Introduction to Special Issue: Why It Worked: Redefining “Success” in Conflict Resolution and Peace Negotiations Open Access

In 2022, researchers from five global universities began a journey to bring hope to populations ensnared in cycles of conflict. Hailing from diverse disciplines, institutions, and countries, they analyzed historic conflicts to determine lessons applicable to various ongoing global conflicts. Those engaged in the project, “Why It Worked,” composed of a globally diverse team of researchers working independently yet sharing a unified vision and roadmap:

Roadmap:

1. Study intractable conflicts that, despite their intractability, ended. Independent projects – Completed.

2. Analyze the cases from diverse academic disciplines and perspectives. Identify the unique elements and richness within individual cases. Identify themes and patterns that emerged from the robust study across the cases. Independent projects – Completed.

3. Synthesize findings into novel frameworks and typologies to stimulate insights and interventions for ongoing conflicts. Independent projects – Completed.

4. Integrate these findings into one comprehensive yet simplified tool that bridges the gap between theory and practice. The integrated work will center a visual framework that can be used as a tool for diagnosis and intervention in local conflict. Integrative work – Ongoing.

5. Disseminate with global practitioners who can localize the tool, make the research come alive for individuals engaged in on-the-ground conflict resolution, and inspire new insights for action that is grounded in both academic research and the realities of their contexts. Localization work – Ongoing.

This special issue of Negotiation Journal invites readers to join our journey of discovery, moving beyond binary notions of “success” and “failure” to explore the elements that propelled the world’s trickiest conflicts toward peace. This collection reflects the independent studies, analysis, and synthesis of our five teams and brings the reader into the conversation as we work toward integration and localization. The issue was produced collaboratively by teams from the Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard University, the University of Ottawa, Uppsala University, George Mason University, the University of Delaware, and Bridging Insights, Inc.

This special issue is the result of a two-year research project called “Why It Worked,”¹ which brought together five research teams to study the world’s trickiest conflicts: conflicts that are protracted, asymmetric, and ethnonational (PAE), as determined by preceding research.

• Protracted conflicts last for at least a generation, or over 20 years.

• Asymmetric conflicts involve significant power disparities between the main parties concerning resources, international legal status, or strategies.

• Ethnonational conflicts are characterized by conflict between specific ethnic groups and/or nationalist aspirations.

Of roughly 350 global conflicts from 1946 to 2018, only 51 have been resolved with a lasting comprehensive peace agreement in which violence (related to the original conflict) has not re-emerged. Of those resolved conflicts, only six were characterized by the structural features that mark them as the world’s trickiest: protracted, asymmetric, and ethnonational.² Each research team studied the following six “core cases”:³

• Guatemala – URNG (1994): This case refers to the civil war from 1963 to 1994 between the Government of Guatemala and many leftist groups, most of them grouped together as the URNG (Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity) from 1982 onward. The conflict stemmed mainly from issues concerning unfair land distribution between descendants of Europeans and poor rural peasants and Indigenous people. Between 140,000 and 200,000 people died from the 31-year-long conflict. The conflict ended in 1994 with the signing of The Agreement for a Firm and Lasting Peace, which implied far-reaching reforms of Guatemalan society, including recognition of Indigenous people’s rights and land and social reforms for the landless and poor, among others.

• Philippines – MNLF (1996): This case refers to the Moro secessionist conflict between 1970 and 1996. The main actors included the Government of the Philippines and the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front). The conflict stemmed from issues mainly concerning autonomy and Sharia law implementation in the Mindanao territory, southern Philippines. Over 27 years of conflict, approximately 120,000 people died. The conflict ended in 1996 with the signing of the Jakarta Accord, which brought with it the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao in the southern Philippines.

• Bangladesh – JSS/SB (1997): This case refers to the Chittagong Hill Tracts conflict between the Government of Bangladesh, and the Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (United People’s Party of the Chittagong Hill Tracts) and its armed wing, the Shanti Bahini. It stemmed from the issue of autonomy and the land rights of Jumma people, mainly Chakma people and the other Indigenous of Chittagong Hill Tracts. Over 22 years of conflict, approximately 6,000 people died. The conflict ended in 1997 with the signing of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord, which included the reintegration of rebels into normal civilian life, the creation of a Chittagong Hill Tracts regional council with a range of autonomous responsibilities, and reforms to redistribute land between conflicting parties.

• Northern Ireland – PIRA (1998): This case, also known as “The Troubles,” was a violent conflict based on deep and long-lasting strife between Protestants loyal to their Britishness and the UK and Catholics who sought to end UK influence and move toward a United Ireland and away from British rule. No generation going back to the sixteenth-century Plantation of Ulster (the northern part of the island) was untouched by its history. The conflict was protracted, lasting about 30 years from the late 1960s to 1998. More than 3,500 people were killed during the conflict, of which over half were civilians. The conflict was terminated with the Good Friday Agreement signed on April 10, 1998, in Belfast. The major actors included the United Kingdom, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), and Ulster Loyalist paramilitaries.

