Track Two Diplomacy (Track Two) frequently has contributed to the resolution of protracted, asymmetric, and ethnonational (PAE) conflicts, but exactly how is not fully known. In this article we explore what role, if any, unofficial and informal dialogues across different “tracks” played in different conflicts. We focus on the role of the third party, how the results of Track Two dialogues were “transferred” to their intended audiences, and how the inclusion of civil society actors and broader public opinion affected negotiations and dialogue. To accomplish this, we develop an original typology of roles that Track Two can play—which provides a framework—and present a conceptual tool based on this typology to illustrate multidirectional transfer from Track Two to different recipients.

This article reviews and assesses United States–Iran track two diplomacy over the nuclear issue from 2005 to 2011. It asks why during what should have been a “ripe” moment for discussions, in the first years of the Obama Administration, track two processes were able to contribute so little to any official progress on the issue. The article concludes that the moment was not so ripe, after all, and that officials on each side were less willing to receive the ideas generated by track two than their rhetoric would have indicated.