Experiment, Community, and the Constitution of Nature in the Seventeenth Century Unavailable

Recent literature has explored at some length the transition between individual observations and the experimental facts that they are supposed to establish, emphasizing particularly the social dimension of this question. In this article I examine some crucial stages in the history of this problem, in particular, the way in which the establishment of experimental facts became social. I begin with a brief discussion of experimental facthood in late Renaissance thought before turning to Bacon and Descartes and showing the extent to which their conception of experimental facthood is radically individualistic. I then discuss the self-consciously social conception of experimental facthood found in the writings of the early Royal Society. After a digression about some recent issues concerning the rhetoric of scientific experiments in the period, I end with some speculations about why the transition occurred when it did. The transformation in the philosophical view about the role of community in the establishment of experimental facts, I suggest, is closely connected with the emergence of a community entitled to make the judgments necessary to establish such facts.