• Angola – UNITA (2002): This case refers to the civil war between the MPLA (Movement for the Liberation of Angola) and the UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) that has been ongoing since 1975. These political parties fought together in the Angolan War of Independence between 1961 and 1975 against Portugal. Then, for the next 27 years, they fought against each other for ideological and military reasons, inflicting a total of 800,000 casualties. After the implementation of the 1994 Lusaka Protocol failed in 1998, the conflict ended in 2002 with a Memorandum of Understanding, which dealt with outstanding issues from the failed protocol such as the inclusion of UNITA forces in the national army, their participation in all levels of government, and their integration into normal social life.

• Sudan – SPLM/A (2005): This case refers to the Second Sudanese Civil War, which took place between 1983 and 2005. The main actors included the Sudanese government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLM/A) from the south of Sudan. The conflict stemmed mainly from issues concerning an unequal distribution of resources. Nearly two million people died. The conflict ended in 2005 with the signing of the Naivasha Agreement, which eventually led to South Sudan’s independence.

In addition to these six core cases, teams studied three additional conflicts, selected for their relevant insights despite fulfilling only one or two of the PAE criteria. These include the following three “special cases”:⁴

• France – FLN (Algeria) (1962): This case was a violent conflict between Algeria’s former colonial power France and the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN), an armed national movement striving for independence. The war was fought between 1954 and 1962 and resulted in complete Algerian Independence. On March 18, 1962, the Evian Accords were signed, which included detailed agreements implementing the recognition of full Algerian sovereignty, prisoner releases, and ceasefire arrangements.

• Colombia – FARC (2016): This case was a protracted civil war spanning across more than five decades from 1964 to 2016. In 2016, the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia People’s Army (FARC) reached a final peace agreement. Both houses of Congress ratified the agreement, marking an end to the conflict. Close to 220,000 people died.

• South Africa – ANC (1993): This case is an internal conflict in which armed violence took place mostly between the 1960s and the early 1990s during South Africa’s apartheid regime. Following the Sharpeville Massacre in March 1960, anti-apartheid groups—led chiefly by the African National Congress (ANC)—transitioned into armed resistance. The conflict ended in 1994 with bilateral negotiations to end apartheid, leading to open elections and universal suffrage for all ethnic groups in the country. The main actors in this conflict were the General National Party (apartheid rule) and the ANC.

Due to shortcomings in agreements, challenges in implementation, or re-emergence of conflict issues, the following conflicts may be more appropriately classified as partially successful despite fulfilling our narrow definition of “resolved”: Guatemala – URNG, Bangladesh – JSS/SB, Sudan – SPLM/A, France – FLN (Algeria), and Philippines – MNLF.

The Why It Worked teams were comprised of researchers with a wide diversity of backgrounds—professionally, academically, culturally, and geographically—in order to create a comprehensive final study with distinctive academic lenses. And, given the practical nature of the work—localization to inspire action and hope for individuals in conflict—the teams all share a passion for, and commitment to, the world of practice.

Our team at the Harvard Kennedy School designed and led this project and was joined by five teams, each representing a specific academic lens and disciplinary focus:

• Uppsala University – Conflict Analysis

  How do parties in conflict design a sustainable peace?

• Harvard University – Power and Leadership

  How do parties in conflict relate to, lead, and engage with others?

• University of Ottawa – Negotiation and Dialogue

  How do parties in conflict use informal negotiations to move a process forward?

• George Mason University – Identity and Religion

  How do parties in conflict see themselves and one another?

• University of Delaware – Land and Natural Resources

  How do parties in conflict relate to their natural environment?

Given the geographic focuses, fields of research, practitioner expertise, and overall diversity of the Why It Worked teams, in addition to the nine cases highlighted, each team was asked to study two to four additional cases, including at least one in which agreement was not reached. The findings from these cases were used to test or support the findings derived primarily from PAE cases. Thus, in the Why It Worked portfolio of work, there are over a dozen additional cases that include diverse countries, actors, and types of conflict.

Each team produced a report of approximately 150 pages that included an overview of their unique methodology, chapters dedicated to analyzing each of the cases, a comparative study of all cases, and a suggested model for use in other conflicts. All of this work feeds into the insights shared in the articles in this special issue.

The articles in this special issue address five key queries of PAE conflicts. The first article, by Mimmi Soderberg Kovacs and Isak Svensson of Uppsala University, tackles the fundamental question of conflict analysis: How do parties in conflict design a sustainable peace? The authors discuss their research on how adversaries build sustainable peace through negotiated settlements, exploring three important turning points on the path from war to peace in a selected set of armed conflicts whose resolution was attempted through negotiation: the opening of negotiations, the reaching of peace agreements, and the establishment of sustainable peace.

The following two articles look at the negotiation process. First, Arvid Bell and Warisha Aslam of Harvard University tackle the question of power and leadership: How do parties in conflict relate to, lead, and engage with others? The team uses “negotiation system analysis” to map power, leadership, and relationships across complex negotiation systems to determine overlapping networks and links between various players at different levels of authority. They describe a causal model that explains how power, leadership, and relationships can lead to the negotiated settlement of protracted, asymmetric, and ethnonational conflicts. Second, Peter Jones, Julia Palmiano Federer, Mariana Savka, Laura O’Connor, and Fernando Aguilar of the University of Ottawa analyze negotiation and dialogue: How do parties in conflict use informal negotiations to move a process forward? This article interrogates the extent to which Track Two diplomacy contributes to the resolution of PAE conflicts. The authors discuss the ways in which Track Two moved a larger peace process forward, with a focus on the role of the third party, the inclusion of civil society actors, and how broader public opinion in the respective conflict contexts impacted negotiations and dialogue. The article develops an original typology of roles that Track Two can play, which provides a framework for analysis. The article also presents a conceptual tool based on this typology to illustrate multidirectional transfer from Track Two.

