This theory article argues that negotiation is often played as a finite game that consists of a known number of players using an agreed‐upon set of rules (when parties are bargaining in good faith) aimed at achieving a specific outcome. However, activities and events leading up to negotiation can be viewed as an infinite game that has no fixed entities such as personnel, rules, and outcomes. Thus, a critical moment occurs when parties agree to make the transition from some infinite game, like conflict, to the finite game of negotiation. This article explores the conditions leading up to this critical transition and provides two examples of negotiations—one that successfully made the transition and one in which the transition did not occur—to illustrate how these conditions function in actual contexts.

Role is a concept that underlies most studies of human behavior in negotiation as subjects take on the roles of buyers and sellers or labor and management contract bargainers, for example Naturalistic studies also focus on such roles as teacher and administrator contract bargainers, hostage takers and hostage negotiators, Palestinian and Israeli peace negotiators, and husbands and wives in divorce mediations. This article examines these role effects and finds consistent patterns across both experimental and naturalistic contexts. Specifically, a “one‐down effect” emerges when individuals in lower power roles assume more aggressive negotiation strategies that are significantly less effective in achieving desired outcomes. The article concludes by identifying the theoretical frameworks that might explain these role differences.