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Shula Gilad
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Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
Negotiation Journal (2022) 38 (4): 537–572.
Published: 15 December 2022
FIGURES
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This article discusses a bitter land dispute in Israel between a Palestinian municipality and a Jewish municipality, analyzing the game‐changing moves made by local civil society organizations to shift their relationship from adversaries to allies for regional cooperation. The article explores the origins of the conflict between Sakhnin Municipality and the neighboring Misgav Regional Council. We explain their failed attempts to negotiate agreements to end a local dispute that can be described as a microcosm of the Israeli–Palestinian geopolitical conflict. Using Lax and Sebenius's 3‐D Negotiation Framework and William Ury's Third Side concept as lenses, we analyze the strategy and activities employed by civil society actors, who embody a Third Side role and succeed in breaking the stalemate, reaching agreements, and transforming relationships. Through conducting interviews and reviewing media articles, emails, protocols, letters, and other documents in Sakhnin's archives and on official governmental websites, we reconstruct the negotiation process and demonstrate how the Third Side was able to restore relationships, trust, and communication and develop creative options—away from the negotiating table. We suggest that this case can serve as a model to resolve other conflicts, particularly local disputes with power disparities that are intertwined with high politics.
Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
Negotiation Journal (2014) 30 (2): 131–156.
Published: 10 April 2014
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Using the 2005 unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Gaza as a case study, this article exposes an apparent paradox: circumstances may exist in which an outcome that serves the interests of parties to a conflict cannot be achieved through bilateral negotiation but can be achieved by unilateral action. Although the withdrawal was seen at the time as serving the interests of both the Israeli government and the Palestinians, we argue that the same result could not have been achieved through bilateral negotiations. “Behind‐the‐table” internal conflicts on each side would have made it impossible for the leaders to agree on the scope of these negotiations. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's success in implementing his Gaza withdrawal was attributable in significant measure to his ability to maintain ambiguity about his long‐run plans for the West Bank. Only by focusing attention on Gaza was he able to build the necessary coalition to implement the controversial move. The Palestinian leaders, on the other hand, could never have agreed to come to the table to negotiate about Gaza alone — they would have insisted that the scope of any negotiations address a broad range of final status issues. In this article, we identify some of the lessons that the Gaza example teaches regarding the utility and limits of unilateralism as well as the benefits and potential costs of employing ambiguity as a strategy to help accomplish a controversial move. Finally, we also explore the aftermath of the withdrawal and its many missed opportunities for improving the outcome. We suggest that, even when acting unilaterally, leaders should carefully consider the probable impact of their actions on the internal conflicts of their adversaries.