The final two articles look at a specific set of substantive issues at the heart of PAE conflicts. First, Karina V. Korostelina, Marc Gopin, Jeffrey W. Helsing, and Alpaslan Özerdem of George Mason University focus on the question of identity and religion: How do parties in conflict see themselves and one another? They argue that the role of identity and religion has been often overlooked and understudied. Their study explores the facets of identity and religion that address and transform relationships within and between different groups. Their article provides a novel framework—the “BRIDGE” model—that can be used in local application to ongoing conflicts. Next, Saleem Ali, Nancy Boyer, Gabriela Mundaca, and Shaghayegh Jabalameli of the University of Delaware, and Lynette de Silva and Jahan Taganova of Oregon State University, explore the question of land and resources: How do parties in conflict relate to their natural environment? This article explores the ways in which land and natural resources contribute to the framing of conflicts and how they may contribute to their resolution. Their analysis suggests there may be opportunities for making peace through a nexus with natural resources and for making agreements more robust with the inclusion of issues related to land and resources.

Each of the articles in this special issue contains a model or a practical tool that actors and groups can take and adapt to their local context. We encourage practitioners to bring these tools home, and use the new language, knowledge, and ideas to spark thoughtful, courageous, and innovative discourse.

In the final article, Julia Palmiano Federer, Brian Mandell, Monica Giannone, and Elan Kogutt of the Harvard Kennedy School integrate the findings from the first five articles and make a case for moving away from outcome-based understandings of success toward a more holistic view of the interrelated dimensions of effectiveness. We leave the reader with integrated factors such as creating cross-cutting identities, redefining the meaning of intergroup divisions, and assuring guarantees for minorities, to provide nuance to ideas of what contributes to effectiveness in peace negotiations.

In 2022, we constructed the Why It Worked project with commonly understood definitions for well-debated concepts. We framed this project as a starting point, allowing teams to tailor their work to their academic backgrounds. We embraced the differences that emerged from this freedom.

Each team utilized its own methodologies, conducted its own research, and developed reports from its distinct academic perspectives. Readers may, as such, notice each team has unique—and, thereby, sometimes contrasting—methodologies and definitions of such concepts as success, peace, and conflict actors. We believe this theoretical eclecticism enhances, rather than detracts from, this compilation of work. As we are not attempting to create or suggest a “magic formula” for peacemaking—and in fact argue against a depoliticizing of conflict—we intend for each divergent and/or complementary notion to provoke a question in us and you, our readers, as to how and why terms are defined, and what impact this has not only on our work but on its practical application.

In service of setting a baseline from which to begin our journey, the following provides a brief starting point for certain essential concepts reflected in this issue. Each team may suggest specific working notions within their articles and a literature review and overall academic grounding for the integrative work can be found in the issue’s concluding article.

Taken together, the articles in this special issue of Negotiation Journal make two distinct arguments. First, they argue that existing academic literature on success and failure, or the elusive “golden formula” of peacemaking, often limits its focus to structural explanations based on the nature of the conflict, the relationship between the parties, and process design. These limits risk depoliticizing conflict resolution efforts and overemphasizing the ability of mediators to end conflicts. We argue for a more integrated approach to understanding why peace agreements between warring actors in conflict have been reached.

Second, the articles argue that while every conflict is unique, patterns, trends, and ideas can be learned by closely examining resolved conflicts. Practitioners, activists, members of civil society, and government actors can learn both by “zooming out” to identify general patterns and “zooming in” to see the application of these patterns in different contexts. The combination of “zooming out” and “zooming in” can generate new insights and interventions relevant to their contexts. Understanding what led to conflict transformation and ripeness in each case presents new avenues to explore and invites tools for gradual, society-based change that acknowledges diverse worldviews and narratives.

This special issue of Negotiation Journal aims to share new insights and generate avenues for further research and practice. The full academic work discussed in the following pages will be published in various forms in the coming months and years. It is our hope that you, the reader, are inspired to continue on our journey with us—through engaging, reading our additional work, and even adding to our portfolio of work—and that we will continue to create space for hope together.

These summaries are based on reports from various universities conducted as part of the original research project, “Why It Worked: A Research-Driven Model for Conflict Resolution” and compiled with the assistance of generative artificial intelligence. This project was conceived and funded by Bridging Insights, Inc. and led by the Negotiation and Conflict Resolution Collaboratory at Harvard Kennedy School.

Comprehensive case studies will be published for classroom use by the Negotiation and Conflict Resolution Collaboratory at the Center for Public Leadership at Harvard Kennedy School.

