A small but growing body of philosophically informed survey work calls into question whether the value-free ideal is a dominant viewpoint among scientists. However, the survey instruments used in these studies have important limitations. Previous work has also made little headway in developing hypotheses that might predict or explain differing views about the value-free ideal among scientists. In this article, we review previous survey work on this topic, explain limitations of the survey instruments used, describe an improved survey, report results from an initial administration of it that strengthen and refine previous results, and develop two hypotheses that may account for gender effects found in the data. These hypotheses suggest that gender socialization and a greater tendency for female scientists to be aware of sexism in their fields makes them more likely to reject certain aspects of the value-free ideal.

Philosophers of science have recently debated whether second-order uncertainty in climate change forecasts demonstrates the applicability of the argument from inductive risk (AIR) to this case. This paper defends a generalized, normative, and structural interpretation of AIR to address challenges raised in this literature. The interpretation of AIR proposed is generalized by including the possibility that scientists may suspend judgment rather than accept or reject a hypothesis. In addition, it distinguishes between descriptive and normative versions of AIR, and provides reasons for preferring the latter. Finally, it emphasizes advantages of applying AIR at a structural rather than individual level.