How can sophisticated negotiation bring about a more peaceful and prosperous Middle East? While a “grand bargain” to accomplish this lofty goal may seem implausible, the potential value of such an agreement would be vast for most Israelis, Palestinians, and key regional players—as well as for many global states. Yet the failure to successfully negotiate it would entail correspondingly huge potential costs for these parties. When the benefits of a deal are high and the costs of no deal are extreme, the underlying basis for a successful negotiation exists—that is, we can envision a collectively beneficial “zone of possible agreement” (ZOPA). The first task of this article is relatively easy: to describe the elements of such a grand bargain—an “Arab-Israeli-Palestinian Peace Initiative (AIPPI),” which should be announced by Saudi Arabia and/or the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The AIPPI would contain a vision of a permanent solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the form of a non-militarized Palestinian state with Israel enjoying normalized relations with moderate Sunni Arab regimes. As a point of departure for negotiating, it would detail the benefits to and obligations of Israelis, Palestinians, and Arab states required to realize this vision, encourage the creation of performance-based milestones toward this end, to be followed by an international conference. The analysis of this article then shows that a ZOPA likely exists among critical stakeholders despite formidable would-be blockers. Yet bringing about the AIPPI requires answering two much harder questions: What are the barriers to realizing it and what is a plausible path to overcome these barriers? Sketching credible answers to these two knotty questions is the main intended contribution of this article.

While social media has had profound effects in many realms, the theory and practice of negotiation have remained relatively untouched by this potent phenomenon. In this article, we survey existing research in this area and develop a broader framework for understanding the wider roles and effects of social media on negotiation. Through a series of detailed case studies, we explore how social media can drive important negotiations either off the rails or toward beneficial outcomes—and how savvy practitioners can harness this often‐neglected factor to their advantage, or else find themselves outmaneuvered by more digitally sophisticated parties. Applying the lens of the “3D negotiation” approach developed by Lax and Sebenius, we describe a number of potentially decisive roles that social media can play to enhance actions by negotiators “at the table,” with respect to deal design, and “away from the table.” In this 3D context, we show how social media can help negotiators learn about their counterparts (interests, perceptions, relationships, and networks), directly and indirectly influence the parties, mobilize supporters, and neutralize potential opponents. We show that being proactive—both in cultivating digital influence or allies and in building resilience to threats across online information ecosystems—can provide critical advantages for negotiators navigating a hyperconnected world. We develop a preliminary framework to help identify the full range of platforms, tools, and methodologies appropriate for the use of social media in negotiations, including network mapping software and open‐source intelligence techniques. Throughout our analysis, we stress the importance of ethical and privacy considerations.

The best alternative to a negotiated agreement (“BATNA”) concept in negotiation has proven to be immensely useful. In tandem with its value in practice, BATNA has become a wildly successful acronym (with more than 14 million Google results). But the initial characterization of this concept in Getting to Yes (Fisher, Ury, and Patton 1991), as well as many later interpretations, can be problematic, limiting, and even misleading in several ways, which this article analyzes and illustrates. First, early characterizations could be easily read to imply that one's BATNA could not itself be a negotiated agreement. Second, and more seriously, common descriptions of one's BATNA as the “best outside option, independent of the other side” needlessly limit its applicability, especially in the many bargaining relationships in which BATNAs are inherently interdependent. Third, BATNAs are often mistakenly described mainly as “last resorts” relevant only in case of impasse or “if the other side is more powerful.” Other uses of the term “BATNA” such as the common question, “How do I negotiate if I have no BATNA?” reflect misconceptions. Although savvy negotiators and analysts generally avoid these pitfalls, the less sophisticated can go astray. This article offers robust correctives to these misimpressions and relates these to three different kinds of “no” in negotiation: a “tactical no,” a “reset no” that permits away‐from‐the‐table moves to favorably alter the underlying setup, and a “final no.”

