This article grows out of our experience teaching an advanced course on multiparty negotiation. The main question underlying the course is: “How can experts in two‐party negotiations make themselves effective multiparty negotiators?” In this article, we describe what and how we taught, what we think worked, and what we decided to change after the first year of teaching.

On October 14 and 15, 2004, just days before the Israeli government submitted to the Knesset a draft legislation to authorize the evacuation of Jewish settlers from Gaza Strip and some settlements on the West Bank, a two‐day conference titled “Past, Present, and Future of the Jewish West Bank and Gaza Settlements: The Internal Israeli Conflict” was held at Harvard Law School. The conference was sponsored by the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School, the Saltman Center for Conflict Resolution of the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, and the United States Institute of Peace. This interdisciplinary conference's six panels, whose proceedings are summarized in the series of articles that follow, explored the religious, ideological, psychological, political, legal, and international dimensions of the conflict. Presenters included former and current Israeli and American government officials, experts on resettlement policies and compensation mechanisms, and scholars from a variety of disciplines. While presentation topics covered a range of issues relating to the settlements, three broad themes arose from the conference. First, participants agreed that it is important, if not fundamental, to understand the perspectives of the national religious settlers who are the driving force behind the settlement movement. Exploring the settlers’ diverse interests, fears, and identities is necessary in order to see why relocation is so threatening to them. The Israeli government can lessen opposition to withdrawal by showing the settlers empathy and reassurance, but only if government officials first achieve a true understanding of the settlers’ concerns. Participants also argued that a reframing of the relocation in ideological terms could be another critical component of a solution to this problem. It may be necessary for the leaders of the settlement movement to develop a new narrative or modify the existing one in order to legitimize their relocation. Part of this narrative will involve the concept of “a greater good”— the government must reassure the settlers that their sacrifice is for a higher cause. Several participants noted that Israel needs to show the settlers “tough love.” When the relocations begin, many expect that there will be violence and that disturbing images will be broadcast throughout Israel and around the world. Internal disruption could put the government led by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and his Likud party coalition in jeopardy. The government must not waver in the face of this crisis, conference participants argued. In fact, the threat of violent and disruptive resistance by settlers and their allies can be part of the solution, not just the problem. The government and relocation supporters can use this extremism to justify decisive measures and to redefine the problem for the broader population to convince them that the stability of the country is at stake. Another major conclusion of conference participants was that, while the Israeli settlement issue has unique features, there is much to be learned from comparative analysis. Other countries have dealt with settlement situations, and their experiences offer invaluable lessons. In particular, participants contrasted Israel's settlements in Gaza and the West Bank with French settlements in Algeria and English settlements in Ireland. Some pointed to the French withdrawal from Algeria, which was politically painful but ultimately successful, as an example of “tough love” that Israel should follow. Finally, the involvement of third parties to help solve this conflict is indispensable. Participants noted that while much of Israel feels alienated from the European Union and the United Nations, the Israeli government is highly sensitive to the concerns of the United States, as evidenced by Sharon's decision to show the Gaza withdrawal plan to the U.S. government before he had even raised it with his cabinet and the Israeli parliament, the Knesset. International participation could help legitimize withdrawal and reduce Israeli responsibility for Gaza's future. Third parties can apply political pressure to encourage an accountable and responsible Palestinian leadership. They may also be called upon to provide some sort of financial aid. The participants acknowledged the complexity of the settlement problem and recognized that easy solutions do not exist. Yet, if the Israeli government works toward understanding the settlers’ perspectives, learns from comparative analysis, and involves third parties appropriately, the likelihood of a successful outcome increases greatly.