• Links to summaries of each case within this appendix:

• Guatemala – URNG (1994)

• Philippines – MNLF (1996)

• Bangladesh – JSS/SB (1997)

• Northern Ireland – PIRA (1998)

• Angola – UNITA (2002)

• Sudan – SPLM/A (2005)

• France – FLN (Algeria) (1962)

• Colombia – FARC (2016)

• South Africa – ANC (1993)

Guatemala’s 36-year civil war, lasting from 1960 to 1996, was one of the longest and most brutal conflicts in Latin American history. The roots of the conflict can be traced back to the 1944–1954 period known as the “Ten Years of Spring,” when democratically elected governments implemented social and economic reforms, including land redistribution. This period ended with a coup in 1954 that overthrew President Jacobo Árbenz, installing a military government and reversing many reforms.

The war officially began on November 13, 1960, when a group of junior military officers attempted a coup against the government of General Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes. Although the coup failed, some of the officers escaped and established the core of the future guerrilla movement. By 1962, the first guerrilla group, the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), had formed.

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the conflict intensified. The government, backed by the United States, implemented increasingly repressive counterinsurgency tactics. In 1966, the U.S. Green Berets began training Guatemalan forces in counterinsurgency techniques. The period from 1970 to 1971 saw particularly intense violence under the presidency of Carlos Arana Osorio.

In 1982, four major guerrilla groups united to form the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG): the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), the Revolutionary Organization of Armed People (ORPA), the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), and the Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT). This unification strengthened the insurgency’s position.

The same year, General Efraín Ríos Montt came to power through a coup. His 17-month rule is considered one of the most violent periods of the war. The military’s “scorched earth” tactics reached their peak, with entire Mayan villages destroyed and their inhabitants massacred. The Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH) later concluded that acts of genocide were committed against Maya groups during this period.

The conflict disproportionately affected the Indigenous Maya population, who make up about 60% of Guatemala’s population. The CEH estimated that 200,000 people were killed or disappeared during the conflict, with 83% of identified victims being Maya.

The path to peace began in the mid-1980s. In 1984, the Contadora Group (Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama) initiated a regional peace process for Central America. In 1986, Guatemala elected its first civilian president in 16 years, Vinicio Cerezo.

The formal peace process started in 1987 with the Esquipulas II Accord, signed by five Central American presidents. This regional agreement set the framework for resolving conflicts in the region. In October 1987, the first direct talks between the Guatemalan government and the URNG took place in Madrid.

The United Nations became formally involved in the peace process in 1994, establishing the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA). Jean Arnault served as the UN mediator for the final phase of negotiations.

Between 1994 and 1996, the government and URNG signed a series of peace accords addressing key issues:

• Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights (March 1994)

• Agreement on Resettlement of the Population Groups Uprooted by the Armed Conflict (June 1994)

• Agreement on the Establishment of the Commission to Clarify Past Human Rights Violations and Acts of Violence that have Caused the Guatemalan Population to Suffer (June 1994)

• Agreement on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples (March 1995)

• Agreement on Social and Economic Aspects and Agrarian Situation (May 1996)

• Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society (September 1996)

• Agreement on the Definitive Ceasefire (December 1996)

• Agreement on Constitutional Reforms and the Electoral Regime (December 1996)

• Agreement on the Basis for the Legal Integration of the URNG (December 1996)

• The final Accord for a Firm and Lasting Peace was signed on December 29, 1996, officially ending the civil war.

Post-conflict, Guatemala has faced challenges in implementing the peace accords. A 1999 referendum on constitutional reforms mandated by the peace accords failed, complicating implementation efforts. While political violence has largely ceased, Guatemala continues to struggle with violence, corruption, and socioeconomic inequality. Economic disparities persist, particularly affecting the Indigenous population.

The URNG transitioned into a political party but has achieved limited electoral success. Despite these challenges, the peace process ended the armed conflict and laid the groundwork for addressing long-standing issues of inequality and discrimination. The process is notable for its comprehensive nature and the inclusion of civil society, particularly through the Assembly of Civil Society (ASC), which allowed for broader participation in the negotiations.

The Moro secessionist conflict in the Philippines, primarily involving the Government of the Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), has its roots in the colonial period and the subsequent marginalization of the Muslim population in Mindanao. The conflict officially began in 1970, stemming from issues concerning autonomy and the implementation of Sharia law in the Mindanao territory, southern Philippines.

The conflict was driven by historical marginalization, land dispossession, and cultural and religious identity suppression under colonial and post-colonial governments. The conflict, marked by atrocities like the Jabidah and Manili massacres, escalated during Ferdinand Marcos’s martial law regime, leading to widespread human rights violations and displacement of millions.

The MNLF was founded in 1969 by Nur Misuari, a former university lecturer, with the initial goal of establishing an independent Moro nation. The group launched its armed struggle in 1970, leading to intense fighting in the early 1970s. In response, President Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law in 1972, further escalating the conflict.

A significant milestone came in 1976 with the signing of the Tripoli Agreement, brokered by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). This agreement laid the groundwork for autonomy in the southern Philippines. However, disagreements over its implementation led to continued conflict.

The 1986 People Power Revolution, which ousted Marcos, brought new hope for peace. President Corazon Aquino initiated peace talks with the MNLF. In 1989, the government created the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), but the MNLF rejected it, arguing it fell short of the Tripoli Agreement’s provisions.

Peace efforts gained momentum in the 1990s. Facilitated by the OIC and the Indonesian government, negotiations between the Philippine government and the MNLF intensified. These talks culminated in the signing of the Jakarta Accord on September 2, 1996, also known as the Final Peace Agreement.

