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Galileo in Paris
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Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
Perspectives on Science (2004) 12 (2): 131–134.
Published: 01 June 2004
Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
Perspectives on Science (2004) 12 (2): 135–163.
Published: 01 June 2004
Abstract
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Marin Mersenne was central to the new mathematical approach to nature in Paris in the 1630s and 1640s. Intellectually, he was one of the most enthusiastic practitioners of that program, and published a number of inºuential books in those important decades. But Mersenne started his career in a rather different way. In the early 1620s, Mersenne was known in Paris primarily as a writer on religious topics, and a staunch defender of Aristotle against attacks by those who would replace him by a new philosophy. In this essay, I would like to examine Mersenne's changing attitude toward Galileo. In the early 1620s, Mersenne lists Galileo among the innovators in natural philosophy whose views should be rejected. However, by the early 1630s, less than a decade later, Mersenne has become one of Galileo's most ardent supporters. How, then, did Mersenne learn to love Galileo?
Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
Perspectives on Science (2004) 12 (2): 191–211.
Published: 01 June 2004
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This paper investigates the inºuence of Galileo's natural philosophy on the philosophical and methodological doctrines of Thomas Hobbes. In particular, I argue that what Hobbes took away from his encounter with Galileo was the fundamental idea that the world is a mechanical system in which everything can be understood in terms of mathematically-specifiable laws of motion. After tracing the history of Hobbes's encounters with Galilean science (through the “Welbeck group” connected with William Cavendish, earl of Newcastle and the “Mersenne circle” in Paris), I argue that Hobbes's 1655 treatise De Corpore is deeply indebted to Galileo. More specifically, I show that Hobbes's mechanistic theory of mind owes a significant debt to Galileo while his treatment of the geometry of parabolic figures in chapter 16 of De Corpore was taken almost straight out of the account of accelerated motion Two New Sciences
Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
Perspectives on Science (2004) 12 (2): 164–190.
Published: 01 June 2004
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Numerical tables are important objects of study in a range of fields, yet they have been largely ignored by historians of science. This paper contrasts and compares ways in which numerical tables were used by Galileo and Mersenne, especially in the Dialogo and Harmonie Universelle. I argue that Galileo and Mersenne used tables in radically different ways, though rarely to present experimental data. Galileo relied on tables in his work on error theory in day three of the Dialogo and also used them in a very different setting in the last day of the Discorsi. In Mersenne's case they represent an important but so far unrecognized feature of his notion of universal harmony. I conclude by presenting a classification of different ways in which tables were used within the well-defined disciplinary and temporal boundaries of my research. In doing so, however, I provide a useful tool for extending similar investigations to broader domains.
Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
Perspectives on Science (2004) 12 (2): 212–237.
Published: 01 June 2004
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In the concluding pages of his Epistolae duae de motu impresso a motore translato (1642), Pierre Gassendi provides a brief summary of the explanation of the tides found in Galileo's Dialogue over the Two Chief World Systems (1632). A comparison between the two texts reveals, however, that Gassendi surreptitiously modifies Galileo's theory in some crucial points in the vain hope of rendering it more compatible with the observed phenomena. But why did Gassendi not acknowledge his departures from the Galilean model? The present article argues that cautiousness was just one of the reasons that stopped the French priest from turning Galileo's theory into his own theory. He was probably also aware of the fact that Kepler's model of planetary motion, which he endorsed in the Epistolae , could not be reconciled with Galileo's explanation of the tides. In the postumously published Syntagma philosophicum (1658), Gassendi tried to mend this major inconsistency by arguing that Galileo's theory of the tides not only remained valid, but became even more coherent, if one attributed to the Earth an elliptic orbit. But given that in the Syntagma Gassendi officially adhered to the Tychonic system, his effort to reconcile Kepler and Galileo, while already unconvincing by itself, appears completely futile.