We report the results of two laboratory experiments and a representative survey that investigate how default effects are shaped by information asymmetries and strategic incentives. We document that defaults are more informative when the interests of default setters and decision makers are more closely aligned. Decision makers’ propensity to accept defaults depends, both, on the alignment of interests and the quality of their information. In a second experiment, we demonstrate that decision makers are more likely to follow defaults than to accept (equally informative) advice. Complementary evidence from a representative survey underlines that consumers commonly perceive defaults as being set strategically.

We document the individual willingness to act against climate change and study the role of social norms in a large sample of US adults. Individual beliefs about social norms positively predict pro-climate donations, comparable in strength to universal moral values and economic preferences. However, we document systematic misperceptions of social norms. Respondents vastly underestimate the prevalence of climate-friendly behaviors and norms. Correcting these misperceptions in an experiment causally raises individual willingness to act against climate change and individual support for climate policies. The effects are strongest for individuals who are skeptical about the existence and threat of global warming.

We study the effects of defaults on charitable giving in a large-scale field experiment on an online fundraising platform. We exogenously vary default options along two choice dimensions: the charitable donation decision and the “co-donation” decision regarding how much to contribute to supporting the platform. We document a strong effect of defaults on individual behavior but nevertheless find that aggregate donation levels are unaffected by defaults. In contrast, co-donations increase in the default amount. We complement our experimental results with a structural model that investigates whether personalizing defaults based on individuals' donation histories can increase donation revenues.

It has long been hypothesized that individuals' migration propensities depend on their risk attitudes, but the empirical evidence has been limited and indirect. We use newly available data from the German Socio-Economic Panel to measure directly the relationship between migration and risk attitudes. We find that individuals who are more willing to take risks are more likely to migrate. Our estimates are substantial compared to unconditional migration probabilities, as well the effects of conventional determinants of migration, and are robust to controlling for a variety of demographic characteristics. We find no evidence that our results are the result of reverse causality.