Owners are often blamed when their property causes harm but might not receive corresponding praise when their property does good. This suggests a double standard of ownership, wherein owning property poses risks for moral blame that are not balanced with equal opportunities for credit. We investigated this possibility in three preregistered experiments on 746 US residents. Participants read vignettes where agentic property (e.g., animals, robots) produced bad or good outcomes, and judged whether owners and the property were morally responsible. With bad outcomes, participants assigned owners more blame than property (Experiments 1 and 2) or similar blame (Experiment 3). But with good outcomes, participants consistently assigned owners much less praise relative to their property. The first two experiments also examined if the double standard arises in two other relationships between authorities and subordinates; participants showed the double standard when assessing moral responsibility for parents and children, but not for employers and employees. Together, these findings point to a novel asymmetry in how owners are assigned responsibility.

Developing the ability to accurately infer others’ emotions is crucial for children’s cognitive development. Here, we offer a new theoretical perspective on how children develop this ability. We first review recent work showing that with age, children increasingly use probability to infer emotions. We discuss how these findings do not fit with prominent accounts of how children understand emotions, namely the script account and the theory of mind account. We then outline a theory of how probability allows children to infer others’ emotions. Specifically, we suggest that probability provides children with information about how much weight to put on alternative outcomes, allowing them to infer emotions by comparing outcomes to counterfactual alternatives.

Owners decide what happens to their property, and so adults typically view autonomous beings as non-owned. If children likewise consider autonomy when judging what is owned, this may have implications for how they view themselves. If children believe that parents have power over them, that they themselves lack autonomy, and that only the autonomous cannot be owned, this may lead them to believe that they are owned by their parents. Across three experiments, we found that 4- to 7-year-old children ( N = 206) consistently affirm that children are owned by their parents. In Experiment 1, children judged that children and domesticated animals are owned, but denied this for adults and wild animals. In Experiment 2, children were more likely to see children as owned by their parents than by their teachers, and also denied that children own either kind of adult. Finally, in Experiment 3, children were less likely to view a child who makes decisions against parental authority as owned. These judgments are unlikely to mirror what children have been told. Instead, they likely result from children spontaneously using autonomy principles, and possibly other principles of ownership, in reasoning about the ownership of living entities.