Multidimensional Separating Equilibria and Moral Hazard: An Empirical Study of National Football League Contract Negotiations | Citedby Results | The Review of Economics and Statistics | MIT Press

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Multidimensional Separating Equilibria and Moral Hazard: An Empirical Study of National Football League Contract Negotiations

The Review of Economics and Statistics (2003) 85 (3): 760–765.

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