Initial random acts can be replicated and evolve into precedents, but precedents can also be built with strategic intent. Regardless of their origin, strategically applying a particular precedent or effectively refuting the relevance of a precedent can help a negotiator control decisions and achieve interdependent goals. The purposeful use of precedents has received little attention in the negotiation literature, even though using precedents can be a powerful negotiating tactic. In this study, we examine how past decisions became precedents that helped establish the Korea–Australia Free Trade Agreement of 2014 (KAFTA). We further consider how precedents established through KAFTA later influenced trade negotiations with Canada, China, India, and Japan. Following an extensive literature review and field research, we developed a two‐dimensional matrix (precedent ownership and negotiator goals) to help guide negotiators both offensively (what I want from you) and defensively (what I don't want to give you). We conclude by proposing research to enhance our understanding of temporal issues in negotiation. No previous study within the negotiation literature has examined precedents empirically.

It is remarkable that precedents and their use have not been well explored within the negotiation literature. In this article, I examine the sparse knowledge of precedents and offer a preliminary framework for understanding the role of precedents in negotiation, including how negotiators establish and apply them. Precedents can either evolve randomly or be created with strategic intent. Understanding precedents generally involves examining how negotiators build, adopt, avoid, and reject them. In this review of the existing literature, I identify twelve concepts and paradigms that are particularly relevant to our understanding of negotiation precedents. I also establish a research agenda and identify three methods for further developing our knowledge of precedents: applying path dependence theory from the field of international relations to a negotiation context; conducting experimental research in a laboratory setting involving subjects engaged in negotiation exercises that contain opportunities to apply precedents; and conducting field research with a focus on case methodology grounded in negotiation linkage theory and theories of negotiation dynamics. Finally, in this article, I formulate a two‐part framework on building and applying precedents, and offer managerial guidance for the negotiation practitioner. Precedents serve as a strategic technique and provide a source of power at that point in a negotiation when decisions are made.

Complex negotiations have been conducted for a long time, although until somewhat recently analysts had yet to conceptualize their fundamental nature, their essential elements, and the relationship between these elements. Over the past forty years, however, scholars have gained increasing understanding of the forces that shape negotiation complexity. In this article, I first review literature that has explored complex negotiations, which is found primarily in negotiation studies, and studies of international negotiation. I then develop a five‐part theoretical framework for analyzing complex negotiations: (1) identification of negotiation architecture, (2) context analysis, (3) process analysis, (4) structural and relational analysis, and (5) decisional analysis. I then demonstrate the utility of this five‐part framework by examining the U.S.–Australia Free Trade negotiations that produced the Australia–U.S. Free Trade Agreement of 2005. Finally, the article closes with some observations on complex negotiations and their analysis.

This article explores negotiation linkage dynamics (how one negotiation influences or determines the process or outcome of another) by examining three bilateral trade treaty negotiations conducted by the governments of Australia, Singapore, and the U.S. from 2000 to 2004. After developing a temporal framework of negotiation linkage, the study examines how one negotiation can influence another negotiation when time is treated as an independent variable and negotiation process and outcome are treated as dependent variables. The study’s findings can be used to help negotiation scholars and practitioners strategically manage the opportunities and challenges inherent in negotiation linkage dynamics. The study concludes with a proposed research agenda and a temporal enhancement of the negotiation paradigm.

“Divide and conquer” is a well‐known expression although the literature on distributive negotiation offers little theory in support of this technique. This article develops theory to explain increases or decreases in unity and disunity among negotiation groups comprising multiple parties in organizational settings. Specifically, this study analyzes the negotiations surrounding the purchase of the Seattle Mariners baseball team in 1992 by a group that included Japanese investors. The study identifies reframing as a technique that can be used strategically to create disunity between cooperating parties on the same side in a negotiation. This article also develops a theory about techniques that can enhance unity between cooperating parties and can protect against disunity that may be generated by the opposition. Dividing and unifying techniques are both components of a larger negotiation theory that seeks to evaluate actions designed to affect the degree of unity between parties working together in distributive settings.