The 1996 peace agreement with the MNLF formally established the ARMM, creating institutions like the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) and provisions for socioeconomic reforms. However, the agreement’s limited scope, weak implementation, and exclusion of key groups like the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) hindered its success.

Key provisions of the 1996 agreement included:

• The integration of MNLF forces into the Philippine military and police

• The establishment of the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD)

• The implementation of a Special Zone of Peace and Development in the southern Philippines

• A commitment to hold a plebiscite in the affected areas to determine the extent of the autonomous region

The peace agreement brought an end to the armed conflict between the government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). Nur Misuari was elected as governor of the ARMM and appointed chairman of the SPCPD. However, challenges remained in the agreement’s implementation, particularly in areas of governance and economic development.

Over the 27 years of conflict, approximately 120,000 people died. While the 1996 agreement was a significant achievement, it did not resolve all conflicts in Mindanao. Other groups, notably the MILF, which had split from the MNLF in 1977, continued their armed struggle.

Following the peace agreement, the Philippines continued its peace efforts, including the 2014 Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) with the MILF. After renewed conflict with the MILF, the government successfully ratified the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL) in 2019, which laid the legal framework for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region (BARMM), granting it greater autonomy and expanded powers. The BARMM officially replaced the ARMM in 2019.

While the 1996 agreement with the MNLF and the 2014 CAB with the MILF helped reduce large-scale violence, sustainable peace remains elusive. The ARMM’s limited autonomy, dependence on Manila, and governance challenges have left underlying grievances unresolved. Tensions persist due to slow implementation, intergroup mistrust, and economic disparities.

The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) conflict in Bangladesh was a 25-year armed struggle between the Bengali-majority government and the Indigenous Jumma people, comprising 11 ethnic groups in the southeastern CHT region. The conflict began after Bangladesh’s independence in 1971, when state policies sought to impose a Bengali-Muslim identity and displace Indigenous communities through state-sponsored settlement programs. The conflict was between the Government of Bangladesh and the Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (United People’s Party of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, JSS) and its armed wing, the Shanti Bahini (SB). The root causes of the conflict were related to issues of autonomy and land rights for the Jumma people, primarily the Chakma and other Indigenous groups of the Chittagong Hill Tracts.

The origins of the conflict can be traced back to the partition of India in 1947, when the CHT, despite its predominantly non-Muslim population, was allocated to East Pakistan (later Bangladesh). The construction of the Kaptai Dam in 1962 displaced over 100,000 Indigenous people, exacerbating tensions.

In 1972, a delegation of Indigenous leaders, led by Manabendra Narayan Larma, met with Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to demand regional autonomy and constitutional recognition. When these demands were rejected, Larma formed the JSS in 1972. The armed struggle began in 1975 when the Shanti Bahini was formed.

Throughout the late 1970s and 1980s, the conflict intensified. The Bangladesh government implemented policies that encouraged the settlement of Bengali people in the CHT, leading to demographic changes and increased pressure on land resources. This period saw significant human rights abuses, including massacres, forced evictions, and cultural suppression of Indigenous peoples.

Peace initiatives began in the early 1990s. The process involved both formal negotiations between the government and the JSS, as well as informal dialogues facilitated by civil society organizations. Key milestones included:

• The formation of the National Committee on CHT Affairs in 1992

• The initiation of dialogue between the government and JSS in 1992

• The establishment of the CHT Regional Council in 1994

On December 2, 1997, the Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord was signed by the government of Sheikh Hasina and Jyotirindra Bodhipriya Larma (Santu Larma) of the JSS.

Key provisions of the accord included:

• The creation of a Chittagong Hill Tracts regional council with a range of autonomous responsibilities

• Reforms to redistribute land between conflicting parties

• The reintegration of rebels into normal civilian life

• Measures to protect the cultural and linguistic rights of the Indigenous people

• The withdrawal of non-permanent military camps from the CHT

While the Peace Accord significantly reduced violence and facilitated progress, including the return of land to displaced Indigenous groups, its implementation—especially of land dispute resolution and full demilitarization—remains unfinished. Tensions between Bengali settlers and Indigenous communities persist, exacerbated by factionalism within Jumma groups like the United People’s Democratic Front (UPDF), which opposes the accord and seeks full autonomy for the CHT from Bangladesh. Some provisions, such as the establishment of the CHT Regional Council and District Councils, have been implemented. However, key issues, including land commission functionality, devolution of power to local bodies, militarization, land disputes, and cultural rights of Indigenous peoples, remain contentious.

The conflict in Northern Ireland, known as “The Troubles” (1968–1998), was a conflict between Catholic nationalists/republicans, who sought a united Ireland, and Protestant unionists/loyalists, who aimed to maintain Northern Ireland’s union with the United Kingdom. Rooted in historical grievances, the conflict was exacerbated by systemic discrimination, economic inequalities, and contested national allegiances. More than 3,500 people were killed during the conflict—of which over half were civilians—mostly by paramilitary groups like the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF).

The origins of the conflict can be traced back to the partition of Ireland in 1921, which left Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom. Discrimination against the Catholic minority in areas such as housing, employment, and political representation led to the civil rights movement of the 1960s.

