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Alisa Bokulich
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Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
Perspectives on Science (2014) 22 (4): 464–490.
Published: 01 December 2014
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The Pluto controversy provides fertile new ground to revisit the traditional philosophical problem of natural kinds and scientific change. Here I show that further insight into the Pluto case is gained by drawing out some of the striking analogies with what is termed the “species problem” in the philosophy of biology. I argue that the taxon ‘planet’ can still be considered a natural kind term despite the fact that a) its meaning and extension have changed over time, b) there are multiple scientifically compelling definitions of planet, and c) many of those definitions include historical and/or relational properties.
Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
Perspectives on Science (2008) 16 (1): 103–114.
Published: 01 May 2008
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Although Dirac rarely participated in the interpretational debates over quantum theory, it is traditionally assumed that his views were aligned with Heisenberg and Bohr in the so-called Copenhagen-Göttingen camp. However, an unpublished—and apparently unknown—lecture of Dirac's reveals that this view is mistaken; in the famous debate between Einstein and Bohr, Dirac sided with Einstein. Surprisingly, Dirac believed that quantum mechanics was not complete, that the uncertainty principle would not survive in the future physics, and that a deterministic description of the microworld would be recovered. In this paper I show how we can make sense of this unpublished lecture in the context of Dirac's broader philosophy of quantum mechanics, and how our present understanding of Dirac's philosophical views must be revised.
Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
Perspectives on Science (2001) 9 (3): 285–307.
Published: 01 September 2001
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An examination of two thought experiments in contemporary physics reveals that the same thought experiment can be reanalyzed from the perspective of different and incompatible theories. This fact undermines those accounts of thought experiments that claim their justificatory power comes from their ability to reveal the laws of nature. While thought experiments do play a genuine evaluative role in science, they do so by testing the nonempirical virtues of a theory, such as consistency and explanatory power. I conclude that, while their interpretation presupposes a whole set of background theories and putative laws, thought experiments nonetheless can evolve and be retooled for different theories and ends.