or secular or religious leaders, depending on the setting, can bridge divides within conflict parties and reconcile individual groups. The cultural divides may continue to grow, making community-level contact and bridge-building increasingly vital in the years to come. These efforts can also generate fresh ideas for conflict resolution and broaden constituencies for peace.

Our research has led us to develop a nascent “tool” for the analysis of the roles Track Two can play in conflict situations. Our comparative research indeed showed that Track Two plays several distinct roles at different points in the conflict process. It does so in a nonlinear fashion, and these different roles impact the nature of “transfer” to different tracks in different ways, thereby having a multidimensional impact and contribution to the resolution of conflicts. Furthermore, our research design, typology, and case study analysis showed that different manifestations of Track Two played distinct roles in incrementally accompanying, supporting, or pushing the process forward in specific ways and “helping” the parties advance toward an agreement.

We show this through combining the typology of the specific roles Track Two plays with distilling specific mechanisms or environmental conditions that helped the “transfer” of tangible elements (outputs, draft agreements, proposals) and intangible elements (trust, relationship, legitimacy) from Track Two to Track One (or Three).

As we have noted, the case studies showed that Track Two was able to begin, sustain, or propel dialogue forward. We found that meeting in a neutral environment, spending significant time together over a long period, equal treatment of both parties, and third-party facilitation contributed to Track One processes. These factors contributed through mechanisms for transfer incorporated into the structure of dialogues that prevented walkouts and impasses, built trust and political relationships between decision-makers and influential stakeholders, made direct inputs to decision-makers, and created opportunities to produce joint statements that were then passed on to actors at the Track One level.

Our data highlighted the importance of multiple directions of transfer to both Track One and Track Three. Our analysis shows that Track Two can be an essential component in fostering inclusion or building a relationship between the parties and the broader society. This is accomplished through consultative forums at the Track Two level, non-armed Track Two level actors such as business or cultural leaders producing joint statements for upward transfer, and intense advocacy and involvement from Track Two and Track Three to increase participation or transfer opportunities to formal negotiations or agreements. In addition, we found that Track Two dialogues that were broad in scope contributed to the peace process by desensitizing the public to the idea of dialogue with the other side, and building greater understanding and latent support for negotiations. Moreover, we found that the absence of civil society inclusion and linkage/connection/transfer between all three tracks was a factor that led to protests and votes against the agreement or challenges with the implementation of the agreement.

Our analysis showed that Track Two’s contributions to the substance of a process and the relationships within it contribute to ripeness and to the wider readiness of participants to talk to each other in situations of protracted conflict. However, it is important to distinguish how exactly this takes place. Therefore, our typology illustrates the roles—or in some cases, “critical junctures” (e.g., “great leap forward” and “in the beginning”)—that Track Two creates to nudge the process toward a greater stage of ripeness or readiness for dialogue. Our analysis also highlights the role of a third party in acting as a mechanism for transfer from Track Two to Track One, such as through direct contact with Track One negotiators and engaging in shuttle dialogue between sides (and tracks) and their connection to key constituencies outside the negotiating parties, to name a few key roles outlined in the comparative case study. These findings inform the model set forth in Figure 3.

We have tried to keep the design of the tool as parsimonious as possible. It is important to view the tool in a holistic fashion, not in a linear way and not only from the inside out, but from the outside in as well. The inner circle shows the Track Two initiative, workshop, or process at the center of our analysis. The different compartments of the circle denote the different stages of the typology, underscoring the non-linearity of the reality of most past and ongoing conflict resolution processes. The outer section shows that Track One and Track Three are equally envisaged as the direction of transfer, and supports our empirical findings that show the importance of civil society or Track Three inclusion in the sustainable resolution of conflicts. The arrows denote the process of transfer and also illustrate that transfer can exist in multiple directions.

The typology and tool developed in this article illustrate how Track Two can help or contribute to the resolution of conflicts through playing different roles at different points of a process. They do this through combining this typology of Track Two’s different roles and critical junctures with the concept of “transfer.” In each section of the circle, transfer can occur within different environments. They contribute to the research and practice of Track Two in conflict resolution in three ways.

First, we contribute the notion of multidirectionality to Track Two scholarship. While Lederach’s triangular model of conflict resolution is an important way of visualizing how multiple levels of society play important roles in conflict resolution, a trianglular model creates, even if inadvertently, a hierarchy between Tracks One, Two, and Three. Our typology and tool move beyond the hierarchy of triangular models of Track Two and view both Track One and Track Three as important destinations for transfer (formal negotiations and agreements as well as civil society inclusion/public support for the process).

Second, in a related way, as many conflict resolution processes are presented in a temporally linear way, our typology and tool strive to capture non-linearity through the circular shape, recognizing that each part can occur in different stages, repeat itself, or start and stop again after long periods of time—reflecting the messy reality of the field. The inherent chaos, complexity, and messiness of any peace process is increasingly recognized in the field. The concept of “patchworked peacemaking,” for example, is an attempt to develop a concept of multitrack peacemaking that eschews linearity and hierarchy as the basis of the relationship between the tracks in favor of an approach in which the embrace of the complexity and confusion of peacemaking in the real world is central to any attempt to encourage cooperation across the tracks. (See, e.g., Hirblinger and Palmiano Federer 2024; Jones 2024.)

Third, our typology and tool illustrate modularity by showing contributing factors such as the role that third parties play or contextual factors like changes in administration or breakdowns in negotiations, which play different roles at different stages of the process.

In these ways, our typology and tool provide a visual representation of how Track Two contributes to the resolution of protracted armed conflicts and have implications for the practice of conflict resolution. They seek to create ways to capture complexity and engender hope, and reflect an understanding that even if a conflict resolution process moves from a “great leap forward” back to “in the beginning,” it does not necessarily signal an “end” of a process, with no prospects of moving forward. Above all, we seek to illustrate that Track Two can serve as a means to make the prospect of progress toward peace seem possible.