The Troubles officially began in 1969 with riots in Derry/Londonderry and Belfast. The British Army was deployed to restore order but soon became viewed as an occupying force by many Catholics. In 1970, PIRA split from the Official IRA, beginning a campaign of armed resistance against British rule.

Key events during the conflict included:

• Bloody Sunday in 1972, when British soldiers killed 14 unarmed civilians during a civil rights march

• The 1981 Hunger Strikes, which saw the deaths of 10 republican prisoners and increased support for Sinn Féin, the political wing of the IRA

• The Brighton hotel bombing in 1984, targeting British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher

• The Enniskillen bombing in 1987, which killed 11 civilians and marked a turning point in public opinion

The peace process began in earnest in the 1990s. Key developments included:

• The Downing Street Declaration of 1993, which affirmed the right of the people of Northern Ireland to self-determination

• The IRA ceasefire of 1994, which was followed by ceasefires from Loyalist groups

• The involvement of the United States, particularly through President Bill Clinton and Senator George Mitchell

The Good Friday Agreement (Belfast Agreement) was signed on April 10, 1998, a landmark in the peace process.

Key provisions of the agreement included:

• Power-sharing between unionists and nationalists in a devolved government

• The decommissioning of paramilitary weapons

• The release of paramilitary prisoners

• Police reform (creation of the Police Service of Northern Ireland)

• The removal of the Republic of Ireland’s constitutional claim to Northern Ireland

• The principle of consent, allowing for a united Ireland if majorities in both jurisdictions agree

The agreement was ratified by referendums in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. It marked the end of large-scale violence, although some dissident republican groups continued to pose a threat.

The peace process in Northern Ireland is notable for its inclusive nature, involving not only the main parties to the conflict but also smaller parties and civil society groups. It also demonstrates the importance of international support and mediation in resolving protracted conflicts.

Northern Ireland has faced challenges in implementing aspects of the Good Friday Agreement, particularly regarding power sharing. The devolved government has been suspended several times, most recently from 2017 to 2020. Northern Ireland has enjoyed relative peace since the agreement was signed, but sectarian divisions persist, reflected in segregated housing and education. Civil society continues to play a role in reconciliation, but political tensions occasionally resurface, particularly around issues like Brexit and its implications for the Irish border. Overall, the peace process is considered a model for resolving ethno-nationalist conflicts globally.

The Angolan Civil War began in 1975 following the country’s independence from Portugal.

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the conflict saw intense fighting interspersed with failed peace attempts. The conflict was primarily between the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and lasted until 2002.

The roots of the conflict lie in Angola’s struggle for independence from Portugal, which began in 1961. Three main groups emerged during this period: the MPLA, UNITA, and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA). When Portugal granted independence in 1975, these groups turned against each other in a struggle for power.

The conflict was fueled by ideological differences and Cold War dynamics, with the MPLA supported by the Soviet Union and Cuba, and UNITA backed by the United States and South Africa. Control over Angola’s vast natural resources, particularly oil and diamonds, also played a significant role in perpetuating the conflict.

Key events and phases of the conflict included:

• The Battle of Luanda in 1975, which saw the MPLA take control of the capital

• South African and Cuban military interventions in the late 1970s and 1980s

• The 1988 New York Accords, leading to the withdrawal of Cuban and South African forces

• The 1991 Bicesse Accords, which led to elections in 1992

• The resumption of war in 1992 after UNITA rejected election results

• The 1994 Lusaka Protocol, providing for power-sharing and the integration of UNITA into the government and armed forces

• The renewal of full-scale war in 1998 after full implementation of the Lusaka Protocol failed

The death of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi in February 2002 marked a turning point in the conflict. Without its charismatic leader, UNITA’s will to continue fighting diminished. This led to the signing of the Luena Memorandum of Understanding on April 4, 2002, which effectively ended the civil war.

Key aspects of the 2002 agreement included:

• A ceasefire between government forces and UNITA

• The demobilization and reintegration of UNITA combatants

• The inclusion of UNITA members in the government and armed forces

• The transformation of UNITA from an armed group into a political party

The Angolan Civil War resulted in approximately 800,000 casualties (with some estimates of 1.5 million) over 27 years and had devastating effects on the country’s infrastructure and economy. Millions were displaced, and the country was left with a legacy of landmines and destroyed infrastructure.

Post-conflict, Angola has faced significant challenges in rebuilding its economy and political system. While the country has experienced economic growth, particularly due to its oil wealth, issues of inequality, corruption, and political repression remain.

The Angolan peace process demonstrates the challenges of implementing peace agreements in resource-rich countries where control over natural resources can provide incentives for continued conflict. It also highlights how changes in leadership and shifts in international support can sometimes provide opportunities for peace.

The Second Sudanese Civil War began in 1983 and lasted until 2005. The conflict was primarily between the government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), representing the interests of Southern Sudan.

The roots of the conflict can be traced back to the first Sudanese Civil War (1955–1972) and the subsequent period of autonomy for Southern Sudan. The breakdown of the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, which had ended the first civil war, led to the resumption of conflict in 1983.