A long analytic tradition has explored the challenge of productively synchronizing “internal” with “external” negotiations, with a special focus on how each side can best manage internal opposition to agreements negotiated “at the table.” Implicit in much of this work has been the view that each side’s leadership is best positioned to manage its own internal conflicts, often by pressing for deal terms that will overcome internal objections and by effectively “selling” the agreement to key constituencies. Far less frequently have analysts considered how each side can help the other side with its “behind‐the‐table” barriers to successful agreement. Following Robert Putnam’s two‐level games schema, I characterize such “behind‐the‐table” or “Level Two” barriers more broadly, offer several innovative examples of how each side can help the other overcome them, and develop more general advice on doing so most effectively. As a fuller illustration of a Level Two negotiator helping the other side with its formidable behind‐the‐table challenges, I pay special attention to the end‐of‐Cold‐War negotiations over German reunification in which former American Secretary of State James Baker played a key role.

While a great deal of excellent advice exists for producing case studies on managerially relevant topics in general, negotiation cases have distinctive aspects that merit explicit treatment. This article offers tailored advice for producing cases on negotiation and related topics (such as mediation and diplomacy) that are primarily intended for classroom discussion. It describes how to decide whether a negotiation‐related case lead is worth developing and how to choose the perspective and case type most suited to one's objectives. Finally, in by far the longest part of the discussion, it offers ten “nuts and bolts” suggestions for structuring and producing an excellent negotiation case study.

Exemplified by the pioneering work of Howard Raiffa and often expressed in the pages of Negotiation Journal , the emergent prescriptive field of “negotiation analysis” progressively developed from Raiffa's early contributions to game theory and to his later foundational work in statistical decision theory and decision analysis. Drawing from each of these fields but methodologically distinct from them, negotiation analysis has mainly adopted an “asymmetrically prescriptive/descriptive” orientation. It develops the best possible advice for what one or more parties should do conditional on empirically grounded assessment of what the other side(s) actually will do. An extensive negotiation analytic literature has developed, often making the traditional assumption of a well‐specified and fixed situation for analysis. Relaxing this requirement, however, more recent work systematically puts the “setup” of a negotiation itself — its parties, their interests, their no‐deal options, the sequence and process choices or design — into the realm of strategic and tactical choice.

Because compensation and dispute resolution lie at the core of most resettlement proposals, this panel had two main objectives: to get an accurate grasp of the current Israeli approach to these challenges and to glean insights from relevant experiences in other settings. Before reading our panelists’ presentations, one might be forgiven for reasonably thinking that “compensation equals cash” and “dispute resolution equals court.” As our panelists discussed, however, such a straightforward view is simply inadequate to the needs of the resettlement problem — a much richer view of compensation and dispute resolution is required.

At first glance, one might expect great similarities between the approaches of two U.S. third parties, both white male Democrats, who acted during the 1990s to resolve two ethnic and religious-based conflicts in Europe. Yet, although each man achieved a substantial measure of success, at least in the short to medium term, a closer comparison of their approaches along a number of strategic dimensions serves to illustrate dramatic differences in the ways and means of third party actions. This article details such a comparison, and in the process sharpens the existing literature on international mediation and calls into question easy generalizations about the determinants of success by third parties in these kinds of conflicts.

Scholars and practitioners have detailed a number of ways that differences in national culture can affect bargaining behavior: from surface etiquette and protocol to deeper cultural characteristics and to systematic variations in decision making and governance. Such cross‐national analysis can be quite useful but is prone to at least four hazardous fallacies described in this article and illustrated, in some cases, by probabilistic reasoning. Along with suggestions for avoiding them, these fallacies include: (1) “The John Wayne v. Charlie Chan Fallacy” (stereotyping); (2) “The Rosetta Stone Fallacy” (overattribution); (3) The Visual Flight Rules Fallacy (skewed perceptions and information processing); and (4) “St. Augustine's Fallacy” (“When in Rome.”).