At first glance, one might expect great similarities between the approaches of two U.S. third parties, both white male Democrats, who acted during the 1990s to resolve two ethnic and religious-based conflicts in Europe. Yet, although each man achieved a substantial measure of success, at least in the short to medium term, a closer comparison of their approaches along a number of strategic dimensions serves to illustrate dramatic differences in the ways and means of third party actions. This article details such a comparison, and in the process sharpens the existing literature on international mediation and calls into question easy generalizations about the determinants of success by third parties in these kinds of conflicts.

Drawing on the literatures on negotiation, communication, and persuasion as well as his research on organizational transformation, the author proposes a framework for understanding and enacting the persuasion process in organizations. He lays out key goals of persuasion and ways that skilled leaders can manage the process. The framework focuses attention on the ways leaders shape perceptions of interests and alternatives, as well as how they persuade one‐on‐one and from a distance. He also highlights the importance of gaining acceptance of ough, unpopular decisions, nothing that the way leaders manage the process can have a major impact on outcomes in such situations.

Drawing on the literatures on negotiation and conflict resolution as well as research on international diplomacy, the author proposes a framework for understanding complexity in real‐world negotiations. Rejecting models of the process that are simplistic, sterile, or static, he argues that complexity is inherent in negotiation. In ten propositions, he lays out key dimensions of complexity and ways that skilled negotiators can manage it. The propositions focus attention on the ways negotiators create and claim value, shape perceptions and learn, work within structure and shape the structure, negotiate and mediate, link and de‐link negotiations, create momentum and engineer impasses, and work outside and inside. The author also highlights the importance of organizational learning in negotiation, noting that most negotiators manage multiple negotiations in parallel, and most organizations have many negotiators doing similar things.

Using the recent Wye Memorandum negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians as a case example, the author applies a framework for analyzing momentum‐building processes previously presented in the July 1998 issue of the journal. Focusing on the impact of action‐forcing events, be examines the factors that led the parties to come to the table at Wye and to make the bard choices necessary to reach agreement. The Wye example illustrates that action‐forcing events can both help to build momentum and erect additional barriers to agreement.

Using the negotiations over the future of Northern Ireland and other case examples, the author develops a conceptual framework for analyzing how negotiators seek to build momentum and overcome stalemate. The framework focuses on the choices negotiators face between taking action and waiting in the hope that counterparts will make concessions, exploring the importance of perceptions of time‐related costs and action‐forcing events in shaping decision making. The framework highlights the uneven, nonlinear nature of the flow of negotiation processes from initiation to agreement or breakdown, and focuses on the ways negotiators seek to influence the flow by shaping perceptions of time‐related costs, structuring action‐forcing events, and creating linkages among sets of negotiations.

Using the secret Middle East peace talks in Oslo, Norway as a case example, the authors develop a conceptual framework for analyzing prenegotiation processes in negotiation. The framework focuses on understanding changes in the balance of geopolitical, internal, political, and group psychological forces that lead parties to negotiate. The framework also highlights the importance of “channel factors,” such as the use of unofficial representatives, small‐state sponsorship, co‐mediation, secret diplomacy, and staged agreements. Although developed with reference to the Oslo peace process, the authors believe this framework has broader applicability to the analysis of prenegotiation processes in international and ethnic disputes and other situations of protracted conflict. They conclude with a series of questions for future prenegotiation research.

This article presents a framework for understanding the roles that interested and powerful intervenors play in resolving disputes. Called an intervention role grid, this framework can be used to analyze the dispute resolution functions that third parties can perform. It may also be used to shed light on the difficult choices that confront intervenors with interests and power. The article uses case material from five recent international conflicts to illustrate how the intervention role grid works.

This article analyzes the coalition‐building tactics employed by the Bush administration during the Persian Gulf crisis of 1990–91. To provide a basis for generalization to other situations, we have developed a conceptual framework for understanding sources of power in coalition building. This framework draws upon research in the social psychology of persuasion, mass communications and negotiation analysis. While the actions of the Bush administration during the Persian Gulf crisis provide a “text‐book” case for applying our conceptual framework, we believe that it could be employed much more broadly to analyze the efforts of leaders to effect political and organizational change.