Key causes of the conflict included:

• Unequal distribution of resources between the north and south

• Religious and cultural differences (Islamic north vs. predominantly Christian and animist south)

• Disputes over oil resources discovered in the south

• Issues of autonomy and self-determination for Southern Sudan

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the conflict saw intense fighting and humanitarian crises. The war was characterized by its asymmetrical nature, with the government forces generally holding military superiority over the SPLM/A. Key events during this period included:

• The formation of the SPLM/A in 1983 under John Garang’s leadership

• The 1989 military coup that brought Omar al-Bashir to power

• The split within the SPLM/A in 1991, leading to factional fighting

• The involvement of neighboring countries, particularly Uganda and Ethiopia

The peace process gained momentum in the early 2000s, facilitated by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and supported by the international community, particularly the United States, the United Kingdom, and Norway (the “Troika”). Key milestones in the peace process included:

• The Machakos Protocol of 2002, which established the framework for the peace process

• A series of protocols addressing key issues, signed between 2002 and 2004

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), also known as the Naivasha Agreement, was signed on January 9, 2005.

Key provisions of the agreement included:

• A six-year interim period of autonomy for Southern Sudan

• Wealth-sharing arrangements, particularly regarding oil revenues

• Security arrangements, including the integration of SPLM/A forces

• A referendum on independence for Southern Sudan to be held after the interim period

• Special arrangements for disputed areas such as Abyei, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile

The CPA effectively ended the North–South conflict, which had resulted in an estimated two million deaths and displaced four million people. The agreement led to the independence of South Sudan on July 9, 2011, following a referendum in which 98.83% of Southerners voted for secession.

However, the CPA did not address other conflicts within Sudan, particularly in Darfur, where a separate conflict had erupted in 2003. Additionally, post-independence South Sudan has faced its own internal conflicts, including a civil war that began in 2013.

The Sudan peace process demonstrates the challenges of addressing multiple, interconnected conflicts within a single country. The process underscores the role of regional organizations and international support in facilitating complex peace negotiations. While the CPA succeeded in ending the North–South conflict and led to the creation of South Sudan, both Sudan and South Sudan continue to face significant challenges in governance, economic development, unresolved Darfur issues, and internal stability.

The Algerian War of Independence, fought between France and the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN), lasted from 1954 until 1962. This conflict was a struggle for independence from French colonial rule, which had been in place since 1830.

The roots of the conflict can be traced to the inequalities and injustices of the French colonial system in Algeria. Despite being considered an integral part of France, the majority Muslim population faced discrimination and lacked political rights. The outbreak of World War II and the fall of France in 1940 weakened the French hold on Algeria and sparked nationalist sentiments.

The war officially began on November 1, 1954, when the FLN launched a series of attacks across Algeria. The conflict quickly escalated, with France deploying a large number of troops to suppress the rebellion. The war was characterized by guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and the use of torture by French forces, with atrocities committed by both sides.

Key events during the war included:

• The Battle of Algiers in 1957, a campaign of urban warfare that saw the French military use controversial counterinsurgency tactics

• The collapse of the Fourth French Republic in 1958, leading to the return of Charles de Gaulle to power

• De Gaulle’s Constantine Plan in 1958, aimed at economic development in Algeria

• The Week of Barricades in 1960, when French settlers in Algiers revolted against de Gaulle’s policies

• The Generals’ Putsch of 1961, a failed coup attempt by French military officers opposed to Algerian independence

• The Paris massacre of 1961, in which French police killed dozens of Algerian protesters

The peace process gained momentum in the early 1960s, driven by growing international pressure, changing domestic politics in France, and the realization that a military solution was unlikely. Secret negotiations between the French government and the FLN began in 1961.

On March 18, 1962, the Evian Accords were signed, bringing an end to the conflict. Key provisions of the accords included:

• A ceasefire

• The recognition of Algerian independence

• Guarantees for the rights of European settlers in Algeria

• Cooperation agreements between France and Algeria

• The organization of a referendum on Algerian self-determination

The implementation of the accords was complicated by continued violence, particularly attacks on European settlers by the Secret Army Organization (OAS), a far-right French paramilitary group opposed to Algerian independence.

Algeria officially gained independence on July 5, 1962. The war resulted in hundreds of thousands of casualties, with estimates ranging from 300,000 to over 1 million deaths. It also led to the displacement of over a million European settlers, most of whom left for France.

The Algerian War of Independence had profound effects on both Algeria and France. For Algeria, it led to independence but also to political instability in the following years. For France, it marked the end of its colonial empire and led to significant political and social changes.

The conflict and its resolution marked a significant moment in the history of decolonization. It demonstrated the challenges of ending colonial rule and the complexities of negotiating independence in the context of a settler colony. The war’s legacy continues to affect Franco–Algerian relations to this day.

Post-independence, Algeria faced numerous challenges, including:

• Political instability and power struggles within the FLN

• Economic difficulties due to the departure of skilled European settlers

• The need to rebuild and develop the country’s infrastructure and economy

For France, the aftermath of the war included:

• The influx of over a million pieds-noirs (European settlers) and harkis (Algerians who had fought for France)

• Political turmoil, including the fall of the Fourth Republic

• A reassessment of France’s role in the world and its relationship with its former colonies

The Algerian War remains a sensitive topic in both countries, with ongoing debates about historical memory, responsibility for war crimes, and the long-term impacts of colonialism and decolonization.

The conflict in Colombia between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) was one of the longest-running insurgencies in the world, lasting over five decades from 1964 to 2016.

