The concept of bounded ethicality, introduced by Chugh et al. (2005) , complements that of bounded rationality by examining how individuals’ capacity to make ethical decisions is inherently constrained, leading to results systematically contradicting their own ethical standards. A key phenomenon that remains underexplored in this research is the tendency of individuals to underestimate the extent to which their own unethical behavior not only harms others but—more significantly—harms them. This blind spot reflects a form of myopia, as it pertains to the complex and far-reaching consequences of one’s actions. This article aims to specify the nature of this phenomenon, offer preliminary explanations, and discuss its broader implications for ethical decision-making in negotiations. Our argument is grounded in a qualitative, theory-building historical case study: the conflict surrounding the Lex Agraria in the late Roman Republic. We argue that unethical myopia is highly relevant for understanding how short-term gains from unethical actions obscure their long-term detrimental effects, and ultimately, it explains why such behavior is irrational. This insight holds not only for high-stakes negotiations but also for everyday situations in which individuals attempt to outsmart others. We also look at how the discussion on unethicality contributes to the discourse on the neglect of stakeholder interests in negotiations.

While successful peacebuilding efforts require official, top-level negotiations (Track 1), scholars and practitioners agree that facilitating contact and dialogue at the grassroots level is instrumental in reducing prejudice, building trust, and increasing community members’ commitment to peaceful coexistence. However, grassroots-level peace interventions, such as intercommunal training activities and peace education workshops, frequently suffer from the “usual suspects” problem, becoming dominated by people who already are persuaded of the benefits of reconciliation. The problem is widespread in Cyprus, with researchers asserting that the island’s peacebuilding practitioners need to adopt strategies—or “theories of change”—that can engage a broader spectrum of the population. This article explores the usual suspects problem by focusing on a group of practitioners and their engagement strategies. It argues that interventions that conceal their connection to peacebuilding and provide opportunities relating to people’s everyday activities, interests, and livelihoods are more likely to engage individuals who are indifferent to the idea of building peaceful relations.

How can sophisticated negotiation bring about a more peaceful and prosperous Middle East? While a “grand bargain” to accomplish this lofty goal may seem implausible, the potential value of such an agreement would be vast for most Israelis, Palestinians, and key regional players—as well as for many global states. Yet the failure to successfully negotiate it would entail correspondingly huge potential costs for these parties. When the benefits of a deal are high and the costs of no deal are extreme, the underlying basis for a successful negotiation exists—that is, we can envision a collectively beneficial “zone of possible agreement” (ZOPA). The first task of this article is relatively easy: to describe the elements of such a grand bargain—an “Arab-Israeli-Palestinian Peace Initiative (AIPPI),” which should be announced by Saudi Arabia and/or the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The AIPPI would contain a vision of a permanent solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the form of a non-militarized Palestinian state with Israel enjoying normalized relations with moderate Sunni Arab regimes. As a point of departure for negotiating, it would detail the benefits to and obligations of Israelis, Palestinians, and Arab states required to realize this vision, encourage the creation of performance-based milestones toward this end, to be followed by an international conference. The analysis of this article then shows that a ZOPA likely exists among critical stakeholders despite formidable would-be blockers. Yet bringing about the AIPPI requires answering two much harder questions: What are the barriers to realizing it and what is a plausible path to overcome these barriers? Sketching credible answers to these two knotty questions is the main intended contribution of this article.

This article offers a novel framework for conceptualizing conflict-intelligent leadership, which builds on evidence-based practices for constructive conflict resolution but extends and enhances them with new insights and strategies gleaned from complexity science. It argues that the development of conflict intelligence (CIQ) requires a broadening of one’s orientation to conflict across four levels: from a focus on and awareness of the self (implicit beliefs, emotional reactions, and ability to self-regulate), to a focus on social dynamics (interpersonal, intergroup, and moral conflict dynamics), as well as situational dynamics (conflicts in fundamentally different contexts), and ultimately to a focus on the broader systemic forces that may determine and be determined by more entrenched conflicts. The article defines CIQ, outlines the competencies and skills conducive to increasing it at each level, and offers a set of “toolkits,” with links to relevant resources such as online assessments, “just-in-time” apps, and popular articles. The aim of this article is to offer leaders a road map; a common vision, language, and skill set for navigating our often dizzying, contentious new world.