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Alma Cohen
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Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
The Review of Economics and Statistics (2024) 106 (1): 151–166.
Published: 09 January 2024
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We study the circumstances under which public pressure affects judging. We show that crowd pressure biases decisions in favor of the crowd for “subjective decisions” with respect to which the judge has more discretion but not for “objective decisions.” The bias is strengthened after a judge's error against the crowd and when errors are costlier to the crowd. We use data about referees' decisions and errors from the Bundesliga. We exploit three regimes where, due to the introduction of Video Assistance Refereeing (VAR) and COVID-19, both crowd pressure and the likelihood of errors vary.
Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
The Review of Economics and Statistics (2013) 95 (1): 1–20.
Published: 01 March 2013
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Using panel data on over 300,000 Israeli women from 1999 to 2005, we exploit variation in Israel's child subsidy to identify the impact of changes in the price of a marginal child on fertility. We find a positive, statistically significant, and economically meaningful price effect on overall fertility and, consistent with Becker (1960) and Becker and Tomes (1976), a small effect of income on fertility, which is negative at low and positive at high income levels. We also find a price effect on fertility among older women, suggesting that part of the overall effect is due to a reduction in total fertility.
Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
The Review of Economics and Statistics (2012) 94 (2): 419–432.
Published: 01 May 2012
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This paper uses a unique panel data set of an insurer's transactions with repeat customers. Consistent with the asymmetric learning hypothesis that repeated contracting enables sellers to obtain an informational advantage over their rivals, I find that the insurer makes higher profits in transactions with repeat customers who have a good claims history with the insurer, the insurer reduces the price charged to these repeat customers by less than the reduction in expected costs associated with such customers, and repeat customers with bad claim histories are more likely to flee their record by switching to other insurers.
Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
The Review of Economics and Statistics (2005) 87 (2): 197–207.
Published: 01 May 2005
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This paper tests the predictions of adverse-selection models using data from the automobile insurance market. I find that, in contrast to what recent research suggests, the evidence is consistent with the presence of informational asymmetries in this market: new customers choosing higher insurance coverage are associated with more accidents. Consistent with the possibility of policyholders' learning about their risk type, such a coverage-accidents correlation exists only for policyholders with enough years of driving experience. The informational advantage that new customers with driving experience have over the insurer appears to arise in part from customers' underreporting their past claim history: policyholders switching to new insurers are disproportionately ones with a poor claims history, and new customers tend to underreport their past claims history when joining a new insurer.
Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
The Review of Economics and Statistics (2003) 85 (4): 828–843.
Published: 01 November 2003
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This paper investigates the effects of mandatory seat belt laws on driver behavior and traffic fatalities. Using a unique panel data set on seat belt usage in all U.S. jurisdictions, we analyze how such laws, by influencing seat belt use, affect the incidence of traffic fatalities. Allowing for the endogeneity of seat belt usage, we find that such usage decreases overall traffic fatalities. The magnitude of this effect, however, is significantly smaller than the estimate used by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. In addition, we do not find significant support for the compensating-behavior theory, which suggests that seat belt use also has an indirect adverse effect on fatalities by encouraging careless driving. Finally, we identify factors, especially the type of enforcement used, that make seat belt laws more effective in increasing seat belt usage.