There are many good reasons for writing negotiation simulations, but designing and preparing simulations that generate desired pedagogical effects is a challenging process. Building on an earlier article in this journal that presented fundamental principles for the design of negotiation simulations, this article offers a practical guide that outlines in detail how negotiation simulations can be structured and what elements they should include. We offer blueprints for creating six types of simulations: short introductory, distributive, integrative, multi‐issue, multiparty, and multiparty multi‐issue. For each type of simulation, we suggest the pedagogical use, discuss the basics of the construction, and present the core elements schematically: parties, decision problem, interests, and options. Finally, we illustrate the different types of negotiation simulations with representative examples.

Much attention has been devoted to the “first offer” in negotiation research. Rightly so, as strong empirical evidence shows that the first offer has a significant impact on the negotiated outcome and, therefore, is a highly relevant topic for negotiation scholars and practitioners. Scholars typically recommend making the first offer. However, in the field, we have observed an alternative opening tactic—asking for the best price that the counterpart is willing to accept. This question represents a real alternative to making the first offer by initiating the discussion of specific settlement proposals, provided the counterpart answers the query. Does it, however, lead the other side to make a better offer? How does the question impact the economic and relational outcomes of the negotiation? Is it advisable to use this tactic in negotiations? We investigated these questions based on a controlled laboratory experiment, in which 227 dyads of cellphone buyers and sellers negotiated synchronously via a text chat. We found that the best‐price question has an impact on not only the first offer but also the negotiation outcome. When the buyers in our experiment asked the question, the results were not significantly different than those from negotiations in which they made the first offer. This effect was driven by the first offer in response to the question. Additionally, we found that the best‐price question did not negatively impact the relational outcome. Moreover, the effect was reduced when list price information was available. These findings suggest rethinking the traditional view of the offer‐counteroffer sequence and provide an alternative opening tactic to making the first offer in the context of high information asymmetry.

Over the last four decades, the field of negotiation has become a fully recognized academic discipline around the world and negotiation courses and competitions have become increasingly popular. Although it is believed that negotiators may be trained and that negotiation is a skill that can be taught and evaluated, the question of how to assess negotiation performance systematically and comprehensively remains largely unanswered. This article proposes a negotiation competency model for evaluating negotiation performance. The model includes a set of selected negotiation competencies together with proficiency levels and their behavioral indicators. Our goal is to help scholars design more effective negotiation courses and fairer negotiation competitions, improve negotiation pedagogy, and train negotiators who are well prepared to handle conflicts in our increasingly complex society.

The last decade has seen the emergence of several new negotiation competitions around the world. We think the two major drivers of this development are a general trend toward the increasing internationalization of higher education and a recognition of the specific benefits of competitions for negotiation pedagogy. These benefits include: the high level of student commitment generated by participation in a competition, which enhances the quality of negotiation; the opportunity that the competitions give students to experience authentic cultural diversity; and the networking opportunities for students and instructors that the competitions create. This article focuses on the role that negotiation competitions can play in negotiation pedagogy. We first present an overview of the currently most important international negotiation competitions. This is followed by an outline of the specific benefits of negotiation competitions for pedagogy. We then take a closer look at the organization and outcome of negotiation competitions and discuss the opportunities for their development and growth.

This article discusses the pedagogical value of using remote role plays in cross‐cultural negotiations between two classes taught simultaneously at different and geographically distant institutions. We argue that remote role‐play simulations provide valuable teaching and learning experiences, and are particularly helpful for managing issues associated with outside‐group negotiation and cultural differences, the prenegotiation stage, electronic negotiations and distorted communication, and one‐shot settings in which the negotiator lacks previous knowledge of the partner. The article begins with a discussion of some critical limitations of “traditional” in‐class role plays, followed by a practical guide to remote role plays and a report of our experiences with them. Finally, we discuss the advantages and disadvantages of remote role plays as a teaching tool for international negotiation classes and the key lessons for the participating students.

In this article, we seek to apply the insights of recent research on routine to the context of repeated negotiations. To demonstrate the link between both concepts, we introduce an analytical framework in which we identify different negotiation situations in which routine can develop. We distinguish two dimensions of the negotiation process: a problem‐solving dimension and a communication dimension. Our framework for analyzing the role of routine in negotiation is built around these two dimensions. We define those skills that we argue in repeated negotiations can help negotiators manage particular kinds of negotiations depending on the level and type of routinization that type of negotiation involves. Moreover, we demonstrate that our framework is inherently dynamic, which we illustrate with simplified business examples.