The roots of the conflict can be traced back to La Violencia, a ten-year civil war in the 1940s and 1950s. The FARC emerged in 1964 as a Marxist-Leninist peasant force, fighting against inequality and land reform. Over time, the conflict evolved, involving other guerrilla groups, paramilitary organizations, and drug cartels.

Key factors that fueled the conflict included:

• Land inequality and rural poverty

• Political exclusion of left-wing groups

• The drug trade, which became a major source of funding for armed groups

• Weak state presence in rural areas

Throughout the conflict, there were several attempts at peace negotiations, including talks in the 1980s and 1990s. Notable efforts included:

• The 1984 Uribe Accords, which established a ceasefire but ultimately failed

• The 1998–2002 peace process under President Andrés Pastrana, which included a demilitarized zone for the FARC but ended without an agreement

The peace process that led to the 2016 agreement began in 2012 with secret exploratory talks in Havana, Cuba. Formal negotiations began later that year in Oslo, Norway, before moving back to Cuba.

Key features of the peace process included:

• The involvement of international actors, including Cuba and Norway as guarantor countries

• The participation of victims in the negotiations

• A focus on transitional justice and reconciliation

• Public updates on the progress of negotiations

On September 26, 2016, the Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace was signed in Cartagena. However, this agreement was narrowly rejected in a public referendum on October 2, 2016. The parties quickly returned to negotiations and produced a revised agreement, which was signed on November 24, 2016, and ratified by the Colombian Congress.

Key provisions of the agreement included:

• Disarmament and reintegration of FARC combatants

• Political participation for the FARC as a legal political party

• Rural development and land reform

• Transitional justice mechanisms, including a Special Jurisdiction for Peace

• Crop substitution and drug policy reform

• Victim reparations and reconciliation efforts

The conflict resulted in over 450,000 deaths and more than 7 million displaced people. While the peace agreement marked a significant step toward ending one of the world’s longest-running conflicts, Colombia has faced difficulties in fully implementing all aspects of the accord. Challenges include:

• Ongoing violence in some areas from dissident FARC members and other armed groups

• Slow progress on land reform and rural development

• Political polarization over the terms of the agreement

• Threats and killings of social leaders and ex-combatants

Despite these challenges, the Colombian peace process is notable for its innovative approaches to transitional justice and victim participation and negotiating peace with long-standing insurgent groups.

The conflict in South Africa, known as the struggle against apartheid, was a prolonged period of racial segregation and discrimination enforced by the white minority government against the Black majority and other non-white groups. While the roots of racial segregation in South Africa date back to colonial times, the formal system of apartheid was institutionalized in 1948 with the election of the National Party.

Key features of the apartheid system included:

• Racial classification of all South Africans

• Separate living areas and facilities for different racial groups

• Restrictions on movement and employment for non-white South Africans

• Denial of political rights to the Black majority

The conflict intensified following the Sharpeville Massacre in 1960, after which the African National Congress (ANC) and other anti-apartheid groups transitioned to armed resistance. The ANC’s military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), was formed in 1961.

Key events during the struggle included:

• The Rivonia Trial of 1963–1964, which led to the imprisonment of Nelson Mandela and other ANC leaders

• The Soweto Uprising of 1976, sparked by protests against the use of Afrikaans in schools

• The formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983, a broad anti-apartheid coalition

• The State of Emergency in the mid-1980s, marked by increased repression and resistance

The peace process began in the late 1980s, driven by a combination of factors including:

• Increasing international pressure—including sanctions, boycotts, divestment campaigns, and cultural isolation—and internal resistance

• Economic challenges faced by the apartheid regime

• The end of the Cold War, which reduced the government’s fear of communist influence

Key milestones in the peace process included:

• The unbanning of the ANC and other political organizations in February 1990

• The release of Nelson Mandela from prison on February 11, 1990

• The Groote Schuur Minute of May 1990, which paved the way for negotiations

• The National Peace Accord of September 1991, which established structures to address political violence

• The Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) talks in 1991–1992

• The Multi-Party Negotiation Process in 1993, following the breakdown of CODESA

These negotiations led to the Interim Constitution of 1993 and the first democratic elections in 1994, in which all racial groups could participate. Nelson Mandela was elected as the country’s first Black president. Key aspects of the transition included:

• The principle of “sunset clauses” to protect some interests of the white minority

• The establishment of a Government of National Unity

• The creation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to address past human rights abuses

The South African peace process is notable for its emphasis on reconciliation, exemplified by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. It also demonstrates the importance of strong leadership, particularly the roles played by Nelson Mandela and F.W. de Klerk.

The death toll from political violence during apartheid is estimated at about 21,000 people, with the majority of deaths occurring between 1990 and 1994 during the negotiation period.

The peace process ended the apartheid system and established a nonracial democracy in South Africa. However, the country continues to grapple with the long-term effects of apartheid, including economic inequality and social divisions. Post-apartheid, South Africa has faced numerous persistent and new challenges, including economic inequality along racial lines, high unemployment rates, crime and corruption, impacts of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, and land reform issues. Despite these challenges, the South African peace process remains a significant example of a negotiated settlement to a deeply entrenched conflict, demonstrating the possibility of peaceful change even in highly polarized societies.